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Abstract 
 
Drawing on Deleuze‟s and Deleuze-Guattari‟s differential and schizoanalytic 
frameworks in Difference and repetition and The logic of sense; Anti-Oedipus and A 
thousand plateaus and their engagement with literary texts in Kafka: Toward a minor 
literature; Proust and signs and Masochism: Coldness and cruelty, I unfold the 
following problematic in this thesis: What Deleuze (and Deleuze-Guattari) inspired 
critical practice can be theorized which allows the reading of works that resist 
interpretative representational practices? 
 
Proposing the differential, the libidinal, the schizoanalytic, the symptomatological and 
the simulacral as schizoid processes of discursive dissociation, this thesis theorizes and 
develops such a practice. More specifically I unravel and explore, theoretically and 
practically, the strands of what I term a differential desiring practice. Further I 
demonstrate the usefulness and power of this differential desiring practice, engaging 
first with Duras‟ work as schizoid and liminal processes of event and becoming; and 
second with Carter‟s work as schizoanalytic and parodic processes.  
 
Overall this thesis presents differential desiring practice as a reading and writing 
practice marked by thematic and stylistic schizodicity and discursive dissociation. Such 
a presentation not only opens a new path into a Deleuze inspired literary discourse by 
reappraising Deleuze‟s and Deleuze-Guattari‟s differential and schizoanalytic project, 
but puts forward a productive model for working with recalcitrant literary texts.  
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1 
Introduction 
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                               
Noticing the abundance of literary references in Deleuze and Deleuze-Guattari, the 
questions arise as to their function, strategic placing and impact in their philosophical 
work. Deleuze studies have, for instance, approached this problematic of literary 
discourse from different perspectives and point to Deleuze singling out path-breaking 
Anglo-American writers,
1
 although many other authors also referred to escape such a 
bracketing. Overall, among the discursive strategies deployed by Deleuze and Deleuze-
Guattari in engaging with literary texts, we find that authors and their literary creations 
appear as conceptual personae which clothe philosophical attitudes, for instance, 
Dostoyevski‟s new (pure) idiot (Deleuze and Guattari 1996, pp. 61-2) or the Stammerer 
(p. 69); as aesthetic figures embodying affects and percepts, for instance, Melville‟s 
Ahab or Bartleby (Deleuze and Guattari 1996, pp. 65-6); as novelistic characters, 
Beckett‟s bravely struggling Molloy, Malone and Unnamable, yet also on the stylistic 
level in ritualized quotations.
2
 As such, do these authorial instantiations
3
 and referrals to 
specific works
4
 simply exemplify specific philosophical problems ‒ meaning they can 
be understood as a demonstration of Deleuze‟s and Deleuze-Guattari‟s erudition and 
personal preference ‒ or is there a shared stylistic and discursive attitude across these 
authors or is there some other kind of engagement going on?  
 
The focus for my thesis thus originates in this problematic. Although this literary 
pervasiveness, or Deleuzian literariness, has not of course gone unnoticed in Deleuze 
studies, the problematic of a specific Deleuze inspired literary discourse has not yet 
been approached. Nonetheless, the question of „whether or not we could imagine 
something like a “Deleuzian school of literary theory”‟ (Buchanan and Marks 2000, p. 
8) persists. Given the ubiquity and persistence of their literariness, I therefore contend 
                                                 
1
 For instance, Melville, Fitzgerald, H Miller and DH Lawrence. Cf. Deleuze and Parnet „On the 
superiority of Anglo-American literature‟ (2002, pp. 36-76; 2006, pp. 27-56).  
2
 For instance, Beckett and Artaud. Cf. Deleuze and Guattari (2004a, pp. 2-3, 13-4, passim and 2004a, pp. 
15-6, passim). 
3
 Focusing on Deleuze-Guattari‟s Anti-Oedipus and A thousand plateaus, Deleuze‟s Difference and 
repetition and The logic of sense, such an exemplary core encompasses Artaud, Beckett, Kafka, 
Klossowski, DH Lawrence, H Miller and Proust. There is also a second cluster of writers who persist in 
their literary presence and signature across Deleuze‟s (and Deleuze-Guattari‟s) works, for instance, 
Melville, Blanchot and Joyce; Péguy, Carroll, Fitzgerald; Tournier and Zola; Mallarmé and Borges; 
Kleist, Masoch, Sade, and Woolf. 
4
 For instance, Joyce‟s Finnegans wake, Mallarmé‟s Book [Un coup de dés jamais n‟abolira le hazard, A 
dice throw will never abolish chance], Woolf‟s The waves. 
  
 
 
2 
that the act of reading Deleuze‟s and Deleuze-Guattari‟s works should encompass not 
only the analytic and meaning-making level, but also the stylistic level which sits above 
this. I would further argue that such a doubling of perspective functions as a technique 
of critical distancing, and it is this that leads into the heart of Deleuze-Guattari‟s 
schizoanalytic project (2004a, pp. 301-421).5 This in turn presents a new notion, the 
schizo, and opens the question as to the conditions under which it can be made 
productive. Further, it is in fusing presentation with purpose that the primary 
schizoanalytic demand ‒ the curettage of the personal unconscious6 ‒ can be brought to 
the fore. This would suggest that Deleuze‟s and Deleuze-Guattari‟s style in their 
philosophical works draws its discursive force from its insistent literariness.  
 
Some issues warrant further consideration. Assuming that a Deleuze inspired literary 
discourse is directed at observing the productive and creative unconscious in its 
transition into the textual fabric, then affective (or schizoanalytic) and differential 
                                                 
5 There are different evaluations of schizoanalysis, depending on whether they follow Deleuze-Guattari‟s 
collaborative project (EW Holland, Buchanan) or put the emphasis on Guattari‟s individual writing 
(Genosko, Watson). The original notion is anchored in the concluding 4th part of Anti-Oedipus, 
„Introduction to schizoanalysis‟, where Deleuze-Guattari collaborately draw up a map of how to proceed 
in setting out positive (and negative) tasks of schizoanalysis for the purpose of a revolutionary materialist 
psychiatry. EW Holland develops in his first schizoanalytically oriented study on Baudelaire (1993) two 
modernist models of poetics, a psychopoetics and a sociopoetics in pursuing textual, psychological and 
social decoding. In his second study (2005a), he sets out two complementary pillars, desiring-production 
as internal critique of Oedipus and social-production as external critique of Oedipus, with the intent to 
demonstrate how these constructs support Deleuze-Guattari‟s discursive strategies in Anti-Oedipus and 
their project of a revolutionary materialist psychiatry. Buchanan (2008) understands his text as a sequel to 
Deleuzism: A metacommentary (2000), both of which are anchored in (Jamesonian) dialectic (that is 
discursive) readings. Buchanan‟s Anti-Oedipus reader intends to deliver the „practical Deleuzism‟ (as 
desired in the closing statement of the earlier book). In his close reading of the 4th part of Anti-Oedipus 
(2008, pp. 126-32) Buchanan follows the strategic tasks (one negative and two positive) of schizoanalysis 
in their entangled demand for subjective and social change and deploys the final four theses of Anti-
Oedipus (1st thesis, pp. 375 seq.; 2nd thesis, pp. 377 seq.; 3rd thesis, pp. 390 seq.; 4th thesis, pp. 401 
seq.) for practical readings. In contrast, Guattari‟s later (individual) approach to schizoanalysis differs in 
that he proposes a schizoanalytic meta-modelization with the aim of an analysis of subjectivity (for 
instance, 1989a, pp. 61-7). Cf. Watson (2009a) and Genosko (2002) for the position of this work in 
Guattari‟s writing. Bosteels provides a detailed background of Guattari‟s writing in „From text to 
territory: Felix Guattari‟s cartographies of the unconscious‟ (Kaufman and Heller (eds), 1998, pp. 145-
74). O‟Sullivan explores „Guattari‟s aesthetic paradigm: From the folding of the finite/infinite relation to 
schizoanalytic metamodelisation‟ (Tynan (ed.), special issue, Deleuze and the symptom, 2010, pp. 256-
86). 
6
 Deleuze-Guattari, for instance, state: „Everything is said in these pages from Miller (after quoting from 
H Miller Hamlet, 1939, vol. 1, pp. 124-9): Oedipus (or Hamlet) led to the point of autocritique; the 
expressive forms – myth and tragedy – denounced as conscious beliefs or illusions, nothing more than 
ideas; the necessity of a scouring of the unconscious, schizoanalysis as a curettage of the unconscious; the 
matrical fissure in opposition to the line of castration; the splendid affirmation of the orphan- and 
producer-unconscious; the exaltation of the process as a schizophrenic process of deterritorialization that 
must produce a new earth‟ (Deleuze and Guattari 2004a, pp. 328-9). 
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positions would need to be aligned.
7
 Such an alignment would lead not to a smooth but 
rather a (Deleuzian) inclusive disjunctive synthesis. A further problematic ‒ literary 
hybridity ‒8 is expressed by a Deleuzian tendency to blend philosophical 
conceptualization and literary exemplification. This opens another perspective onto 
Deleuze-Guattari‟s strategic intent, where the literary is wielded as a critical tool in 
pushing speculative ‒ and polemic ‒ boundaries (as demonstrated according to Deleuze 
in Hölderlin, Kleist and Nietzsche).
9
  
 
To explore the literary strategies10 which allow access to their discursive regime, 
Deleuze‟s and Deleuze-Guattari‟s critical models of literary exegesis need to be 
                                                 
7
 Early Deleuze studies (for instance Bogue (1989)) problematize such an alignment of schizoanalytically 
oriented and differential positions while later Deleuze studies, for instance J Williams (2003, 2008) and 
Bogue (2007) are inclined to view them as complementary approaches. 
8
 Such a literary hybridity is for instance demonstrated in The logic of sense where writer Carroll does not 
function as a literary figure, nor as a philosophical persona but as a type of hybrid innovator. Cf. J 
Williams who explores the relations between „Language and event‟ (chapter three, 2008, pp. 28-76) in 
Deleuze‟s The logic of sense, for instance the notions of series and paradox, paradox and nonsense, thus 
opening questions concerning the relativity of meaning and signification while he examines these notions 
as seriation (J Williams‟ term rather than serialization) and phantasm in drawing on the unconscious 
(chapter five: „Thought and the unconscious‟, 2008, pp. 175-201). Deleuze‟s The logic of sense emerges 
in J Williams‟ reading as a groundbreaking literary critique. 
9
 In Difference and repetition, chapter II „Repetition for itself‟ (Deleuze 2004b, pp. 90-163), while 
developing his ideas on the inter-relations between time and fractured I, Deleuze states „that neither 
Fichte nor Hegel is the descendant of Kant – rather, it is Hölderlin, who discovers the emptiness of pure 
time and, in this emptiness, simultaneously the continued diversion of the divine, the prolonged fracture 
of the I and the constitutive passion of the self. Hölderlin saw in this form of time both the essence of 
tragedy and the adventure of Oedipus, as though they were complementary figures of the same death 
instinct‟ (pp. 109-10). Accordingly, in his „Note on the three repetitions‟ (Deleuze 2004b, pp. 114 seq.), 
and referring to Hölderlin‟s commentaries on Sophocles‟s plays Oedipus and Antigone, Deleuze takes 
Hölderlin as master example („showed this with incomparable rigour‟, p. 115). At other instances Deleuze 
reads Hölderlin‟s tragedy The death of Empedocles and Empedocles on the Etna. Cf. „Eighteenth series of 
the three images of philosophers‟ (Deleuze 2004c, pp. 145-52, esp. pp. 146-7) where Hölderlin is credited 
to discover Empedocles before Nietzsche. Deleuze-Guattari, in the first part of Anti-Oedipus, while 
developing their idea of desiring-machines (desiring-production as libido, the Body without Organs as 
numen, the subject and enjoyment as voluptas) take again Hölderlin and Nietzsche as historic exemplars 
of the schizo (and voluptas) (Deleuze and Guattari 2004a, pp. 22-3), following Klossowski (Nietzsche and 
the vicious circle (2005)). In A thousand plateaus, Plateau 15, Deleuze-Guattari state that „Spinoza, 
Hölderlin, Kleist, Nietzsche are the surveyors of such a plane of consistency‟ (Deleuze and Guattari 
2004b, p. 558). 
10
 Cf. for instance Murphy on Beckett (Buchanan and Marks (eds), 2000, pp. 229-50). Literary strategies 
which so far appear in Deleuze studies are: libidinal intensity (Murphy (2000)), threshold-existence and 
infinite becomings (Kaufman, Colebrook, Murphy (in Grosz (ed.) 1999)), linguistic-discursive difficulty 
and intransigence (for instance, Bogue (n.d. [2000], Khalfa (ed.), pp. 114-32, on Kafka). Buydens (2005) 
refers to desertification in the frame of Deleuzian aesthetics; Sauvagnargues (Sasso and Villani (eds), 
2004) and Sauvagnargues (2005) comments on fulguration in Deleuzian art/aesthetics; Gaudlitz takes up 
liminality with regard to Deleuze on Beckett (Tynan (ed.), 2010). 
  
 
 
4 
scrutinized,11 in particular their defiance of interpretation and of representation as 
mimesis. This sets the frame for my research question of whether Deleuze‟s and 
Deleuze-Guattari‟s engagement with an array of literary texts and authors permits the 
development of a schizoanalytically inflected practice of literary critique (as opposed to 
developing another kind of literary analysis or practical criticism). Such a critique 
would be drawn from both Deleuze-Guattari‟s schizoanalytic practice and Deleuze‟s 
own differential practice (itself pushing beyond poststructuralism and deconstruction),12 
and thus from Deleuze‟s and Deleuze-Guattari‟s philosophical and literary-aesthetic 
texts (I consider the essays on Kafka, Proust and Masoch as aesthetic treatises, not 
forms of representational literary essays). It would therefore comprise an enquiry into 
the conditions under which literary texts can be read not only libidinally and affectively 
‒ that is schizoanalytically ‒ but differentially. These strategic moves allow me to 
engage with Deleuze‟s critique of representation, to override the interpretative mode of 
practical criticism and to replace it with a discursive mode of differenciation.13 In other 
words, my intent is to establish an apparatus of literary critique built on a libidinal and 
differential construct, a critical practice which can creatively and productively handle 
texts that resist representational interpretative practices as well as opening a path into a 
Deleuze inspired literary discourse. 
 
My research project thus has two interlinked objectives, namely, to theorize and develop 
principles for a Deleuze inspired literary discourse and to demonstrate the utility of such 
a-representational practice. There are several challenges to be met, for instance to 
decide on the discursive principles and to actualize their instantiations in selected 
literary texts by Duras and Carter. Hitherto evaluation of Duras‟ work has fluctuated 
from it being considered mad and dangerous, „a world of unsettling, infectious ill-
being‟14 to delivering insights of unheard depths,15 an imbalance that needs to be 
                                                 
11
 Such critical models of literary exegesis span a vast canon (cf. the first and second cluster in footnote 
4). I am focusing here on Deleuze-Guattari‟s treatise of Kafka and Deleuze‟s work on Proust, Beckett, 
Masoch, and to a lesser degree Melville.   
12
 In the first instance, Deleuze‟s stance on „structuralism‟ (or rather on „post-structuralism‟ and beyond) 
is of interest, as developed in an article written for Châtelet‟s History of philosophy, cf. „How do we 
recognize structuralism?‟ (2004a, pp. 170-92).  
13
 A discursive mode of differenciation is here understood by contrast to differentiation as the underlying 
„dialectical Idea‟ (Deleuze 2004b, pp. 273-4), the first in the sense of an aesthetic mode, the second as the 
conditioning philosophical-epistemological mode.  
14
 Kristeva‟s essay „The malady of grief: Duras‟ (trans. Roudiez, 1989, pp. 219-59) concludes Black sun, 
a study of depression and melancholia in painting and in literature which also includes essays on Nerval 
and Dostoyevsky. Kristeva presents a severe critique of Duras‟ work here (for instance, The ravishing of 
  
 
 
5 
revisited. Similarly Carter‟s work has been generically characterized as gothic and 
picaresque storytelling, characterizations that also need revisiting.  
 
Having set out my objectives, there are several structural points that need to be made. 
First, one of the challenging aspects of Deleuze‟s and Deleuze-Guattari‟s style of 
presentation lies in their prolific creation of concepts, notions and at times their use of 
extravagant terminology. This is further complicated by their gliding scale of 
signification(s) and their treatment of problems from changing angles which makes 
notions and terms creatively contingent on a specific context. This suggests that 
concepts should be read in the sense of propositions and creative approximations as 
opposed to definitions. Nonetheless, since terms are arguably not definitionally but 
propositionally employed, they can be used as critical means to approach the outer 
edges of problems with the intent of stretching the problematic further (at times beyond 
the existing linguistic and expressive means).  
 
Second, the thesis project progresses in three parts. In the first part of the thesis, 
chapters one to three, I lay the foundation for my enquiry into the possibility of 
developing a Deleuze inspired critical practice that enables the reading of texts resisting 
interpretative representational practices. Here three foundational steps lead from 
considering psychoanalytic subjectivity to discussing schizoanalytic affectivity and then 
proposing libidinal becoming. I start, however, with scrutinizing selected Freudian and 
Lacanian texts relevant for my subsequent discussion of Anti-Oedipus (Deleuze and 
Guattari 2004a) and A thousand plateaus (Deleuze and Guattari 2004b). In chapter one I 
thus prepare the ground for what I term the schizoid weave by focusing on issues which 
tie together psychoanalysis and schizoanalysis. More specifically I engage with Freud 
and Lacan to outline three interrelated problems, namely, subjectivity in alignment with 
sexuality, the Freudian understanding of oedipalization and the rewritten subject 
position in Lacanian theory of desire.  
                                                                                                                                               
Lol V. Stein, The malady of death, The lover, The vice-consul, Destroy, she said), defining her writing as 
„an aesthetic of awkwardness‟ and „noncarthatic literature‟ (trans. Roudiez, 1989, pp. 225-30). 
15
 Lacan recognizes in Duras‟ literary work problematics he deals with in his psychoanalytic practice. For 
instances he views parallels between the double-naming of Lol (V.) and his diagrammatic vel in the 
problematic of subjectivity. Lacan „Hommage fait à Marguerite Duras du Ravissement de Lol V. Stein‟ 
(1965, pp. 7-15). Cf. also for instance, Lacan „The subject and the Other (alienation, aphanisis, etc.)‟ 
(trans. Sheridan, Miller (ed.), 1987, pp. 203-43). Duras and Farges et al. (1987) present a range of 
evaluations of Duras‟ work. Also of interest: Foucault and Cixous „A propos de Marguerite Duras‟ (1975, 
pp. 8-22). 
  
 
 
6 
To set out the schizoid weave in chapter two, I discuss Deleuze-Guattari‟s schizoid 
conceptualizations from Anti-Oedipus and A thousand plateaus. Taking up the issues 
laid out in chapter one, I proceed in two stages: first examining Deleuze-Guattari‟s 
critique of the Freudian unconscious, a critical key to the understanding of what I shall 
term schizodicity; second outlining how Deleuze-Guattari enter into a dialogue with the 
Lacanian unconscious. Here I focus on the notion of desiring-machines and the Body 
without Organs, the schizo and the schizoid, and the extension of these notions in a 
theory of becoming. From this further schizoid principles are extracted which intimate a 
libidinal and larval subjectivity and anoedipal desire, as well as the discursive 
positioning of the schizoid as textual and literary dissociation. 
 
In chapter three I consolidate my insights into Deleuze-Guattari‟s schizoid 
conceptualizations, patterning a schizoid constellation of their individual and 
collaborative understanding of what I shall term schizodicity. The multiple anchor 
points of my strategic construct here are the notion of the schizoanalytic machine in its 
triangulation of unconscious, desire and becoming; the regime of desiring-machine(s) 
and the Body without Organs; assemblage(s) of desire and the notion of abstract 
machine(s). My delineation of the schizoid constellation furthermore draws beyond 
Deleuze-Guattari‟s speculative deliberations on schizoanalysis in Anti-Oedipus and A 
thousand plateaus, widening the circumference of the construct to the literary field. 
Here I consider assemblage(s) of desire in Deleuze-Guattari‟s treatise on Kafka, 
Deleuze‟s exegeses of Proust as well as his work on the literary machines of 
symptomatology as the critical-clinical. In this way the foundation stones are laid for an 
understanding as well as a development of their libidinal theory.    
 
The second part of the thesis comprises chapters four to six. Here my project produces, 
theoretically and practically, the strands of what I term a differential desiring practice. 
In focusing here on Deleuze‟s critique of representation in Difference and repetition 
(Deleuze 2004b) and The logic of sense (Deleuze 2004c) I develop the notion of a 
Deleuze inspired literary discourse and test its propositions in their literary treatises, 
Kafka: Toward a minor literature (Deleuze and Guattari 2006), Proust and signs 
(Deleuze 2000) and Masochism: Coldness and cruelty (Deleuze 2006d), and conclude 
with considering the potential of literary machines. Under the heading of enacting 
desiring practice in chapter four, the hermeneutic frame of my project is repositioned to 
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the differential after having engaged with the schizoanalytic, libidinal and 
symptomatological strands of the notion of schizodicity. Other differential aspects of 
desiring practice such as event, haecceity and becoming are extracted from Deleuze‟s 
work in Difference and repetition and The logic of sense, enabling me to consider 
Deleuzian enactment and actualization as set against traditional representation. 
Additionally this chapter sees the start of a new cycle of consideration that explores the 
stages of becoming as desire in action, the writing process as a process of 
experimentation and the Deleuzian understanding of phantasm and simulacrum. Finally, 
shifting to the processual and differential, I engage with the simulacral and thus 
reposition my project theoretically, setting up in this manner a Deleuzian frame for a 
differential desiring practice.  
 
The concern of chapter five is literary analysis in Deleuze and Deleuze-Guattari as a 
way to test their theoretical premises. I thus re-visit my earlier discussion of their 
treatise on Kafka (chapter three), but now from within the reset hermeneutic frame of 
the differential and the libidinal. Deleuze‟s treatise on Proust is also examined in its 
several evolving instantiations in the hermeneutic frame of the symptomatological and 
the libidinal, and I re-engage with Deleuze‟s treatise on masochism and his 
commentaries on Beckett within the symptomatology of the critical-clinical. In these 
three sections, aspects from my earlier Freudian critique (from chapter two), my 
discussions of Kafka with regard to the process of oedipalization, and Proust and 
Masoch with regard to Deleuze‟s notion of the three libidinal machines (of impulses, 
Eros and Thanatos in Difference and repetition) are taken up and rethought. Thus while 
chapter four concerns the theoretical frame of my project of differential desiring 
practice, chapter five mounts further theoretical parameters for its consolidation, and I 
propose specific schizoid processes of discursive dissociation in each of the sections on 
Kafka, Proust and Masoch. In this way Deleuze‟s and Deleuze-Guattari‟s philosophical 
and literary considerations are complemented with processual and discursive 
parameters. 
 
In chapter six I lay out my theorization of differential desiring practice as it has evolved 
in the preceding chapters. Here some aspects of a literary mode of desiring practice in 
body surfaces and intensities and elements of composition in differential desiring 
practice are considered, such as machine(s) of resonance or desire, transversality and 
  
 
 
8 
serialization. I also propose that desiring-machine(s) and assemblage(s) of desire 
eventuate in a simulacral manner in the shape of phantasm. The chapter concludes with 
a preview of how the processes of becoming and their regimes may be instantiated, 
discursively and textually, in literary works by Duras and Carter.    
 
In the third and final part of the thesis, chapters seven and eight, I demonstrate the 
usefulness and power of differential desiring practice via my engagement with two 
authors whose works, in different ways, would benefit from a reading practice marked 
by thematic and stylistic schizodicity and discursive dissociation. In the first section of 
chapter seven I read several shorter texts by Duras in the frame of desire, memory, 
trauma and death and deploy some discursive principles of differential desiring practice. 
In the second section two longer texts by Duras are considered in the thematic and 
stylistic frame of dissolution and madness and as a demonstration of paradoxes of pure 
becoming. The processes of event and becoming in these texts are exemplified and their 
schizoid core read in terms of the liminal and the delirious. In taking the texts through 
the stages of phantasm, I practise discursively and textually the differential modes of 
desiring practice, the libidinal, symptomatological and simulacral, thus observing the 
formation of Duras-machine(s). 
 
In chapter eight three texts by Carter are explored in the frame of the fluidity of 
gendering as a specific modality of Deleuzian becoming, following the formation of 
desiring-machines and assemblages of desire. The processes of event and becoming, in 
contrast to those in Duras with their schizoid core, are in Carter transgressive, 
experimental and parodic and thus more appropriately defined as having a 
schizoanalytic core. I propose that Carter‟s signature lies in polemic, provocative and 
schizoanalytic politicization which grows out of the deployment of differential 
phantasm. The formation of Carter-machine(s) is read as defying representation in other 
respects than Duras-machine(s). While Duras‟ critique eventuates out of the differential 
and paradoxical, Carter‟s critique is read as growing out of the symptomatological 
milieu which anchors parody. 
 
Finally, in my conclusion, I present metacritical observations which draw on my 
theoretical development of differential desiring practice in the thesis and my practice in 
chapters seven and eight. Deleuze inspired differential desiring practice, as I present it 
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here, eschews representational practices (such as the deployment and foregrounding of 
narrative constructs, and the subjectification of characters) and opens a path into a 
Deleuze inspired literary discourse since it works a-representationally. Differential 
desiring practice as presented in this thesis establishes an integrated approach and 
provides practical critical tools for its enactment while demonstrating its usefulness and 
creativity. It provides an apparatus of literary critique anchored in a libidinal and 
differential construct which can creatively and productively handle texts which resist 
representational interpretative practices. 
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Chapter one: A psychoanalytic weave through Freud and Lacan 
 
The aims of the chapter 
 
In the first part of the thesis, chapters one to three, I present three foundational steps that 
lead me from considering psychoanalytic subjectivity to exploring schizoanalytic 
affectivity and then proposing libidinal becoming. My objectives for this chapter, then, 
are to trace what I term here a psychoanalytic understanding of subjectivity ‒ drawing 
on various points of Freud‟s and Lacan‟s theories ‒ and to inquire into the function of 
language in its linguistic and literary sense as the medium between subjectivity and 
literary text. This sets the frame for my discussion of Deleuze-Guattari‟s Anti-Oedipus 
(Deleuze and Guattari 2004a) and A thousand plateaus (Deleuze and Guattari 2004b) in 
chapter two allowing me to follow their ongoing polemic in these works which takes, as 
I shall propose, the form of a dialogue between psychoanalysis and schizoanalysis in its 
philosophical and literary aspects. 
 
In choosing Freud and Lacan as guides to a psychoanalytic understanding of 
subjectivity, I will demonstrate the specific cut-off points between the two 
psychoanalytic theorists and the inter-relations they each propose between subjectivity 
and language. While my main objective is tracing a psychoanalytic understanding of 
subjectivity, I aim to outline how subjectivity is tied to sexuality, and specifically how 
this problematic is related to the unconscious and the process of oedipalization as 
conceived by Freud and in Lacan‟s re-assessment of Freud‟s ideas. I focus then on three 
interrelated problems, the Freudian hypothesis of subjectivity in alignment with 
sexuality, the Freudian understanding of oedipalization as anchored in a theorized 
unconscious and the rewritten subject position as theorized in the Lacanian theory of 
desire.  
 
Understanding the unconscious and oedipalization 
 
A view of how Freud understands the unconscious can be formed from specific 
characteristics he has drawn from observation in his practice and then theorized. The 
following features of the unconscious, as based on early writings of Freud, can be 
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proposed.
1
 The unconscious presents itself as a free and mobile libidinal energy which 
is established in the primary process.
2
 The unconscious seems indifferent to reality and 
governed by the rule of pleasure and unpleasure which Freud later formulated as the 
dialectic of reality and pleasure principle. Most importantly ‒ with regard to my tracing 
of a psychoanalytic understanding of subjectivity ‒ Freud concludes that: 
 
In summary, the characteristics we can expect to find in the processes belonging to the ucs 
system [unconscious system] are: absence of contradiction, the primary process (mobility of 
investments), timelessness and substitution of psychic reality for external reality (Freud [1915] 
„The unconscious‟, trans. Frankland, 2005, p. 70; original emphases).3 
 
                                                 
1
 These traits are drawn from early Freudian sources which I follow in my discussion in this chapter and 
in the following. I refer to the Strachey translation and an updated translation by Frankland. (1) Freud 
[1915b] „Instincts and their vicissitudes‟ (SE, vol. XIV, pp. 114-40), as „Drives and their fates‟, trans. 
Frankland (2005, pp. 11-31); (2) Freud [1915c] „Repression‟ (SE, vol. XIV, pp. 141-58), trans. Frankland 
(2005, pp. 33-45); (3) Freud [1915d] „The unconscious‟ (SE, vol. XIV, pp. 161-215), trans. Frankland 
(2005, pp. 47-85); (4) Freud [1911a] „Psycho-analytic notes on an autobiographical account of a case of 
paranoia (Dementia paranoides)‟ (SE, vol. XII, pp. 1-83 (the „Schreber case‟ study)). Cf. Laplanche and 
Pontalis (2006, pp. 474-6).   
2
 The (hypothetical) primary process described by Freud refers to the initial repression which grounds the 
core of the unconscious. The following acts of repression („after-pressure‟) attach themselves to this 
initial core. Freud [1915c] „Repression‟ (trans. Frankland, 2005, pp. 33-45; esp. p. 37) which opposes 
primal repression and actual repression. Cf. also Laplanche and Pontalis (2006, pp. 333-4). 
3
 Freud‟s article on „The unconscious‟ starts with a defence (trans. Frankland, 2005, pp. 50-4) of his ideas 
(against contemporary opponents), then presents the topography and dynamics of repression 
(Verdrängung) (trans. Frankland, 2005, pp. 63-8): „When we succeed in describing a psychic process in 
its dynamic, topographical and economic aspects, I propose we call this a metapsychological account‟ 
(trans. Frankland, 2005, p 64). After outlining the special properties of the Ucs system, he identifies its 
sources and practical „proofs‟ (trans. Frankland, 2005, p. 67), namely, hypnosis (trans. Frankland, 2005, 
p. 52), cases of hysteria and neurosis while referring to the case studies of „Little Hans‟ (trans. Frankland, 
2005, pp. 65-6) and „The Ratman‟ (trans. Frankland, 2005, p. 81), dream analysis (trans. Frankland, 2005, 
p. 52, p. 60, p. 83) and „hypochondric organ language‟ (trans. Frankland, 2005, p. 81) in referring to the 
Schreber case. Laplanche-Pontalis state (with a slight difference) that the unconscious exhibits an 
„absence of negation, of doubt and of degrees of certitude‟ (2006, p. 476). Freud had to defend his 
hypotheses during this lifetime and his ideas have repeatedly come under criticism. Althusser for 
instance, sees reason to ask for a return to the Freudian texts (1971, pp. 189-221). He writes in his 
prefatory note: „So a return to Freud today demands: 1. Not only that we reject the ideological layers of 
the reactionary exploitation of Freud as a crude mystification; 2. but also that we avoid the more subtle 
ambiguities of psycho-analytic revisionism, sustained as they are by the prestige of certain more or less 
scientific disciplines; 3. and finally that we commit ourselves to a serious effort of historico-theoretical 
criticism in order to identify and define, in the concepts Freud had to use, the true epistemological relation 
between these concepts and their thought content. Without this triple labour of ideological criticism (1, 2) 
and epistemological elucidation (3), which, in France, has been initiated by Lacan, Freud‟s discovery in 
its specificity will remain beyond our reach (1971, pp. 191-2). Ricoeur in Book II: „Analytic: Reading of 
Freud‟ approaches the epistemological problem of Freudianism. He inquires into the possibility of an 
„energetics without a hermeneutics‟ (1970/1965, pp. 69-86) and then turns to The interpretation of 
dreams as the starting point of Freud‟s system. In a later part of Book II he examines „Eros, Thanatos, 
Ananke‟ (1970/1965, pp. 261-338). In Book III, „Dialectic: A philosophical interpretation of Freud‟ he 
situates Freud as neither adhering to epistemology nor to phenomenology. Of particular interest is the 
chapter „Reflection: An archaeology of the subject‟ (1970/1965, pp. 419-58) where Ricoeur proposes that 
it is the problematic of the subject which has psychoanalysis enter the domain of philosophy. 
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A more refined definition takes account of the evolution of the term which according to 
Laplanche-Pontalis can focus on the adjective „unconscious‟ which is at times used to 
connote all those contents that are not present in the field of consciousness at a given 
moment. This is then a „descriptive‟, not a „topographical‟, sense of the word, for no 
distinction is being made here between the respective contents of the preconscious and 
unconscious systems. 
 
In its „topographical‟ sense, the term „unconscious‟ describes one of the systems defined 
by Freud in the context of his first theory of the psychical apparatus. This system 
comprises the repressed contents which have been denied access to the preconscious-
conscious system by the operation of repression (primal repression plus repression 
proper of „after-pressure‟). The essential characteristics of the unconscious (as a psychic 
system) focus on its „contents‟ as „representatives‟ of the instincts.4 These contents are 
governed by the mechanisms specific to the primary process, especially by 
condensation and displacement (which are regained in dream analysis). In Freud‟s 
understanding instincts seek to re-enter consciousness and resume activity (the „return 
of the repressed‟), but they can only gain access to the system of the preconscious and 
the conscious in compromise-formations after having undergone the distortions of 
censorship. In the second Freudian topography the term „unconscious‟ does not present 
a single agency since not only the id (now standing in for the unconscious) but also 
parts of the ego (standing in for consciousness) and super-ego (an agency of censorship) 
are hypothesized as unconscious. 
 
[W]e need to replace this antithesis [of conscious and unconscious] with a different one ‒ 
namely that between the coherent ego and the repressed element that has been split off from it. 
[…] The implications are even more significant, with respect to our general conception of the 
unconscious. We first corrected our position as a result of considering the dynamic aspect, and a 
second correction necessitated by our insight concerning structure. We now realize that the Ucs 
and the repressed are not conterminous; while it remains correct to say that all of the repressed is 
Ucs, it is not also the case that all of the Ucs is repressed. Part of the ego ‒ God alone knows 
how important a part ‒ may also be Ucs, indeed it is undoubtedly Ucs. And this Ucs component 
of the ego is not latent in a Pcs sense, otherwise it could surely not be activated without 
                                                 
4
 Ucs, Cs and Pcs refer to the Unconscious, the Conscious and the Preconscious. Cf. Freud [1915b] 
„Instincts and their vicissitudes‟ (SE, vol. XIV, pp. 114-40), trans. Frankland, where the corresponding 
essay is titled: „Drives and their fates‟ (2005, pp. 11-31). Strachey, the translator and editor of the 
Standard Edition (SE) of Freud‟s works uses „instincts‟ for Freud‟s terms Trieb (drive) and Instinkt 
(instinct), whereby the first term refers to libidinal drives (and thus sexuality) and the second to biological 
instincts directed at self-preservation. Laplanche-Pontalis follow Strachey‟s use. Cf. Gardner „The 
unconscious‟ (Neu (ed.), 1991, pp. 136-60) and Neu „Freud and perversion‟ (Neu (ed.), 1991, pp. 175-
208) for details on the conceptual shifts. 
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becoming Cs, and it would surely not be so enormously difficult to render it conscious. If we 
thus find ourselves compelled to postulate a third kind of Ucs, i.e. a non-repressed one, then we 
have to admit that „unconsciousness‟ as a category loses some of the significance that it 
otherwise holds for us. It becomes a multivalent quality that allows no scope for the far-reaching 
and definitive conclusions that we would have liked to draw from it (Freud [1923] The ego and 
the id, trans. Reddick, 2003, p. 109; original emphases).
5
 
 
Freud makes a decisive shift in his hypothesis concerning the unconscious. Since the 
Freudian case studies are theorized within the frame of the first (topological) system, 
attention needs to be paid when considering later Freudian texts while drawing on the 
case studies (as Lacan does). 
 
To sum up the definitions so far pursued, it needs to be taken into consideration that 
Freud‟s theorization of the unconscious changes over time. Its original model is 
topological, encompassing the conscious (Cs) and the unconscious (Ucs) systems, then 
enlarged with a third preconscious system (Pcs), while Freud‟s later understanding 
moves to a dynamic model of psychic agencies (the ego, the id, the super-ego) which 
does not completely eclipse the original topology but can be understood as its extension 
or refinement with unsettling consequences. Such shifts in modelling the psychic 
apparatus affect the theorization of the nexus I am concerned with in this chapter, the 
inter-relations of subjectivity, sexuality, the unconscious and the process of 
oedipalization chosen as my focus of their inter-connectedness, in particular the 
hypothesized Oedipus to which I turn now. 
 
I propose that it is the problematic of oedipalization and its anchor, the unconscious, 
which ties subjectivity and sexuality ‒ the two psychoanalytic parameters I foreground 
here ‒ together as if inseparable. Reading the problematic this way implies that at the 
core of Freud‟s conception of subjectivity lies the Oedipus, and that under its aegis 
Freud despairs of understanding women‟s subjectivity and sexuality.6 Lacan‟s 
                                                 
5
 Freud [1923] The ego and the id presents a revised systematization of the unconscious in five parts, 
setting against each other conscious and unconscious, ego and id and introducing the super-ego; it also 
takes up again the discussion of the drives („sexual drives (plural) or Eros and death drive‟; original 
emphasis). Freud‟s introductory note to the essay points out that The ego and the id is an elaboration of 
his thesis in [1920] Beyond the pleasure principle (2003, p. 104). Cf. also Laplanche and Pontalis (2006, 
p. 474). 
6
 Mitchell in the feminist frame of her re-examination of the Freudian legacy, i.e. the interpretation of the 
problematic of repression and the nexus of Oedipus complex and castration complex treats them 
separately (1987, pp. 61-73, pp. 74-91), the castration issue of course being the contentious issue in the 
feminist discussion. Mitchell reviews some feminist positions of her time (1987, pp. 293-355), for 
instance, Beauvoir (1987, pp. 305-18), Friedan (1987, pp. 319-27), Figes (1987, pp. 328-39), Greer (1987, 
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conception of subjectivity ‒ to which I return later ‒ although following (in his early 
stage) Freud, is less focused on oedipalization, however for Lacan there also remains 
the impasse of conceiving of the feminine sexed subject position. (After all, within the 
Lacanian Symbolic order only a phallic jouissance can be theorized – I return to this 
later). To follow the problematic of oedipalization and the unconscious more closely, I 
trace first the issue of the two-fold mechanism of repression (Oedipus and castration), 
then the issue of the Freudian case studies as explorative proof of the problematic of 
oedipalization. Turning to the first issue, with regard to the origin and aetiology of the 
unconscious, and to explain its characteristics (in Freud‟s earlier topological model) and 
its actions (in his later dynamic model), Freud proposes an elaborate two-fold 
mechanism of forces set to work by consciousness. He describes this mechanism of 
repression as Oedipus complex (using the reference to Sophocles‟ plays) and castration 
complex and – tentatively – probes into the complications of related processes. 
 
We now want to gain some insight into the mechanism of the process of repression, and we 
especially want to know if there is just one mechanism of repression, or several, and whether 
perhaps each of the psychoneuroses has its own distinctive mechanism of repression. But this 
investigation runs into complications from the outset. The mechanism of a repression is 
accessible to us only by inference from its effects. If we restrict our observations to its effects on 
the ideational element of the representative, we find, as a rule, that repression creates a substitute 
formation. What, then, is the mechanism of these substitute formations – or are there several 
distinct mechanisms here, too? We also know that repression generates symptoms. Can we 
regard substitute formation and symptom formation as one and the same, and if, on the whole, 
we can, is the mechanism of symptom formation identical to that of repression? Tentatively, we 
can say the likelihood is that the two are very different, and that it is not repression itself that 
creates substitute formation and symptoms, but rather that these latter signify a return of the 
repressed and so owe their existence to very different processes. It would also seem advisable to 
examine the mechanisms of substitute and symptom formation before we tackle those of 
repression (Freud [1915c] „Repression‟, trans. Frankland, 2005, pp. 41-2; original emphases). 
                                                                                                                                               
pp. 340-5), Firestone (1987, pp. 346-50) and Millett (1987, pp. 351-5). In her opinion, the main obstacle 
to comprehension lies in that „they (the above feminists) try to discuss Freud‟s concept of femininity (a 
late study, Freud (1933b)) outside the framework of psychoanalysis that their objections (or even their 
tributes) cannot be made to stand up‟ (1987, p. 304). She comes to the conclusion that their Freudian 
critique (exemplified in her selection) can be traced to the tendency to separate the castration issue, and 
thus the problematic of women and femininity, from the encompassing Freudian problematic of sexuality 
and the unconscious which Mitchell evaluates as the real concerns of psychoanalysis. Separating these 
two parameters by necessity sets the issue of sexual difference into a precarious (and unacceptable she 
argues) position (1987, p. 352). Another criticism is directed at focusing on specific texts such as the later 
Freudian essays which deal less or not at all with psychoanalysis but with social-mythological history and 
cultural inquiry (referring to Civilization and its discontents and Moses and monotheism). Specific 
feminist readings of psychoanalytic topics such as the castration complex (Bronfen, Wright (ed.), 1992a, 
pp. 41-5), the Freudian and Lacanian death drive (Bronfen, Wright (ed.), 1992b, pp. 52-7; Ragland-
Sullivan, Wright (ed.), 1992a, pp. 57-9), Freudian and Lacanian desire (Flower MacCannell, Wright (ed.), 
1992b, pp. 63-8; Ragland-Sullivan, Feldstein and Roof (eds), 1989, pp. 40-64), hysteria (Ragland-
Sullivan, Wright (ed.), 1992b, pp. 163-6), masochism (Ragland-Sullivan, Wright (ed.), pp. 239-42) offer 
an implicit critique which I cannot pursue in detail. See also David-Ménard on hysteria from Freud to 
Lacan (trans. Porter, 1989).         
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Further, according to the Freudian model, the two stages of this process of dissociation 
of consciousness from the unconscious eventuate within the family. A circumscription 
of the (male) Oedipus complex, theorized by Freud as the first stage, has Oedipus stand 
for primary incestuous wishes towards the mother and inimical and even murderous 
intentions towards the father as rival and opponent in the relationship with the mother.
7
 
The second stage, theorized as the castration complex, continues the inter-familial 
struggle in that the threat of castration may take all kinds of form of deprivation (loss of 
genitals, of eyes, and other bodily parts). This results, according to Freud‟s hypothesis, 
in a series of reactions so that incestuous wishes are repressed, the castration fear 
internalized, finally the loss of the mother accepted and the submission to the paternal 
law (in degrees) achieved. In following this line of theorization, then, the Oedipus as a 
struggle to come to terms with libidinal wishes within the family, with sexuality but also 
with societal rules, functions as a turning point within the development of subjectivity 
as tied to sexuality and the unconscious. Castration can be understood as a general 
description of loss (to be redefined by Lacan as lack), as loss of bodily integrity, a 
smaller death. To conclude, then, in Freud‟s hypothesis, the dual process of Oedipus 
and castration, with ensuing repression, combines the libidinal, disallowed forces in an 
enforced act of renunciation, thus creating internalized fear, which reappears in the 
„return of the repressed‟ (Freud [1915c] „Repression‟ (SE, vol. XIV, p. 154), trans. 
Frankland, 2005, p. 42). 
 
I am now turning to the second issue of the Freudian case studies as testing ground of 
the problematic of oedipalization. The question of the Oedipus leads to an enquiry into 
the relations, and specifically the communication, between the unconscious as a 
tabooed, yet very active presence and consciousness, the rational mind. The problem 
                                                 
7
 Ricoeur draws out the conflict between civilization and instincts as the core issue of the Oedipus: „What 
makes the individual secret a universal – and ethical – destiny, if not the involvement in institutions? The 
Oedipus complex is incest dreamed; but “incest is anti-social and civilization consists in a progressive 
renunciation of it” (quoting from Freud‟s drafts). Thus repression, which belongs to the individual‟s 
history of desire, coincides with one of the most formidable cultural institutions, the prohibition of incest. 
The Oedipus situation sets up the great conflict between civilization and the instincts on which Freud will 
repeatedly comment from „“Civilized” sexual morality and modern nervous illness‟ (1908) and Totem 
and taboo (1914b), to Civilization and its discontents (1930) and Why war? (1933). Thus repression and 
culture, intrapsychical institution and social institution, coincide in this paradigmatic case‟ (1970/1965, 
pp. 190-1). Cf. Freud [1908b] „“Civilized” sex morality and modern nervous illness‟ (SE, vol. IX, pp. 
177-204), trans. McLintock (2010, pp. 83-104). Parallel to Ricoeur, Marcuse (1972/1955) and Fromm 
(2006/1962) express their views on Freud‟s problematic of Eros/libido struggling with civilization. In the 
case of Fromm the epistemological critique includes a blend of psychoanalysis and Marxism, for instance 
in Beyond the chains of illusion: My encounter with Freud and Marx; cf. also Fromm (1963) which 
presents an account and an evaluation of Freud‟s impact across many fields. 
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arises how to demonstrate the very existence of a psychic domain, or activity, such as 
the unconscious which is based on the (theorized) process of oedipalization (drawn by 
Freud from his psychoanalytic practice). I propose that here the foundational importance 
of the Freudian case studies comes into play since they can function as an explorative 
proof of problematic oedipalization. The four essential case studies, Schreber, Wolf-
Man, Rat-Man and Little Hans become the corner stone of Freud‟s understanding of the 
unconscious and his system of oedipalization.
8
 The enigma of these cases cannot, in 
Freud‟s understanding, be resolved (or even approached) without further hypothesizing 
the process of oedipalization and its repressive outcome, the unconscious.
9
 The case 
studies describe in detail the process of the analytic cure
10
 of some of Freud‟s disturbed 
patients and then attempt to draw from the sessions theoretical insights by systematizing 
the theorist‟s assumptions and aligning them with previous analytic results. In most 
cases it is the adult patient who is taken back to the past of childhood where the 
disturbances are hypothesized to be anchored and held as unconscious. These 
disturbances take the form of an animal phobia for „Little Hans‟ and obsessional 
neurosis for the „Rat-Man‟ and the „Wolf-Man‟; in the case of Schreber the form of 
paranoia (or psychosis). However, in all cases the disturbing symptoms are traced along 
the lines of the (hypothesized) oedipalization.  
                                                 
8
 The case studies are repeatedly revisited by Freud, and updated, and thus the postscripts and additions 
reflect on the shifts in his hypotheses. Cf. (1) Freud [1911a] „Schreber-Case‟, „Psycho-analytic notes on 
an autobiographical account of a case of paranoia (Dementia paranoides) (SE, vol. XII, pp. 1-83); (2) 
Freud [1909b] „The Rat-Man‟, „Notes upon a case of obsessional neurosis‟ (SE, vol. X, pp. 152-249), 
trans. Adey Huish (2002, pp. 123-202); (3) Freud [1918/14; footnote 1923] „The Wolf-Man‟, „From the 
history of an infantile neurosis‟ (SE, vol. XVII, pp. 1-122), trans. Adey Huish (2002, pp. 203- 320); (4) 
Freud [1909a; Postscript 1922] „Little Hans‟, „Analysis of a phobia in a five-year old boy‟ (SE, vol. X, pp. 
1-150), trans. Adey Huish ( 2002, pp. 1-122). Freud‟s later case studies (of male patients) stand in 
remarkable opposition to his earlier case studies of hysteria (in female patients), for instance the „Dora‟ 
case, where the connection between subjectivity and sexuality is established, but the event of 
oedipalization is (understandably) underplayed. As such it is important to remember that Freud‟s theories 
undergo lifelong revisions and are not to be viewed as monolithic (an instance of this can be found in his 
hypotheses of the unconscious as anchored in early studies of hysteria, as drawn from dream studies, and 
as based in oedipalization). Cf. Freud [1905/01] „Fragment of an analysis of a case of hysteria‟ („Dora‟) 
(SE, vol. VII, pp. 1-122). 
9
 Freud‟s affirmation of the Oedipus as central and decisive takes shape in his discussion with Jung who 
questioned Freud‟s sexual aetiology of neuroses which finalizes the Oedipus. Here Freud establishes a 
network of ideas (speculative though supported by analytic practice) between subjectivity, sexuality, 
neurotic (and thus symptomatic) disturbances and an all-powerful unconscious, with the further extension 
of the decisive event of oedipalization. Cf. Freud [1923] The ego and the id (SE, vol. XIX, pp. 1-66), 
trans. Reddick (2003, pp. 103-49). Jung of course proposes the notion of a collective unconscious which 
cannot be entered into in the frame of my discussion. The Kleinian critique shifts the focus to the pre-
oedipal and the importance of the role of the mother, a position later taken up by Kristeva. Cf. Kristeva 
(2004) and Klein (Mitchell (ed.), 1991).  
10
 Not all cases can be solved; some are too knotted and confused and resist, for enigmatic reasons, a 
solution. A cure is thus not always attained and Freud expresses his own hesitations. Cf. Freud [1937] 
„Analysis terminable and indeterminable‟ (SE, vol. XXIII, pp. 209-53). 
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To appreciate the scope of theorization Freud engaged in, I follow some lines of his 
enquiry. While the analysis of obsessional cases evolves out of Freud‟s direct personal 
contact, the analysis of the phobic case is mediated through written reports by the 
child‟s father, which by necessity throws a different light on how the case is theorized 
by Freud. Since in the case of „Little Hans‟ the father was himself a practising 
psychiatrist, a proximity of insights can be expected, in the case of Schreber however it 
is the patient‟s own (published) descriptions and interpretations which serve Freud as 
documentation for his understanding. In the Schreber case study, Freud takes the written 
autobiographical account of a case of paranoia as the starting point for his theoretical 
findings. It is through these case studies, then, that Freud proposes and theorizes an 
active infantile sexuality located in an unconscious, tied to the process of oedipalization, 
and to which later disturbances can be traced. Such a theory puts the emphasis on the 
developmental aetiology of neuroses, also theoretically affirming Freud‟s understanding 
of the unconscious. I conclude that, viewed in this frame of theorization, subjectivity 
and sexuality are thereby proposed as intricately enmeshed with each other, the Oedipus 
forming the decisively binding element between them and the existence of an 
unconscious being needed to support the theoretical construct. Thus the question of 
oedipalization becomes an essential part of Freud‟s psychoanalytic understanding, 
originating in the early dream studies ‒ to which I return further on ‒ (and studies of 
parapraxes) and then anchored and affirmed in the analysis of the (male) case studies. 
An understanding of the unconscious and oedipalization, then, in Freud‟s perspective, 
allows accessing the complex enmeshing of subjectivity and sexuality, yet also 
highlights the degree of necessary hypothesis to accommodate the observations in 
psychoanalytic practice. 
 
With regard to the second objective of the chapter (beside tracing the psychoanalytic 
understanding of subjectivity), to inquire into the function of language as the medium 
between subjectivity and literary text, the dream sequences in the case studies offer an  
intriguing insight into the linguistic and literary aspects of my argument. These dream 
sequences ‒ which feature as highpoints in all case studies ‒ often become for Freud 
turning points in the analysis and the cure of his patients.
11
 With regard to the Schreber 
                                                 
11
 Cf. Freud [1911c] „Dreams in folklore‟ (Freud and Oppenheim); Freud [1913] „The theme of the three 
caskets‟; Freud [1913] „The occurrence in dreams of material from fairy-tales‟, Papers on technique 
[1911-15/1914].   
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case Freud proposes hallucination-work as paralleling dream-work.
12
 In „Little Hans‟ 
small dream sequences occur as part of a long drawn-out horse (widdler)-father phobia 
described in detail by the father-psychiatrist and handed over to Freud for further 
analysis.
13
 Freud establishes a careful developmental routine to trace the stages of the 
(theorized) oedipalization, its execution, its disturbances and its effects as animal-
phobia. I propose that in this manner Freud draws dream studies as exemplary 
demonstration and (hypothesized) effects of unsuccessful oedipalization in form of 
symptomatic nervous illnesses together in mutual support to refine his understanding of 
the unconscious. In the „Wolf-Man‟ the pivotal dream sequence14 functions as the 
master example of the primal scene, analyzed by Freud as the repressed observation of 
parental intercourse, transferred into the disguise of dream language. Freud‟s 
hypothesizes that the repressed event triggers an unsuccessful oedipalization which 
symptomatically shows up in the later obsessive psychosis. 
 
Two critical points of an epistemological nature arise here. Firstly, the dreams told by 
patients to analysts are remembered, thus most likely blending recall and phantasy 
(however this does not matter for the purposes of theorization of the course of the 
Oedipus). Secondly, these remembered dreams, particularly those in the case studies, 
are expressed in language, thus transferring images, feelings, setting and personal 
involvement into words which can only ever approximate the experienced (or rather 
experienced-as-recalled) event. In Freud‟s hypothesis, such dream sequences allow a 
more direct access to the unconscious than self-directed memories.
15
 Not only do the 
expression and verbalization of the repressed contents of the unconscious lead to a 
freeing of the patient from neurotic symptoms, but at the same time a communication 
between consciousness and unconscious can be demonstrated. This is the point where 
language and the linguistic, and consequently the literary, come into play. Such a 
revival of early experiences and memories, even though they might be (in part) 
                                                 
12
 Cf. Freud [1900/01] The interpretation of dreams (SE, vols IV and V, chapter VI); trans. Underwood, 
chapter six „Dream-work‟ (2006, pp. 293-525); Freud [ 1911a] „Schreber-Case‟, „Psycho-analytic notes 
on an autobiographical account of a case of paranoia (Dementia paranoides‟) (SE, vol. XII, pp. 1-83) and 
(SE, vol. XII, p. 38, Footnote 2). See also Schreber (1988). 
13
 Cf. Freud „Little Hans‟, section I „Introduction‟, trans. Adey Huish (2002, pp. 3-16). 
14
 Cf. Freud „Wolf-Man‟, section IV „The dream and the primal scene‟, trans. Adey Huish (2002, pp. 227-
46). 
15
 This is a decisive point to which I will return, being of special interest for my discussion since it aligns 
the theory of subjectivity with the function of language, and thereby connects the two trajectories of this 
chapter. 
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phantasized or hallucinated, can happen over wide temporal expanses. The conclusion 
can be drawn that the unconscious can be hypothesized as being a-temporal and 
unchanging in nature. 
 
At this point I shall again draw up a summary of the characteristics of Freud‟s 
understanding of the unconscious which will serve as a guide for the progression of my 
argument. The unconscious is a force to be reckoned with as shown in dreams, in the 
treatment of hysteria and neuroses, yet it is elsewhere, i.e. it adheres to rules which do 
not apply to consciousness.
16
 Censorship by consciousness ensures that the unconscious 
can never appear directly, however it makes its entrance indirectly, disguised and in a 
fragmentary manner which can be traced and thus identified. The unconscious works 
with meanings, core representations within an associative network from which it 
charges at consciousness (in dreams) as well as at the body (in symptoms). I conclude 
from this ‒ if I consider these effects as libidinal charges ‒ that they demonstrate that 
the unconscious is a psychic apparatus governed by libidinal energy. The unconscious 
works on an affective basis; it is directed and ruled by pleasure which overrides any 
other ruling; it does not conform to moral obligations. It can reconcile contradictions 
and paradoxical structures without difficulty. In contrast to the logical structure of 
consciousness and its order, the unconscious appears to be primordial, alien, often 
childish but irresistibly forceful (and has its own logic). 
 
The process of oedipalization as hypothesized by Freud, then, affords a more distinct 
summary of the characteristics of the unconscious than in the initial Freudian 
topological model (although it needs to be kept in mind that Freud progressively 
amended his views). The unconscious has to deal with contradiction since the erasure of 
content is impossible. This means that the unconscious (as id, in the later Freudian 
theorization) holds on to libidinal desires, even phantasized incest and patricide, while 
at the same time co-operates with the controlling power of conscience (as super-ego) 
and thus concedes to the prohibition of incest and patricide. The affective charges and 
libidinal energies of the unconscious adhere to a balanced economy, are mobile and 
                                                 
16
 Freud‟s expression (borrowed from Fechner) ein anderer Schauplatz, another stage or scene, intends to 
describe the location of the unconscious (as dream stage, as stage of fantasy). Lacan takes Freud‟s 
expression up, for instance in his paper on psychosis dealing with the Schreber case (Lacan [1955/56a] 
„On a question prior to any possible treatment of psychosis‟, trans. Fink (2006, pp. 445-88; p. 458). 
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recombine at will into new configurations.
17
 The unconscious challenges consciousness 
through its adherence to the pleasure principle and its rules of desire escape rational 
order and law. Through its origin in childhood and its store of early inscriptions the 
unconscious denies any time structure, which causes the „return of the repressed‟ in 
unexpected combinations with no necessary relation to the time of origin. The 
unconscious seeks pleasure, disregards reality, and expresses itself in wishes and 
fantasies. This libidinal immersion is a faint remnant of childhood bliss left behind 
(Freudian „oceanic‟ feeling,18 or Lacanian jouissance to which I return later). 
 
The Freudian dream studies 
 
As already noted, firstly, with regard to the second objective, language as medium 
between subjectivity and literary text, and secondly, with regard to the two critical 
epistemological points (i.e. remembering and expressing dreams) a linguistic and 
literary link between subjectivity, sexuality and expression can be drawn from Freud‟s 
comprehensive dream studies [1900/01] where the principles of the unconscious can be 
specified.
19
 Indeed Freud‟s dream studies formulate his hypothesis of the unconscious 
                                                 
17
 Cf. Freud [1915c] „Repression‟; Freud [1915d] „The unconscious‟; as well as later revised theories in 
Freud [1926] Inhibitions, symptoms and anxiety (SE, vol. XX, pp. 75-176); trans. Reddick (2003, pp. 151-
240). Within the Freudian economical model „affects‟ and „ideas‟ make up the drive (or „instinct‟ in 
Strachey‟s translation). Laplanche-Pontalis read „ideas‟ in the Freudian sense as Vorstellungen (or in the 
Lacanian sense as signifier(s)). „It [affect] connotes any affective state, whether painful or pleasant, 
whether vague or well defined, and whether it is manifested in the form of a massive discharge or in the 
form of a general mood. […] The affect is the qualitative expression of the quantity of instinctual energy 
and of its fluctuations‟ (2006, pp. 13-4). They state that Freud conceives the origin of hysterical symptom 
in a strangulated affective discharge; the traumatic event is not affectively expressed. Affect and idea are 
not necessarily bound and three pathways or mechanisms can be drawn from Freud‟s writings: (1) a 
conversion hysteria which is grounded in the idea of a transformation of affect; (2) the observation of 
obsessions which are theorized as a displacement of affect; and (3) the appearance of anxiety neurosis and 
melancholia where an exchange of affect takes place. It is important to take note of the changes in 
Freudian theorization with regard to the unconscious (and all related notions), in particular with regard to 
the two different (topological and economic or dynamic) models. The quota of affect is understood in the 
above economic model of libidinal theory as an unchanged amount of libidinal energy despite the 
modifications it undergoes (2006, pp. 374-5). 
18
 Freud [1930] Civilization and its discontents (SE, vol. XXI, pp. 59-148); trans. McLintock (2010, pp. 3-
4, p. 10). Freud is referring to his correspondence with Romain Rolland who considered „the oceanic 
feeling‟ a source of religious energy.  
19
 Freud‟s dream studies span across many years and are an integral part of his case studies and thus of his 
hypotheses with regard to the unconscious. Not all studies can be taken into account.Freud [1900/01] The 
interpretation of dreams (SE, vols IV and V, chapter VI); in particular the following sections: (1) chapter 
II „The method of interpreting dreams: An analysis of a specimen dream‟ (SE, vol. IV, pp. 96-121); trans. 
Underwood (2006, pp. 110-35); (2) chapter III „A dream is the fulfilment of a wish‟ (pp. 122-33); trans. 
Underwood (2006, pp. 136-47); (3) chapter IV „Distortion in dreams‟ (pp. 134-6); trans. Underwood 
(2006, pp. 148-76); (4) chapter V „The material and the sources of dreams‟ (pp. 163-276); trans. 
Underwood (2006, pp. 177-292); (5) chapter VI „The dream-work‟ (pp. 277-339); trans. Underwood 
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while his psychoanalytic treatment of patients (cases of female hysteria and in 
cooperation with Breuer)
20
 led up to these studies and the (male) case studies follow and 
confirm his hypotheses. Two Freudian trajectories develop out of this practice, both of 
which are important for my project: how practising analysts approach dream-
interpretation in their analytic treatment and correspondingly critics the literary texts 
under their consideration, and how the writers‟ creativity may be compared to the 
processes hypothesized in the act of dreaming (i.e. the dream work of the unconscious). 
In both cases, the correspondence between analysts and critics and the analogy between 
creativity and dream work, the parallels are anchored in, and supported by Freud‟s 
theory of the unconscious. The Freudian version of psychoanalytic literary criticism not 
only relates to the dream processes of the unconscious but draws its critical principles 
and techniques from these postulated parallels. The active principles of the unconscious 
as operating in the dream work, condensation (or compression; Freud [1900/01] The 
interpretation of dreams; trans. Underwood, Interpreting dreams, 2006, pp. 295-320) 
and displacement (2006, pp. 321-3) are theorized as methods or mechanism by which 
the unconscious handles unacceptable content, thus circumventing censorship of 
consciousness.  
 
The main characteristics of the dream work executed by the unconscious, as theorized 
by Freud, can be inferred from the innocuous, yet often discordant content. The 
meaning or „manifest content‟ of the dream is conveyed in ambiguous images which are 
re-arranged to make up a believable „narrative‟ (2006, pp. 326-64). The dream work 
absolved by the unconscious consists of the use of imagery or visual representations; an 
associative, quasi-logical narrative thread; an elaborate, layered pattern allowing 
multiple readings and weird, absurd or even unreasonable possibilities which are 
intended to circumvent censorship. The twofold epistemological problem previously 
commented upon (in the context of the Freudian case studies) ‒ i.e. firstly that dreams 
                                                                                                                                               
(2006, pp. 292-525); (6) chapter VI „The dream-work cont. (pp. 339-508); trans. Underwood (2006, pp. 
526-637); (7) chapter VII „The psychology of the dream-processes‟ (pp. 509-622). Some later studies 
which elaborate specific traits: Freud [1901] ‟On dreams‟ (SE, vol. V, pp. 629-713); Freud [1907/06] 
Delusions and dreams in Jensen‟s Gradiva (SE, vol. IX, pp. 1-96); Freud [1908a] „Creative writers and 
day-dreaming‟ (SE, vol. IX, pp. 141-54). Freud [1911b] „The handling of dream-interpretation in psycho-
analysis‟ (SE, vol. XII, pp. 89-96); Freud [1911c] „Dreams in folklore‟ (SE, vol. XII, pp. 175-204), in 
Papers on technique [1911-15]. Cf. Hopkins „The interpretation of dreams‟ (Neu (ed.), 1991, pp. 86-135). 
20
 Breuer and Freud treating cases of hysteria (SE, vol. II, pp. 1-182) observed bodily paralysis, loss of 
movement and deterioration of body balance, for instance in the case of Anna O. but successfully „lifted‟ 
the „repressed‟ trauma from the unconscious into consciousness by Anna O. speaking. Cf. specifically 
Freud and Breuer [1893-95a] „Case histories (1) Fräulein Anna O.‟ (Breuer) (SE, vol. II, pp. 21-47). 
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are remembered and may thus blend recall and phantasy, and secondly that dreams (in 
form of images, feelings and situations) are transferred into words ‒ occurs here also 
since the „latent‟ dream content, the original „repressed‟ idea or content, demands to be 
verbalized by the dreamer (or analyst) which becomes the „manifest‟ dream content, 
that is transferred into a potentially readable and understandable representation which 
can be communicated (2006, pp. 148-76).  
 
According to Freud‟s early theory, the dream work effected by the unconscious so as to 
circumvent the censorship of the conscious mind, can be understood in terms of some 
inter-related principles of unconscious functioning: „primary representation‟ selects 
images with regard to their representability; condensation and displacement of content 
and images fuse and shift the selected images, „secondary representation‟ (2006, pp. 
505-25) creates sufficient ambiguity for the imagery to elude the censor. 
 
In the „secondary processing‟ that we have attributed to our fourth dream-shaping factor as it 
moulds dream-content, we find the same activity as is able, uninhibited by other influences, to 
find expression in the creation of day-dreams. We could say straight out, in fact, that our fourth 
factor takes the material it is offered and tries to create something like a day-dream. […] That 
product (a dream) needs above all to be removed from censorship, and to that end dream-work 
uses a shifting of psychical intensities to the point of re-evaluating all psychical values; thoughts 
are to be reflected solely and primarily in the material of visual or acoustic memory-traces, and 
from this requirement there arises, so far as dream-work is concerned, a concern for 
representability, which is meets by means of fresh displacements. The (probable) intention is to 
create greater intensities than are available in the relevant dream-thoughts at night, and it is this 
that the extensive compression undertaken with the components of those dream-thoughts serves 
to promote. Little consideration is paid to the logical relations of the thought-material; they 
eventually find concealed representation in formal properties of the dreams concerned. Affects 
associated with dream-thoughts undergo less important changes than their ideational content. 
Usually, they are suppressed; if preserved, they are detached from the ideas and grouped by 
similarity. Only a portion of the dream-work – namely, reprocessing (of variable extent) by a 
partially aroused waking mind – in fact fits in with the view that the literature seeks to assert in 
respect of the entire activity of dream-formation (Freud [1900/01] The interpretation of dreams; 
trans. Underwood, Interpreting dreams, 2006, p. 509 and p. 523; original emphases). 
 
In interpreting dreams, that is verbalizing and assigning meaning to the dream elements, 
analysts and critics are tracing the desire hidden somewhere in the disguised content and 
imagery. I conclude that Freud‟s hypothesis with regard to the connection between 
unconscious, dream work (the „latent dream‟) and dream interpretation (the „manifest 
dream‟), thus allows the manifest dream to be considered as one possible form of a 
discourse of the unconscious. I propose that literary writing and artistic activity to 
which I turn later can be viewed as following the dream principles of the discourse of 
the unconscious. 
  
 
 
23 
The Lacanian unconscious and desire 
 
I am now turning to Lacan‟s re-assessment of Freud‟s ideas, the Freudian legacy, with 
particular regard to the relations theorized between subjectivity and sexuality and the 
dream language of the unconscious, as re-written by Lacan. I only focus on the 
instances which relate to subjectivity and sexuality and their interlinking. Lacan‟s 
conception of subjectivity – as mentioned – does not prioritize oedipalization, yet the 
impasse of conceiving of the feminine sexed subject position remains a problematic.
21
 I 
propose that the main shift from Freud to Lacan lies in moving from subjectivity and 
sexuality to a functional interest in the relation of desire to language and silence, and 
then, as a consequence, coming back to subjectivity. To follow Lacan‟s The four 
fundamental concepts of psycho-analysis [1964] [The seminar of Jacques Lacan, Book 
XI], trans. Sheridan, 1987) the first pair of Lacanian theses concerns the unconscious 
and its support and establishment in repetition; the second pair focuses on transference 
and its anchor in the drive(s), or topical interest in libido. Viewed in this (early) frame, 
Lacan aims at a systematization of the vast Freudian work as well as moving beyond it 
in postulating the theory of the Other.
22
  
 
At this point I reposition my stance with regard to my objectives, to elaborate what I 
term a psychoanalytic understanding of subjectivity, and my second objective, the 
function of language as the medium between subjectivity and literary text. If it is 
possible to speak of a divided subject in Freudian terms, divided between consciousness 
and the unconscious, to speak of a Lacanian subject is self-defeating. In Lacan‟s 
theorization, the subject reaches a status of integration only ever in mis-recognition in 
                                                 
21
 As mentioned, in the Lacanian Symbolic order only a phallic jouissance can be theorized. Lacan 
revisions the last bastion of a phallic jouissance by postulating the possibility of a supplementary, non-
phallic jouissance as witnessed in the mystical rapture of Bernini‟s St Theresa. Rose comments in her 
„Introduction ‒ II‟ on Lacan‟s choice of Bernini‟s statue of St Theresa of Avila (Rome): „The concept of 
jouissance (what escapes in sexuality) and the concept of signifiance (what shifts within language) are 
inseparable. […] Only when this is seen can we properly locate the tension which runs right through the 
chapters translated here from Lacan‟s Seminar XX, Encore (E), between his critique of the forms of 
mystification latent to the category Woman, and the repeated question as to what her “otherness” might 
be. A tension which can be recognised in the very query “What does a woman want?” on which Freud 
stalled and to which Lacan returned. Cf. Lacan „God and the jouissance of the [„the‟ crossed out] 
Woman‟ (trans. Rose, Rose and Mitchell (eds), 1982, pp. 137-61). 
22
 According to Lacan, the four fundamentals are of psycho-analysis are the drive, repetition, the 
unconscious and transference. Later Lacanian concepts are: libido; the theory of the Other as the 
opposition of „the Other‟ („the Symbolic order‟ or „the Symbolic‟) and „the other‟ („the (small) other‟ 
(object), l‟objet petit a).  
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the mirror-phase and an ensuing repeated self-deception, sustained through a continuous 
(though frustrated) pursuit of desire which effectuates a fragmentary scaffolding of 
„subjectivity‟. Such a posited state of fragmentation of the subject allows other 
considerations to move into the foreground such as the question of the drive(s), libidinal 
structures, repetition, and in particular a focus on the elusive, yet insisting force of 
desire
23
 (which is without wishing to condense the complexity of Lacan‟s papers of 
special interest for my project of a desiring practice). I propose that subjectivity in his 
understanding is conceived as functional only, as a term to be used in connection with 
the Other / other (small object, objet petit a), i.e. the opposition of Symbolic realm 
(culture and society at large) in contrast to material „objects‟ in which it instantiates.24 
The relations between Freudian drive(s), libidinal structures, and the Lacanian notion of 
desire (desire – need – demand) are complex and undergo changes over time. 
  
With the acquisition of language, the speaking-being [le parlêtre] is constituted as a divided 
subject, and a part of his being is alienated in the unconscious that is a product of this very 
division. Fundamentally, the only outlet for the subject‟s desire is for that desire to become 
speech addressed to the other. The subject of desire, identified with the subject of the 
unconscious, is therefore hidden under the mask of the subject of the utterance, to whom this 
speech (what is said) seems to refer, and who can make himself understood by the other to 
whom this speech is addressed only in its enunciation (the act of saying). […] The emergence of 
the subject thus leads to an irreversible intertwining, within him, of desire, language, and the 
unconscious, the structure of which is henceforth organized around the signifying order (Dor, 
part III: „Desire – language – the unconscious‟, chapter twenty: „Need – desire – demand‟, trans. 
Fairfield, Feher Gurevich (ed.), 1997, p. 181; original French insert).  
 
                                                 
23
 Cf. for the question of drive(s): Lacan [1964] „Sexuality in the defiles of the signifier‟ (trans. Sheridan, 
1987, pp. 149-60); „The deconstruction of the drive‟ (pp. 161-73); „The partial drive and its circuit‟: „Die 
ganze Sexualstrebung‟ [‟The totality of the sexual drive‟] (pp. 174-86). Lacan uses the Freudian German 
terms and the French equivalents (Trieb; pulsion).The emphasis is on psychoanalytic techniques as 
appropriate for Lacan‟s interest in psychoanalytic practice and the training of psychoanalysts. Such an 
attempt at a system follows Freud‟s idea of an (incomplete) metapsychology, an attempt to establish an 
epistemology of psychoanalysis. Cf. for the question of libidinal structures: for instance, „From love to 
libido‟ (trans. Sheridan, 1987, pp. 187-200); esp. „The field of the drive: making oneself […] seen, heard, 
sucked, shitted‟ (pp. 194-6). Cf. for the processes of repetition: for instance, „The network of signifiers‟ 
(trans. Sheridan, 1987, pp. 42-52). Cf. for the discussion around desire: „The subversion of the subject 
and the dialectic of desire in the Freudian unconscious‟ (trans. Fink, 2006, pp. 671-702); „Position of the 
unconscious‟  (pp. 703-21); „On Freud‟s Trieb and the psychoanalyst‟s desire‟ (pp. 722-5). Lacan uses 
the Freudian German terms and the French equivalents (Wunsch, Begierde, Lust; désir). Cf. Fink‟s 
examination of the Lacanian subject caught between language (and its effects) and jouissance (as 
expression of desire) (1995). 
24
 The notion of Lacanian desire can be approached from several angles (without offering definitive 
answers). For instance, Baas proposes a reading based on Lacan‟s paper on „Kant with Sade‟: Baas „Le 
désir pur: à propos de “Kant avec Sade” de Lacan‟ (Žižek (ed.), 2003, pp. 34-66). Boothby, in contrast, 
arranges the notion of desire around the objet a: Boothby „Figurations of the objet a‟ (Žižek (ed.), 2003, 
pp. 159-91). Barbaras (2006/1999) and Egginton (2007) position (Lacanian) desire within the 
phenomenological and psychoanalytic frame. In contrast, see Boucher and Sharpe (eds) 2008 for 
commentaries on Žižek and Žižek‟s school of Lacanianism and Žižek (2009) for „cultural Lacanian 
readings‟. 
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However, Lacan‟s decisive expansion of psychoanalytic theory lies in his move into the 
linguistic field
25
 and his establishment of a reciprocal network between fragmented 
subject (hommelette trans. Sheridan, 1987, p. 197), desire as lack, and speech / silence 
as signs of a fleeting subjective presence. This is a discursive shift from a bodily subject 
to an enunciative subject position. (I examine the problematic of Lacan‟s understanding 
of desire as lack separately.) 
 
The speaking subject 
 
I single out two aspects which make up Lacan‟s position on subjectivity, i.e. a subject 
conceived as fragmented and its desire viewed as lack and thus dependent on others as 
against its possible status as speaking subject. These two aspects are not easily 
reconciled and appear paradoxical. To approach this problematic I propose to consider 
Lacan‟s take of oedipalization. The Freudian position of sexual difference guaranteed 
by (hypothesized) oedipalization operates independently from the discourse of the 
unconscious as expressed in the dream work while the Lacanian event of 
„oedipalization‟ takes place as castration in language (and as a condition for entering the 
Symbolic Order, the world of culture and society).
26
 By postulating the inscription of 
sexed subject positions in the unconscious Lacan circumvents the conditioning of sexual 
difference through anatomical, bodily difference, or expectations of defined social 
roles.
27
 Since for Lacan „castration‟ means taking up language, entering discourse and 
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 This move into the linguistic field, that is understanding psychoanalysis in structuralist terms, can be 
followed in the following papers: Lacan [1953] „The function and field of speech and language in 
psychoanalysis‟ (trans. Fink, 2006, pp. 197-268); Lacan [1957] „The instance of the letter in the 
unconscious, or reason since Freud‟ (pp. 412-44).  
26
 A full appreciation of Lacan‟s re-assessment of Freud‟s understanding of oedipalization requires a 
reading of Lacan‟s seminars, for instance, Lacan (trans. Sheridan, 1987, Seminar XI, The four 
fundamental concepts of psychoanalysis), Lacan (trans. Grigg, 2007, Seminar XVII, The other side of 
psychoanalysis) and Lacan (trans. Porter, 2008, Seminar VII, The ethics of psychoanalysis). For an 
interpretative access, cf. Feldstein, Fink and Jaanus ((eds) 1995); Grigg „Beyond the Oedipus complex‟ 
(Clemens and Grigg (eds), 2007, pp. 50-68); Verhaeghe „Enjoyment and impossibility: Lacan‟s revision 
of the Oedipus complex‟ (Clemens and Grigg (eds), 2007, pp. 29-49). Seminar XVII also elaborates 
Lacan‟s ideas on the four discourses (of university, master, hysteric and analyst) depending on the 
processes of subjectification. 
27
 Cf. Feminine sexuality: Jacques Lacan and the école freudienne, for instance: Lacan „God and the 
jouissance of the [„the‟ crossed out] Woman‟ (trans. Rose, Rose and Mitchell (eds), 1987, pp. 137-61). 
See also: „Sexuality in the defiles of the signifier‟ (trans. Sheridan, 1987, pp. 149-60); „The subject and 
the other: Alienation‟ (trans. Sheridan, 1987, pp. 203-15); „Guiding remarks for a convention on female 
sexuality‟ (trans. Fink, 2006, pp. 610-22); „The Freudian unconscious and ours‟ (trans. Sheridan, 1987, 
pp. 17-28). In the essay „Sexuality in the defiles of the signifier„ the term „defiles‟ is ambiguous which 
can be read as (1) a small, narrow path for sexuality to take in the field of the signifiers, or (2) sexuality 
finding itself „sullied or desecrated‟ in the chain of signifiers. Lacan for instance states: that there is „the 
  
 
 
26 
the Symbolic order, language becomes the divider (not the primordial father); becoming 
a speaking subject „castrates‟, takes away early immersion and (phantasized) bodily 
integrity and separates and splits being (existence) and meaning (signification).
28
 The 
subject as speaking subject falls into the chain of signifiers and exists in the ephemeral 
gaps between them. Taken in this wider sense, castration becomes loss, lack, absence, 
and finally the phantasy which can fleetingly fill the gap(s). The speaking subject is thus 
a castrated subject which attempts to master the loss/lack with words/language. 
 
The metaphor of the name-of-the-Father is a foundational process in psychic development for 
more than one reason. Not only does it permit the child‟s emergence as a subject by giving him 
access to the symbolic order (and to the practice of the mother tongue), but it also institutes an 
irreversible psychic division (Spaltung) in that subject. The mechanism of the paternal metaphor 
is based entirely on an effect of a signifier, namely signifying substitution, Strictly speaking, 
therefore, it is the order of signifiers that establishes the subject in his divided structure. This is 
another way of saying that the subject is divided by the very order of language. Since the 
paternal metaphor is also grounded in primal repression, that is, in the advent of the unconscious, 
it follows that the unconscious, as such, is likewise subject to the signifying order. This 
metapsychological organization, which is without a doubt the most crucial argument in favor of 
the thesis of the unconscious structured like a language, needs to be examined in detail with 
regard to its constituting principles and its implications (Dor, trans. Fairfield, Feher Gurevich 
(ed.), 1997, p. 127).
29
 
 
Language and the linguistic (and consequently the literary) become the medium 
between subjectivity and literary text, thus it is appropriate to name the position of this 
fragmented „subject‟ a speaking (or discursive) subject. I read this as the specific 
discursive position which impacts on Lacanian psychoanalytic literary criticism. My 
reading of Lacan‟s re-assessment of Freud concentrates here on the oedipalization of the 
subject (which I discussed in Freud‟s take on subjectivity, i.e. that in Freud‟s 
                                                                                                                                               
affinity between the enigmas of sexuality and the play of the signifier‟ (trans. Rose, Rose and Mitchell 
(eds), 1987, p. 151). Noteworthy is also a duplicity between the subject of the statement and the subject of 
enunciation. The pleasure principle sexualizes, the reality principle de-sexualizes (following here Freud‟s 
contention in Civilization and its discontents and Beyond the pleasure principle. Most importantly, „the 
path of the subject passes between the two walls of the impossible‟ (trans. Rose, Rose and Mitchell (eds), 
1987, p. 167).  
28
 „[Thus] the symbol [here the cotton reel of Freud‟s grandson in the Fort/Da game] manifests itself first 
of all as the murder of the thing, and this death constitutes in the subject the eternalization of his desire‟ 
(Lacan [1953/56] „The function and field of speech and language in psychoanalysis‟, trans. Sheridan 
(1985, pp. 30-113; p. 104), trans. Fink (2006, pp. 197-268) for an alternative translation. 
29
 Dor (1997) points out (in drawing on Laplanche and Pontalis) that ‟[t]he very notion of Spaltung calls 
for several preliminary terminological remarks. As Laplanche and Pontalis (1973) point out, the concept 
of psychic division had already been implicitly formulated in several studies on psychopathology at the 
end of the nineteenth century, especially in the works on hypnosis and hysteria. For it is in the sense of a 
psychic division of the subject that we must understand – to cite only two examples – terms such as 
double consciousness or psychic dissociation as they appear in Breuer‟s and Freud‟s (1893-1995) Studies 
of Hysteria. The notion of psychic division is elaborated by Janet, but above all by Breuer and Freud. 
Later we find it expressed under different names: splitting of consciousness, splitting of the content of 
consciousness, psychic splitting. It is these terms that give substance to the Freudian notion of the 
unconscious‟ (Dor, trans. Fairfield, Feher Gurevich (ed.), p. 127). 
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understanding subjectivity and sexuality are bound to the Oedipus read as repression of 
sexual intents and libidinal wishes).
30
 Lacan‟s intent, then, is to shift away from 
oedipalization.
31
 He reconsiders the repression mechanism, finally relegates the issue of 
subjectivity and foregrounds desire which becomes a decisive theme of his thought. 
With the Oedipus fading into the background, Lacan opens a re-questioning of the 
mechanism of sexuality, tied as it is in Freud‟s understanding to subjectivity, which in 
the end becomes an elusive and tangled problematic. „The reality of the unconscious is 
sexual reality – an untenable truth. At every opportunity, Freud defended his formula, if 
I may say so, with tooth and nail. Why is it an untenable reality?‟ (Lacan [1964] 
„Sexuality in the defiles of the signifier‟, trans. Sheridan, 1987, p. 150). Instead, Lacan 
will propose: „The unconscious [is] structured like a language‟ („The Freudian 
unconscious and ours‟, trans. Sheridan, 1987, p. 20) which has become the signature of 
Lacan‟s (earlier) structuralist position. 
 
Further, since Lacan prioritizes the linguistic approach in his psychoanalytic theory, the 
Freudian interest in such matters as dream language and speech phenomena ‒ 
parapraxes, slips of the tongue, forgetting of names as indicators of a (hypothesized) 
unconscious ‒ also takes a different turn. The process of signification is reframed in 
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 I cannot enter into the discussion of developmental stages which are theorized as encompassing the 
stages of polymorphous perversity, the oral and the anal, the genital; developmental stages which are for 
instance pursued by Klein and Kristeva. 
31
 This shift find its expression, for instance, in Lacan‟s later seminars as collected in The other side of 
psychoanalysis [1969-70] where Lacan presents the „four discourses‟ (of the university, the master, the 
hysteric and the analyst) (trans. Grigg, 2007, pp. 9-26), elaborates his notion of jouissance and sets out his 
thesis of „Beyond the Oedipus complex‟ (trans. Grigg, 2007, pp. 99-142). He concludes section VII 
„Oedipus and Moses and the father of the horde‟ (pp. 102-17), after having commented on Totem and 
taboo and Moses and monotheism with the following (critical) words: „It is not possible seriously to 
examine the Freudian reference without bringing in the dimension of truth to bear, along with murder and 
jouissance. […] That‟s where I can leave you today. […] It‟s simply that, seeing how Freud articulates 
this fundamental myth, it is clear that it is truly incorrect to put everything in the same basket as Oedipus. 
What in God‟s name, so to speak, does Moses have to do with Oedipus and the father of the primal 
horde? There really must be something there that stems from the manifest content and the latent content. 
[…] To finish up for today, I would say that what we propose is to analyze the Oedipus complex a being 
Freud‟s dream‟ (p. 117). Lacan refers to Freud [1914b], Totem and taboo (SE, XIII, pp. 1-161); Freud 
[1939] Moses and monotheism and with „manifest content and latent content‟ to The interpretation of 
dreams. Lacan also comments on the notion of „The castrated master‟: „unusable Oedipus‟ (pp. 85-140, 
esp. pp. 87-101). See also for a reading of this chapter: Grigg „Beyond the Oedipus complex‟ (Clemens 
and Grigg (eds), 2007, pp. 50-68) who he insists on the importance of the Oedipus complex for Lacan 
(see the start of his essay, p. 50); Verhaeghe „Enjoyment and impossibility: Lacan‟s revision of the 
Oedipus complex‟ (Clemens and Grigg (eds), 2007, pp. 29-49). For a discussion of Lacan‟s four 
discourses, see Grigg „Discourse‟ (Glowinski et al., 2001, pp. 61-70). The discourses are established in 
the metamorphoses of the divided, split subject of Freudian unconscious, the split brought about by 
language, the signifier. The modifications of the discourses follow repression (Verdrängung) leading to 
neurosis, foreclosure (Verwerfung) in psychosis and disavowal (Verleugnung) in perversion (Grigg, 
Glowinski et al., 2001, p. 64). 
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structuralist terms, foregrounded and becomes tied to a rethinking of the mechanics of 
desire and how this relates to subjectivity. The process of meaning-making also 
becomes enmeshed with sexuality, or rather the process of sexuation, to adopt a 
Lacanian phrasing. Lacan‟s structuralist argument32 is as follows (and this impacts not 
only on the psychoanalytic practice but also on the reading of literary texts): Signifier 
and signified, theorized as the two linguistic components of any sign, are separated and 
pulled apart, as Lacan theorizes a perpetual displacement of the signifier, a double-
sliding. The excess of floating signifiers without any allotted signifieds makes it 
possible to evoke existing absence, or in Lacan‟s terms, imaginary existence (such as 
the missing book on the shelf against the expectation of finding it there), thus allowing 
for phantasy as constructive absence. Overall, then, Lacan‟s position on the speaking (or 
discursive) subject (which is a linguistically „castrated‟ subject) stands in contrast to an 
oedipalized (sexualized) subject of Freudian understanding. Since Lacan distances 
himself from oedipalization (which I proposed earlier as the binding element in Freud‟s 
understanding between subjectivity and sexuality), the theorization of subjectivity and 
sexuality takes a different trajectory. A fragmented subject, a more complex process of 
sexuation, an unconscious as a system of shifting signifiers/signifieds constitute the 
Lacanian understanding, thus re-writing the Freudian hypotheses here under my 
consideration. With regard to my main objective of tracing a psychoanalytic 
understanding of subjectivity, here then I find a specific cut-off point between the two 
psychoanalytic theorists and their different position with respect to the relation each of 
them propose between subjectivity and language. For Freud subjectivity is tied to 
sexuality, for Lacan the rewritten subject position becomes an integral part of his theory 
of desire. 
 
For the purposes of my project I propose to read Lacan‟s structuralist argument as 
paradoxical since it incorporates mutually exclusive opposites without solving the 
                                                 
32
 To follow Lacan‟s line of argumentation, cf. Lacan „Sexuality in the defiles of the signifier‟ (trans. 
Sheridan, 1987, pp. 149-60) which is an early (that is structuralist) definition of the Freudian problematic, 
however it sets out Lacan‟s main positions. See also Dor, Feher Gurevich (ed.), 1997). Three phases can 
be discriminated in Lacan‟s writings, according to Ragland-Sullivan (1986, 1989, 1992a, b, c), namely: 
(1) early 1950s with an emphasis on „speech‟ and oriented towards phenomenology; (2) late 1950s with a 
shift to „language‟ and oriented towards structuralism; and (3) 1960s with an emphasis on loss and lack, 
jouissance and fantasy. The proposition of three stages can be supported by an analysis of the following  
papers: (1) „The function and field of speech and language in psychoanalysis‟ (trans. Fink, 2006, pp. 197-
268); (2) „The instance of the letter in the unconscious, or reason since Freud‟ (trans. Fink, 2006, pp. 412-
41); (3) „Position of the unconscious‟ (trans. Fink, 2006, pp. 703-21); „The subversion of the subject and 
the dialectic of desire in the Freudian unconscious‟ (trans. Fink, 2006,  pp. 671-702). 
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ambiguity, or needing to do so. Lacan‟s paradox can be read as evoking the Imaginary 
realm ‒ an approximate equivalent of the Freudian unconscious although with the 
distinct difference that it is personalized ‒ as against Freud‟s proposition of an 
impersonal unconscious. Lacan theorizes a perpetual displacement of the signifier, a 
double-sliding. 
 
Whence we can say that it is in the chain of the signifier that meaning insists, but that none of the 
chain‟s elements consists in the signification it can provide at that very moment. […] The notion 
of an incessant sliding of the signified under the signifier thus comes to the fore – which 
Ferdinand de Saussure illustrates with an image resembling the wavy lines of the upper and 
lower Waters in miniatures from manuscripts of Genesis. It is a twofold flood in which the 
landmarks – fine streaks of rain traced by vertical dotted lines that supposedly delimit 
corresponding segments – seem insubstantial. […] All our experience runs counter to this, which 
made me speak at one point in my seminar on the psychoses of the “button ties” [points de 
capiton] required by this schema to account for the dominance of the letter in the dramatic 
transformation that dialogue can effect in the subject (Lacan [1957] „The instance of the letter in 
the unconscious, or reason since Freud‟, trans. Fink, 2006, p. 419).33 
 
Some signifiers, however, which are caught in the Symbolic realm (the world of 
culture) obtain a degree of realized and persistent signification. Lacan‟s paradox, then, 
is situated between these two realms without finding a place for negotiation. It is 
aligned with both excess (of floating signifiers) and lack (of determinable signifieds). 
 
In this manner consciousness deals with imaginary existence (while noticing the 
existing absence) and draws on its (as yet not produced) powers which allow for 
creativity, engendered by libidinal forces. Lacan aims at this in-between, the before 
speech, that is before any signified is allotted, when he proposes to theorize the 
unconscious in linguistic terms; however he relies on the possibility of a fusion, or 
connection, of signifier and signified (if in a preliminary manner). As a structuralist 
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 Lacan‟s essay proceeds in three stages: I. The meaning of the letter, II. The letter in the unconscious, 
III. The letter, being, and the other. The second section takes Freud‟s Interpretation of dreams to 
exemplify what Lacan calls „the letter of discourse, in its texture, uses, and immanence in the matter in 
question‟ (i.e. that the unconscious is structured like a language) (trans Fink, 2006, p. 424). „The 
linguistic structure that enables us to read dreams is at the crux of the “signifierness of dreams”, at the 
crux of the Traumdeutung (dream analysis)‟ (trans Fink, 2006, p. 424). Lacan elaborates Freud‟s four 
principles of dreamwork: (1) Entstellung (transposition, or rather distortion), (2) Verdichting 
(condensation), (3) Verschiebung (displacement), and (4) Rücksicht auf Darstellbarkeit (consideration of 
the means of staging or, the translation by the “role of the possibility of representation”). These notions 
are later part of Lacan‟s rewriting of the unconscious and desire (as well as the processes of 
subjectivation). The first „reshaping‟ of „content„ (point (1)) is followed by a second „reshaping‟ (point 
(4)) to evade the censorship of consciousness. The „staging‟ or „possibility of representation‟ refers to the 
process of reconnecting with memory or experienced matter and is thus governed by a „personal 
language‟ (trans Fink, 2006, pp. 424-8). 
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thinker (at least in the earlier part of his thought), Lacan works in terms of mathemes 
and oppositional models and understands structure (of signifier and signified) as purely 
combinatory, that is open-ended and arbitrarily defined, and as a relational system.  
 
A relational theory of intersubjectivity 
  
At this point of tracing a psychoanalytic understanding of subjectivity, some questions 
need to be raised. If subjectivity, according to Lacan, is caught in the net of desire 
which follows the continuous drift of floating signifiers, and the relation of sexuality 
and the unconscious is declared untenable, what is left of the Freudian legacy in Lacan‟s 
re-assessment? Lacan might as well theorize the unconscious as a topological space, a 
locus with shifting allegiances that is sited but endlessly defined relationally and 
differentially. With some effort, these ever-changing connections of signifiers and 
signifieds can be viewed as evolving out of the Freudian concepts of condensation and 
displacement, or metaphor and metonymy/synecdoche respectively in literary terms. 
However, the continual differences between the signifiers and signifieds Lacan 
proposes, and their shifting allegiances, interfere with any reliable fixity of the subject 
whose status becomes precarious and whose identity cannot be guaranteed. Rather I 
propose that an intersubjective space must be conceived where the relations between 
changeable identities or subjects defines their status of response (i.e. one side of the 
relation may expect a response which the other side of the relation does not deliver, thus 
expectation stands against eventuation). This relational theory of intersubjectivity is 
demonstrated in Lacan‟s „Seminar on “The purloined letter”‟ (trans. Fink, 2006, pp. 6-
48)
34
 where it is never certain whether the imaginary letter (as phantasized by the 
persons), the real letter (as initially existing and obviously circulating and being hidden 
somewhere) and the symbolic letter (as the absent and nevertheless existing letter but 
only present in the shared experience of all persons) exist or are imagined to exist.  
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 Cf. Lacan [1956; 1966] „Seminar on “The purloined letter”‟ (trans. Fink, 2006, pp. 6-48; Translator‟s 
endnotes, pp. 767-72); Poe “The purloined letter” (Thompson (ed.), 2004, pp. 430-51). Lacan‟s seminar 
sparked off a wide discussion. Cf. for instance, Mehlman on Lacan‟s „floating signifier‟ in its diverse 
structuralist positions (1972, pp. 10-37); Muller and Richardson on Lacan and Derrida within the field of 
a psychoanalytic reading inspited by Poe‟s text ((eds) 1988). Of interest is also the initial elaboration of 
the „letter‟ (in its ambiguous reading) by Nancy and Lacoue-Labarthe (1992/1973) and by Leclaire 
(1998/1968); cf. Leclaire „Extracts from Psychoanalyzing: On the order of the unconscious and the 
practice of the “letter”‟ (trans. Kamuf, Žižek (ed.), 2003, pp. 163-89). 
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The discursive splitting of „the letter‟ into the imaginary, symbolic and real letter relies 
on Lacan‟s model of interrelated realms (the Imaginary, the Symbolic and the Real), 
and the uncertainty of the placing of the letter demonstrates the network of power 
relations (as presented in Poe‟s text and by inference between people) and thus of desire 
in Lacan‟s understanding. Such a relational model highlights the process of shifting 
allegiances between „partial‟, fragmented, inter-related subjects. The subjects come into 
existence when the letter traverses them, standing in here for a floating, shifting 
signifier. Such considerations impact on a Lacanian psychoanalytic readings of other 
literary texts where circulating desire is traced across ephemeral subjects. 
 
If we were to take „The purloined letter‟ as the model for endlessly postponed 
signification, the circulation of the letter can be understood as a process of (differential) 
serialization. Lacan‟s idea of serialization consists in a process of transfer, leading us 
finally to the idea of absence, an opening of perpetual lack as occasioned by the shift of 
signifiers. The fluctuation between serial signifiers and signifieds achieves an elusive 
communication, is rather absence than presence. This active although empty principle 
has taken on the status of Lacanian phallus, a Symbolic phallus (not the real organ or 
the Imaginary phallus). Its function is viewed as being the placeholder, an escaping and 
ephemeral placeholder but nevertheless with the function of fitting any demand. 
 
What are the consequences of Lacan‟s re-assessment of the Freudian theory of the 
relations of subjectivity, sexuality and their shared focus, the unconscious and of 
Lacan‟s attenuation of oedipalization? What does this leave us with regarding the status 
of the subject and sexuality, and language as the medium connecting both with the 
unconscious? Lacan claims that the subject follows the empty place, that it is in pursuit 
of the phallus, the placeholder, the signifier without signified, and that the subject‟s 
essence consists in its displacements rather than its being in one and only one place. The 
phallus also stands in for the objet petit a, which is the ever escaping trajectory of 
desire. Desire then becomes the reaching out for the objet petit a, an unrealisable aim 
but nevertheless potent in that it creates a transitory, ephemeral subject.
35
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 For an early Lacanian paper on the phallus, see: Lacan [1958] „Die Bedeutung des Phallus‟, „The 
signification of the phallus‟ (trans. Fink, 2006, pp. 575-84). See also Fink (1990, 1991 and 1995). On 
Lacan‟s notion of desire, sexuation and jouissance, the precariousness (if not non-existence) of the 
Lacanian subject, see Leclaire (1998). For a feminist inflection, see Ragland-Sullivan „Seeking the third 
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A radical shift in understanding subjectivity 
 
Having reached this stage of tracing a psychoanalytic understanding of subjectivity, I 
draw up some insights with regard to the impact of Freud and Lacan‟s ideas. I propose 
that the psychoanalytic understanding of subjectivity ‒ as conceived by Freud and 
Lacan ‒ problematizes the traditional understanding of the subject by questioning its 
definition as a singular individual, a self-reflective and self-conscious being and that the 
status of subjectivity has thus radically shifted. The assumption that such an individual 
is characterized by completion and closure as well as consciousness falls under scrutiny; 
in particular, the trustworthiness of subjective consciousness, as the core of 
understanding subjectivity, is doubted. Also the traditional understanding of the subject 
as an integrated unity of mind and body (which are of different essence but co-operate) 
cannot any longer be taken for granted. Thus psychoanalytic rethinking, here pursued in 
Freud and Lacan, affects the assumed Cartesian dualist model of body and mind as well 
as the humanist model of reliable rationality and the reasoning capacity of the human 
subject. Similarly, the status of subjectivity as anchored in lived experience, particularly 
in consciousness, and the subject‟s capacity for agency, becomes doubtful.36 
Subjectivity cannot be taken as a status guaranteeing the mastery of self or providing a 
secure and unchanging identity. The concept of the human subject enters a precarious 
status of lack of definition of self and others. 
 
Psychoanalytic questioning (here in both Freud‟s and Lacan‟s sense) of subjectivity is 
primarily directed at problematizing consciousness and mind. At the same time, 
however, the understanding of corporeality and of the body in its attachment to 
consciousness and the mind is affected. Thus the psychoanalytic scrutiny of subjectivity 
has a double trajectory: it dissects consciousness, resulting in the dissolution of the 
subject‟s integrity, and observes the corporeal symptoms of the proposed inner forces.37 
                                                                                                                                               
term: Desire, the phallus, and the materiality of language‟ (Feldstein and Roof (eds), 1989, pp. 40-64); 
Gallop (1986b and 1988). 
36
 This has challenging consequences for the social and political status of subjects, as persons and agents 
with an assumed self-determination and a reasoning power of decision as demonstrated in the permanent 
dialogue of feminism with psychoanalysis which dominated the 1970s and 1980s and reached into the 
1990s. Cf. for instance, among many other documents of this wide-ranging discussion: Irigaray (1985a) 
and (1985b) being trained in the Lacanian school but then confronting Lacan with her critique. See also 
the earlier discussion by Mitchell (1987). 
37
 The notion of symptom and „symptom-formation‟ is a difficult and complex one, not easily pinned 
down. As a guideline Laplanche-Pontalis state that the „[T]erm used to denote the fact that the 
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The emerging psychoanalytic conception of subjectivity according to Freud and Lacan 
is thus of a different nature from previous idealist and empiricist conception: a new 
interiority, a more dispersed embodiment inseparably attached to this interiority, and 
consciousness that is either fractured or altogether difficult to locate. The 
psychoanalytic subject becomes detached from consciousness and is not conceived any 
longer as the all-powerful thinking and speaking centre of the person. Rather the 
unconscious, the unknown and (in degrees) inaccessible part or layer of the subject, 
needs to be reckoned with. This involves a decisive shift in the conceptualization and 
discursive positioning of the subject, in fact a deep questioning (if not loss) of the 
conception of subjectivity as such. 
 
Further, in Lacan‟s view, beyond the de-centering of the subject, the inner processes of 
desire are understood to hold the subject under their sway; the subject has little or no 
awareness of this, and only a precarious and limited control of the assumed conscious 
mind. In Freud‟s view, the inner unconscious libidinal processes gain expression, often 
against the subject‟s decision and will, in dreams, in jokes, in parapraxes, involuntary 
lapses and gestures, that is, in linguistic and corporeal manifestations. Both Freud and 
Lacan consider such linguistic and corporeal manifestations as symptoms and indicators 
of the existence of the unconscious.
38
 Such a move works by inference and with indirect 
phenomena, some of which are subsequently verbalized.
39
 The nature of the experiential 
indicators for the existence of an unconscious (such as dreams, jokes, lapses in speech 
and behaviour, but also gestures and bodily symptoms, neurotic tics and psychotic 
complexes) points to an expressive connection between linguistic and corporeal effects. 
                                                                                                                                               
psychoneurotic symptom is the result of a specific process, of a psychical working-out‟ (p. 446), that it 
recurs through all of Freud‟s works despite referring to the early essays, for instance, Freud [1915] 
„Repression‟ (SE, vol. XIV); Freud [1911a] „Psycho-analytic notes on an autobiographical account of a 
case of paranoia (Dementia paranoides)‟ (SE, vol. XII, the „Schreber case‟). The term „underscores the 
fact that the formation of psychoneurotic symptoms should be looked upon as a specific moment in the 
genesis of neurosis.‟ […] [H]e [Freud] eventually assimilates symptom-formation to the return of the 
repressed and makes the latter into a separate process. […] In a broad sense symptom-formation embraces 
not only the return of the repressed in the form of „substitutive formations‟ or „compromise-formations‟, 
but also „reaction-formations‟ (2006, p. 446). 
38
 The later Lacan develops a specific theory of the symptom (sinthome) with reference for instance to 
Joyce. Cf. Hoens and Pluth „The sinthome: A new way of writing an old problem‟ (Thurston (ed.), 2002, 
pp. 1-18); Laurent 2007 „Symptom and discourse‟ (Clemens and Grigg (eds), 2007, pp. 229-53). 
39
 This raises an epistemological question with regard to the persuasiveness and theoretical validity of 
linguistically transferred (and thus probably altered) observations. This problematic will be taken up in 
later chapters since it affects psychoanalytic practice and theory generally insofar as it presents itself as a 
linguistic or discursive discipline, for instance as a „talking cure‟ practice. I propose that psychoanalytic 
theory and practice functions as a literary discourse as does schizoanalytic and differential theory and 
practice.   
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The language of dreams, jokes and lapses displays discontinuities, a different type of 
logic and a paradoxical structure of „reasoning‟.40 Such language and logic break with 
the rational model of cause and effect and are riddled with omissions, ellipses and 
lacunae. These forms of incompletion or reduction of structures to traces are countered, 
and complemented, with a tendency towards excess, for instance in the breaking of 
taboos. Bodily signs or symptoms, as observed in hysteria, hypnosis, neuroses and 
psychoses, are less indirect than the linguistic indicators but a break with the rational 
model of cause and effect is here also demonstrated, as the body displays signs for 
which there are no physiological causes, as if possessed by inner forces. Thus despite 
the indirect nature of the indicators and the necessity for inference, the postulate of an 
unconscious lends itself to explaining strange,
41
 unfamiliar and (at first) unreadable 
linguistic and corporeal phenomena. 
 
This approach to explaining and theorizing the unconscious and the inter-relations 
between body and mind operates on the assumption of innate (even inherited) instincts
42
 
or drives. Here the proposition of two types of drives concerned with self-preservation 
and individual survival and preservation of the species and reproduction, attempts to 
explain the connection as well as the separation between body and mind. For Freud 
these drives are bodily phenomena that work at the frontier between mental and somatic 
existence.
43
 The two types of drives which later find a theoretical expression as 
                                                 
40
 The relevant Freudian texts are: Freud [1900/01] The interpretation of dreams, parts 1-2 (SE, vols IV-
V); Freud [1901] The psychopathology of everyday life; Freud [1905] Jokes and their relation to the 
unconscious; Freud [1916-17/1915-16] Introductory lectures on psycho-analysis, „Part I: Parapraxes 
(Lectures I-IV)‟, „Part II: Dreams (Lectures V-XV)‟. I have set some of these texts into context earlier on 
in this chapter, others I will have to leave. The corresponding Lacanian comments can be found, for 
instance, in: Lacan [1956; 1966] „Seminar on “The purloined letter”‟ (trans. Fink, 2006, pp. 6-48); Lacan 
[1957] „The instance of the letter in the unconscious‟ (trans. Fink, 2006, pp. 412-41).  
41
 Freud deals with the literary implications of the unconscious in several papers, for instance in Freud 
[1919] „The uncanny‟ (SE, vol. XVII, pp. 219 seq.) where he „interprets‟ ETA Hoffman‟s novella „The 
Sandman‟[1813], in the collection Nachtstücke [1817], as mirroring unconscious processes on linguistic 
and textual levels. Cf. Hertz „Freud and “The Sandman”‟ (Harari (ed.), 1980, pp. 296-321). 
42
 The Standard Edition (SE) translates Freud‟s Trieb as instinct where drive might be more appropriate. 
Laplanche-Pontalis provide the following comment on Instinct (or drive): „[D]ynamic process consisting 
in a pressure (charge of energy, motricity factor) which directs the organism towards an aim. According 
to Freud, an instinct has its source in a bodily stimulus; its aim is to eliminate the state of tension 
obtaining at the instinctual source; and it is in the object, or thanks to it, that the instinct may achieve its 
aim‟ (2006, p. 214). Cf. Freud [1905] Three essays on the theory of sexuality and Freud [1914-15] 
„Instincts and its vicissitudes‟ as basis of the definition (p. 215). They further qualify this definition: 
„[T]he new instinctual dualism introduced in Beyond the pleasure principle [1920] contrasts life instincts 
and death instincts, modifying the function and the location of the instincts in the conflict‟ (p. 216). As 
stated earlier, note has to be taken of Freud‟s changing positions over twenty years.  
43
 Freud‟s early statements are laid down in Freud [1914-15] „Instincts and their vicissitudes‟ which he 
intended to consolidate as Papers on metapsychology (SE, vol. XIV, pp. 109-40) but was not completed. 
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narcissism and libido theory
44
 can be considered as a demonstrative test for the 
epistemological question arising from the subsequent verbalization of observations. The 
core issue here, however, is whether, and if so how, bodily, organic stimuli can be 
transformed into psychical phenomena which then become representable, that is 
linguistically traceable. Freud proposes a series of hypotheses to explain these 
phenomena: the origin of the stimuli in the organism, the body; the demand made by the 
body on the mind by means of the drive; a conversion or transformation of this demand 
into a psychical representative; and finally the drive displaying a measure of this 
demand as affect quota or cathexis.
45
 This throws a light on the connection between the 
unconscious and consciousness, with Freud postulating them as two different (though 
connected and connecting) mental or psychic apparatuses. Attached to this problematic 
is the question of inscription or registering of outer and inner stimuli in the empiricist 
sense.
46
  
 
The consideration of hysterical, psycho-somatic symptoms as physical effects without a 
secure physical origin or cause occupies an axiomatic place in Freud‟s hypothesis of an 
unconscious.
47
 The assumption is that the knotting which caused the hysterical 
symptoms, and with it the bodily symptoms, was released on the linguistic level of 
language; the meaning attached to the symptom (although not achieved in conscious 
insight) vanished with the release. Psychoanalysis, here viewed in Freud and Lacan, 
thus works as a linguistic and discursive discipline; speech and free association function 
                                                 
44
 The two important texts are here, Freud [1915a] „Narcissism: an introduction‟ (SE, vol. XIV, pp. 67-
104) and Freud [1923/22] „The libido theory‟, Encyclopedia article (SE, vol. XVIII, pp. 255-62). 
45
 Cathexis [Besetzung, investment] can be described along the following lines: „Economic concept: the 
fact that a certain amount of psychical energy is attached to an idea or to a group of ideas, to a part of the 
body, to an object, etc.‟ (Laplanche and Pontalis 2006, p. 62). They point out that although the term is 
found throughout Freud‟s writing, its connotation and significance varies. Freud apparently abandoned 
the early neurological explanation in transposing the notion of „cathectic energy‟ to the functioning of the 
„psychical apparatus‟, the unconscious system. In The interpretation of dreams the cathectic energy is 
shared out between the different systems. „The functioning of the unconscious system is subordinated to 
the principle of the discharge of quantities of excitation; the preconscious system attempts to inhibit this 
immediate discharge while simultaneously devoting a small amount of energy to the thought-activity 
needed for the exploration of the outside world: “I therefore postulate that for the sake of efficiency the 
second system succeeds in retaining the major part of its cathexes of energy in a state of quiescence and 
in employing only a small part on displacement”‟ (SE, vol. V, p. 599) (Laplanche and Pontalis 2006, p. 
63). In speaking about the „amount of psychical energy‟, the „quota of affect‟, or „sum of excitation‟, 
„libidinal cathexis‟ (as referring to the energy of the sexual instinct), the term never escapes ambiguity. 
46
 Freud appears anchored in a biological, or physiological, model, yet moves beyond the purely 
experiential explanation. 
47
 Breuer and Freud treating cases of hysteria observed bodily paralysis, loss of movement and 
deterioration of body balance, for instance in the case of Anna O. but successfully „lifted‟ the „repressed‟ 
trauma, presumably from the unconscious, into consciousness by Anna O. speaking. Cf. Freud and Breuer 
[1893-95] „Case histories (1) Fräulein Anna O.‟ (Breuer) (SE, vol. II, pp. 21-47). 
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as its practical methodology. Speech lifts the repressed content and the speaking subject 
re-arranges feelings and ideas, dispersing connections between inscribed experiences, 
bodily stimuli, attached drives and their affect quota or cathexis. Unknotting, as a cure, 
occurs through a decisive pinning down in meaning through the linguistic act of 
expression. This is comparable to the reading of texts where the mystery of ambivalence 
is pinned down to a meaningful interpretation. Accordingly, the processes in dreams, 
such as their associative imagery and disguised meanings, are linguistically retrieved 
and the dream work (assumed to be done by the unconscious) unravelled in a reverse 
manner. Like the hysterical symptoms, so too the dream language exemplifies libidinal 
energy, desire, expressing itself, the unconscious „speaking‟. 
 
To sum up, then, the radical shift in understanding the subject in Freud and Lacan, and 
consequently the status of subjectivity, concerns the fact that expression and 
communication between people cannot be taken for granted as a rational and 
consciously controlled exchange of meaningful messages. Within Freud‟s and Lacan‟s 
psychoanalytic understanding and rethinking of the subject, the level and performance 
of discourse also need to be rethought and re-configured. If discourse is not in the 
control of the subject (either as speaker or listener) messages cannot be assumed to be 
exchanged and understood. Due consideration has thus to be given to what is distorted 
and unspoken in the spoken, and unheard in the heard. The psychoanalytically defined 
subject in Freudian and Lacanian terms becomes a mouthpiece whose utterances display 
a range of libidinal, cultural and imaginary expressions rather than conveying a rational 
statement. Since language is the principal medium of exchange between people, and 
discourse a principal element of communication, the subject finds its new location in the 
speaking situation without being the speaking person but rather a person spoken 
through, a relay for discourse.  
 
Subjectivity in alignment with sexuality 
 
Returning now to my original starting point, I am taking my line of argument once more 
through the stages of consideration. My foregrounding of a psychoanalytic 
understanding of subjectivity finds its justification in that the status of the subject is 
aligned with the nature, formation and function of sexuality. Subjectivity and sexuality, 
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and their mutual conditioning, are Freud‟s, and Lacan‟s recurrent fields of discussion.48 
This is also the point of their convergence in the discussion of libido as will be seen. 
The more intimate focus for Freud, however, is the rupture of the subject into an 
assumed integer consciousness and an unknown and only in degrees accessible 
unconscious. As noted, such a provocative assumption tears at the comfortable notion of 
a stable identity, based in a rational mind, as a reliable and dependable personal and 
social agent. From this questioning of the traditional model of subjectivity, further 
questions arise as to the relations and, in particular, the communication between 
consciousness and the unconscious.  
 
The main point of interest in my discussion of subjectivity is the exact placing of the 
process of the subject‟s oedipalization ‒ read as denial of the desire for the mother and 
simultaneous acceptance of the law of the father (by the boy child only) under the threat 
of castration ‒ in Freudian understanding the process which engenders the unconscious. 
At this stage I propose ‒ for the purpose of preparing for my discussion of Deleuze-
Guattari‟s critique of psychoanalysis in Anti-Oedipus ‒ to define the Oedipus as a 
bundle of hypotheses which circle around incestuous wishes (for the primordial mother 
in the first place) and murderous wishes (against the primordial father in the first place) 
but, in the second place, also to define its reverse, the process of repression and 
forgetting of these wishes, as an integral part of (Freudian) hypotheses. Oedipalization 
(or the Oedipus) is thus a complex, layered psychic, corporeal and social event because 
overcoming dread, fear, anxiety and horror, and finally acceptance of loss (of the 
primordial mother and all that she stands for) and submission to the law (of the 
primordial father and all that he stands for) reaches beyond the individual (and familial) 
existence. This Oedipal scenario, in Freudian and (adapted and attenuated) Lacanian 
terms, as anchored in each family and repeated over every generation, becomes the 
breaking point for the individual subject, creating its hypothesized, yet symptomatically 
affirmed  unconscious, the split (Spaltung) in subjectivity (the breaking into 
consciousness and the unconscious) as well as launching the problematic of sexuality. 
Furthermore, renunciation (of the mother) and submission (to the father) is the price to 
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 Ricoeur (1970) situates Freud‟s work as a sexual theory, a theory of culture as well as a (failed) 
epistemology. Marcuse (1972) and Fromm (1980) draw out Freud‟s cultural and political legacy in their 
long-ranging debate. For an overview of critical positions on Freud see P Robinson (1993) and Lear 
(2005). 
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be paid for entrance into culture and society. If the (inner and outer) prohibitions are not 
honoured, exile ensues in the forms of expulsion and madness.
49
 
 
If the Oedipus complex and the castration complex
50
 are, however, to be read 
metaphorically in Freud‟s writings is a contentious issue.51 If so, such a reading defuses 
the libidinal strength of „desire for the mother‟ and attenuates the feared (sexual) 
castration by the father to a generalized fear of the body‟s immolation, with death 
dreaded as the ultimate surrender of bodily existence. Incest-desire-loss (Lacan rewrites 
it as lack) on the one hand, castration-horror-denial on the other, seem locked into each 
other as sign of the knotting of subjectivity and sexuality, and the unconscious deals 
with the „remnants‟ (Lacan rewrites it as excess). Consciousness must reject, repress, 
deny, disavow, and forget, to deal with the burden of Oedipus and castration, as the 
supporting pillars of the oedipal construct. To phrase it in terms which encompass my 
trajectory of the three inter-related problems of Freudian subjectivity and sexuality, and 
Lacanian desire, oedipalization comes to stand, in the frame of my objectives for this 
chapter, for three things: the subjective-sexual trajectory, the inner fissure or split 
(Spaltung) and the unavoidable „return of the repressed‟ (Freud [1915] „Repression‟ 
(SE, vol. XIV, p. 154); trans. Frankland, 2005, p. 42) , in dreams, hysterical symptoms, 
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 Lacan formulates this as a (Freudian) dilemma in pointing to the underlying nexus: „What we find in 
the incest law is located as such at the level of the unconscious in relation to das Ding, the Thing. The 
desire for the mother cannot be satisfied because it is the end, the terminal point, the abolition of the 
whole world of demand, which is the one that at its deepest level structures man‟s unconscious. It is to the 
extent that the function of the pleasure principle is to make man always search for what he has to find 
again, but which he never will attain, that one reaches the essence, namely, that sphere or relationship 
which is known as the law of the prohibition of incest‟. Cf. Lacan [1959] „Mother as Das Ding (II)‟ 
(trans. Porter, 2008, p. 82). 
50
 As early as 1908/09 Freud proposes that the Oedipus has two functions: a prohibitive and a normative 
function, supporting his idea with observations from his practice, for instance, Freud [1909a] „Analysis of 
a phobia in a five-year-old boy‟ (SE, vol. X, pp. 1-150), the case study of „Little Hans‟. Later essays, for 
instance, Freud [1924b] „The dissolution of the Oedipus complex‟ (SE, vol. XIX, pp. 173-82) and Freud 
[1926] Inhibitions, symptoms and anxiety (SE, vol. XX, pp. 75-176), elaborate the oedipal trajectory. 
Laplanche-Pontalis point to the entanglement, and close link, of the original idea of the Oedipus complex 
with the castration complex. They define the castration complex as a „[C]omplex centring on the phantasy 
of castration which is produced in response to the child‟s puzzlement over the anatomical differences 
between the sexes (presence or absence of the penis): the child attributes this difference to the fact of the 
girl‟s penis having been cut off. The structure and consequences of the castration complex are different in 
the boy and in the girl. The boy fears castration, which he sees as the carrying out of a paternal threat 
made in reply to his sexual activities; the result for him is an intense castration anxiety. In the girl, the 
absence of a penis is experienced as a wrong suffered which she attempts to deny, to compensate for or to 
remedy‟ (2006, pp. 56-60; p. 56). There are other (similarly restricting) attempts to define the double-
complex which cannot be entered into. 
51
 Here again it has to be kept in mind that Freud‟s writings and his positions undergo changes. Cf. for 
instance, Freud [1914b] Totem and taboo, an early text with a contrary (not psychoanalytic but rather 
cultural) stance. Cf. for instance Ricoeur, Book II, „Part II: The interpretation of culture‟ (1970/1965, pp. 
159-259). Relevant is here beside Totem and taboo Freud [1930] Civilization and its discontents. 
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phobias, neuroses, and psychoses. Although Freud postulates an „inherited‟ primary 
repression to which the repressed elements in the secondary repression attach 
themselves, the „stored‟ unconscious content is considered mobile, entering associative 
combinations as testified by the incongruous dreamscapes. 
 
Freudian psychoanalytic understanding problematizes sexuality by considering it not 
primarily in biological terms but as a psychic event or a psychoanalytic fact. Lacanian 
psychoanalytic understanding, in contrast, separates the instances of bodily „sexed‟ 
appearance and psychic „sexuated‟ actuality even further in making sexuality a 
speculative convex mirror of subjectivity (Lacan [1964] „Analysis and truth or the 
closure of the unconscious‟, trans. Sheridan, 1987, pp. 136-48; p. 145).  The 
problematic of subjectivity, the postulated separation of consciousness and unconscious, 
is thus inseparably tied up with sexuality (as a psychoanalytic category). Such a 
reciprocal definition of psychic sexuality and the unconscious finds its (hypothetical) 
support in Freud‟s studies of hysteria, primarily drawn from his own psychoanalytic 
practice. Freud hypothesizes that hysterical disturbances (mostly in female patients)
52
 
can be traced back to „complications‟ in psychic sexuality. Thus forgotten (repressed) 
and unavowed sexual events become another definitional key to the unconscious. For 
instance, in the „Dora‟ case53 dreams and hysterical, corporeal symptoms are both 
understood as psychoanalytic indicators pointing to that other stage, that other scene of 
the unconscious. 
 
The two critical points of an epistemological nature I pointed to arise here in that 
dreams are verbalized and reported and thus shaped by a transfer from images into 
words, where linguistic phrasing filters around the censorship regulations of 
consciousness. All of this makes a direct „reading‟ difficult. However, Freud‟s later 
dynamic understanding of the inter-relations between sexuality and unconscious affords 
overcoming this „obstacle‟ if read along the following lines: a part of sexuality is 
repressed and creates a „content‟ fragment in the unconscious, or rather as the 
unconscious; at the same time the repressed „content‟ fragment establishes a libidinal 
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 Cf. Freud‟s and Breuer‟s early case studies of hysterical patients: Freud and Breuer [1983-95a] 
„Fräulein Anna O.‟ (Breuer), „Frau Emmy von N.‟ (Freud), „Miss Lucy R.‟ (Freud), „Katharina‟ (Freud), 
„Fräulein Elizabeth von R.‟ (Freud). Freud and Breuer [1893-95] Studies on hysteria (SE, vol. II, pp. 1-
182). 
53
 Cf. Freud [1905/01] „Fragment of an analysis of a case of hysteria‟ („Dora‟) (SE, vol. VII, pp. 1-122). 
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charge within the network of a libidinal economy which keeps a „balance sheet‟, a so-
called affect quota of desire in a latent but permanent position of waiting in the 
(hypothetical) unconscious. It is this libidinal charge, or cathected desire, which breaks 
through the censorship barriers of consciousness whenever possible, for instance, in 
drams, parapraxes, and „speaking‟ symptoms. 
 
Viewed from the reverse angle of oedipalization (Oedipus as incest and murder but also 
as repression and forgetting of both „events‟), sexuality can be read as a functional part 
of subjectivity (in Freudian terms), and as far as the unconscious is concerned, sexuality 
is neither masculine nor feminine but phallic („unsexed‟). In contrast, Lacan‟s position 
can be read as being more specific in this respect, pointing to the ambiguity of Freud‟s 
model and by attaching meaning to the linguistic aspect. While in Lacanian thinking the 
early form of psychic sexuality is phallic, unsexed, taking into account the Oedipus 
brings about a further complication: phallic sexuality (or libidinally governed sexuality 
which is the same in both sexes) is over-layered by two different subject-positions or 
sexual positions, termed masculine and feminine, yet organized and governed by an 
identical libido.
54
  The Freudian approach is thus less accommodating than the Lacanian 
with regard to sexual positioning, as, despite Freud‟s lifelong revisions, female 
sexuality
55
 remained an unsurpassable obstacle within his theory. 
 
My reconsideration of the problematic of subjectivity and sexuality in terms of 
alignment (and taking into account later Freudian and Lacanian texts) rather than 
proposing the conception of oedipalization as the bond between subjectivity and 
sexuality can open some new perspectives. For instance, Lacan‟s first attempt at 
separating unsexed phallic sexuality from later sexual positioning is further theorized in 
his concept of the phallus which is the objet a (the small other object), the illusory 
stakeholder for all desired objects. His unfolding of the idea of different orders, the 
Imaginary and the Symbolic order
56
 allows for theorizing a Symbolic function of the 
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 This of course is Lacan‟s first attempt to solve the Freudian problem of oedipalization understood as 
denial of the desire for the mother and simultaneous acceptance of the patriarchal law of the father (by the 
boy child only) under the threat of castration. 
55
 Cf. for instance, Freud [1931] „Female sexuality‟ (SE, vol. XXI, pp. 221-46). 
56
 It is not possible in the frame of this discussion to trace the changing Lacanian approaches, however, as 
a guideline, Laplanche-Pontalis define the Imaginary as „one of the three essential orders of the psycho-
analytic field, namely the Real, the Symbolic and the Imaginary. The Imaginary order is characterised by 
the prevalence of the relation to the image of the counterpart (le semblable). [...] Lacan insists on the 
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phallus in contrast to an Imaginary function of the phallus. Since the Symbolic order 
governs social and cultural practices, the Symbolic function of the phallus is attached to 
the threat of castration, and consequently to giving up, sacrificing an early plenitude 
(jouissance), the desire for the mother.
57
 Acceptance that the phantasized „fullness‟ is 
forever lost allows entry into the Symbolic order, most importantly into language and 
discourse as encapsulating the Symbolic order. The aim of the phallic trajectory is 
therefore to become the speaking, discursive subject ‒ to be viewed in the Lacanian 
context of imaginary mis-recognition ‒ which by necessity, in Lacanian understanding, 
demands taking up a sexual position. With regard to the Imaginary order, governing the 
„personal space‟ of the subject, the Imaginary phallus is part of the phantasized body 
image, as body inscription. This parallels Lacan‟s notion of mis-recognizing body 
fragmentation as body unity. 
 
                                                                                                                                               
difference, and the opposition, between the Imaginary and the Symbolic, showing that intersubjectivity 
cannot be reduced to the group of relations that he classes as imaginary; it is particularly important, in his 
view, that the two orders should not be confused in the course of the analytic treatment‟ (Laplanche and 
Pontalis 2006, p. 210). The article refers to Lacan [1936/37; 1949] „The mirror stage as formative of the I 
function‟ (trans. Fink, 2006, pp. 75-81); cf. Translator‟s endnotes (pp. 773-4), which is of course an early 
statement by Lacan later to be revised. „The Symbolic [that is the term introduced by Lacan] covers those 
phenomena with which psycho-analysis deals in so far as they are structured like a language. The term 
also refers to the idea that the effectiveness of the cure is based on the constitutive nature of the Word (le 
caractère fondateur de la parole). [...] There is an obvious difference between Freud‟s „die Symbolik‟ and 
Lacan‟s „le symbolique‟‟ (Laplanche and Pontalis 2006, p. 439). Freud‟s use is anchored in The 
interpretation of dreams [1900/01] where it refers to the symbols as products of the unconscious. Fink, 
for instance, is more circumspect when he circumscribes in his Translator‟s endnotes the ambiguous use 
of the Real [le Réel], either referring to réalité or to Réel in the later Lacanian sense where it is juxtaposed 
to the Imaginary and the Symbolic (2006, p. 763). Libbrecht circumscribes the Real as that which escapes 
and resists symbolization, the unsayable, thus sets the limit of experience but also relates to jouissance as 
the unattainable and fantasy as mask of the real. Libbrecht refers to Lacan‟s Fundamentals [1964] and 
Seminar XX, Encore, On feminine sexuality, The limits of love and knowledge [1972-73]. See Libbrecht 
„The Real‟ (Glowinski et al., 2001, pp. 154-9). Cf. Lacan (trans. Rose, Rose and Mitchell (eds), 1982, pp. 
137-61) and Lacan (trans. Fink, 1998) for alternative translations of the named Lacanian essays. ZM 
Marks expands these circumscriptions of the Real in her article on the Borromean Knot quoting Lacan: 
„mathematization alone reaches a real. [...] The real, I will say, is the mystery of the speaking body, the 
mystery of the unconscious‟ [1975] (trans. Fink, 1998, p. 131). Marks points out that „[t]he fourth term, 
the sinthome, an aspect of the knot but beyond it, beyond the symbolic and beyond metaphor, is the 
support of the subject in his or her own way to relating to jouissance; this is Lacan‟s creation‟ (ZM Marks 
„The Borromean knot‟, Glowinski et al., 2001, pp. 38-41; p. 41). The source text is Seminar XX, Encore, 
On feminine sexuality, The limits of love and knowledge [1972-73]. Cf. above for the text. The Borromean 
Knot, as conceived by Lacan, completes the twisting of a „self‟, yet is still further developed in Lacan‟s 
Seminar XXII, R.S.I. [1974-75] and Seminar XXIII [1975-76], Le sinthome, the seminar on James Joyce, 
who used it to „the point of reaching his Real‟ (Lacan, cited in Marini, 1992, p. 224) (ZM Marks, 
Glowinski et al., 2001, p. 40). The Lacanian acronym R.S.I. stands for the three orders of Real-Symbolic-
Imaginary. 
57
 Chiesa examines Artaud as one of the „silent‟ (unmentioned-unmentionable) partners of Lacan (beside 
Kafka and others) in articulating jouissance in its (Artaudian) reverberations: Chiesa „Lacan with Artaud: 
j‟ouïs-sens, jouis-sens, jouis-sans‟ (Žižek (ed.) 2006, pp. 336-64). Cf. also Chiesa (2007) on Lacan‟s 
notion of subjectivity. 
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Now with postulating the inscription of sexed subject positions in the unconscious, 
Lacan circumvents the conditioning of sexual difference through anatomical difference, 
or expectations of defined social roles. Since „castration‟ means for Lacan taking up 
language, entering discourse and the Symbolic order, language becomes the decisive 
factor, becoming a speaking subject „castrates‟. In psychoanalytic understanding (here 
of Freud and Lacan) subjectivity, sexuality and the unconscious thus function in the 
interpretation of a definitional nexus. The triad also functions to comprise the 
problematic of the Oedipus which is the overarching regime in the nexus between 
subjectivity and sexuality (as it „creates‟ the unconscious through the repression of the 
incestuous wishes for the mother and the murderous intents on the father, both enforced 
by dreaded castration). The (psychoanalytic) subject hinges on the process of (more or 
less successful) oedipalization which brings about its split (Spaltung) into consciousness 
and unconscious but normalizes sexuality.  
 
However, in a later move (after 1975), Lacan introduces a different formula for 
understanding sexuality beyond oppositional sexual positions (conceived as either 
complementary or symmetrical) which stretches the model of alignment of subjectivity 
and sexuality I pursue  here. He proposes a process of masculine and feminine 
sexuation,
58
 based neither on anatomy (as Freud might have been inclined to claim) nor 
on social role expectation, but on inscribing sexed subject positions in the unconscious. 
Sexuation is an event of inscription, and thus production, in the unconscious by means 
                                                 
58
 This difficult Lacanian notion can be approached as follows (although others recur): „Sexuation refers 
to how the speaking being comes to acquire a sexual position [...] For both Freud and Lacan, the subject 
has to acquire his or her sexual position. This sexual position is not a given or natural one and does not 
follow an inscribed or set course. [...] Sexuation involves a choice whereby a subject positions him- or 
herself within a particular sex. This is the radical level at which Lacan introduces the notion of sexuation 
or choice of sex and it operates at another level from biological sex. Thus, a subject with male anatomy 
may position himself on the side of women, and a subject with female anatomy may position herself on 
the side of a man‟ (Levy-Stokes „Sexuation‟, Glowinski et al., 2001, pp. 173-84; p. 173). Lacan‟s early 
theories of sexuation are formulated in „The signification of the phallus‟ [1958] and „Guiding remarks for 
a congress on feminine sexuality‟ [1964]. Lacan reworks the Freudian Oedipus complex in developing the 
paternal metaphor which allows reading castration symbolically. Lacan‟s later theories propose different 
modes of male and female jouissance and a complex schema of sexuation, for instance in Seminar XX, 
Encore, On feminine sexuality, The limits of love and knowledge [1972-73] on which I have commented 
earlier on in this chapter. Cf. Mitchell „Introduction – I‟ (Mitchell and Rose 1987, pp. 1-26). The seven 
translated essays in this very early Lacanian study trace the evolution of Lacan‟s thought from the 1950s 
to the 1970s and thus provide an awareness of the changes in methodology and of the struggle to come to 
terms with female sexuality: (1) „Intervention on transference‟ [1951]; (2) „The meaning of the phallus‟ 
[1958]; (3) „Guiding remarks for a congress on feminine sexuality‟ [1958]; (4) „The phallic phase and the 
subjective import of the castration complex‟ [1964]; (5) „Feminine sexuality in psychoanalytic doctrine‟ 
[1975]; (6) „God and the jouissance of [the] [„the‟ crossed out] woman – A love letter‟ [1972-73]; and (7) 
„Seminar of 21 January 1975‟. Cf. Lacan (trans. Rose, Rose and Mitchell (eds), 1982, pp. 137-61); cf. 
also Lacan (trans. Fink, 1998) for a corresponding translation of these seminars. 
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of becoming a speaking subject. Such a construct can be read as a final fusion of 
sexuality and subjectivity, as modes of inscription in the unconscious whereby 
cathected (that is charged) desire guides the sexed subject positions.
59
  
 
Positioning Freud and Lacan  
 
My primary concerns have been to untangle the Freudian and Lacanian understanding 
of subjectivity and the function of language as the medium between subjectivity and 
literary text. This sets out some of the premises pursued in the next chapter. Freudian 
and Lacanian conceptions of subjectivity, Freudian oedipalization and Lacanian 
fragmentation of the subject, and their shared but differently perceived and formulated 
premise of an unconscious, are bound to particular linguistic foundations. In Freud this 
takes the form of a generally posited metaphoricity of language as evidenced in his 
recurrent emphasis on revelatory dreams in his case studies. More importantly, the 
psychoanalytic cure consists in the successful verbalization and expression of repressed 
contents. This makes language in its spoken and written versions an integral part of 
individual existence where language functions, in the Freudian sense, as an apparatus of 
closure. In Lacanian understanding this link between subject, unconscious and language 
moves in the opposite direction, towards a rift and the impossibility of closure. 
 
Thus, for Freud, the notion of Spaltung appears to be polyvalent. It reminds us that the psychic 
apparatus is divided into agencies, and it also indicates that the psychic agency is divided within 
itself. Finally, on a more general level, it specifies that the subject may be cut off from a part of 
his psychic contents through the action of repression. […] For Lacan, Spaltung is unequivocally 
the most foundational feature defining subjectivity, since it is the means through which the 
subject comes into being and, as he does so, takes on a given psychic structure. It is not, 
therefore, an intrasystemic splitting. Nor it is intersystemic. For Lacan, Spaltung is that which 
establishes the psychic apparatus as being plurisystemic. In this sense it may be considered as 
the inaugural division of the subject that proceeds from the subject‟s own subjection to a third 
order, the Symbolic. More precisely, this symbolic order mediates the subject‟s relation to the 
Real by knotting together the Real and the Imaginary orders for him. This binding occurs during 
the establishment of the paternal metaphor (Dor, trans. Fairfield, Feher Gurevich (ed.), 1997, p. 
129). 
 
Rather than adopting Freud‟s (earlier) topological structure or (later) understanding of 
the unconscious as interplay of psychic agencies, Lacan proposes that the unconscious 
is structured like a language and that the unconscious establishes an Imaginary order by 
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 These challenges, for instance the process of masculine and feminine sexuation, inscribed sexed subject 
positions in the unconscious and the fusion of sexuality and subjectivity, are taken up by feminist 
psychoanalysts. Cf. for instance, Irigaray (1985a; 1985b and1993).  
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contradistinction to the Symbolic order, the cultural-social world. The gap opened 
between these two orders manifests itself in forever frustrated desire, always present as 
lack and foreshadowing the posited third order of the unreachable, transcendental Real. 
While Freud theorizes heterosexual adult sexuality as a successful oedipalization of the 
subject, and argues that disturbances in infantile sexual development cause neuroses and 
psychoses, the Lacanian solution presents itself as the problematic of sexuation in terms 
of accepted gendering and acceptance of patriarchal, phallic, Symbolic order. The 
Lacanian version of the stages of subject formation focuses from the start on mis-
recognition and self-deception as the mirror phase creates the split subject: a subject 
theorizes by Lacan as being fragmented but (wrongly as Lacan claims) perceiving and 
experiencing itself as an integrated self. 
 
A note on psychoanalytic literary criticism  
 
Finally, the relationship of language and the literary as medium between subjectivity 
and literary text is of concern to Freudian and Lacanian psychoanalytic literary 
criticism. Such a critical approach relies on a range of axioms, that language in literary 
texts can be evaluated as a transparent mirror of the unconscious understood in either 
the Freudian or the Lacanian sense.
60
 For instance, as one of the premises, in accordance 
with Freudian dream analysis the nature of language is innately metaphorical, and thus 
Freudian, and (in different respects) Lacanian literary analysis draws on the principles 
of condensation and displacement. By necessity, literary texts need to be read in the 
light of this ambiguity and ambivalence caused by language‟s metaphorical nature. 
Such ambiguity allows access to tabooed or as yet unshaped thoughts and ideas. These 
axioms establish one of the central premises of psychoanalytic literary criticism, that it 
is possible, and desirable, to trace the dynamics of either explicitly expressed or implied 
desire of the author, the reader, or the literary characters. Variants of psychoanalytic 
literary criticism can be differentiated as to which of these three approaches is favoured.  
 
Procedures in classical Freudian psychoanalytic literary analysis initially follow the 
Freudian model of dream analysis. Here the dream work, happening in the dreamer‟s 
unconscious, consists in transposing and transferring the „latent‟, that is the disallowed 
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 The specifics of the type of psychoanalytic literary criticism is shaped by whichever theorist it is based 
on, for instance, Freud, Lacan, Klein or Kristeva. Cf. Wright (1984, 1988; (ed.) 1992). 
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and censored dream thoughts and images, located in the unconscious, into the 
„manifest‟ dream thoughts and images, the actual dream which the dreamer might (in 
part) recall in the waking state, that is, in the state of consciousness. The literary 
analysis then operates between latency and manifestation in the textual fabric. 
Psychoanalytic literary criticism, in its classical Freudian version, also adheres to the 
Freudian principles of dream work, standing in for the main characteristics of the 
Freudian unconscious, expressed in literary terms as metaphor and 
metonymy/synecdoche. These two processes afford a disguise for the original tabooed, 
unconscious material so as to circumvent ego-censorship. Psychoanalytic literary 
criticism asks for an interpretation of the literary text to unravel ambiguities and thus 
arrive at clarifying its disguised, distorted, hidden meaning(s).
61
 
 
In contrast, psychoanalytic literary criticism using the Lacanian approach focuses less 
on accessing the unconscious than on tracing and elaborating the path of desire through 
the literary text, pointing to its lacunae and irregularities, exemplified in Poe‟s story of 
„The purloined letter‟.62 The trajectory of desire is always misguided and fails, 
demonstrating desire‟s essence as lack, frustrated wish, absence, blank, and as never 
recoverable. While Freudian desire manifests through its (if at times unsuccessful) 
erasure, occasioned by the repetitive repression mechanism, Lacanian desire establishes 
itself through its insisting absence. Neither of these genres of literary criticism, as they 
are applications of psychoanalytic principles, promises however to be of any help in 
dealing with literary texts resisting representational practices since their premises are 
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 Most Freudian case studies such as the „Schreber Case‟, „Little Hans‟, „The Rat-Man‟ and „The Wolf-
Man‟ have a component of dream analysis, considered the „royal road‟ (The interpretation of dreams 
[1900/01]) to the unconscious, and functioning as the turning points in the analysis bringing about the 
analytic cure. Dream studies, studies of neurosis (and psychosis) and of sexual „perversions‟ (in the 
Freudian sense of oedipal misplacements) are recurrent (and shifting) anchor points for the centrality of 
the unconscious in psychoanalytic theory (and practice). 
62
 Lacanian literary criticism has taken its inspiration from Lacan‟s original seminars, in particular, the 
„Seminar on the “Purloined letter”‟. Cf. Felman (1977, pp. 94-207) and (1985/1978) who adapts the open-
ended subject position to literary positions (including the process of writing and madness). B Johnson 
(1977, pp. 457-505) and (1981) works from Lacan across to Derrida, integrating aspects of Lacanian 
literary criticism and Derridean différance. Derrida‟s writing often inflects Freudian perspectives (see for 
instance „The Purveyor of Truth‟ [„Le facteur de la vérité‟] [1975] (trans. Bass, 1987b, pp. 413-96) and 
„Freud and the scene of writing‟ [1966] (trans. Bass, 2009a, pp. 246-91). See also Schwab‟s comparative 
introduction on Derrida‟s and Deleuze‟s position to psychoanalysis, „Introduction: Derrida, Deleuze, and 
the psychoanalysis to come‟ (2007b, pp. 1-34). Major examines Derrida‟s „desistantial psychoanalysis‟ 
(Cohen (ed.), 2001, pp. 296-315); cf. Derrida „Desistance‟ (trans. Fynsk, in Lacoue-Labarthe, 1998a, pp. 
1-42). 
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anchored in hypotheses of oedipalization (in Freud‟s case) and of desire as lack (in 
Lacan‟s case). 
 
In choosing Freud and Lacan as protagonists for this psychoanalytic weave, I have 
outlined the inter-relations they posit between subjectivity and language. This was done 
in view of the insistent presence of Freudian and Lacanian theories in Deleuze-
Guattari‟s writings. I have also established some of the key ideas informing 
psychoanalytic approaches to subjectivity, sexuality, the unconscious and especially the 
process of oedipalization in Freud and in Lacan‟s re-assessment. In the next chapter I 
outline in which respects and to what degree Deleuze-Guattari appropriate, assimilate 
and adapt the specific key ideas of Freudian and Lacanian psychoanalytic thoughts but 
also where they depart, revert and set out their own trajectories. There my tightening of 
the psychoanalytic weave to the inter-relations between subjectivity and sexuality, and 
in particular my focusing on oedipalization as the bind between them, finds its 
justification in Deleuze-Guattari‟s insisting use of this relational nexus for polemic 
purposes.
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Chapter two: A schizoid weave through Deleuze and Deleuze-Guattari 
 
The aims of the chapter 
 
The revolutionary is the first to have the right to say: “Oedipus? Never heard of it.” […] Too bad 
if the psychoanalysts roar their disapproval at this point (Deleuze and Guattari 2004a, p. 106).  
 
In the previous chapter I examined the psychoanalytic notion of subjectivity as 
theorized by Freud and Lacan through their anchoring of it in the postulate of a de-
centering unconscious. I also introduced the Freudian position on sexuality based on 
oedipalization and some aspects of the Lacanian theory of desire and lack. This chapter 
takes the discussion of these points one step further towards the unsettling of the 
(topological) unconscious, the diffraction of the nexus of subjectivity and sexuality and 
into the domain of affectivity and desire, but also attempts to overcome the idea of a 
schizoid refutation of psychoanalysis.
1
 My objective is to engage with Deleuze-
Guattari‟s proposition of an unconscious freed from the stranglehold of oedipalization ‒ 
that is, their notion of an anoedipal unconscious
2
 ‒ and to discuss its status with regard 
                                                 
1
 David-Ménard (2005) discusses the altercation between Deleuze and psychoanalysis, or rather attempts 
a positioning of psychoanalysis within philosophy and reads across Deleuze‟s works which provides a 
fresh perspective to which I am indebted. She considers Deleuze‟s work on Proust, Masoch, Difference 
and repetition, his essay on structuralism, Essays critical and clinical as well as Deleuze-Guattari‟s works 
Anti-Oedipus, A thousand plateaus and What is philosophy?. She focuses on several thematic cores: (1) 
can Lacan‟s desire as lack be matched by Deleuze‟s affirmative stance that desire doesn‟t lack anything 
(chapter I „Clinique et philosophie‟, pp. 15-30); (2) the notion of masochism (chapter II, pp. 31-42); (3) 
can Freud‟s repetition compulsion be compared to Deleuze‟s thought of repetition vs difference (chapter 
III „Philosophie de la répétition‟, pp. 43-56); attached to this discussion: the problematic of the 
unconscious, as a gaping need, as a question of sexuality or as a problematic of thought and creation; (4) 
the Body without Organs (chapter IV „Le corps sans organes: critique ou abandon de la 
psychoanalyse?‟, pp. 67-105); includes the discussion of (Deleuzian) becoming(s) and their immanent 
goals: the imperceptible, the indiscernable, the impersonal; can an epistemology and metaphysics of 
becoming be envisaged; (5) becoming(s) and disjunctive synthesis (chapter V, pp. 91-106). Chapter VI 
deals with Badiou‟s reading of Deleuze (The clamor of being); chapter VII with transference (for 
instance, Lacan Seminar VIII Le transfert); chapter VIII with Deleuze‟s critique of Kant. Also of 
importance to my comments are the essays collected in Schwab ((ed.) 2007) which throw a complex light 
on the relations between psychoanalysis and Deleuzian (and Derridean) thought with regard to specific 
topics such as the spectrum of pain (Arsić, Schwab (ed.), 2007, pp. 142-70); „buccality‟ (Guyer, Schwab 
(ed.), 2007, pp. 77-104); territorializing and deterritorializing psycho-analysis (Lambert, Schwab (ed.), 
2007, pp. 192-212) and (the Freudian claim of) polymorphism (Malabou, trans. Rose, Schwab (ed.), 
2007, pp. 61-76). In contrast, the essays collected in De Bolle ((ed.) 2010) are not (all) embracing an 
integrative approach which I attempt in this thesis although I find the engagement with Masoch by 
Geyskens (de Bolle (ed.), 2010, pp. 103-15) and Alliez (de Bolle (ed.), 2010, pp. 117-30) productive and 
helpful for my enquiry.  
2
 Deleuze-Guattari use the notion of „anoedipal‟, for instance, in the context of „anoedipal desiring-
production‟: „[…] the regressions and progressions are made only within the artificially closed vessel of 
Oedipus, and in reality depend on a state of forces that is changing, yet always actual and contemporary, 
within anoedipal desiring-production. Desiring-production has solely an actual existence; progressions 
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to my project of making it productive for the reading of texts in the framework of a 
postulated desiring practice. My focus here for unfolding Deleuze-Guattari‟s schizoid 
conceptualizations via a psychoanalytic critique and dialogue is on their collaborative 
Capitalism and schizophrenia: Anti-Oedipus (Deleuze and Guattari 2004a)
3
 and A 
thousand plateaus (Deleuze and Guattari 2004b). On occasion, however, I also draw on 
Deleuze‟s earlier works, Masochism: Coldness and cruelty (Deleuze 2006d), Difference 
and repetition (Deleuze 2004a) and The logic of sense (Deleuze 2004b) for important 
                                                                                                                                               
and regressions are merely the effectuations of a virtuality that is always fulfilled as perfectly as it can be 
by virtue of the states of desire‟ (Deleuze and Guattari 2004a, p. 141). 
3
 There are several recurrences of the notion of the schizoid in Anti-Oedipus, however with a changing 
emphasis in its contextualized use. I am here listing four modalities on which I am drawing in the thesis 
but which warrant further exploration. The term is used: (1) to support a new libidinal theory of intensive 
quantities of the celibate machine, for instance, „The Kantian theory according to which intensive 
quantities fill up, to varying degrees, matter that has no empty spaces, is profoundly schizoid‟ (Deleuze 
and Guattari 2004a, p. 20; part 1, section 3: „The subject and enjoyment‟). (2) The notion is used as a 
literary stylistic notion to circumscribe Proust‟s Search, for instance, „In the literary machine that Proust‟s 
In search of lost time constitutes, we are struck by the fact that all the parts are produced as asymmetrical 
sections, paths that suddenly come to an end, hermetically sealed boxes, noncommunicating vessels, 
watertight compartments, in which there are gaps even between things that are contiguous, gaps that are 
affirmations, pieces of a puzzle belonging not to any puzzle but to many, pieces assembled by forcing 
them into a certain place where they may or may not belong, their unmatched edges violently bent out of 
shape, forcibly made to fit together, to interlock, with a number of pieces always left over. It is a schizoid 
work par excellence: it is almost as though the author‟s guilt, his confessions of guilt are merely a sort of 
joke. (In Kleinian terms, it might be said that the depressive position is only a cover-up for a more deeply 
rooted schizoid attitude.)‟ (Deleuze and Guattari 2004a, p. 46; part 1, section 6: „The whole and the 
parts‟). (3) The term schizoid is deployed in the sense of a dissolution of fixed sexuality: „The 
schizophrenic is not man and woman. He is man or woman, but he belongs precisely to both sides, man 
on the side of men, woman on the side of women. […] The schizophrenic is dead or alive, not both at 
once, but each of the two as the terminal point of a distance over which he glides. He is child or parent, 
not both, but the one at the end of the other, like the two ends of a stick in a nondecomposable space. This 
is the meaning of the disjunctions where Beckett records his characters and the events that befall them: 
everything divides, but into itself. Even the distances are positive, at the same time as the included 
disjunctions. […] He [the schizophrenic] is and remains in disjunction: he does not abolish disjunction by 
identifying the contradictory elements by means of elaboration; instead, he affirms it through a 
continuous overflight spanning an indivisible distance. He is not simply bisexual, or between the two, or 
intersexual. He is transsexual. He is trans-alivedead, trans-parentchild. […] Schreber is man and woman, 
parent and child, dead and alive: which is to say, he is situated wherever there is singularity, in all the 
series and in all the branches marked by a singular point, because he is himself this distance that 
transforms him into a woman, and at its terminal point he is already the mother of a new humanity and 
can finally die‟ (Deleuze and Guattari 2004a, pp. 84-5). (4) The notion of the schizoid is contextualized as 
a specific practice of reading and writing: „Delirium has something like two poles, racist and racial, 
paranoiac-segregative and schizonomadic. And between the two, ever so many subtle, uncertain shiftings 
where the unconscious itself oscillates between its reactionary charge and its revolutionary potential. 
Even Schreber finds himself to be the Great Mogul when he breaks through the Aryan segregation. 
Whence the ambiguity in the text of the great authors, when they develop the theme of races, as rich in 
ambiguity as destiny itself. Here schizoanalysis must unravel the thread. For reading a text is never a 
scholarly exercise in search of what is signified, still less a highly textual exercise in search of a signifier. 
Rather it is a productive use of the literary machine, a montage of desiring-machines, a schizoid exercise 
that extracts from the text its revolutionary force. The exclamation “So it‟s …!”, or the mediation of 
Igitur on race, in an essential relationship with madness‟ (Deleuze and Guattari 2004a, p. 116). Igitur 
refers to a collection of Mallarmé‟s poems. Of interest is also that in the background hovers the awareness 
and praise of Foucault‟s History of madness, for instance: “„While the victim of mental illness is entirely 
alienated in the real person of his doctor, the doctor dissipates the reality of the mental illness in the 
critical concept of madness.” Luminous pages‟ (Deleuze and Guattari 2004a, p. 102). 
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parallels with regard to the theories of the unconscious and of body surfaces 
(simulacrum and phantasm). 
 
To outline what I‟m here calling the schizoid weave, then, I start with Deleuze-
Guattari‟s reading and polemic re-visiting of Freud‟s foundational cases since it is in 
these cases ‒ paranoid-psychotic Schreber, obsessive-neurotic „Wolf-Man‟ and phobic-
neurotic „Little Hans‟ ‒ that Deleuze-Guattari anchor their diffraction of psychoanalytic 
reasoning. Their reading develops in contrast to any acceptance of the Freudian 
unconscious organized around the idea of oedipalization. Thus, in a conceptual 
turnaround, these cases of disturbed, if not strictly „mad‟ patients, become for Deleuze-
Guattari model cases for introducing and demonstrating their concept of a „liberated‟, 
de-oedipalized schizo. I also briefly examine the examples of schizoid states Deleuze-
Guattari draw from Beckett‟s Molloy trilogy (1983/1950-2), Joyce‟s Finnegans wake 
(1975/1922-39), Büchner‟s „Lenz‟ (trans. Reddick, 1993b/1839, pp. 141-64) and 
Artaud‟s works (trans. Weaver, Sontag (ed.), 1988), proposing that Deleuze-Guattari‟s 
reconsideration of the Freudian cases takes place through expanding their notion of the 
creative schizo and her/his desirable schizoid state in terms of literary parallels. 
Drawing into perspective the intent of Deleuze-Guattari‟s Anti-Oedipus as a specific 
proposal for a libidinal economy with individual and social impact as well as their 
strategies of schizoanalysis as a method and practice for change ‒ a proposal they 
further enlarge through A thousand plateaus ‒ I also explore in this chapter the degree 
to which Deleuze-Guattari‟s libidinal proposal of schizoanalysis is informed by the 
Lacanian orders of the Symbolic, the Imaginary and the Real as possible parameters for 
subjectivity. My overall aim is therefore to achieve a first mapping here of what I term 
Deleuze-Guattari‟s libidinal project, a project which consists in overthrowing the nexus 
of subjectivity and sexuality and the oedipal double-bind of desire. 
 
Productive desiring-machines 
 
Deleuze-Guattari‟s polemic critique of Freud in Anti-Oedipus is organized around the 
idea of oedipalization for two inter-related reasons. The first reason is that in Freudian 
understanding (as discussed previously) successful oedipalization creates a specific 
unconscious of repressed contents, and the second is that the Freudian position on 
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sexuality is based in oedipalization. For Deleuze-Guattari, Freud‟s theorizing of the 
status of subjectivity ‒ as an interdependent aligned and regulated sexuality, and oedipal 
unconscious ‒ freezes any possibility of desire into a rigid structure and does not take 
lived experience into account. Deleuze-Guattari‟s critique emphasizes in particular 
Freud‟s postulated repeated and reinforcing acts of repression. As in their view these 
hypothesized acts adversely affect, diminish and strangle the subject‟s libidinal 
economy, Deleuze-Guattari‟s critique aims specifically at oedipalized sexuality, its 
origin in incestuous interfamilial rivalry and its narrow and enforced scope. 
Furthermore, they direct their critical comments, beyond the irritant of the 
oedipalization of the subject, at the restraint and loss of libido which happen within the 
theorized process of repression, assimilation and adaptation of the subject from 
childhood through adolescence into adulthood. 
 
Not content with acerbic critique, Deleuze-Guattari develop out of this critique their 
own conceptions of desiring-machines producing the (full and empty) Body without 
Organs of the schizo. That is, they expand the psychoanalytic rewriting of corporeality, 
affectivity and subjectivity in proposing a process of becoming as a continuous series of 
bodily refinement based on a freed anoedipal unconscious.
4
 From within their critique, 
Deleuze-Guattari establish their own libidinal theory which involves a rewriting of the 
processes of desire and sexuality, and consequently propose a new understanding of 
                                                 
4
 Such a rewriting of corporeality, affectivity and subjectivity in proposing a process of becoming as a 
continuous series of bodily refinement based on a freed, anoedipal unconscious can be followed through 
many interviews and discussions after the publication of Anti-Oedipus and A thousand plateaus. I propose 
that these statements have to be taken into account when evaluating Deleuze‟s, Deleuze-Guattari‟s (as 
well as Guattari‟s) standpoint(s). My emphasis then in this chapter is on reading primary texts by 
Deleuze-Guattari and the ensuing public discussion. Cf. for instance, Deleuze „Deleuze and Guattari fight 
back‟ (2004a, pp. 216-29); „Capitalism and schizophrenia‟ (pp. 232-41); „Your special “desiring-
machines”: what are they?‟ (pp. 242-3); „On capitalism and desire‟ (pp. 262-73); „Five propositions for 
psychoanalysis‟ (pp. 274-80). Deleuze „Gilles Deleuze and Felix Guattari on Anti-Oedipus‟ (1995, pp. 13-
24); „On A thousand plateaus‟ (pp. 25-34). Deleuze „Two regimes of madness‟ [Milan conference 
Psychoanalyse and semiotics], only Deleuze‟s presentation (2006g, pp. 11-6); „Four propositions on 
psychoanalysis‟ (pp. 79-88), cf. Deleuze „Five propositions on psychoanalysis‟ which derives from the 
Italian version; „Eight years later: 1980 interview‟ (pp. 175-80). Cf. also Guattari‟s view of the 
problematic: Guattari „Section I. Texts for Anti-Oedipus„ (Nadaud (ed.), 2006, pp. 25-81): „Desire and the 
sign‟ (pp. 43-52); „Infinitives‟ (pp. 58-61); „Psychoanalysis and polyvocality‟ (pp. 70-8) and „Section II. 
Psychoanalysis and schizo-analysis‟ (pp. 83-158): „Of anxiety, the phallic object and interpretation‟ (pp. 
103-6); „Who wrote …‟ [„schizo-analysis is…‟] (pp. 123-7); „Of the narcissistic machine‟ [Cocteau 
Infernal machine, Oedipus, Lacan „Kant with Sade‟] (pp. 135-42); „Of schizo-analysis‟ (pp. 143-51); „Of 
a machinic interpretation of Lacan‟s “a”‟ (pp. 152-8) and „Section VI. Glossary of schizo-analysis‟ (pp. 
415-21). Note that Guattari hyphenates the term „schizo-analysis‟ (in analogy to Freud‟s early habit of 
„psycho-analysis‟). For a contrasting reading of Lacan‟s essay „Kant with Sade‟ see: Baas (Žižek (ed.), 
2003, pp. 34-66).  
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subjectivity and its supposed libidinal anchorage, the unconscious. They name such an 
emptied, only intermittently „produced‟ unconscious anoedipal.5  
 
In introducing new concepts Deleuze-Guattari strategically use conceptual personae, 
renowned philosophical or literary figures embodying the most salient features of their 
intended concept through their mentality and thought patterns, their actions and their 
character traits. As such the figures of Freudian case studies such as Judge Schreber, the 
„Wolf-Man‟ and the „Rat-Man‟, „Little Hans‟, or even „Dora‟ (von Pappenheim), and to 
a degree the mythical or literary figures, aesthetic figures, of Oedipus or Hamlet, are 
viewed as conceptual personae. Other literary figures Deleuze-Guattari engage for 
concept creation in Anti-Oedipus are Büchner‟s Lenz, Beckett‟s Molloy and Malone, 
even the Unnamable, and Melville‟s Captain Ahab. Here rather than proceeding by 
abstraction and definition of concepts, in employing conceptual personae the ideas are 
already „clothed‟ and facilitate a visionary access to the problematic which the concept 
embodies. Judge Schreber, dramatist Lenz, and „existentialists‟ Molloy and Malone, as 
well as the writer (and clinically declared schizophrenic) Artaud, are selected for 
                                                 
5
 This rewriting of libidinal processes circulates around the notion of an unconscious which takes several 
(and shifting) forms, as anoedipal (still referring to Freud and to a lesser degree to Lacan), as molecular (a 
later version, contextualized in A thousand plateaus, as orphan unconscious (as well as anarchist and 
atheist unconscious) and as productive, creative unconscious against the psychoanalytic unconscious as 
stage or (inner) theater. „Images, nothing but images. What is left in the end is an intimate familial 
theater, the theater of private man, which is no longer either desiring-production or objective 
representation. The unconscious as a stage. A whole theater put in the place of production, a theater that 
disfigures this production even more than could tragedy and myth when reduced to their meager ancient 
resources. […] A theater series, instead of a production series. But why in fact does representation, 
having become subjective representation, assume this theatrical form („There is a mysterious tie between 
psychoanalysis and the theater”)? We are familiar with the eminently modern reply of certain recent 
authors: the theater elicits the finite structure of the infinite subjective representation. What is meant by 
“elicit” is very complex, since the structure can never present more than its own absence, or represent 
something not represented in the representation: but it is claimed that the theater‟s privilege is that of 
staging this metaphoric and metonymic causality that marks both the presence and the absence of the 
structures in its effects‟ (Deleuze and Guattari 2004a, pp. 335-6). The characteristics of the orphan 
unconscious are circumscribed as follows: „For the unconscious of schizoanalysis is unaware of persons, 
aggregates, and laws, and of images, structures, and symbols. It is an orphan, just as it is an anarchist and 
an atheist. It is not an orphan in the sense that the father‟s name would designate an absence, but in the 
sense that the unconscious reproduces itself wherever the names of history designate present intensities 
(“the sea of proper names”). The unconscious is not figurative, since its figural is abstract, the figure-
schiz. It is not structural, nor is it symbolic, for its reality is that of the Real in its very production, in its 
very inorganization. It is not representative, but solely machinic, and productive‟ (Deleuze and Guattari 
2004a, p. 342). This sets the frame for rewriting the psychoanalytic libidinal theory and setting out criteria 
for artistic creation such as a-metaphoricity, „figurality‟ (not representative figuration) which is given the 
name „the figure-schiz‟ to mark its schizoid status. Cf. also Deleuze‟s work on Francis Bacon (2005c), for 
instance, chapter two „Note on figuration in past painting‟ (Deleuze 2005c, pp. 6-8), chap. 7 „Hysteria‟ 
(Deleuze 2005c, pp. 32-9: the Body without Organs and Artaud), chapter twelve „The diagram‟ (Deleuze 
2005c, pp.70-7: „This is what Bacon calls a “graph” or a diagram: […] A Sahara, a rhinoceros skin: such 
is the suddenly outstretched diagram‟ (Deleuze 2005c, p. 71) and chapter 17 „The eye and the hand‟ 
(Deleuze 2005c, pp. 108-13: the optic and the haptic, the second function of sight as touch).  
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incarnating Deleuze-Guattari‟s concept of the schizo. At first impression, then, the 
schizo appears to be a character who displays neurotic, psychotic or manic behaviour, 
and who (apparently) escapes oedipalization. Progressively stripping away the clinical 
apparatus and psychoanalytic labels, Deleuze-Guattari turn the schizo into a desired 
antithesis to Oedipus, a not-repressed, not-castrated embodiment of freed desiring-
machines. The incarnations of the schizo are embodiments and articulations of 
threshold-crossings, incorporated exemplars, and thus become discursive figures in the 
process of rhetoric and persuasion. 
 
Desiring-production, in its turn, is executed by desiring-machines which can take on 
different modes of functioning, modifying the affectivity of the material body. If desire 
has an unhindered flow, the desiring-machine „produces‟ the Body without Organs. 
Thus the concept of desiring-machines and the concept of the Body without Organs 
stand at times either in opposition or in unison. The schizo as the persona incorporating 
the (successful) production of desiring-machines is not the Body without Organs which 
is conceived as a surface in bands of intensities, nor is it a „subject‟, whether conceived 
as larval, residual or transitory. I will return to explicating the inter-relations and the 
sliding scale of these concepts. 
 
Schreber features prominently throughout Anti-Oedipus as conceptual persona, as 
incarnated schizo par excellence, a model case for the concept of the Body without 
Organs as well as a demonstration of states of becoming.
6
 Here the Body without 
                                                 
6
 Beside the recurrent exemplification of the distorted power of desire in the schizo, as lived and suffered 
in Schreber, in Anti-Oedipus (in part 1, „Desiring-machines‟, esp. Deleuze and Guattari 2004a, pp. 17-21; 
in part 2, „Psychoanalysis and familialism: the holy family‟, esp. pp. 64-76 and in part 4, „Introduction to 
schizoanalysis‟, esp. pp. 307-11; p. 399), Deleuze explicates the historical, political and even 
cosmological features of the Schreber case in other texts, discussions and interviews. Cf. Deleuze‟s 
preface to Guattari‟s Psychoanalyse et transversalité; „Three group-related problems‟ (Deleuze 2004a, 
pp. 193-203, esp. pp. 200-1); the roundtable on Anti-Oedipus „Deleuze and Guattari fight back ...‟ 
(Deleuze 2004a, pp. 216-29, esp. p. 220 and p. 229); the interview on Anti-Oedipus, „Capitalism and 
schizophrenia‟ (Deleuze 2004a, pp. 232-41, esp. p. 235) and the published discussion (edited), „Five 
propositions on psychoanalysis‟ (Deleuze 2004a, pp. 274-80, esp. pp. 274-5). Schreber‟s „racial, racist, 
historical delirium‟ (2004a, p. 235) cross-connects with Deleuze‟s evaluation of Masoch‟s 
symptomatological responses to historical and ethnic „milieu‟. For instance, chapter VI, „The art of 
Masoch‟ (Deleuze 2006d, pp. 69-80); chapter XI, „Sadistic superego and masochistic ego‟ (2006d, pp. 
123-34). Cf. also Chapsal interviewing Deleuze after the publication of Masochism: Coldness and 
cruelty, „Mysticism and masochism‟ (Deleuze 2004a, pp. 131-4). In particular the „Proust round table„ 
directly responds to the problematic [participants: Barthes, Genette, Doubrowsky, Richard, Ricardou, and 
audience] (Deleuze 2006g, pp. 29-60). Deleuze encounters here Barthes and Genette (as structuralist 
thinkers) which reveals their different approaches to literature. Barthes rejects for instance an alluding 
  
 
 
53 
Organs as a surface structure of heightened intensities appears as the corporeal 
instantiation of the process of becoming and thus the two schizoid conceptualizations 
(the schizo and the Body without Organs) are in a functional relationship. The device of 
conceptual personae also allows Deleuze-Guattari to circumvent interpretation and to 
work from the already existing persona in a reverse manner. For instance, Schreber‟s 
case history delivers the bodily affective „phenomena‟, the stages of transformation of 
his „illness‟ in several successive bouts, and sparks off Deleuze-Guattari‟s theorization 
in terms of processes. This stands in contrast to the existing psychoanalytic 
„observations‟, „interpretations‟7 and concluding systematization according to 
repression (of sexuality), oedipalization, castration, and intra-familial tensions (incest 
and rivalry with castration threat). At the same time Deleuze-Guattari can make the 
body and its corporeality the center of observation through personification. This leads 
away from the speculative psychoanalytic methodology of reasoning in the Freudian 
case studies of neuroses and psychoses where the focus is on the mind and its splits in 
consciousness and the unconscious.
8
 Indeed I read Deleuze-Guattari‟s schizoid 
conceptualizations as an embryonic diagnostic approach which re-emerges in the 
symptomatology of the critical-clinical as will be seen later. 
 
Deleuze-Guattari‟s libidinal theory thus does not take a Freudian topology of conscious-
unconscious-preconscious (or the later proposal of ego-id-superego)
9
 as guiding 
                                                                                                                                               
remark of a participant to „the pleasure of the text‟ in Proust. See also: Barthes (1967, 1975, 1976 and 
1985); Genette (1982, 1983). 
7
 Freud‟s reading of Schreber and Lacan‟s counter-reading have different trajectories: for Freud Schreber 
is a case of (repeated bouts of) psychosis, for Lacan Schreber exemplifies a linguistic (and corporeal) 
„miracle‟ (the main piece being the Brüllenwunder, the bellowing-miracle Schreber, or rather his 
unconscious „voice‟, performs (Lacan, trans. Fink, 2006, p. 467)). The main sources are: Freud „Psycho-
analytic notes on an autobiographical account of a case of paranoia (Dementia paranoides)‟ (SE, vol. XII, 
pp. 1-80) and (SE, vol. XII, p. 38, Footnote 2); Lacan „On a question prior to any possible treatment of 
psychosis‟ (Lacan, trans. Fink, 2006, pp. 445-88 [Section I „Toward Freud‟, Section II „After Freud‟, 
Section III „With Freud‟, Section IV „Schreber‟s way‟, Section V „Postscript‟]). Cf. also the comparative 
study of the Schreber case read through various perspectives by Egginton, chapter two „The psychosis 
string‟ (2007, pp. 38-82) where Schreber‟s Memoir is filtered through Freud, Lacan, Derrida and 
Deleuze-Guattari.  
8
 The Freudian case studies undergo a meticulous (though at times acerbic) discussion in Deleuze-
Guattari‟s Anti-Oedipus and A thousand plateaus (as well as in Deleuze‟s Difference and repetition). 
Deleuze presents a double-textual reading (Freud‟s texts and his own side by side) of „Little Hans‟, 
complemented by two other child analyses, in Two regimes of madness: „The interpretation of utterances‟ 
[1977] dealing with Freud „Little Hans‟; Klein „Richard‟; Hochmann „Agnes‟. This is a Vincennes 
seminar paper done in collaboration with Guattari, Parnet and Scala; cf. Deleuze and Guattari 
Psychanalyse et politique (1977, pp. 18-23). Deleuze (2006g, Lapoujade (ed.), pp. 89-112). Cf. also 
Bettelheim (1967) to which Deleuze-Guattari refer (Deleuze and Guattari 2004a, pp. 40-1; p. 141). 
9
 See my discussion of the (early) Freudian topological model of conscious-unconscious-preconscious in 
contrast to the (later) actional/libidinal model of ego-id-superego in chapter one. 
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principle but the living and experiencing person. Bodily signs, symptoms, become a 
source of demonstrating the functioning of desiring-machines as the libidinal expression 
of inner impulses through the flesh. They are therefore not evaluated by reference to an 
(assumed) „normality‟ as psychoanalysis and traditional medical, clinical psychiatry are 
prone to do. The concept of the machinic which at first appears odd (and mechanistic) 
instead indicates the compulsive and productive nature of desires which break forth and 
flow through the body. These flows undergo productive cuts and breaks which are the 
ephemeral moments of „subjectification‟. The concept of desiring-machines thus stands 
in for the libidinal functioning of the unconscious in Deleuze-Guattari‟s sense, 
producing and being the product at the same time. In this way the restricted relations of 
cause and effect, and the consideration of any substantial end-product, are disregarded 
and the emphasis falls onto process.
10
 
                                                 
10
 The libidinal functioning of the unconscious conceived in terms of desiring-machines is difficult to 
unravel since the problematic evolves from Anti-Oedipus to A thousand plateaus but also because a shift 
from representative (psychoanalytic) to processual (schizoanalytic) understanding takes place. I follow 
some stages of the evolution of the problematic in drawing on Zourabichvili‟s wide-ranging comments on 
the functions of desiring-machines (2003, pp. 48-51 (‟machines désirantes‟); see also the comments on 
the Body without Organs (2003, pp. 15-7 („corps sans organes (CsO)‟). The wider contextualization of 
the problematic can be followed in the comments on the event, becoming, non-organic life (or vitality) 
and assemblage (2003, pp. 36-40 („événement‟); pp. 29-31 („devenir‟); pp. 84-9 („vie (ou vitalité) non-
organique‟) and pp. 6-10 („agencement‟)). (1) The basic notion of desiring-machines encompasses 
discontinuity (jumps and breaks), irregularities (breakdowns and misfiring), spurts of energies and 
responses (intermittences and short-circuits), and most importantly, different space and time concepts 
(distances and „crumbling‟) which are principles of dis-organization (or disparity). These descriptors 
follow Anti-Oedipus, part 1 „The desiring-machines‟ (Deleuze and Guattari 2004a, pp. 1-57). Such a 
functional model relies on the simultaneity of the discontinuous „actions‟ and is engulfed in a chaotic yet 
productive process which is not governed by a logical principle. In Anti-Oedipus, part 4, „Introduction to 
schizoanalysis‟ (Deleuze and Guattari 2004a, pp. 301-421) the relations between desiring-machines and 
the unconscious are emphasized. The desired anoedipal unconscious does away with repression (and thus 
abolishes the Freudian oedipal unconscious). The notion of desiring-machines replaces the idea of 
repressed elements re-appearing (according to Zourabichvili‟s reading of the text). In the appendix added 
to the second French edition of Anti-Oedipus, „Appendice: Bilan-programme pour machines désirantes‟  
(Deleuze and Guattari 2008a, pp. 463-87), in the English version „Balance-sheet program for desiring-
machines‟ (Guattari 1995b, Lotringer (ed.), pp. 119-50), desiring-machines are equated with the 
anoedipal unconscious. „Les machines désirantes constituent la vie non-oedipienne de l‟inconscient. 
Œdipe, gadget ou fantasme‟ (2008a, p. 468); „Desiring-machines constitute the non-oedipal life of the 
unconscious ‒ Oedipus being the gadget or phantasy‟ (1995b, Lotringer (ed.), p. 125). (2) The more 
complex notion of desiring-machines can be conveyed through their characteristics: the 1st characteristic: 
desiring-machines are productive and functional; 2nd characteristic: desiring-machines are inscribing, 
registering and recording effects; 3rd characteristic: a „residual subject‟ circulates within the desiring-
production; 4th characteristic: desiring-machines are paradoxical since they function by interruption; 5th 
characteristic: desiring-machines are of doubled or folded nature as private/familial and public/social 
desiring-machines; 6th characteristic (appearing in A thousand plateaus): desiring-machines combine to 
become assemblages of desire with preserved producitivity, functionality and characteristics. (3) Critique 
and comments on desiring-machines and assemblages of desire: Deleuze-Guattari‟s notion of desire runs 
counter to its psychoanalytic understanding since it is productive and creative, not staged and 
representative; desire expresses an experimental process; desire is machinic and not dream-imagery (in 
contrast to Freud‟s axiom of the dream as royal road to the (oedipal) unconscious; desire is processual and 
excess (in contrast to Lacan‟s axiom of desire as lack and infinite pursuit); desire is linked to becoming as 
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Why choose figures such as Schreber or Lenz who are classified in traditional 
psychoanalysis and psychiatry as clinical cases of psychosis, of deep mental 
disturbance? Schreber and Lenz are traditionally labelled either paranoiac or 
schizophrenic while the „Wolf-Man‟ and the „Rat-Man‟ figure as obsessional neurotics, 
with intimations of moving into psychotic states (as an aggravation of neurosis), and 
„Little Hans‟ goes through several stages of a progressive (horse) phobia triggered off 
by a disturbed oedipalization. The shared characteristic of these mental cases lies in the 
display of delirium, a state of over-excitation and raving traditionally classified as 
mental deviance and abnormality. Yet Deleuze-Guattari promote the stage of delirium 
as exemplary and noteworthy for undeniably demonstrating the inner processes of 
desire when they are in force.
11
 Deleuze-Guattari are well aware of the ill-defined 
boundaries between emotions and passions on the one hand (that is, expressions of 
affectivity) and ideas and thoughts on the other (that is, rational concepts). Thus a 
delirium may affect several layers or parts of the person, of their body and of their mind. 
In fact, by shifting their interest to the body and its affectivity, Deleuze-Guattari leap 
across the chasm of body and mind, and consequently for them the delirium and its 
affectivity adopts expressive and discursive functions.  
 
In the second case of delirium, as clinically defined, the thought often focuses on one 
emotional core, such as the idea of grandeur or personal greatness,
12
 feelings of guilt 
and culpability (for instance, in Büchner‟s Lenz or in Kafka), deep-running feelings of 
jealousy, or immersion into the feeling of persecution (paranoia as in Schreber or in 
Kafka). Psychoanalysis attempts to direct its cure at lifting the reasons for such mental 
disturbances to the level of consciousness, and making conscious the repressed and 
obscure underlying feelings, sexually originated and motivated, thus clearing the way to 
                                                                                                                                               
an affective trajectory (appearing in A thousand plateaus); desire is a response to the exterior (in contrast 
to the psychoanalytic understanding of desire originating in the interior); desire actualizes and enacts, 
produces encounters and „events‟. Cf. also the inspiring (if idiosyncratic) comments by Massumi in A 
user‟s guide to Capitalism and schizophrenia: Deviations from Deleuze und Guattari [1992] on Pleasures 
of philosophy; Force, Habit; Monstrosity (2003a). For another early statement see: „The autonomy of 
affect‟ [1995], Patton (ed.), 1996, pp. 217-40. Massumi anchors his work on affectivity in contemporary, 
cultural models to illustrate his ideas. More recent works ((ed.) 2002a), (2002b, pp. xi-xxxvii), and 
Parables for the virtual: Movement, affect, sensation (2003b/2002) where Massumi proposes a gradual 
system of virtuality. 
11
 Traditionally, in psychoanalysis and psychiatry, a delirium is characterized in two ways: as either the 
expression of great agitation caused by emotions up to a state where the person is overpowered and 
subdued by her/his emotions and passions; or, clinically defined, as a mental disturbance where the 
expression of ideas and thoughts becomes blurred and confused.  
12
 Megalomania as in Schreber, being impregnated by God as a woman, thus becoming the redeemer of 
the next world; or Nietzsche, also referred to by Deleuze-Guattari, following Klossowski.  
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„normality‟. Deleuze-Guattari, by contradistinction, re-direct their attention to the 
outpouring of the emotions as such, thus emphasizing the definition of delirium as 
„agitation‟, and appreciating the force of passions as a sign of the freed flow of desire. 
 
Deleuze-Guattari reconceptualize this second clinical orientation of the delirium (that is, 
a heightened state of affectivity) as demonstrating the stages of the development of the 
Body without Organs and thus of becoming. They undercut the medicalization and 
clinical status of the notion of delirium and sever the psychoanalytic link to the 
determining idea of a sexualized oedipal unconscious. Thus Oedipus has to be brought 
to a self-critique, that is, the systematic individual and social status of repression has to 
be uprooted from its inner anchorage (the concepts of oedipalized subjectivity, and with 
it sexuality, and the oedipal unconscious). The aspired status of an anoedipal 
unconscious, and consequently a re-written subjectivity and sexuality, grow out of the 
auto-critique. I propose that out of the polemical interrogation of psychoanalytic 
principles grows a new vision of libidinal forces which is grounded in the selected 
literary exemplars. Thus the function of the aesthetic figures is not that of referentiality 
but of forming a parallel account of literary creativity; they are demonstrating a 
delirious literary discourse. 
 
It is often not clear where exactly the borderlines between the displayed clinical 
symptoms of schizophrenia, paranoia (and associated psychoses) and neuroses
13
 should 
be drawn. Traditional psychiatry, as well as psychoanalysis which treats only the milder 
cases of neurosis, does not agree in all cases how and where to locate such symptoms 
and how to categorize these mental disturbances. This is not a problem for Deleuze-
Guattari since they are not working on the level of mental constructs but on that of 
corporeality and affectivity where the clinical symptoms are evaluated for their 
                                                 
13
 The traditional clinical sense of schizophrenia is described as a diminution or lack of affectivity, a 
coldness of feeling which is accompanied or followed by a withdrawal and detachment from the world 
around, leading to a preoccupation with the self and its inner processes, ideas, thoughts and images. This 
is at times described in terms of a progressive alienation, a dissociation of the person from its 
surroundings as well as an inner split in thinking and feeling. The discourse of the schizophrenic is 
affected by the state of alienation and becomes incoherent, double-layered or rather many-layered. This 
leads to a progressive fading of sentence patterns and fixed meanings which reflects the severed 
connections between person and surroundings. The clinical picture of paranoia, and associated psychoses, 
by contrast – but often overlapping with other symptoms – focuses on feeling persecuted, thus being 
mistrusting and insecure towards the world but also having an inflated self-esteem and showing sign of 
extreme egotism. Phobic neurosis also shows signs of alienation between the self and the world with an 
exaggerated focus on specific objects which instil fear, dread, and consequently a loss of self. 
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productivity of desiring-production and faculty as desiring-machines to establish a Body 
without Organs and build a creative (if odd and idiosyncratic) schizo. Deleuze-Guattari 
draw on the fuzziness of clinical categorizations for their own purposes and employ a 
cross-section of neurotic and psychotic symptoms to develop their libidinal theory. 
 
The schizo 
 
Judge Schreber “lived for a long time without a stomach, without intestines, almost without 
lungs, with a torn oesophagus, without a bladder, and with shattered ribs; he used sometimes to 
swallow part of his own larynx with his food, etc.” (Deleuze and Guattari 2004a, p. 9; quoting 
Freud [1911a] „The case of Schreber‟ (SE, vol. XII, pp. 1-83; p. 17)).14 
 
 
From the very start Deleuze-Guattari put the emphasis on heightened affectivity in 
Schreber: „Judge Schreber has sunbeams in his ass. A solar anus‟ (Deleuze and Guattari 
2004a, pp. 1-2); on the changes and shifts he experiences in the functionality of his 
organs and in his sexuality while, affectively, becoming a woman. His (assumed) lack 
of normality (that is, the expected functions of his organs and the anatomical status of 
his sexuality) is of no interest. Schreber is communicating with God whose rays enter 
him and draw pleasure from him. Büchner‟s Lenz, the second supporting conceptual 
persona for the schizo, is communicating with nature, the earth, the stones, and the 
heavens. The third supporting persona, Beckett‟s Molloy who feels he is born into this 
world by the „mother-anus-machine‟ (Deleuze and Guattari 2004a, p. 2), modifies 
himself for locomotion into a bicycle-machine. All three transgress their „human‟ status 
in body, mind, affectivity and aspirations with regard to their sexuality and their 
subjectivity. These variants or types of schizo outgrow their human corporeality, instead 
they feel and live through the intensities of their affects. They become for Deleuze-
Guattari demonstrative models of desiring-machines in action and in full production 
mode. Deleuze-Guattari measure the schizo by her/his faculty of desiring-production 
which takes the form of bodily changes and mental shifts but also affects their discourse 
in linguistic and verbal modifications. This is demonstrated in Artaud‟s „gasps and 
                                                 
14
 Choosing a case of paranoia (as assumed by Freudian psychoanalysis) such as Schreber‟s as their 
leading conceptual persona to develop the idea of the schizo is a provocative statement. The schizo is 
presented as the “homo natura” (Deleuze and Guattari 2004a, p. 5) and “homo historia” (p. 35) for 
establishing a „materialist psychiatry‟. It is a direct affront since it draws the psychoanalytic 
categorization of neuroses and psychoses into doubt and turns the meticulous Freudian speculations in the 
Schreber case, especially the attempted systematization, on its head. (Cf. Freud „The case of Schreber‟, III 
„On the mechanism of paranoia‟ (SE, vol. XII, pp. 59-79)). 
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cries‟ (Deleuze and Guattari 2004a, p. 10), „howls‟, „echolalia, the uttering of odd 
sounds, or sudden irrational outbursts‟ (Deleuze and Guattari 2004a, pp. 23-4). 
 
Yes, I have been my father and I have been my son. “I, Antonin Artaud, am my son, my father, 
my mother, and myself.” The schizo has his own system of co-ordinates for situating himself at 
his disposal, because, first of all, he has at his disposal his very own recording code, which does 
not coincide with the social code, or coincides with it only in order to parody it. The code of 
delirium or of desire proves to have an extraordinary fluidity. It might be said that the 
schizophrenic passes from one code to the other, that he deliberately scrambles all the codes, by 
quickly shifting from one to another, according to the questions asked him, never giving the 
same explanation from one day to the next, never invoking the same genealogy, never recording 
the same event in the same way (Deleuze and Guattari 2004a, p. 16; original emphases). 
 
The materialist psychiatry Deleuze-Guattari propose is not interested in the „artificial 
schizophrenic found in mental institutions‟ (Deleuze and Guattari 2004a, p. 5) but in the 
schizo engaged in desiring-production, who lives herself/himself the desiring-machine, 
bodily, mentally, and socially: „The schizophrenic is the universal producer‟ (Deleuze 
and Guattari 2004a, p. 7). Rather than viewing Schreber as a hypochondriac (“I live 
without organs”), a paranoiac (“Flechsig, that soul-murderer!”), a deluded 
megalomaniac (“I am in direct communication with God”) descending into a 
progressive delirium, for Deleuze-Guattari Schreber exemplifies the experiential, and 
existential, successive stages of the Body without Organs. Although Artaud has been 
credited with being the source for Deleuze-Guattari‟s concept of Body without Organs 
and features prominently at other instances in Anti-Oedipus,
15
 Schreber‟s case is 
                                                 
15
 Bell discusses the importance of Artaud in both Derrida‟s and Deleuze‟s work (respectively Deleuze-
Guattari‟s work) in following the evolution of the notion of the Body without Organs in Anti-Oedipus 
(Deleuze and Guattari 2004a, pp. 9-17, pp. 358-64) and A thousand plateaus, „Plateau 6: November 28, 
1947: „How to make yourself a Body without Organs?‟ (Deleuze and Guattari 2004b, pp. 165-84). Cf. 
chapter five „Thinking and the loss of system: Derrida and Deleuze on Artaud‟ (Bell 2006, pp. 142-74, 
esp. pp. 152-65). Derrida‟s thoughts on Artaud stretch from his essays in Writing and difference, for 
instance, „The theatre of cruelty and the closure of representation‟ (1978, pp. 232-50) and Margins of 
philosophy to The secret art of Antonin Artaud, for instance, „To unsense the subjectile‟ (1998, pp. 59-
157); Artaud le mômo: Interjections d‟appel [Artaud the kid: Calls (for help)] and two interviews, 
„Artaud et ses doubles‟ and „Les voix d‟Artaud‟ [„Artaud and his doubles‟, „The voices of Artaud‟] which  
are untranslated. For a comparison, with regard to „affinities‟ and „divergences‟ (Patton and Protevi‟s 
terms) of Derrida‟s and Deleuze‟s thought, cf. Lawlor „The beginnings of thought: the fundamental 
experience in Derrida and Deleuze‟ (Patton and Protevi (eds) 2003, pp. 67-83); DW Smith „Deleuze and 
Derrida, immanence and transcendence: Two directions in recent French thought‟ (Patton and Protevi 
(eds) 2003, pp. 46-66) and Patton and Protevi‟s „Introduction‟ (2003, pp. 1-14). Chiesa traces the hidden 
or so far not explored connections between Lacan and Artaud in „Lacan with Artaud: j‟ouïs-sens, jouis-
sens, jouis-sans‟ [„Lacan with Artaud: I hear-sense, enjoy-sense, enjoy-without : jouissance‟] (Žižek 
(ed.), 2006, pp. 336-64) [Chiesa refers to his work, 2001, Antonin Artaud, verso un corpo senza organi, 
Ombre Corte, Verona; Antonin Artaud, toward a body without organs]. For Artaud‟s writing see the 
selection by Sontag ((ed.), 1998). Some texts are collected in Artaud (trans. Richards, 1958) and Artaud 
(trans. Eshleman and Glass, 1982). Jamison (2007) provides some insights on Artaud‟s theory and 
practice. For the texts by Derrida referred to, see Writing and Difference (2009/1966): „Freud and the 
scene of writing‟ [1966] (trans. Bass, 2009a, pp. 246-91); „La parole soufflée‟ [1965] (trans. Bass, 2009b, 
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apparently employed to embody the evolution of the schizo in the three stages theorized 
by Deleuze-Guattari: the „paranoiac machine‟ (Deleuze and Guattari 2004a, p. 10) as 
form of repulsion of affects, the „miraculating machine‟ (Deleuze and Guattari 2004a, 
pp. 11-3) as form of attraction of affects, and the final concluding stage of the Body 
without Organs, the „celibate machine‟ (Deleuze and Guattari 2004a, pp. 19-20) as the 
stage of enjoyment, or voluptuousness, an equivalent to Lacanian jouissance.
16
 
 
The three stages of the progressive establishment of the Body without Organs, in the 
affective modes of the paranoiac, the miraculating and the celibate, perform the shift 
away from the psychoanalytic perception of subjectivity linked to sexuality and the 
unconscious as evolving from the repression of unacceptable sexual content. The 
affective modes are themselves conceptualized as desiring-machines. These three types 
of desiring-machines lead to a new vision of corporeality in the Body without Organs, a 
„strange subject … with no fixed identity, wandering over the body without organs but 
always remaining peripheral to the desiring-machines‟ (Deleuze and Guattari 2004a, p. 
18)
17
 and the production of „intensities‟ (Deleuze and Guattari 2004a, p. 20). I propose 
that Deleuze-Guattari‟s libido theory can be anchored in this vision of corporeality 
which they express in the triangular relations of libido-numen-voluptas (Deleuze and 
Guattari 2004a, p. 18) standing in for desiring-machines („drives‟), the Body without 
Organs and jouissance.
18
 Thus, the three syntheses of the unconscious ‒ connection to 
produce, disjunction to record and conjunction to consume or consummate ‒ allow in 
                                                                                                                                               
pp. 212-45); „Structure, Sign, and Play in the Discourse of the Human Sciences‟ [1966] (trans. Bass, 
2009c, pp. 351-70) and „The theatre of cruelty and the closure of representation‟ [1966] (trans. Bass,  
2009d, pp. 292-316).                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                     
16
 „Returning yet again to the case of Judge Schreber, we note that he is vividly aware of this fact: the rate 
of cosmic sexual pleasure remains constant, so that God will find a way of taking his pleasure with 
Schreber, even if in order to do so Schreber must transform himself into a woman. But Schreber 
experiences only a residual share of this pleasure, as a recompense for his suffering or as a reward for his 
becoming-woman. “„On the other hand, God demands a constant state of enjoyment […] and it is my duty 
to provide him with this […] in the shape of the greatest possible [output] [generation] of spiritual 
voluptuousness. And if, in this process, a little sensual pleasure falls to my share, I feel justified in 
accepting it as some slight compensation for the inordinate measure of suffering and privation that has 
been mine for so many past years‟ (p. 283)”‟ (Deleuze and Guattari 2004a, pp. 17-8; Freud „The case of 
Schreber‟ (SE, vol. XII, p. 34, quoting from Schreber‟s autobiography, 1903, p. 283)). This is a three 
times removed persona Schreber who becomes the notional form of the schizo since Deleuze-Guattari 
quote from Freud‟s selected quotes from Schreber‟s autobiography (which is a heavily censored edition 
of the actually written version). I cannot here follow the discursive implications.  
17
 There is no consistency in the Deleuze-Guattari‟s and Deleuze‟s texts between Body without Organs 
and body without organs. In A thousand plateaus Deleuze-Guattari use BwOs. I keep to the full and 
capitalized version except where I quote from the texts. Guattari also uses in his (French) texts: corps 
sans organe (that is „a body without any organ‟, in the singular). 
18
 Deleuze proposes in Difference and repetition a corresponding triangular model to which I return later. 
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the final stage of desiring-production a residual energy, a larval subject, which is driven 
by desire and passes through the stages in a nomadic manner of continuous becoming 
(Deleuze and Guattari 2004a, pp. 20-1). What is taking place here is a shift to 
conceptualize a libidinal theory where its discursive elements (affectivity expressed) are 
described as productive desiring-machines that are the fore-runners of literary machines 
which I explore later.   
 
Deleuze-Guattari do not meddle with the Freudian report of the Schreber case study. 
Quite to the contrary, they keep to the chronological order and to the extraordinary 
precision of Schreber‟s later autobiographical report of his suffering, his 
„hallucinations‟ in the states of heightened „nervous excitation‟. They follow the 
patterns of delirium or desire in his bouts of „illness‟.19 Schreber‟s auto-portraiture 
describes him as „a man of superior mental gifts and endowed with an unusual keenness 
of intellect and of observation‟ (Freud „The case of Schreber‟ (SE, vol. XII, p. 10), 
quoting from Schreber‟s autobiography (1903, p. 35)). Schreber never loses his mental 
alertness or his rational clarity throughout his illness; instead, he mocks his own 
troubles and points to the utter absurdity of his own constructs while at the same time 
insisting on their truth and correctness. For Deleuze-Guattari this demonstrates that 
psychoanalytic analysis as neurosis or psychosis is misplaced. In fact the case history 
records the first bout of illness as tolerable „hypochondria‟ (Freud „The case of 
Schreber‟ (SE, vol. XII, p. 10)). For Deleuze-Guattari this clearly indicates that 
Schreber experiences a changed relationship to his own body (not his mind). These 
hypochondrial ideas centre on the feeling of a softening of his brain such that he might 
die soon. Sensory, visual and auditory illusions overcome him, dominating his feeling 
and his thought, accompanied by a great sensitivity to light and noise and painful 
sleeplessness. For Deleuze-Guattari this heightened body awareness points to the first 
bands of intensities on the Body without Organs, not to clinical hypochondria. This is 
confirmed when early on the idea of becoming a woman arises, although in a dream and 
declared absurd and rejected by the conscious Schreber: “[T]hat after all it really must 
be very nice to be a woman submitting to the act of copulation” (Freud „The case of 
                                                 
19 Schreber „experiences‟ three separate stages, „bouts of illness‟, at age 42-43, 51-60 and 65-69, which 
Freud evaluates as progressive (and worsening) bouts while in Deleuze-Guattari‟s view these phases 
encompass the progressive (positive) constitution of the Body without Organs and thus are signs of 
affirmative affectivity: Schreber „produces‟ (while suffering) a new corporeality with heightened 
sensitivity.  
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Schreber‟ (SE, vol. XII, p. 13), quoting from Schreber‟s autobiography (1903, p. 36)). 
Schreber suffers from believing that he is dead and decomposing. He knows his body is 
terribly abused, yet believes that there is most likely a „holy purpose‟ (Freud „The case 
of Schreber‟ (SE, vol. XII, p. 13)) behind the torture. 
 
In the next stage of his transformation „delusional ideas‟ take a „mystical and religious 
character‟ (Freud „The case of Schreber‟ (SE, vol. XII, p. 14)): now he is in direct 
communication with God, he has „miraculous apparitions‟ (Freud „The case of 
Schreber‟ (SE, vol. XII, p. 14), quoting from Schreber‟s autobiography (1903, p. 380))  
and, in his psychiatrist‟s as well as Freud‟s understanding, he has moved from 
hypochondria and acute psychosis into the aggravated stage of paranoia. His former 
physician Professor Flechsig turns into his hated „soul-murderer‟ (Freud „The case of 
Schreber‟ (SE, vol. XII, p. 14), quoting from Schreber‟s autobiography (1903, p. 383)). 
For Deleuze-Guattari, in their theory of the evolution of the schizo, of desiring-
production, desiring-machines and Body without Organs, and in the frame of their 
developing libidinal theory, this transition means moving from the stage of the 
paranoiac to that of the miraculating machine. They describe the „paranoiac‟ mode as 
dealing with torture, darkness and the ancient Law (Freud „The case of Schreber‟ (SE, 
vol. XII, p. 19)), while the miraculating mode deals with miracles of desire and bursts of 
affectivity (Freud „The case of Schreber‟ (SE, vol. XII, p. 11)).20  
 
This last stage encompasses in Deleuze-Guattari‟s libidinal theory the completion of the 
Body without Organs or, as they also name it, the „celibate‟ machine which is conceived 
as auto-erotic and ecstatic, a state of intensities. 
 
                                                 
20
 Schreber‟s psychiatrist (as well as Freud) note that Schreber‟s intelligence is not impaired, his mind 
quite collected and his memory excellent despite some small (well handled) bodily symptoms and (well 
controlled) „pathological ideas‟. Despite the open acceptance of his „mission‟ (to be the world saviour) his 
court appeal for release from the asylum was granted. „He believed that he had a mission to redeem the 
world and to restore it to its lost state of bliss. This, however, he could only bring about if he were first 
transformed from a man into a woman‟ (p. 16; p. 475). This transformation may take years, decades or 
centuries, and will be executed by means of miracles (p. 17) which have been working on his body for 
years and make him an exceptional human being. The expected femaleness is accepted and welcomed as 
a distinction since he can be impregnated by God to create a new race of men and restore lost bliss to the 
world. All around him miraculous things happen (p. 17; p. 368) and the sun, the trees and birds – which 
are “bemiracled residues of former human souls” – speak to him in human accents. Freud‟s fascination 
with this enigmatic (and unresolvable) case reverberates in Deleuze-Guattari‟s equally captivating 
deliberations. 
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Further, if we are to believe Judge Schreber‟s doctrine, attraction and repulsion produce intense 
nervous states that fill up the body without organs to varying degrees – states through which 
Schreber-the-subject passes, becoming a woman and many other things as well, following an 
endless circle of eternal return. The breasts on the judge‟s naked torso are neither / delirious nor 
hallucinatory phenomena: they designate, first of all, a band of intensity, a zone of intensity on 
his body without organs. The body without organs is an egg: it is crisscrossed with axes and 
thresholds, with latitudes and longitudes and geodesic lines, traversed by gradients marking the 
transitions and the becomings, the destinations of the subject developing along these particular 
vectors. Nothing is here representative; rather it is all life and lived experience (Deleuze and 
Guattari 2004a, pp. 20-1). 
 
Noticeably, the subject – if there is one to speak of – is always peripheral to the Body 
without Organs and the desiring-machines.
21
 Overall, the Schreber case offers a first full 
portrait of a discursive rendering of creative delirious unconscious in full production 
mode. Deleuze-Guattari‟s rewriting of the Schreber case is in fact a form of libidinal 
practice, which is diagnostic, critical-clinical, symptomatological and schizoid. It can 
thus function as an experimental model for my intended differential desiring practice.  
 
The Body without Organs 
 
Deleuze-Guattari point to an apparent conflict between productive routines and the 
Body without Organs struggling against any organization which might strangle it 
(Deleuze and Guattari 2004a, p. 9). The Body without Organs resists the establishment 
of functioning that is purposeful organs: „the body without organs presents its smooth, 
slippery, opaque, taut surface as a barrier‟ (Deleuze and Guattari 2004a, p. 10). Its 
resistance takes the shape of „a counterflow of amorphous, undifferentiated fluid‟ 
(Deleuze and Guattari 2004a, p. 10). Beside corporeal struggle on the affective plane, 
the resistance of the Body without Organs de-constructs and rejects linguistic coding on 
                                                 
21
 Buchanan‟s reader‟s guide to Anti-Oedipus (2008) sets out to provide „practical Deleuzism‟ and to give 
answers to questions raised in Deleuzism (2000), in particular, can Deleuze-Guattari‟s proposed reversal 
of stuck (psychoanalytic) desire by means of a task-monitored schizoanalysis be achieved, practised and 
demonstrated: does it work and if so, how does it work? As such the reader‟s guide (also indexed under 
„social psychiatry‟ and „social aspects of schizophrenia‟ and „of capitalism‟) takes up the political (and 
dialectical) baton from Deleuzism but also revives reading the original (challenging) text (rather than 
pursuing yet another interpretation). The close reading reveals the multiple ties between Deleuze-
Guattari‟s Anti-Oedipus and Deleuze‟s Difference and repetition (for instance in the threefold syntheses) 
as well as the impact of Guattari‟s work. The three-pronged section on further reading (psychoanalysis: 
Freud, Lacan, Bettelheim, Klein, Reich; historical materialism: Marx, Nietzsche, Foucault, Sartre, Fanon, 
Turner; literature: Artaud, DH Lawrence, Proust, Beckett, Büchner, S Butler) provides access to one layer 
of the rich source text and re-opens the debate on the enmeshing of private and public desiring-production 
as proposed by Deleuze-Guattari which I cannot fully pursue in the frame of this thesis. Despite its title 
pointing to an inquiry into the function of the unconscious in Deleuze‟s work, Kerslake (2007) does not 
consider either Anti-Oedipus or A thousand plateaus but rather ventures into a search for the historical  
(and in parts genealogical) sources Deleuze might (or might not) have consulted for his projects (for 
instance, Malfatto (an early interest of Deleuze).  
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the phonetic-linguistic plane in expressing itself only in „gasps and cries that are sheer 
unarticulated blocks of sound‟ (Deleuze and Guattari 2004a, p. 10). The processes 
described here are those of a new discursive regime which is affectively propelled and 
linguistically registered, yet encompasses auditory and sensory elements which escape 
critical criticism but can be captured by the proposed differential desiring practice. 
 
The struggle between Body without Organs and desiring-machines occurs at the 
borderline between the psychic and somatic functioning and thus corresponds, as 
Deleuze-Guattari point out, to the postulated Freudian processes of „primary repression‟ 
(and secondary repression later hooking on these patterns). Rather than theorizing a 
„counter-cathexis‟ or contrary investment of libido or desire, as formulated by Freud, 
Deleuze-Guattari reformulate the psychic libidinal battle within their construct of the 
threefold modes and functioning of desiring-machines. 
 
The first stage of connection between the schizo-in-progress and her/his „surrounds‟ is 
thus the Body without Organs‟s repulsion of desiring-machines. The paranoiac reaction 
following the experience of persecution is a reflection of the desiring-machines 
invading and breaking into the Body without Organs which repels them. According to 
Deleuze-Guattari, the opposition between the corporeal forces of the productive 
desiring-machines and the non-productive stasis of the Body without Organs evokes the 
libidinal modes and their functioning better than the Freudian assumption of a 
separation of mind and body. What is observed in the psychiatric clinical sense as 
disturbances primarily of the mind which then affect the body, is for Deleuze-Guattari 
the reverse: the resistance, and in a sense final victory, of the Body without Organs, 
once its tolerance level is surpassed, is the dis-sociation and withdrawal from being 
overridden by desiring-production. 
 
Here Deleuze-Guattari draw a parallel between the („individual‟) Body without Organs 
and the socius, their term for the social-political agent,
22
 so as to evoke the „taut-
                                                 
22
 The socius can take the form of the „body of the earth‟, „of the tyrant‟, or „of capital‟, within their 
historical-political model. For the social-political implications which I cannot here entered into, see,  
for instance, EW Holland (Kaufman and Heller (eds), 1998, pp. 65-73) who examines Deleuze-Guattari‟s 
schizophrenic double-bind of social control; Jameson (Buchanan (ed.), 1999, pp. 13-36) exploring the 
(potential) Marxist angles in Deleuze and Deleuze-Guattari; Alliez (Fuglsang and Sǿrensen (eds), 2006, 
pp. 135-68) considering the relations between arts and politics thirty years after the publication of Anti-
Oedipus and Patton (Boundas (ed.), 2009, pp. 187-203) who investigates the pragmatic aspects of 
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surface‟ powers of the Body without Organs once it accesses an uninterrupted process. 
Purely on the level of a phenomenological parallel and not claiming any mutual, or a 
priori, relations of desiring-production and social production, „the socius as a full body 
forms a surface where all production is recorded, whereupon the entire process appears 
to emanate from this recording surface‟ (Deleuze and Guattari 2004a, p. 11). The 
parallel between the („individual‟) libidinal and the („social‟) libidinal Body without 
Organs highlights some features of their modes and functioning: connective „surface‟ 
structures are constituted which record the „process of production‟ and over which 
„forces‟ are distributed. In a miraculous way, „[s]ociety constructs its own delirium by 
recording the process of production‟ (Deleuze and Guattari 2004a, p. 11). The libidinal 
processes „delude‟ or even reverse and finally do away with cause and effect, giving in 
to the machinic. It may appear as if within the threefold construct of the evolution of the 
schizo the (connecting) paranoid stage of repulsion is followed by the (recording) 
miraculating stage of attraction, and then on to the (consuming-consummating) 
voluptuous stage of jouissance, but these stages are co-existing. 
 
The body without organs, the unproductive, the unconsumable, serves as a surface for the 
recording of the entire process of production of desire, so that the desiring-machines seem to 
emanate from it in the apparent objective movement that establishes a relationship between the 
machines and the body without organs. […] So true it is that the schizo practices political 
economy, and that all sexuality is a matter of economy (Deleuze and Guattari 2004a, pp. 12-3). 
 
If then the schizo is the model for Deleuze-Guattari‟s libidinal theory, the Body without 
Organs the postulated „recording‟, that is responsive surface, and the desiring-machines 
the unbeatable corporeal productive „life-forces‟, where does this leave the Freudian 
oedipal construct? Deleuze-Guattari rhetorically express their doubt: „does the recording 
of desire go by way of the various stages in the formation of the Oedipus complex?‟ 
(Deleuze and Guattari 2004a, p. 15). The concept of the Body without Organs 
overcomes the idea of a permanently inscribed („repressed‟) interiorized oedipalized 
desire. In particular, the interfering process of sexual differentiation and gendering ‒ or 
in the Lacanian construct, the process of sexuation ‒ is altogether taken out of the 
equation. Thus in Deleuze-Guattari‟s thought, the Freudian repressive and castrative 
                                                                                                                                               
Deleuze and Deleuze-Guattari which amounts in his view to them assuming „the speaking position of […] 
practical ethicist‟ as if „in response to Foucault‟s provocation‟ (in the preface to Anti-Oedipus naming it 
„a book of ethics‟) (Boundas (ed.), 2009, p. 193). Cf. Foucault „Introduction‟ [1972] (2004b, pp. xiii-xvi).  
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cycle has little explanatory and practical value, especially by comparison to the libidinal 
powers of desiring-machines. 
 
For desiring-machines are the fundamental category of the economy of desire; they produce a 
body without organs all by themselves, and make no distinction between agents and their own 
parts, or between the relations of production and their own relations, or between the social order 
and technology. Desiring-machines are both technical and social (Deleuze and Guattari 2004a, p. 
35).  
 
Although they keep at bay a strict equation of desiring-production and social 
production, Deleuze-Guattari view the various types of libidinal persona, such as the 
neurotic, the pervert, the psychotic, the Oedipus, the schizo, within the parallel 
structures of material production on the libidinal and the social plane. Deleuze-Guattari 
introduce the concept of (modern) territoriality in the sense of libidinal and social 
fixation so that they can propose that the neurotic finds himself „trapped within the 
residual or artificial territorialities of our society‟ (Deleuze and Guattari 2004a, p. 37), 
reduced „to Oedipus as the ultimate territoriality‟ (Deleuze and Guattari 2004a, p. 37). 
In contrast, they can claim that the schizo has some chance for reconnecting with life.  
 
As for the schizo, continually wandering about, migrating here, there, and everywhere as best he 
can, plunges further and further into the realm of deterritorialization, reaching the furthest limits 
of the decomposition of the socius on the surface of his own body without organs. It may well be 
that these peregrinations are the schizo‟s own particular way of rediscovering the earth (Deleuze 
and Guattari 2004a, p. 38). 
 
The schizo is thus the potential outsider, perhaps one small step ahead of the (clinically 
defined) schizophrenic. 
 
The schizophrenic deliberately seeks out the very limit of capitalism: he is its inherent tendency 
brought to fulfilment, its surplus product, its proletariat, and its exterminating angel. He 
scrambles all the codes and is the transmitter of the decoded flows of desire. The real continues 
to flow (Deleuze and Guattari 2004a, p. 38). 
 
As Oedipus has to be brought to his self-critique, the task of his alter redeeming ego, the 
schizo, is conjoined to the libidinal task in both senses, individually and socially since 
„Schizophrenia is desiring-production as the limit of social production‟ (Deleuze and 
Guattari 2004a, p. 38). If there is a connection, then it may be conceived in terms of an 
„ongoing process of becoming that is the becoming of reality‟ (Deleuze and Guattari 
2004a, p. 38).  
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At this point, I want to turn to the exploration of the further stages of Deleuze-Guattari‟s 
evolving libidinal theory in A thousand plateaus.
23
 In accordance with its essayistic 
style Deleuze-Guattari do not explore the concept of the Body without Organs within 
the frame of their libidinal theory as in Anti-Oedipus. Rather they set out an 
experimental program: „Plateau 6: November 28, 1947: How do you make yourself a 
body without organs?‟ (Deleuze and Guattari 2004b, pp. 165-84) with an emphasis on 
practical observations from widely diverse cultural and historical backgrounds.
24
 The 
(approximate) recording date for Artaud‟s work „To have done with the judgement of 
God‟ (Deleuze and Guattari 2004b, p. 166, pp. 175-6, p. 181), November 28, 1947, 
marks the chronology for Plateau 6 which can thus be viewed as a belated eulogy and 
homage to Artaud.
25
 Deleuze-Guattari‟s sources for their exposition of how to 
experiment with establishing a Body without Organs are literary and psychoanalytic. 
They draw on the Schreber case, explored earlier, on some Lacanian notions such as the 
difference between desire, pleasure and jouissance, but shift their attention to Artaud‟s 
literary version of his experimentation with drugs such as peyote (while living in 
Mexico with the tribe of the Tarahumaras) and the contemporary popular Indian 
adventures of Don Juan as related by Castaneda (Tales of power 1974, pp. 179-80). 
Several levels of experimentation intersect in these instances, testing the capacity of the 
body to its limits of endurance and pain in the case of masochism, or exercising a 
deliberate and masterful libidinal control, in the case of taoist avoidance of orgasm and 
ejaculation, and self-denial and abstinence in the case of courtly „love‟. In the case of 
reports on drugs altering the experience of mind and body Deleuze-Guattari accept the 
openings but with caution. These practical observations of corporeal „techniques‟ allow 
for a speculative access to the borderline between the mind and the body in order to 
                                                 
23
 Cf. for comments and evaluations on A thousand plateaus: Deleuze „On A thousand plateaus‟ (1995, 
pp. 25-34); Deleuze „Eight years later: 1980 interview‟ (2006g, pp. 175-80); Deleuze „Preface to the 
Italian edition of A thousand plateaus‟ [for Passerone] (2006g, pp. 308-11); Passerone translated A 
thousand plateaus into Italian in 1987. Further statements: Massumi (2003a/1992), Carl-Haerle ((ed.) 
1993). 
24
 Deleuze-Guattari utilize (western) masochistic (and sadistic) practices (2004b, pp. 167-8, pp. 172-3) in 
the form of a pastiche of Lyotard‟s Libidinal economy which responded to Deleuze-Guattari‟s Anti-
Oedipus, and with a wink to Deleuze‟s own work on Sacher-Masoch; western medieval rites of (platonic) 
courtly „love‟ (pp. 173-4); eastern medieval ascetic sexual practices in taoism and confucianism (p. 174); 
experimentation with drugs in Burroughs (Naked lunch, p. 166, p. 170; Speed, p. 169) and in Artaud‟s 
works Héliogabale and Les Tarahumaras (2004b, p. 175). There are multiple cross-connections between 
the work of Lyotard and Deleuze (and Deleuze-Guattari), in particular, Lyotard (1971, 1988/1983 and as 
a pastiche to Anti-Oedipus, Libidinal economy (trans. Grant, 2004/1974). For guidance, see Malpas 
(2002); Crome and J Williams ((eds), 2005) and J Williams (2005b, 2005c) on Lyotard. 
25
 The broadcast was prohibited because of its outrageous composition (extreme emotions, disturbing 
sounds, blasphemy). Artaud died four months later. 
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trace the patterns of intensities which characterize the surface of the Body without 
Organs. If experimentation furthers insight into somatic states, Deleuze-Guattari assume 
that the Body without Organs exists prior to its acknowledgment since the living body 
desires. 
 
The BwO is desire; it is that which one desires and by which one desires. And not only because 
it is the plane of consistency or the field of immanence of desire. Even when it falls into the void 
of too sudden destratification, or into the proliferation of a cancerous stratum, it is still desire. 
Desire stretches that far; desiring one‟s own annihilation, or desiring the power to annihilate. 
Money, army, police, and State desire, fascist desire, even fascism is desire. There is desire 
whenever there is the constitution of the BwO under one relation or another. It is a problem not 
of ideology but of pure matter, a phenomenon of physical, biological, psychic, social, or cosmic 
matter (Deleuze and Guattari 2004b, p. 183; abbreviation of BwO in the original translation). 
 
Plateau 6 sets out in a programmatic manner to develop what I shall term Deleuze-
Guattari‟s schizoid libidinal theory. Although titled in a probing and questioning way: 
„How do you make yourself a body without organs?‟, it lays out an experimental 
practice, „a set of practices‟ (Deleuze and Guattari 2004b, p. 166) rather than 
constructing a notion of the Body without Organs around the conceptual persona of the 
schizo in its incarnations as in Anti-Oedipus. Here Deleuze-Guattari‟s approach to 
desiring-production takes the form of making yourself a Body without Organs, an 
effortless undertaking since it is the founding principle of desire: „you can‟t desire 
without making one (a Body without Organs) […] it is the shape desire takes by 
necessity‟ (Deleuze and Guattari 2004b, p. 166). Since it is a practice, or a set of 
practices, each of us has access to and can achieve one or several Body without Organs. 
 
The affective experimentation with the Body without Organs focuses on the borderline 
between mind and body, the psycho-somatic realm; thus the exploration even of 
„botched experiments‟26 of achieving only an empty Body without Organs, such as is 
                                                 
26
 The notion of „botching‟ the practice, the danger involved in the set of practices and the routines of 
experimentation is repeatedly emphasized. „And it (BwO) awaits you; it is an inevitable exercise or 
experimentation, […] This is not reassuring, because you can botch it‟ (Deleuze and Guattari 2004b, p. 
166). „What happened? Were you cautious enough? Not wisdom, caution. In doses. As a rule immanent 
to experimentation: injections of caution. Many have been defeated in this battle‟ (Deleuze and Guattari 
2004b, p. 167). „It is a very delicate experimentation since there must not be any stagnation of the modes 
or slippage in type: the masochist and the drug user court these ever-present dangers that empty their 
BwO‟s instead of filling them‟ (Deleuze and Guattari 2004b, p. 169). While on the one hand the maker of 
the Body without Organs has to deal with the dangers of lacking control in intensity, on the other hand, 
the person in the hand of the psychoanalyst encounters the „royal botching‟ of the BwO: „The BwO is 
what remains when you take everything away. What you take away is precisely the phantasy, and 
signifiances and subjectifications as a whole. Psychoanalysis does the opposite: it translates everything 
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the case in the paranoid or masochist Body without Organs, is useful for gaining insight 
into the process of completion. A decision needs to be made, a choice taken and risks 
and dangers cannot completely be avoided since the making of the Body without 
Organs is viewed as a limit experience: „it can be terrifying, and lead you to your death‟ 
(Deleuze and Guattari 2004b, p. 166). This might indicate that Deleuze-Guattari start 
from the psychoanalytic principle of the death drive or instinct, however, as will be 
seen, this is only a very preliminary starting position for the practice they have in mind. 
To make yourself a Body without Organs approaches a vital principle which is part of 
our corporeality but, as I read it, apparently the demanded threshold crossing interferes 
with the preserving principles of the „normal‟ body where the threshold is set by 
corporeal guardians (for instance in the form of self-preservation and self-defense). The 
line between life and death is opened: „It is nondesire as well as desire‟ (Deleuze and 
Guattari 2004b, p. 166). Here Deleuze-Guattari introduce the logical structure of the 
paradox, inclusive disjunction where „either‟ and „or‟ co-exist and function purposefully 
at the same time. Nondesire can here be read as death, submission to nonlife; on the 
processual level cause and effect are reversible. If the process of making yourself a 
Body without Organs is death and life, it is bound neither to corporeality nor to any 
mental constructs.  
 
Plateau 6 is thus about demonstrating the possibilities of gaining access to this set of 
affective practices and about the caution and care needed as such a practice deals with 
the dangers of unforeseen encounters whose unpredictability demands discipline. While 
the first characteristic is that desire takes the form of the Body without Organs, the 
second characteristic, according to Deleuze-Guattari, is that the Body without Organs 
cannot be attained.
27
 Desire (as having the unattainable form of the Body without 
Organs) eventuates as becoming which is being involved in the process of attaining (but 
not reaching the attainment) since „it is a limit‟ (Deleuze and Guattari 2004b, p. 166). 
Liminality then and striving for the unattainable accompany the unforeseen and 
unpredictable nature and outcome of making yourself a Body without Organs.
28
 
                                                                                                                                               
into phantasies, it converts everything into phantasy, it retains the phantasy. It royally botches the real, 
because it botches the BwO‟ (Deleuze and Guattari 2004b, p. 168). 
27
 This approaches the Lacanian idea of desire as forever postponed in fulfilment and being part of the 
unreachable Real. 
28
 The notion of  liminality can be viewed as an offspring of the Lacanian (third) order of the Real and 
Deleuze-Guattari hint as much at this when calling the Body without Organs at one point the Real. The 
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As a third characteristic, the Body without Organs is not determined as substance but 
rather as a principle of connectivity, as mobility, as a surface display, or a surface in 
inter-connected plateaus.
29
 Deleuze-Guattari make the point that the Body without 
Organs is a surface on which you (as „subject‟) can be situated, which distances it from 
any understanding of corporeality, embodiment or „bodiness‟. The activities of „the 
human‟ executed on this „surface‟ as Body without Organs are not endearing: „scurrying 
like a vermin‟ (Deleuze and Guattari 2004b, p. 166) is reminiscent of cockroaches 
flitting away needing to run for cover, being hunted down. „[G]roping like a blind 
person‟ (Deleuze and Guattari 2004b, p. 166) suggests disorientation; „running like a 
lunatic: desert traveler and nomad of the steppes‟ (Deleuze and Guattari 2004b, p. 166) 
evokes the lack of goal, pointing to running, travelling and open-ended movement.
30
 We 
are blind, in the dark; we have a limited comprehension of the „surface‟ as Body 
without Organs. Nevertheless, all our lived and experienced activities such as sleeping, 
living, fighting, experiencing happiness and defeat, loving, eventuates on the Body 
without Organs which is, in Deleuze-Guattari‟s vision, stretched out as surface where 
desires as fluctuations of affects take place. The Body without Organs then is a difficult 
and complex model of affectivity, attached to corporeality but not identical with it. 
Deleuze-Guattari express a certain dismay about the insignificance of human activities 
by comparison to the intensities on the Body without Organs.
31
 
 
Nevertheless experimentation in achieving the Body without Organs takes place, 
although often going astray. Deleuze-Guattari point to a line-up of examples, „a long 
procession‟ of mostly clinical cases (as to be expected) and some literary, drug-related 
examples (Artaud, Burroughs, Castaneda), all of which demonstrate a prevalent social 
                                                                                                                                               
Lacanian third order of the Real points to that which cannot be reached but it is nevertheless determining 
the other orders (the Imaginary and the Symbolic). 
29
 Deleuze-Guattari follow here Bateson Steps to an ecology of the mind (2000/1972) 
30
 Here is the first indication of spaces, territory and desert/steppes with the notion of the nomadic which 
is attached to the libidinal pursuit of achieving the Body without Organs. The full introductory evocation 
of the Body without Organs reads: „People ask, So what is this BwO? ‒ But you‟re already on it, 
scurrying like a vermin, groping like a blind person, or running like a lunatic: desert traveler and nomad 
of the steppes. On it we sleep, live our waking lives, fight ‒ fight and are fought ‒ seek our place, 
experience untold happiness and fabulous defeats; on it we penetrate and are penetrated; on it we love‟ 
(Deleuze and Guattari 2004a, p. 166). 
31
 Pointing to the example of Artaud, they demonstrate the opposition of the „corpus‟ as Body without 
Organs and the socius as the regulated social body, the biological and the political, and also intimate the 
social control taking place and the (necessary) struggle against the forbiddenness of experimentation. 
Artaud‟s aborted radio production makes the censorship and repression of his work, the refusal to 
broadcast his admittedly shocking, unnerving and „unsuitable‟ experimentation the prime example of the 
(true) „schizophrenic‟ state of affairs. 
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misjudgment and skewed „evaluation‟. Five historically repeated misadventures of 
„empty‟ Body without Organs are presented: the hypochondriac body (the case of 
imagined, imaginary bodily illness); the paranoid body (feeling persecuted); the schizo 
body (lost in clinical catatonia); the drugged body (left in limbo) and the masochist 
body (which is still poorly understood and misinterpreted in Deleuze-Guattari‟s opinion 
but, as will be seen, becomes central for the understanding of the „practice‟ of making 
yourself a Body without Organs). 
 
In the case of the hypochondriac body the process has gone too far, while in the case of 
the paranoid body the exchange between inside and outside energies has been lost. In 
both cases it is the metabolism which becomes symptomatic of the dis-organization of 
the organs which has taken place but has not been held in check. In the case of the 
schizo subdued and stalled in catatonia, the internal struggle is going on but halted. 
Deleuze-Guattari treat the masochist body as their master example and an exemplary 
case of experimentation, especially since it is in their opinion unduly misrepresented. 
Masochism
32
 is in their view fundamentally a question of the Body without Organs and 
                                                 
32
 Deleuze-Guattari‟s doubts about the psychoanalytic evaluation of masochism sets another milestone in 
their shattering of established Freudian hypotheses. They propose that masochism is a case of affectivity 
in the sense of the Body without Organs which runs counter to Freud‟s understanding of masochism and 
sadomasochism, and the possible reversal of sadism and masochism. Both, sadism and masochism are 
also entangled in Freud‟s thought with the death instincts (Todestriebe), another complex and shifting 
problematic in his work. According to Laplanche-Pontalis (2006, pp. 97-103) „[I]n the framework of the 
final Freudian theory of the instincts, this is the name given to a basic category: the death instincts, which 
are opposed to the life instincts, strive towards the reduction of tensions to zero-point. In other words, 
their goal is to bring the living back to the inorganic state. […] The death instincts are to begin with 
directed inwards and tend towards self-destruction, but they are subsequently turned towards the outside 
world in the form of aggressive or destructive instinct‟ (p. 97). These comments mark the 1920s turning 
point in Freud‟s thought (Beyond the pleasure principle (SE, vol. XVIII, pp. 7-64). The destructive 
instinct towards inside can be read as masochism while the outward bound destructive instinct can be 
viewed as representing sadism while at the same time functioning as the instinct for mastery or will to 
power. However, it is not easily conceived of a death instinct played out in erotism which assumes two 
instinctual categories, of libido and destruction (or Eros and Thanatos). Laplanche and Pontalis finish 
with an obscure comment which demonstrates the opaqueness of the problematic: „Nevertheless, even 
though it is possible to recognise the death instinct as a new guise for a basic and constant sine qua non of 
Freudian thought, it must be emphasised that its introduction does embody a new conceptual departure: 
the death instinct makes the destructive tendency, as revealed for example in sado-masochism, into an 
irreducible datum; it is furthermore the chosen expression of the most fundamental principle or [sic, of] 
psychical functioning; and lastly, in so far as it is „the essence of the instinctual‟, it binds every wish, 
whether aggressive or sexual, to the wish for death‟ (p. 103). The Freudian source texts dealing with 
several aspects of this problematic are: An outline of psycho-analysis (SE, vol. XXIII), Beyond the 
pleasure principle (SE, vol. XVIII, pp. 7-64), „The economic problem of masochism‟ (SE, vol. XIX), 
„Instincts and their vicissitudes‟ (SE, vol. XIV), Civilisation and its discontents (SE, vol. XXI), 
Inhibitions, symptoms and anxiety (SE, vol. XX), The ego and the id (SE, vol. XIX), „Psycho-analysis‟ 
(SE, vol. XX), „Analysis terminable and indeterminable‟ (SE, vol. XXIII). My focus is on Freud‟s essay 
Beyond the pleasure principle since Deleuze-Guattari (and Deleuze in his work on Masoch) draw on it at 
many instances. Cf. for instance Deleuze (2004b, pp. 18-22) for comments on „Remembering, repeating 
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has little to do with the experience of pleasure through pain and the suppression of 
anxiety, as psychoanalysis claims it to be. Several examples drawn from clinical cases 
are cited in drastic detail and the procedures are described as torture, processes which 
repeatedly go through tying up, lashing and „sewing-up‟ the body parts to stop the 
organs from working. Mortifying the flesh and fighting the operation of the senses are 
intended to close down the organic systems of the body. Deleuze-Guattari point to 
existing scenarios in the medical field (but admit these as cases of misguided 
experimentation). The parade of emptied Body without Organs amounts to failures, yet 
gives an indication of potential functionality, but also the dangers involved. The process 
of making yourself an open field of affectivity is intended to demonstrate the 
dismantling of the self as a way to find your Body without Organs.
33
  
 
One of the purposes of exposing such details is that while psychoanalysis treats these 
scenarios as phantasies ripe for interpretation, Deleuze-Guattari insist that they are 
programs, albeit botched ones, for achieving the Body without Organs. After all, the 
Body without Organs aims to reach for the real that is, to rid the body not of its organs, 
but of its organization, losing its significance in the process and further ridding itself of 
any subjectification. These are then the three intentions: reaching out for the limit, the 
real, escaping or avoiding meaning-making and abolishing the subject. 
 
In following Deleuze-Guattari, my exegesis of the masochist experiment discerns two 
phases: the fabrication or production of the Body without Organs and the parallel or 
ensuing circulation on the surface, the passing on, through and further of intensities. 
These intensities takes the form of pain for the masochist body or of cold for the 
drugged body, showing that they ruin the experiments
34
 since the intention to make the 
Body without Organs productive, creative, requires keeping desire intact rather than 
                                                                                                                                               
and working through‟, Beyond the pleasure principle; Deleuze (2004b, pp. 119-22; pp. 127-41) for 
comments on Eros, Mnemosyne, Thanatos; Beyond the pleasure principle, The ego and the id, 
Inhibitions, symptoms and anxiety. 
33
 The libidinal structures are not clear here although the (unquoted) references point to the models of de 
Sade, Sacher-Masoch and Lyotard‟s Libidinal economy where similar processes (flaying and stretching of 
the body surfaces, sewing-up etc.) are laid out in detail. 
34
 Deleuze-Guattari‟s libidinal theory points to specific desiring practices which run counter to 
psychoanalytic models, as here demonstrated in the case of masochism. They state that the transfer into 
phantasies „royally botches the real, because it botches the Body without Organs‟. The royalty of the 
botching refers to Freud‟s assumption that dreams („phantasies‟) are the „royal road‟ to the unconscious.  
(Deleuze and Guattari 2004b, p. 168). Here the struggle for establishing a new regime of subjectivity, a 
new discourse which is not directed at interpretation but establishes the principle of differential liminality 
emerges. 
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demeaning it. Thus the fabrication-production and operation of the Body without 
Organs are two related activities. While the variety of achievable (or partly achievable) 
Body without Organs is infinite, certain types and modes are prevalent, yet the outcome 
can never be known for sure, beyond the infinity of passages. The empty Body without 
Organs (in contrast to the aspired full Body without Organs) demonstrates a 
misguidance of energies although the completed full Body without Organs also halts 
and appears to be a state of death in life, in zero intensity. There is a certain ambiguity 
in Deleuze-Guattari‟s exegesis of these failures or marginal successes, such as reaching 
the stage of delirium, even though they point to liminality (as outer limit of experience 
and affectivity) and the impossibility of achieving the completion of the Body without 
Organs. Their statement that the Body without Organs is unstratified, unformed, intense 
matter points to Artaud‟s claim of „crowned anarchy‟ (Deleuze 2004b, p. 47; p. 348 and 
p. 378)
35
 while zero intensity can be understood as a point of death in life. How it may 
be lived is not explained. As experimentation and practice, striving to achieve the Body 
without Organs, that is, aiming at heightened affectivity, offers potentiality, 
transformation to degrees and experiential openness which are my later stated 
parameters for differential desiring practice.  
 
Deleuze-Guattari provide some philosophical backing for their double-pronged theory 
of fabrication-production and operation of the making of the Body without Organs by 
drawing on Spinoza‟s Ethics (trans. Boyle, 1967; trans. Shirley, 1991), „the great book 
of the Body without Organs‟ (Deleuze and Guattari 2004b, p. 170).36 In this frame the 
masochist body is set in the pain mode, the drugged body in the cold mode. Deleuze-
Guattari also presume that there could be a totality of all Body without Organs‟, a 
„fusional multiplicity‟ (Deleuze and Guattari 2004b, p. 170) that could be theorized in 
accordance with Spinoza‟s thought. In this line, Deleuze-Guattari propose that „[T]he 
                                                 
35
 Deleuze‟s statement of „crowned anarchies‟ appears repeatedly in Difference and repetition, for 
instance: „Crowned anarchies are substituted for the hierarchies of representation; nomadic distributions 
for the sedentary distributions of representations‟ (2004b, p. 348) whereby the simulacra function as the 
„crowning‟ element that holds an „informal chaos‟ together. In the closing statement Deleuze affirms this 
unity as „univocity‟: „A single and same voice for the whole thousand-voiced multiple, a single and same 
Ocean for all the drops, a single clamour of Being for all beings‟ (2004b, p. 378).  
36
 Here the attributes are types or genuses of Body without Organs; substances, powers, zero intensities as 
matrices of production and the modes are the circulating and passing intensities, the waves and vibrations, 
migrations, thresholds and gradients on the Body without Organs. Cf. Deleuze (1988b, 2005b); Nadler 
(2006) for an introduction to Spinoza‟s Ethics, esp. chapter seven „The passions‟ (2006, pp. 190-212) on 
conatus and affects. See also Gatens „Through a spinozist lens: Ethology, difference, power‟ (Patton (ed.), 
1996, pp. 162-87); Massumi (2003b/2002). 
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Body without Organs is the field of immanence of desire ‒ the plane of consistency 
specific to desire (with desire defined as a process of production without reference to 
any exterior agency, whether it be lack that hollows it out or a pleasure that fills it)‟ 
(Deleuze and Guattari 2004b, pp. 170-1; original emphases). Here is, as I read it, the 
link between the Body without Organs and desire. The foundation of Deleuze-Guattari‟s 
libido theory must thus be placed with Spinoza, as well as with their rejection of 
psychoanalysis.  
 
The molecular unconscious: A theory of multiplicities      
 
The notion of the molecular unconscious also replaces to a certain degree the notion of 
psychoanalytic subjectivity while the idea of multiplicities further diffracts any assumed 
potential for individualization. For Deleuze-Guattari, for example, the Wolf-Man, 
explored mainly in Plateau 2 of A thousand plateaus, „1914: „One or several wolves?‟ 
(Deleuze and Guattari 2004b, pp. 29-43), functions as a model case for explicating some 
key features of their libidinal project: their theory of multiplicities (in contrast to 
subjectivity and singular existence); characteristics of the molecular unconscious, 
intensities and affectivity; the relations between the Body without Organs and the 
process of becoming; the peripheral position of the schizo; and, last but not least, a 
demonstration of machinic assemblages as a form of libidinal practice. Some of these 
features I pursue here while others will be taken up later in a different context. 
 
According to Freud, the Wolf-Man is a case of infantile neurosis, an obsessional 
disturbance which takes a later turn into psychosis, and can thus serve as a demarcation 
line to trace Freud‟s theorization of the unconscious. This implies that the Wolf-Man 
case is anchored in the process of oedipalization, especially if disturbed or gone wrong 
(as Freud assumes for the Wolf-Man). Deleuze-Guattari initially express their 
fascination in dealing with this „difficult case‟, „its unresolvability‟ (Deleuze and 
Guattari 2004b, p. 30), by evoking the scenario of the Wolf-Man on Freud‟s couch (and 
the images of wolves and anuses which the case involves).
37
 A deep childhood trauma, 
the haunting primal scene, parental intercourse watched and not understood, desire for 
                                                 
37
 Deleuze-Guattari follow the lead of Mack Brunswick [1971, a contemporary publication]; Leclaire 
[1971, Démasquer le réel, Editions du Seuil, Paris]; Lacan and other psychoanalysts who have ventured 
to disentangle the complexities of the Wolf-Man case. See, in particular, Lacan‟s essay „The function and 
field of speech and language in psychoanalysis‟ [the Rome Congress address]. 
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the father‟s role, hatred of the father‟s access to the mother: fundamentally the Oedipus 
in all its conflictual patterns as read and theorized by Freud. Not so for Deleuze-Guattari 
who entitle plateau 2, „One or several wolves?‟, pointing thereby to Freud‟s reductive 
reading since the first dream of the Wolf-Man clearly figures several wolves (rather 
than Freud‟s one) in a tree displaying their tails as dogs express fond recognition for 
their human companions.
38
 For Deleuze-Guattari we are not dealing with a question of 
metaphoricity – thus tearing at the Freudian dream work structure – but with the 
phenomenon of multiplicities, that is splitting, which divides the neurotic‟s discourse 
from psychotic discourse. Multiplicities are viewed by them as a sign for the schizo‟s 
(freed or loosened) „asignifying‟ discourse which does not adhere to socially recognized 
rules of signifiers and signifieds. This insight becomes the foundation stone for 
Deleuze-Guattari‟s notion of the molecular unconscious. Although they credit Freud 
with the „greatest art of the unconscious, this art of molecular multiplicities‟ (Deleuze 
and Guattari 2004b, p. 30) – seeing him as nearly on the verge of discovering the 
existence of the rhizome, that is, the transversal inter-connectedness of „currents‟ 
(Deleuze and Guattari 2004b, p. 31) – unfortunately they see that this idea becomes 
stalled in Freud‟s thinking by his reversion back to molar unities, the „familiar themes 
of the father, the penis, the vagina, Castration with capital C‟ (Deleuze and Guattari 
2004b, pp. 30-1). Freudian procedures are reductive in the sense that they insist on the 
difference between representations of things (for the neurotic) and representations of 
words (for the psychotic): „What has dictated the substitution is not resemblance 
between the things denoted but the sameness of the words used to express them‟ (Freud 
[1915d] „The unconscious‟ (SE, vol. XIV, pp. 159-204; p. 201). This refers to Freud‟s 
theorization that it is impossible for the unconscious, as demonstrated in dream work 
and its interpretation, to express itself directly without without detouring into the 
question of representability (of images and ideas). This gives rise to the distinction 
between representation of things and representation of words which do not refer to 
                                                 
38
 Freud‟s systematization of the demarcation line between neurosis and psychosis in his article „The 
unconscious‟, exemplified in the Wolf-Man case, assumes different styles of „delusion‟ in hysterics or 
obsessives (such as the Wolf-Man). He makes (according to Deleuze-Guattari) a metaphoric leap between 
vastly different fields of images, for instance from socks to vaginas, from scars to castration. Deleuze-
Guattari doubt that the neurotic gives in to such comparisons while the psychotic can in her/his loosening 
of signification. Freud does not recognize (according to Deleuze-Guattari) multiplicities (little cavities, 
pores on the nose with which the Wolf-Man is obsessed) (Papers on metapsychology (SE, vol. XIV, p. 
200)) while he notices the phenomenon. Deleuze-Guattari take issue with the „metaphoric leaps‟ in 
Freud‟s exegesis: the sock as a vagina may be acceptable but comparing the stitches (of the sock) to a 
„field of vaginas‟ might be taking it a bit far (Deleuze and Guattari 2004b, p. 30). 
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things any longer for the psychotic, or the schizo for that matter, as evidenced by the 
„scrambling of the codes‟ (in Artaud; Deleuze and Guattari 2004a, p. 16).39  Deleuze-
Guattari also anchor here their later expanded theory of the setting-free of the signifier, 
the „asignifying proper names‟ (Deleuze and Guattari 2004b, p. 31). Freud, by contrast, 
when things and words splinter and lose their identity, restores it or invents a new one, 
thus expressing his refusal to deal with irritating multiplicities. 
 
Deleuze-Guattari‟s project of introducing the idea of multiplicities, in contrast to 
Freud‟s tendency to singularize the pack of wolves (of the dream) to a single wolf, has 
wider implications with regard to the Freudian oedipal construct since the parallel 
between one wolf and a father collapses. Freud‟s reductive procedure, using free 
association on the level of representation of things (wolves become associated with 
goats in a tale), rather than verbal subsumption on the level of representation of words 
(there are seven, six, or five wolves, not one wolf), is motivated in Deleuze-Guattari‟s 
view by Freud‟s insistence on unity, identity, and representation rather than on 
multiplicities, and non-resemblance. „The wolves will have to be purged of their 
multiplicity‟ (Deleuze and Guattari 2004b, p. 31).40 Despite the playful scenario 
Deleuze-Guattari have a serious aim, to refuse any anchoring of the idea of castration in 
the unconscious, to sever the link between neurosis / psychosis and the dream / father-
wolf equation since the castration idea can only make sense with reference to a fear 
inspired by the father, or an (even imagined) threat of rivalry.  
 
In introducing the notion of multiplicities, Deleuze-Guattari also throw up the position 
of the subject itself in relation to the pack or wolf-multiplicity; in particular with regard 
to the postulated peripheral positioning of the schizo. Since the notion of multiplicity 
                                                 
39
 „The schizo has his own system of co-ordinates for situating himself at his disposal, because, first of all, 
he has at his disposal his very own recording code, which does not coincide with the social code, or 
coincides with it only in order to parody it. The code of delirium or of desire proves to have an 
extraordinary fluidity. It might be said that the schizophrenic passes from one code to the other, that he 
deliberately scrambles all the codes, by quickly shifting from one to another, according to the question 
asked him, never giving the same explanation from one day to the next, never invoking the same 
genealogy, never recording the same event in the same way‟ (Deleuze and Guattari 2004a, p. 16). This 
opens the door to „anarchic creativity‟ in need for co-ordinated responses (such as proposed with the 
„dark precursor‟). 
40
 Deleuze-Guattari lead Freud‟s associative „trick‟ (wolves-goats) ad absurdum in staging a sort of mock 
count-down to get to the singularity of the father as wolf: 7 wolves (goats), 6, 5 (his parents make love at 
5 o‟clock), 3 (they made love three times), 2 (the parents couple more ferarum, or perhaps doggy 
fashion), 1 wolf (the father as we knew from the start), 0 wolves (he lost his tail, castrater and castrated): 
„Who is Freud trying to fool?‟ (Deleuze and Guattari 2004b, p. 32). 
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becomes part of Deleuze-Guattari‟s theorizing of the unconscious, it becomes „peopled‟, 
„swarming, teeming‟ (Deleuze and Guattari 2004b, p. 33). Drawing on texts by Artaud 
(without precisely referencing them), Deleuze-Guattari oppose the perspective of the 
schizo
41
  to that of Freud who did not see that the unconscious itself was fundamentally 
a crowd.
42
 Deleuze-Guattari proceed to define two factors involved in the formation of 
the unconscious as they theorize it. The first factor concerns the fact that something 
plays the role of the full body, namely the Body without Organs. „The body without 
organs is not a dead body but a living body, all the more alive and teeming, once it has 
blown apart the organism and its organization. […] The full body without organs is a 
body populated by multiplicities‟ (Deleuze and Guattari 2004b, p. 34). A wider 
perspective is opened in relating these new conceptions of the „body‟ to the „body of the 
earth‟, in shifting away from the idea of generation (family, father-mother-child) to the 
idea of „peopling‟, „population‟. They evoke Artaud‟s (again without referencing) 
adoption of/by tribes (in fact fifteen thereof) and his repeated denial that he has any 
father-mother (familial relations are discounted as having any impact on his molecular 
unconscious). The Body without Organs, the schizo and the molecular unconscious thus 
all form part of Deleuze-Guattari‟s rewriting of the libidinal project.  
 
The second factor defining the formation of the unconscious, as Deleuze-Guattari 
theorize it, concerns the nature of multiplicities. Multiplicities are inherently and 
ceaselessly variable and alterable, and thus describe a process of becoming. 
Multiplicities and becoming inter-relate in that the process is executed on a variable 
scale and never halted or limited. Here Deleuze-Guattari draw a distinction between the 
intensive character of multiplicities (which is comparable to those of speeds and 
temperatures where „measuring‟ is rather a method of enveloping or superseding) and 
the metrical principle that is the measuring as such. Intensities, as Deleuze-Guattari 
define them, are of a different nature, not quantifiable, however they anchor the forces 
behind the multiplicities (making up the unconscious) „precisely in the libido‟ (Deleuze 
and Guattari 2004b, p. 35) which constitutes the multiplicities from within. According 
                                                 
41
 „(Artaud:) “I don‟t want them to give me any shots, except with camphored alcohol. Otherwise breasts 
grow in my every pore”‟ (Deleuze and Guattari 2004b, p. 33). 
42
 „He [Freud] was myopic and hard of hearing; he mistook crowds for a single person. Schizos, on the 
other hand, have sharp eyes and ears, they don‟t mistake the buzz and shove of the crowd for daddy‟s 
voice‟ (Deleuze and Guattari 2004b, p. 33).  
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to Deleuze-Guattari, Freud recognized the libidinal „currents‟ co-existing in the Wolf-
Man but could not overcome his insistence on identification and the idea of unity. 
 
Once the notion of intensities is aligned with that of multiplicities ‒ countering any 
notion of singular or individual subjectivity, or identity for that matter ‒ Deleuze-
Guattari‟s reading of the Wolf-Man can proceed. 
 
If the unconscious knows nothing of negation, it is because there is nothing negative in the 
unconscious, only indefinite moves toward and away from zero, which does not at all express 
lack but rather the positivity of the full body as support and prop („for an afflux is necessary 
simply to signify the absence of intensity‟) (Deleuze and Guattari 2004b, p. 35). 
 
In their reading the assemblage of wolves designates a band of intensity on the Wolf-
Man‟s body without organs, a threshold of intensity. Such a reading moves away from 
representation or substitution as is the case in the Freudian reading (the wolf is the 
father) and shifts to an expression of affectivity and an intense status of feeling, on the 
surface of the Body without Organs. At the same time, this heightened state of feeling 
expresses the process of becoming-wolf, „a swarming, a wolfing‟ (Deleuze and Guattari 
2004b, p. 35), not in the sense of representing a wolf but being a wolf-machine 
(Deleuze and Guattari 2004b, p. 35). Intensities take multiple forms such as wolf-
machine or anus-machine, or any other assemblage such as jaw and wolf, eye and wolf, 
anus and wolf. The process of becoming excels in freed organs which can undergo any 
metamorphosis.
43
  
 
Deleuze-Guattari do not leave the discussion at the level of Freudian critique but move 
toward a wider perspective as already announced by the parallels to modern physics. 
They make further moves of daring theorization, though with the intent to 
„accommodate‟ the molar and molecular systems (for instance in Kafka‟s works) while 
avoiding a dualist model by introducing the notion of machinic assemblages. Also, 
since the Wolf-Man is engaged in the military (which sets the date for the plateau, 
1914), the large-scale social machine (Deleuze and Guattari 2004b, p. 39) is drawn into 
the discussion, an aspect that psychoanalysis has deliberately neglected or 
circumvented. For Deleuze-Guattari the full spectrum of their libido theory needs to 
                                                 
43
 „A hole is no more negative than a wolf. Castration, lack, substitution: a tale told by an overconscious 
idiot who has no understanding of multiplicities as formations of the unconscious […] Flying anuses, 
speeding vaginas, there is no castration‟ (Deleuze and Guattari 2004b, p. 36).  
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encompass the private and the social „investments‟ of the libido while the molecular 
unconscious operates, and is productive, on both planes. Machinic assemblages are 
conceived as „fundamentally libidinal and unconscious‟ (Deleuze and Guattari 2004b, p. 
40), as the „faceless figure of the libido‟ (Deleuze and Guattari 2004b, p. 41). While 
Deleuze-Guattari‟s main interest shifts to outlining (in a preliminary manner) their own 
libidinal theory, they do not hesitate to vent some final spite with regards to both the 
Freudian oedipal construct and psychoanalytic discipline. „Silence people, prevent them 
from speaking, and above all, when they do speak, pretend they haven‟t said a thing: the 
famous psychoanalytic neutrality‟ (Deleuze and Guattari 2004b, pp. 42-3). The difficult 
case of the Wolf-Man, rather than being just a case of neurosis and psychosis and the 
demarcation line for the (Freudian) unconscious, turns for Deleuze-Guattari into a 
model case for explicating and demonstrating their own version of libidinal practice. 
The notion of subjectivity is overcome if not abolished and replaced by the notion of 
multiplicities and supported by the notion of intensities. What emerges is a libidinal 
theory which distances itself from psychoanalytic rules.
44
 
 
Anoedipal desire and larval subject 
 
At this stage, I return to Deleuze-Guattari‟s schizoanalytic argumentation in Anti-
Oedipus. While defining schizoanalysis as a politically and socially aware 
psychoanalysis as well as a militant analysis, Deleuze-Guattari focus on demonstrating 
the existence of an unconscious libidinal investment of socio-historical production. 
Psychoanalysis has been utterly privatized and individualized; schizoanalysis by 
contrast attempts to draw in the social, historical and political dimensions of delirium. 
The suppression of the socio-historical content in psychoanalysis needs to be 
approached and thus the disjointed elements of the Oedipus, the extrafamilial and 
subfamilial gaps and breaks taken into consideration (Deleuze and Guattari 2004a, p. 
108). A different model of the unconscious then evolves with three related conceptual 
                                                 
44
 Deleuze-Guattari‟s rewritten (if not overcome) notion of subjectivity and their proposition of the notion 
of multiplicities (supported by the notion of intensities) establishes a new model of libidinal practice and 
theory. It needs to be further explored whether, in which ways and particularly to which effect such a 
libidinal understanding can still be aligned with the psychoanalytic approach. Cf. the essays collected in 
De Bolle ((ed.) 2010). The approaches to an understanding of the Body without Organs are dispersed (and 
contradictory). Cf. for instance, two early statements: Olkowski „Nietzsche‟s dice throw: Tragedy, 
nihilism, and the Body without Organs‟ (Boundas and Olkowski (eds), 1994, pp. 119-40) and Howard 
„Subjectivity and space: Deleuze and Guattari‟s BwO in the New World Order‟ (Kaufman and Heller 
(eds), 1998, pp. 112-26).  
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layers of desiring-machines, libido and anoedipal unconscious. Desiring-machines are 
the processual element, libido the descriptor for the force or pulsion and anoedipal 
unconscious the descriptor for aloofness and remoteness of the processes.  
 
It is the function of the libido to invest the social field in unconscious forms, thereby 
hallucinating all history, reproducing in delirium entire civilizations, races, and continents, and 
intensely „feeling‟ the becoming of the world […] Schizoanalysis sets out to undo the expressive 
Oedipal unconscious, always artificial, repressive and repressed, mediated by the family, in 
order to attain the immediate productive unconscious (Deleuze and Guattari 2004a, p. 108). 
 
The characteristics of the oedipal unconscious ‒ a tight network of influences which are 
centred in the family, although the family proves a „stimulus‟ ‒ provide the anchoring of 
the schizoid construct. Being expressive indicates that the oedipal unconscious is 
descriptive, interpretative, meaning-bound and „symbolizing‟ (Deleuze and Guattari 
2004a, p. 108). It is artificial in the sense that it is induced and its necessity can be 
doubted. It is repressive and repressed because it disallows the living of sexual content 
according to the libidinal impulses. Being family-bound, the oedipal unconscious gets 
stuck in the triangular mould which will be transferred to the next generation. It is also 
social-political-historically unaware since it is confined to the family boundaries. The 
anoedipal unconscious in contrast is immediate and productive. Such an immediate 
productive unconscious is necessarily directed toward the trans-familial and community 
connection. While they do not deny the familial „stimulus‟ Deleuze-Guattari critique the 
paradigm of „beginnings‟: „At least in the beginning […] the unconscious is expressed 
in a state of familial relations and constellations where the Real, the Imaginary, and the 
Symbolic intermingle‟ (Deleuze and Guattari 2004a, p. 108). Rather than the Freudian 
reference to the Oedipus, it is here the Lacanian model of the process of subjectification 
and the unconscious which is in view: beginning one (the pre-oedipal dyad of mother 
and child); beginning two (the desire for the mother, the mirror phase); then the Oedipus 
(the interfering law of the father); and finally the „celebrated latency, after which the 
beyond begins‟ (Deleuze and Guattari 2004a, p. 109). According to Deleuze-Guattari 
the oedipal construct suffers from the presupposed „referential axis‟ so that even stages 
or phases which occur before the Oedipus are understood by reference to the later 
oedipal stages: „[I]t is quite clear that the two ends of Oedipus have simply been closed, 
and the beyond and the afterward will always be interpreted in terms of Oedipus, in 
relation to Oedipus, within the frame of Oedipus‟ (Deleuze and Guattari 2004a, p. 109). 
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The oedipal structure is thus viewed as a reductive model; later neuroses are traced back 
to an oedipalization gone wrong. Deleuze-Guattari‟s dialogue becomes progressively 
polemical and also questioning with regard to Lacanian postulates, in particular to the 
„cult of lack‟: „[W]hat a perverse operation psychoanalysis is, where this neoidealism, 
this rehabilitated cult of castration, this ideology of lack culminates: the 
anthropomorphic representation of sex!‟ (Deleuze and Guattari 2004a, p. 339). Deleuze-
Guattari‟s acerbic tone and their frustration with the rigidity of the model come to the 
fore: „Oedipus and castration, the Imaginary and the Symbolic, the great lesson of the 
inadequacy of being or of dispossession. Psychoanalysis as a gadget, Oedipus as 
reterritorialization, a retimbering of modern man on the “rock of castration”‟ (Deleuze 
and Guattari 2004a, p. 339). Freudian and Lacanian notions are drawn together in such 
attacks and in particular the fixture and inflexibility of the „ideology‟ are regretted (the 
“rock” of castration being a direct but unreferenced quote from Lacan). Although 
Deleuze-Guattari make it clear that they blame Lacan less than his disciples in the 
second and third generation (for instance Miller, Lagache and Leclaire), they do 
nonetheless express bafflement and some dismay regarding Lacan‟s constructions. They 
adopt a vacillating ‒ and negotiating ‒ attitude towards his work, pointing to Lacan‟s 
repeated (indeed lifelong) revisions and his struggles with the Freudian system. 
 
[H]e [Lacan] refuses to be caught up in the oedipal Imaginary and the oedipalizing structure, the 
imaginary identity of persons and the structural unity of machines, everywhere knocking against 
the impasses of a molar representation that the family closes around itself (Deleuze and Guattari 
2004a, p. 339). 
 
Deleuze-Guattari infiltrate into their comments their own conceptualizations and 
viewpoints, such as reterritorialization
45
 and molar representation, bending the original 
(Lacanian or Freudian) statements and opening up space for their own constructions. 
This turns into a sharpening of their own logical pursuit by employing Lacanian 
constructs.
46
 Indeed Deleuze-Guattari‟s aim is to integrate the Lacanian lexicon into 
                                                 
45
 Reterritorialization here carries the meaning of bringing the neurotics and psychotics back to order, 
fixing the disturbances and thus integrating the patients into the appropriate behaviour acceptable, and 
demanded by society at large.   
46
 Cf. for an example of such a double-layered (dialogic, not dialectical) discourse the following quotation 
where I indicate the shifting „voices‟ of  Deleuze-Guattari (D-G) and Lacan (L): „As partial objects the 
desiring-machines (D-G) undergo two totalizations, one when the socius (D-G) confers on them a 
structural unity under a symbolic signifier (L) acting as absence (L) and lack (L) in an aggregate (D-G) of 
departure, the other when the family imposes on them a personal unity with imaginary signifieds (L) that 
distribute, that „vacuolize‟ (D-G) lack (L) in an aggregate of destination: a double abduction of the orphan 
machines (D-G), inasmuch as the structure applies its articulation to them, inasmuch as the parents lay 
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their argumentation, grinding it down while using it as pebbles for their own proposition 
of desiring-machines as the productive principle of the libido. They direct four main 
charges at the Lacanian system of thought. Lacan reduces production to representation; 
he uses the despotic / totalizing signifier / sign / symbol as an „extrapolated sign‟ 
(Deleuze and Guattari 2004a, p. 341); he puts the signifier into the service of an 
ideology of lack, using it „in the name of its absence or withdrawal‟ (Deleuze and 
Guattari 2004a, p. 341); and finally ‒ this being Deleuze-Guattari‟s main charge against 
the psychoanalytic thought model ‒ he humanizes or anthropomorphosizes the libido. In 
this theory the despotic symbol or master signifier stands for the Lacanian phallus. So 
the productive force of the libido, of desire confronts the negating force of absence, 
lack, withdrawal and it is this negation which is the irritating stumbling block for 
Deleuze-Guattari. The principal rhetorical structure of using the Lacanian notion but for 
their own ends is at times humorously underplayed. „The great Other (Lacan) as the 
nonhuman sex gives way, in representation, to a signifier of the great Other as an 
always missing term, the all-too-human-sex, the phallus of molar castration‟ (Deleuze 
and Guattari 2004a, p. 341).
47
 Thus the Nietzschean all-too human wink is followed by 
a footnote quoting from the work of a Lacanian disciple, Serge Leclaire, dealing with 
the reality of desire in human sexuality (published in 1970). Leclaire for Deleuze-
Guattari twists the problematic of the founding of desire in negation and lack further 
towards the „irreducible difference, the difference between the sexes‟ (Deleuze and 
Guattari 2004a, p. 341)
48
 which is in Deleuze-Guattari‟s terms the ultimate in 
anthropomorphic understanding of sex and to be rejected. 
                                                                                                                                               
their fingers on them. To trace back from images to the structure would have little significance and would 
not rescue the representation, if the structure did not have a reverse side that is the real production of 
desire (D-G)‟ (2004a, p. 339). I have indicated where I „read‟ (or better „hear‟) Deleuze-Guattari‟s voice 
and where Lacan‟s voice permeates the text and how the (combined) discourse fuses both while 
constructing a different modus of expression. 
47
 The footnote attached to the quotation points to Lacan‟s Ecrits, published in 1966 (a selection of which 
was translated by Sheridan in 1977, followed by a new translation by Fink in 2002 [Ecrits I] and a 
complete edition of the essays by Fink in 2006). I use (when relevant) both translations. 
48
 Deleuze-Guattari follow here (while at the same discursively stretching their own pursuit) first Lacan‟s 
statement of desire as lack (from Ecrits): „For want of this signifier, all the others would represent 
nothing‟, then move on to Leclaire‟s (elusive and interpretative) statement (from „La réalite du désir‟ in 
Sexualité humaine (1970)) introducing it with the words: „Serge Leclaire shows how the structure is 
organized around a missing term, or rather a signifier of lack.‟ This introductory note by itself implies 
amazed disbelief (if held in a neutral position), but the following quote from Leclaire dissembles the 
meaningfulness of a claim of desire as lack. The quote from Leclaire reads: „It is the elective signifier of 
the absence of a link, the phallus, that we find again in the unique privilege of its relation to the essence of 
lack – an emblem of difference par excellence – the irreducible difference, the difference between the 
sexes. […] If man can talk, this is because at one point in the language system there is a guarantor of the 
irreducibility of lack: the phallic signifier‟. Deleuze-Guattari‟s biting finishing flourish is: „How strange 
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[E]veryone is bisexual, everyone has two sexes […] We are statistically or molarly heterosexual, 
but personally homosexual, without knowing it or being fully aware of it, and finally we are 
transsexual in an elemental, molecular sense (Deleuze and Guattari 2004a, p. 77).
49
 
 
Deleuze-Guattari‟s radical position on the interconnections between their (unsexed) 
libido theory and their refutation of molar, binary sexuality ‒ in contrast to the Lacanian 
model of sexuation, not to speak of Leclaire‟s model of sexual difference ‒ is thus 
affirmed within Anti-Oedipus and further in A thousand plateaus, at first polemically 
and later with a distanced assertion.
50
 
 
Deleuze-Guattari underline Lacan‟s difference from the original Freudian position with 
regard to the unconscious. „[H]e does not enclose the unconscious in an oedipal 
structure‟ (Deleuze and Guattari 2004a, p. 341). They highlight three main points in the 
Lacanian understanding of the Oedipus: he is imaginary, „nothing but an image, a 
myth‟; these images are produced by the oedipalizing structure; this structure 
reproduces the symbolic element of castration (Deleuze and Guattari 2004a, pp. 341-2). 
                                                                                                                                               
all this is!‟ (2004a, p. 341, *FN). The questions arising out of this complex line of reasoning are: Firstly, 
why postulating a despotic / totalizing or master signifier, the phallus; secondly, why making it a missing 
centre of all possible signification; thirdly, why linking it to sexuality as difference (castration) as well as 
a (sexed / sexuated) speaking position. Leclaire‟s work features throughout beside Lacan‟s since it 
apparently draws a narrow (perhaps epigonal) frame and can thus be deployed for contrast. 
49
 Here Deleuze-Guattari also make reference to Proust Sodom and Gomorrah (the 4th volume of Search 
in lost time) and Burroughs Cities of the plain. 
50
 The dispute actually widened after the publication of Anti-Oedipus in a round-table discussion where 
the opposing viewpoints are clashing against each other. The director of La Quinzaine littéraire, Nadeau, 
in collaboration with philosopher Châtelet have Deleuze and Guattari discuss their work with specialists 
of different disciplines. Participants are: Châtelet (philosophy), Clastres (ethnology), Dadouan 
(psychoanalysis), Leclaire (psychoanalysis), Nadeau, Pividal (sociology), Rose, Torrubia (psychiatry). Cf. 
Deleuze „Deleuze and Guattari fight back‟, discussion (2004a, pp. 216-29). Cf. also Deleuze „Capitalism 
and schizophrenia‟, interview with Deleuze and Guattari (2004a, pp. 232-41); „Your special “desiring-
machines”: what are they?‟ (pp. 242-3); „On capitalism and desire‟, interview with Deleuze and Guattari 
(pp. 262-73); „Five propositions for psychoanalysis‟, presentation and discussion (pp. 274-80). These 
texts (in Desert islands and other texts, 1953-1974) are originally published in 2002 by Lapoujade (ed.) 
and throw a very different light onto the debate after the publication of Anti-Oedipus by comparison to a 
conversation with Deleuze-Guattari originally published in 1990 (in Negotiations, 1972-1990). Cf. 
Deleuze „Gilles Deleuze and Felix Guattari on Anti-Oedipus‟ (2004a, pp. 13-24); „On A thousand 
plateaus‟ (pp. 25-34). Another interview of interest (in Two regimes of madness: Texts and interviews, 
1975-1995), Lapoujade (ed.), Deleuze „Eight years later: 1980 interview‟ (2006g, pp. 175-80) offers a 
distanced (if not resigned) view: „Anti-Oedipus came just after May ‟68, which was a period of upheaval 
and experimentation. Today a decided reaction has set in. A certain economy of the book, a new politics, 
is responsible for today‟s conformity. We see a labor crisis, an organized and deliberate crisis where 
books are concerned, and in other domains as well. Journalism has appropriated increasing power in 
literature. And a flood of novels are rediscovering the theme of the family in its most banal form, doing 
infinite variations on mommy-daddy. It‟s disconcerting to discover a ready-made, prefabricated novel in 
one‟s own family. This year is the year of paternal heritage, and in this sense Anti-Oedipus was a total 
failure. It would take too long to analyze why, but the current situation is especially difficult for young 
writers, who are suffocating. I can‟t tell you where these dire feelings come from‟ (Deleuze 2006g, pp. 
175-6). 
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The oedipal construct is defused by declaring it not only a phantasy, a mythic apparatus, 
but also a threefold logical plane of structuration which corresponds to the „molar 
aggregates‟: 
 
Oedipus as the imaginary reterritorialization of private man, produced under the structural 
conditions of capitalism, inasmuch as capitalism reproduces and revives the archaism of the 
imperial symbol or the vanished despot. All three are necessary – precisely in order to lead 
Oedipus to the point of self-critique. The task undertaken by Lacan is to lead Oedipus to such a 
point (Deleuze and Guattari 2004a, p. 342).  
 
Deleuze-Guattari attempt here to introduce an historical and political perspective
51
 into 
the schizoanalytic proposition and to distance themselves from the individuated form of 
the psychoanalytic model, but this is not the endpoint of their argumentation. Once they 
approach their proposition of schizoanalysis, the simultaneous pursuit of the destructive 
task and the two positive tasks, their position becomes more aggressive and clearer with 
regard to subjectivity, sexuality, the unconscious and their mutual links and inter-
dependency. „Causing Oedipus and castration to explode, brutally intervening each time 
the subject strikes up the song of myth or intones tragic lines, carrying him back to the 
factory (of the unconscious)‟ (Deleuze and Guattari 2004a, p. 345). Oedipus and 
castration are evaluated as „reactional (sic, reactionary?) formations, resistances, 
blockages, and armorings whose destruction can‟t come fast enough‟ (Deleuze and 
Guattari 2004a, p. 345). Declaring Oedipus a resistance to their understanding of the 
                                                 
51
 In the middle part of Anti-Oedipus, 3 „Savages, barbarians, civilized men‟ (Deleuze-Guattari 2004a, pp. 
153-300) drawing up a genealogy (mixing anthropology, ethnology and history) of the Oedipus across 
several social and political systems (including non-western cultures, for instances African as well as 
Amazonian filtered through the work of Lévi-Strauss and Clastres), Deleuze-Guattari close the section in 
proposing how Oedipus brought to self-critique ties in with overturning representation: „Freud is the 
Luther and the Adam Smith of psychiatry. He mobilizes all the resources of myth, of tragedy, of dreams, 
in order to re-enslave desire, this time from within: an intimate theater. Yes, Oedipus is nevertheless the 
universal of desire, the product of universal history – but on one condition, which is not met by Freud: 
that Oedipus be capable, at least to a certain point, of conducting its autocritique. Universal history is 
nothing more than a theology if it does not seize control of the conditions of its contingent, singular 
existence, its irony, and its own critique. And what are these conditions, this point where the autocritique 
is possible and necessary? To discover beneath the familial reduction the nature of the social investments 
of the unconscious. To discover beneath the individual fantasy the nature of group fantasies. Or, what 
amounts to the same thing, to push the simulacrum to the point where it ceases to be the image of an 
image, so as to discover the abstract figures, the schizzes-flows that it harbors and conceals. To substitute, 
for the private subject of castration, split into a subject of enunciation and a subject of the statement 
relating only to the two orders of personal images, the collective agents of enunciation that for their part 
refer to machinic arrangements. To overturn the theater of representation into the order of desiring-
production: this is the whole task of schizoanalysis‟ (pp. 293-4). This does not preclude to integrate 
literary analyses, for instance, of Kafka‟s „In the penal colony‟ and „The great wall of China‟ (Deleuze-
Guattari 2004c, pp. 212-3, p. 216; p. 231-3), taken up again in their treatise on Kafka (Deleuze-Guattari 
2006, chapter five „Immanence and desire‟ and chapter eight „Blocks, series, intensities‟). 
 
 
  
 
 
84 
unconscious, implies that subjectivity and sexuality are freed from each other and that 
the unconscious is cleared of existence. The unconscious as the repressed, sexual 
material does not exist but is rather produced by the libidinal flows, immediately and 
productively, instantaneously. Psychoanalytic mythic constructs are in the service of the 
economic system of capitalism, according to Deleuze-Guattari‟s theorization, and must 
be viewed as a detrimental cult, an ideology to be got rid of.  
 
With the declaration of the non-existence of the unconscious, representation and 
interpretation fall by the wayside: „[S]chizoanalysis has nothing to interpret‟ (Deleuze 
and Guattari 2004a, p. 346). The three syntheses of the unconscious, connection, 
disjunction and conjunction ‒ respectively, producing, recording and consuming / 
consummating ‒ drive the libidinal theory as performed by desiring-machines. The 
tripartite model based on territoriality, a preliminary anchoring region of processes, 
further supports the schizoanalytic construct. Psychoanalysis‟ nature is evaluated as 
„intrinsically perverted‟ (Deleuze and Guattari 2004a, p. 346), that is, as an artificial re-
territorialization of the flows of desire. This can be read as meaning that the flows of 
desire are fixed again, backwards. The flows are stemmed, as in the Freudian model of 
repression, while Deleuze-Guattari‟s model of desiring-machines de-territorializes the 
production, un-fixing, freeing the flows of desire. „The psychoanalyst reterritorialises on 
the couch, in the representation of the Oedipus and castration, schizoanalysis on the 
contrary must disengage the deterritorialized flows of desire, in the molecular elements 
of desiring-production‟ (Deleuze and Guattari 2004a, p. 346). The destructive task of 
schizoanalysis has to proceed with „great patience, great care‟ (Deleuze and Guattari 
2004a, p. 349) so as to avoid being stalled since the process of unfixing, unbinding, 
untying, „[s]chizophrenia as process, deterritorialization as a process‟ (Deleuze and 
Guattari 2004a, p. 349) can fall back into neurosis, perversion and psychosis.  If not 
stalled, however, the undoing of the territories and fixing passages for the „subject‟ can 
be taken into the projected „new land‟ (Deleuze and Guattari 2004a, p. 350).  
 
In this schizoid weave I have thus focused on issues which tie together and separate 
psychoanalysis and schizoanalysis, shifting from an assumption of psychoanalytic 
subjectivity to a proposition of schizoanalytic affectivity. Taking up the issues I laid out 
in chapter one, I examined Deleuze-Guattari‟s critique of the Freudian unconscious so 
  
 
 
85 
as to establish a critical key to the understanding of what I term in this thesis 
schizodicity. I outlined Deleuze-Guattari‟s dialogue with the Lacanian unconscious 
rather than assuming a refutation as such. I have also interrogated the notion of 
productive desiring-machines and the Body without Organs, the schizo and the schizoid, 
and the extension of these notions in a theory of becoming. This lays a foundation for 
setting further schizoid principles such as a libidinal and larval subjectivity and 
anoedipal desire into a wider framework to explore my strategic construct of 
schizodicity.
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Chapter three: A schizoid constellation in Deleuze, Deleuze-Guattari 
and Guattari 
 
This chapter takes up the strategic construct of schizodicity as it evolved in chapter two 
and explores Deleuze-Guattari‟s collaborative as well their individual approaches to the 
schizoanalytic machine. Beyond established insights into unconscious, desire and 
becoming, I interrogate the regime and principles of desiring-machines and 
assemblage(s) of desire. While I worked in the previous chapter toward establishing the 
discursive positioning of the schizoid as textual and literary dissociation, in this chapter 
I open schizodicity to the literary field via assemblage(s) of desire in Deleuze-Guattari‟s 
treatise on Kafka and Deleuze‟s exegeses of Proust as well as his work on literary 
machines. I thus demonstrate the distinctiveness and audacity of Deleuze-Guattari‟s 
libidinal theory. 
 
The aims of the chapter 
 
In this chapter I begin again with how the schizoid constellation is grounded in the 
inter-dependence of the unconscious, desire and becoming. As in chapter two,
1
 for the 
notions of anoedipal unconscious and desiring-machines I draw on Deleuze-Guattari‟s 
Anti-Oedipus (Deleuze and Guattari 2004a), while for the notion of becoming I draw on 
A thousand plateaus, in particular Plateau 10 (Deleuze and Guattari 2004b, pp. 256-
341). In this instance, I use the term „constellation‟ for the wider network of concepts 
since I argue here that two theories of subjectivity – desiring machines and assemblages 
of desire – need to be considered which do not conflict, yet cannot be equated. 
Specifically, the regime of desiring-machines as theorized in Anti-Oedipus is developed 
in A thousand plateaus to a more complex conception of assemblages of desire. In my 
earlier discussion of Deleuze-Guattari‟s libidinal theory of subjectivity, the former was 
outlined as emphasizing the machinic and productive function of desire in desiring-
machines, the latter the rules of transformations in becoming, while the notion of the 
Body without Organs was viewed as the conceptual bridge between them. However, for 
                                                 
1
 In chapter two I contrasted the theorization of the schizo in Anti-Oedipus with that of the Body without 
Organs and the molecular unconscious in A thousand plateaus and returned to Anti-Oedipus for a 
concluding position on the anoedipal unconscious. I demonstrated that for an integrated approach it is 
necessary to work across the texts in multiple and several ways. 
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the purpose of developing a literary desiring practice, I now draw these 
conceptualizations more tightly together. After all, Deleuze-Guattari‟s version of the 
schizoanalytic machine does justice to the many literary instantiations in Anti-Oedipus 
and in A thousand plateaus, irrespective of their status as desiring-machines or as 
assemblages of desire, since both are directed at the process of becoming. I also turn to 
Deleuze-Guattari‟s treatise Kafka: Toward a minor literature (Deleuze and Guattari 
2006) in this chapter since it connects the schizoanalytic conceptualizations of Anti-
Oedipus and A thousand plateaus and sets them into literary practice.
2
 In this chapter I 
thus outline a range of schizoanalytic principles: the machinic and the dynamic as 
governing the regime of desiring-machines and their production of the Body without 
Organs, and the expanded instantiation of desiring-machines as assemblages of desire in 
A thousand plateaus. Finally I discuss the literary machine of symptomatology as 
proposed in the frame of the critical-clinical.  
 
Overall what I have in mind in this chapter is a grounding of the notion of the schizoid 
state of subjectivity in the frames of Deleuze‟s, Deleuze-Guattari‟s and Guattari‟s 
conceptualizations. As I have shown, Deleuze-Guattari‟s version of desiring practice 
enables the building of a libidinal theory of subjectivity, where the Freudian 
unconscious is first de-constructed and then replaced by Deleuze-Guattari‟s 
conceptualization of productive desiring-machines, assuming the notion of anoedipal 
unconscious. Here I observe these strategic moves in three consecutive steps: the 
foundation of Freudian oedipal subjectivity is attenuated, some innovative concepts of 
transitory subjectification come into focus and then these concepts are given form in 
various instantiations, such as cancerous, empty and full Body without Organs.
3
 In its 
turn the notion of symptomatology functions in my view as sign-like indicator, and 
descriptor, for the mobile processes of desiring-machines. Desiring-machines, the Body 
without Organs and symptomatology are thus all directed at evoking the processual 
nature of the schizoid constellation while the notions of anoedipal unconscious, desire 
                                                 
2
 The Kafka treatise is published between the two volumes of Capitalism and schizophrenia and can be 
considered as an exemplification of Deleuze-Guattari‟s libidinal theory and as a programmatic literary 
treatise. It does however need to be taken into account that Deleuze worked on the „revision‟ of his Proust 
treatise before starting with Guattari the work on Kafka (a topic much in vogue at the time). Both 
approaches therefore need to be „reconciled‟. Cf. my discussion in chapter five.  
3
 The Body without Organs is theorized in various instantiations as cancerous, empty and full Body 
without Organs (the first approach), then as a (general) model of affectivity (second approach) and in this 
latter form transposed into the literary field (in Proust, Masoch and Beckett). These different stances 
across thirty years cannot be followed in the frame of this thesis.  
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and becoming are transitory pointers to the stages which are undergone by larval 
subjects. 
 
The triangulated schizoanalytic machine 
 
I turn first to the initial anchor point of my strategic construct for the schizoid 
constellation, the schizoanalytic machine. I propose that it can function as the core of 
the constellation in relating the notions of unconscious, desire and becoming. The other 
aspects of the constellation, namely the machinic and dynamic principles within the 
regime
4
 of desiring-machines ‒ the production of the Body without Organs by the 
desiring-machines and the extension of desiring-machines into assemblages of desire ‒ 
open this chapter toward the literary desiring practice which is here approached through 
                                                 
4
 Deleuze-Guattari deploy a range of notions from Foucault‟s work, for instance, a regime of discourse 
(understood as genealogically shifting rather than as a fixed code of a system), a diagram as a model of 
power relations rather than as a fixed and binary structure. Further they follow first observations and then 
„describe‟ them in (always contingent) terms, thus following Foucault‟s genealogical principle. Cf. 
Foucault, chapter ten „The human sciences‟, The order of things: An archaeology of the human sciences 
[1966] (2009b, pp. 375-422). After having commented on psychology, sociology, the analysis of 
literature and mythology, and history, stating that the human sciences are not sciences at all (2009b, p. 
400), Foucault concludes with tracing the position of psychoanalysis and ethnology (pp. 407-21) and 
elaborating why they have a privileged position in our knowledge (2009b, p. 407). „Psychoanalysis stands 
as close as possible, in fact, to that critical function, which, […] exists within all the human sciences. In 
setting itself the task of making the discourse of the unconscious speak through consciousness, 
psychoanalysis is advancing in the direction of that fundamental region in which the relations of 
representation and finitude come into play. Whereas all the human sciences advance towards the 
unconscious only with their back to it, waiting for it to unveil itself as fast as consciousness is analysed, 
as it were backwards, psychoanalysis, on the other hand, points directly towards it, with a deliberate 
purpose – not towards that which must be rendered gradually more explicit by the progressive 
illumination of the implicit, but towards what is there and yet is hidden, towards what exists with the 
mute solidity of a thing, of a text closed upon itself, or of a blank space in a visible text, and uses that 
quality to defend itself. […] And in this region where representation remains in suspense, on the edge of 
itself, open, in a sense, to the closed boundary of finitude, we find outlined the three figures by means of 
which life, with its functions and norms, attains its foundation in the mute repetition of Death, conflicts 
and rules their foundation in the naked opening of Desire, significations and systems their foundation in a 
language which is at the same time Law‟ (2009b, pp. 408-9). What holds the „human disciplines‟ together 
is language and the speaking position („Who speaks?‟) (2009b, p. 417), that is their discursivity. Cf. also 
the following statements by Deleuze on Foucault: „Michel Foucault‟s main concepts‟ [for D Defert] 
(2006g, pp. 241-60): an early sketch after Foucault‟s death in 1984; in parts used in Deleuze‟s book 
Foucault (2006c). „Life as a work of art‟ (1995, pp. 94-101); „Breaking things open, breaking words 
open‟ (1995, pp. 83-93); „A portrait of Foucault‟ (1995, pp. 102-18 [conversation with Parnet, 1986, on 
writing the Foucault book]). Deleuze „Foucault and prison‟ (2006g, pp. 272-81). The cross-connections 
between Deleuze (and Deleuze-Guattari) and Foucault are multiple, especially with regard to innovative 
discourse (The order of things: An archaeology of the human sciences [1966] 2009b; The archaeology of 
knowledge and the discourse on language, 1972); the understanding of „madness‟ (History of madness 
[1961], trans. Murphy and Khalfa, Khalfa (ed.), 2009a; trans. Howard, 1988a), the „pathological‟ and the 
„abnormal‟ (Abnormal: Lectures at the College de France, 1974-1975, trans. Burchell, Marchetti and 
Salomoni (eds), 2003 [1999]) and the excessive (and creative) use of language (Death and the labyrinth: 
The world of Raymond Roussel [1963], trans. Ruas, 2004a). Further connections exist between Deleuze 
and Blanchot, and Foucault and Blanchot. See for instance the collaboration Foucault/Blanchot (trans. 
Massumi, 1987).       
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an abbreviated discussion of the Kafka treatise (this will be extended later). To consider 
a triangulation also does justice to the chapter‟s further aim, that of working toward a 
libidinal theory of subjectivity which can support literary desiring practice. In proposing 
such a triangulation I lay out some inter-connections between the concepts, their 
functions within the schizoid constellation and the ground for their questioning. 
Although I focus in the first instance on how such a schizoid constellation takes shape 
in the frame of Anti-Oedipus and A thousand plateaus, I do also draw on related notions 
from Difference and repetition (Deleuze 2004b), The logic of sense (Deleuze 2004c) 
and Masochism: Coldness and cruelty (Deleuze 2006d) for my consideration of the 
literary machine of symptomatology in the frame of the critical-clinical. 
 
My overriding question is how a theory of schizoid subjectivity (grounded in the 
notions of an anoedipal unconscious and desiring-machines) overcomes a theory of 
psychoanalytic subjectivity (grounded in the Freudian and revised Lacanian notions of 
oedipalization). In this manner I shall be re-assessing the libidinal constructs supporting 
both of these theories. I pointed out that Deleuze-Guattari consider any successful future 
overcoming of the libidinal status quo as a double-pronged undertaking, psychological-
personal as well as social-political. However, I contend that a re-assessment of the 
libidinal constructs ‒ if I take Deleuze-Guattari‟s three simultaneously executed tasks of 
schizoanalysis, two positive ones, one negative one as a guideline ‒ starts with the 
personal curettage of individual consciousness (Deleuze and Guattari 2004a, pp. 328). I 
intend then to keep the notions of an (either oedipal or anoedipal-schizoid) unconscious 
and of (either oedipalized or schizoid) subjectivity and desiring-machines open while I 
pursue my re-assessment of the libidinal constructs, Freud‟s and Lacan‟s as against 
Deleuze-Guattari‟s. However, before I can begin this task, several preliminary points 
need to be made regarding my engagement with Deleuze-Guattari‟s work. 
 
First, to lay the foundations for the processes of schizoanalysis embodied as 
schizoanalytic machine, I turn to Deleuze-Guattari‟s proposition of a threefold anti-
dialectical synthesis, connection-disjunction-conjunction, theorized as the operating 
modes of desiring-machines of the unconscious, or desiring-production (Deleuze and 
  
 
 
90 
Guattari 2004a, pp. 1-57).
5
 Specifically, I view the relations between unconscious and 
desire as a decisive conceptual difficulty in the sense that productive desiring-machines 
fuse separate instances of unconscious and desire and thus replace any topological 
Freudian or Lacanian construct. Deleuze-Guattari‟s processual mode of desiring-
machines focuses on their productivity, in the literary sense on their creativity, rather 
than on the notion of a reservoir of repressed images or complexes in the sense of an 
oedipal unconscious. Here a shift in ontological anchoring takes place from an 
understanding of substances, locations (topoi) and identical structures (in the Freudian 
and Lacanian reading) to an understanding of processes in the continuity of becoming. 
The schizoanalytic machine, if successful and productive, serves its ultimate purpose 
which is perpetual becoming. I acknowledge the difficulty of making practical use of 
Deleuze-Guattari‟s notion of the Body without Organs as a governing schizoanalytic 
model of phantasm, yet it has potential as standing in for the ideas of connectivity, inter-
relationality and affectivity and as a construct to model affective transitions in 
becoming.
6
 Deleuze in fact demonstrates the literary-discursive use of the construct of 
                                                 
5
 In the first part of Anti-Oedipus „The desiring-machines‟, the threefold synthesis is taken through its 
modalities and the libidinal qualities are theorized, namely, libido through connection, numen through 
disjunction and voluptas through conjunction. These libidinal modalities are once more played through in 
the second part of Anti-Oedipus „Psychoanalysis and familialism: The holy family‟, in the 2nd, 3rd, 4th 
and 5th sections: „The connective synthesis of production‟, „The disjunctive synthesis of recording‟, „The 
conjunctive synthesis of consumption-consummation‟. Each section takes up one aspect of the 
problematic of the Oedipus: ideology of [Lacanian] lack (Deleuze and Guattari 2004a, pp. 64-75), 
[Freudian] familial triangulation (Deleuze and Guattari 2004a, pp. 76-82), [Lacanian] Symbolic and 
Imaginary double-bind (Deleuze and Guattari 2004a, pp. 83-91) and restricted („biunivocal‟) Oedipus 
against delirious (Deleuze and Guattari 2004a, p. 64), nondifferentiated (Deleuze and Guattari 2004a, p. 
85), nomadic and polyvocal (Deleuze and Guattari 2004a, p. 98, p. 116) Schreber who functions as the 
antithesis (if it is allowed to call it such). Another superseding structure of paralogisms of psychoanalysis 
eventuates: 1st paralogism: extrapolation, 2nd paralogism: oedipal double-bind; 3rd paralogism: Oedipus 
as biunivocal „application‟; 4th paralogism: oedipal displacement or disfiguration of the repressed; 5th 
paralogism: undecidability of neurosis and psychosis. These discursive framings of the inherent 
contradictions of the oedipal scheme are played through again in the fourth part of Anti-Oedipus, „In 
troduction to schizoanalysis‟ where it is again the figure of Schreber which functions as the sanctioned 
model of Anti-Oedipus (Deleuze and Guattari 2004a, pp. 308-9, p. 327, p. 348, p. 399). 
6
 Delourme and Lecercle (Sasso and Villani (eds), 2004, pp. 30-3) refer to Deleuze‟s early work on 
Spinoza and the later critical-clinical as well as to Deleuze-Guattari‟s What is philosophy? as basis for 
their essay on the triple reading of affect. „Affect is that what is extracted, in blocks, from affections. It is 
the role of art to execute that extraction, as it is to extract blocks of percepts from perceptions. The thus 
extracted affect looses all individual or personal aspect‟ [„L‟affect est ce qui est extrait, par blocs, des 
affections. C‟est le rôle de l‟art que d‟effectuer cette extraction, comme d‟extraire des blocs de percepts 
des perceptions. L‟affect ainsi extrait perd tout aspect individuel et personnel‟] (p. 30). They point out 
that by contrast to Freud‟s understanding of affect (and affect quota, as discharge of psychic energy), 
Deleuze‟s understanding follows Spinoza‟s Ethics where affection is a mode, affects are read in the (lost) 
sense of „passions‟ (cf. Spinoza: Philosophie pratique 1970/1981, p. 69) (Delourme and Lecercle 2004, p. 
30). The use of affect in Cinema 1 [1983] differs in that it defines intensity as well as force [puissance] 
and intense usage of space (p. 31). In What is philosophy? (1991, chapter seven: „Percept, affect and 
concept‟) a third reading of affect arises in that affect plays an aesthetic role in art. Percepts and affects 
are drawn out of a block of sensation which is shaped by perceptions and affections. This (violent) act is 
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the Body without Organs in his final Proust exegesis [1973] (Deleuze 2000)
7
 and 
Deleuze-Guattari express in their Kafka treatise [1975] (Deleuze and Guattari 2006) 
ideas approximating such a model of affectivity.
8
 
 
Secondly, I follow Deleuze-Guattari‟s strategy of grounding all principles related to 
schizoanalysis in the contradictions of the oedipal system in psychoanalysis.
9
 These 
„contradictions‟, which I examined in the preceding chapters, are considered by 
Deleuze-Guattari to be anchored in the repressive function of oedipalization (as 
enforcing sexual difference via the postulated castration complex and its ensuing 
familial and social repercussions). Such a strategy of contrasting the shortcoming of the 
psychoanalytical oedipal system with the promise of a schizoanalytic anoedipal system 
is valuable in my pursuit of establishing a schizoanalytically oriented differential 
practice. As yet there exists little consensus on how to proceed in the critical reading of 
perplexing modern texts where an approach via the oedipal unconscious and its 
narrative resolution of conflicts is unsatisfactory. 
 
Thirdly, I propose to not only keep the threefold schizoanalytic function of connection-
disjunction-conjunction (to describe the process of desiring-production) as a working 
model (Deleuze and Guattari, part one: „The desiring-machines‟, 2004a, pp. 1-57) but to 
combine it with the threefold simultaneous tasks set out by Deleuze-Guattari for 
schizoanalysis (to decide on the form and function of your desiring-machines and the 
curettage of your personal unconscious) (Deleuze and Guattari, part four: „Introduction 
                                                                                                                                               
„a becoming non-human of man‟ [„un devenir non-humain de l‟homme‟ (1991, p. 158)]. The artist is a 
creator of affects, an inventor of unknown affects. They quote as examples the becoming-whale of 
Captain Ahab from Melville‟s Moby Dick and the violent affect which unites Heathcliff to Catherine in 
Brontë‟s Wuthering heights. In their critique (pp. 32-3) Delourme and Lecercle state that by contrast to 
the psychoanalytic understanding (as well as, for instance, the philosophical and political understandings 
of Lyotard and Agamben), Deleuze‟s and Deleuze-Guattari‟s understanding of affect does not refer to 
trauma, or an experience of loss but quite to the contrary to a force of affirmation and relation which 
encompasses all modes of the living. Affects heighten the power [puissance] to act and is an integral part 
of becoming. Delourme and Lecercle also underline the non-personal mode of affect in contrast to the 
interiority of (psychoanalytically read) impulses. Affect reaches beyond the personal or individual. In the 
process of becoming affect expresses itself in speeds, sudden petrifications or infinite accelerations.   
7
 The narrator is conceived as spider in its affective net or as a Body without Organs (in the conclusion to 
the second part of the treatise). This is Deleuze‟s last revision of his work on Proust and enlarges but also 
overthrows some of the early notions, especially with regard to modelling affectivity in literary texts.   
8
 For instance the proposition of polyvocality (in the Kafka treatise) approaches the literary expression of 
affectivity from within the assemblage and its (desirous, libidinal) relations. 
9
 These inherent contradictions are mounted in form of a series of paralogisms pursuing a logical-
discursive thread which is dialogical (since it doesnot reject the Freudian and (even less) the Lacanian 
ideas but creatively „assimilates‟ them). 
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to schizoanalysis‟, 2004a, pp. 301-421). This opens a path into palpating desiring-
machines in literary texts, that is, detecting the flow of affectivity in the textual fabric. I 
view the potential for such freed desiring-machines in literary texts in the sense that 
they work as agents of schizoanalysis.
10
 I cannot fully resolve in this thesis the 
enmeshing of the personal and political and their libidinal entanglement as theorized by 
Deleuze-Guattari, yet some literary texts invite consideration of a „doubled libidinal 
investment‟. A freed, schizo-analyzed, anoedipal unconscious can stand in as an 
alternative theorization of productive desiring-machines. Deleuze-Guattari‟s „impasse‟ ‒ 
that is, the separation or fusion of unconscious and desire ‒ is of value rather than a 
hindrance since my focus on productive process, form and function of producing 
desiring-machines does away with Freudian topology and Lacanian lack and thus 
frustration of desire. 
 
It is necessary, as I pointed out earlier, to stay alert to Deleuze-Guattari‟s gliding scale 
of theorizations. These are not meant to be contradictory but rather question the 
problematic at hand and expand the borderlines of fixed concepts. This in turn often 
leads in their work to parallel, yet not contradictory theorizations. For example, both the 
notion of anoedipal unconscious (in particular with regard to time concepts) and the 
notion of desiring-machines as the enactment (focusing on the process) and the producer 
(focusing on the product) of an unconscious, can be upheld, by referring either to 
                                                 
10
 Palpating desiring-machines in literary texts, that is, detecting the flow of affectivity in the textual 
fabric establishes a textualized reading of schizoanalysis and desiring-machines as functional indicators. I 
have pointed out earlier on the different approaches taken to the program and process of schizoanalysis. 
Here I read the notion of schizoanalysis not in interpretative terms but contextually, that is set into the 
frame of Deleuze‟s and Deleuze-Guattari‟s writings. Andrieu (Sasso and Villani (eds), 2004, pp. 308-13) 
sets the notion of schizoanalysis into the context of Deleuze-Guattari‟s twofold work on Capitalism and 
schizophrenia, Anti-Oedipus and A thousand plateaus and Guattari‟s works. His summary is double-
pronged: (1) „An analysis, inspired by how the schizophrenic experiences life, of the specific nature of 
libidinal flows and investments in groups and individuals from which evolves a specific political theory; 
(2) an analysis of schizophrenia, schizoid states and productions grounded in the dynamic constitution of 
the subject through a caring-cared work with the aim to institute desire„ (p. 308). The first tangent refers 
to micro-politics while the second is anchored in Guattari‟s psychiatric work with Oury at La Borde as 
well as the textual practice with Deleuze. Andrieu points to Deleuze‟s schizoanalytic reading of Proust in 
terms of the Body without Organs, the presence and function of madness (p. 309) where schizoanalysis 
concerns its literary impact and to Deleuze‟s preface for Wolfson‟s Le schizo et les langues (1970) 
(reprint in Essays critical and clinical (1993, pp. 18-33)) where schizoanalysis concerns the linguistic 
transformations taking place on the textual level. In his critique (pp. 310-2) Andrieu proposes that 
Deleuze-Guattari‟s schizoanalysis, in contrast to Lacan‟s reading of psychoses (and its interest in 
highlighting the shifts in significations), describes the production of the delirant text as an outcome of 
productive desire (in the process of  a subjectivation ) and not as a pathological form. Cf. also Guattari 
„Schizoanalyses‟ (Lotringer (ed.), 2009b, pp. 204-25) which draws on the schizoanalytic diagrams in 
Guattari (1989a).                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                
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Deleuze-Guattari‟s Anti-Oedipus or Deleuze‟s Difference and repetition. This double-
pronged theorization, accommodating the schizoanalytic and the differential, will 
become a decisive turning point in my argument. That is, Deleuze-Guattari‟s 
ontological shift from substance and identity (as a schizoanalytic problematic) to 
process and becoming (as a differential problematic) impacts on their understanding of 
subjectivity.
11
 With the move away from oedipal subjectivity, fixed identity and being 
toward schizoid subjectivity, fragmentation and perpetual becoming ‒ as two opposed 
ontological readings ‒ the structures of representation give way. Becoming is 
differentially governed and needs to be grasped in its immediacy of transitions, thus not 
in literary representation but in presentation. The two positive tasks of schizoanalysis
12
 
justify such an alternative theorization of becoming without referring to the liminal 
positioning of the Body without Organs as goal of creative desiring-machines.  
 
The machinic principle 
 
Encountered in Anti-Oedipus in part 1 as the enactment of the desiring-production in a 
succession of working machines, I read the machinic in the sense of the processual, the 
productive, but also in the autopoietic sense since desiring-production can be conceived 
as a self-generating life force.
13
 While discussing the Schreber case, for instance, the 
                                                 
11
 Leclerq and Villani (Sasso and Villani (eds), 2004, pp. 101-6) propose that Deleuze‟s notion of 
becoming originates in his early work on Nietzsche, yet is also inspired by Heraclite, the Greek tragedy as 
well as Mallarmé‟s work, and that it implies as an instantaneous meeting of series of virtual points (object 
or subject) a process of metamorphosis (p. 101). Specifically, the meeting [rencontre] takes place 
between two realms, as a short-circuit, a capture of code where each territorializes, quoting from Deleuze 
and Parnet (1977, p. 55) (Leclerq and Villani 2004, p. 103). The notion of becoming evolves into a 
complex vision, in Deleuze-Guattari‟s Kafka treatise described as „immobile voyage‟ where „a threshold 
is broached‟ (Kafka (1975, p. 24, p. 65, p. 67)) and in A thousand plateaus as a milieu-creating „in-
between‟ of two states (A thousand plateaus (1980, p. 360)) (Leclerq and Villani 2004, p. 104). Deleuze-
Guattari‟s notion of becoming, especially the notion of the (necessary) becoming-woman sparked off 
early responses (for instance, by Braidotti (1994; 2002, 2006a, 2006b), Griggers (1997), Hayden (1998) 
and Grosz ((ed.) 1999). Cf. also the comparison between Deleuze‟s and Irigaray‟s reading of Nietzsche 
by Lorraine (1999) under the aegis of visceral philosophy. See also Deleuze 2006e/1962. 
12
 The two positive tasks of schizoanalysis (as proposed in the 4th part of Anti-Oedipus) are directed 
toward individualized goals such as learning what a subject‟s desiring-machines are, that is deciding on 
their nature; then deciding on the goals toward which they are directed, that is learning what their 
formation and function are. Such a libidinal strategy will be transferred to the literary exegesis as an 
analytic principle to circumvent the focus on tracing (fixed) subjectivity.    
13
 The machinic principle governs Deleuze-Guattari‟s conceptualization of the social-political agenda. 
This is in keeping with their double-pronged critique of 20th century (psychoanalytically anchored) 
social-political capitalism and schizophrenia which mutually condition and sustain each other. Part 3 of 
Anti-Oedipus attempts a historical-ethnological sweeping portrait of how a theory of oedipal/schizoid 
subjectivity links into a social-political analysis of capitalism in the form of an exposition of the three 
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exemplary paranoiac machine, the miraculating machine and the celibate machine make 
an entrance. The celibate machine also figures prominently in Deleuze-Guattari‟s Kafka 
treatise where in my reading the machinic principle functions as a literary practice.
14
 I 
propose that the divergent configurations of the machinic are instantiations of 
productive desiring-machines, avatars, which do not represent the phenomena of 
paranoia, miraculation or celibacy respectively, in the psychoanalytic sense. Rather, 
they point to potential combinatorial products of desiring-production. In this sense I 
read the schizoanalytic machine as the core of my schizoid constellation, not as a mode 
of being but of becoming. The machinic principle cannot be read as a mechanical 
functioning but needs to be understood as a creative principle of production and anti-
production. This becomes clear in Deleuze-Guattari‟s transposition of the celibate-
machine into the Kafka text. The conflict between the functioning of desiring-machines 
‒ where the break of the flow is the motivator ‒ and the body without organs as a 
responsive network of affects produces the avatars of the desiring-machines through 
shifting responses. These avatars become literary instantiations as will be seen later. 
Additionally the machinic principle is not limited to Deleuze-Guattari‟s argumentation 
in Anti-Oedipus but reappears in A thousand plateaus in the form of abstract 
machines,
15
 with the difference that the machinic principle here functions in the sense of 
                                                                                                                                               
great social machines: the primitive territorial and the barbaric despotic leading up to the civilized 
capitalist machine. 
14
 In the context of „The connectors‟ (chapter seven of Deleuze-Guattari‟s  Kafka treatise) dealing with 
the function of women in Kafka‟s work, schizo-incest and homosexuality, Deleuze-Guattari are drawing 
an intimate connection between the artistic machine and the bachelor machine for reasons of their 
heightened intensity: „If we try to sum up the nature of the artistic machine for Kafka, we must say that it 
is a bachelor machine, the only bachelor machine, and, as such, plugged all the more into a social field 
with multiple connections. Machinic definition, and not an aesthetic one. The bachelor is a state of desire 
much larger and more intense than incestuous desire or homosexual desire. Undoubtedly, it has its 
problems, its weaknesses, such as its moments of lowered intensity: […] (“[H]e can live only as a hermit 
or a parasite”), and, even worse, the suicidal desire for self-abolition (“His nature is suicidal, therefore, he 
has teeth only for his own flesh and flesh only for his own teeth”). But, even with these downfalls, it is a 
production of intensities (“The bachelor has only one moment”). […] Production of intensive quantities in 
the social body, proliferation and precipitation of series, polyvalent and collective connections brought 
about by the bachelor agent – there is no other definition possible for a minor literature‟ (Deleuze and 
Guattari 2006, pp. 70-1). The exemplary Kafka text dealing with the bachelor machine(s) is 
Metamorphosis (as the becoming-animal of Gregor Samsa). Another sketch of interest is: „Bachelor‟s ill 
luck‟ (trans. W and E Muir, 1982, p. 94), as „The plight of the bachelor‟ (trans. Hofmann, 2007, p. 14).  
I return to this issue in chapters three and five. 
15
 Plateaus 3, 4, 5, 7. In the introductory plateau, „Rhizome‟, Deleuze-Guattari point to Bateson‟s use of 
the plateau and define the rhizome as composed of interacting plateaus: „A plateau is always in the 
middle, not at the beginning or the end. A rhizome is made of plateaus. Gregory Bateson uses the word 
„plateau‟ to designate something special: a continuous, self-vibrating region of intensities whose 
development avoids any orientation towards a culmination point or eternal end. […] We are writing this 
book as a rhizome. It is composed of plateaus. We have given it a circular form, but only for laughs‟ 
(Deleuze and Guattari 2004b, p. 24). They are referring to Bateson Steps to an ecology of mind. 
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a system of rules, in particular within assemblages and inter-assemblages, rather than as 
a productive or creative aspect of desiring-machines. My focus is on its application as 
literary machine, for instance as literary machine of symptomatology in Masoch and 
Beckett or Kafka-machine which I consider in this chapter and more extensively later.                            
 
The dynamic principle 
 
I introduce now another aspect of the regime of the schizoanalytic machine, its dynamic 
principle which gains its functionality in the context of Deleuze-Guattari‟s  
schizoanalytic postulate in Anti-Oedipus. They maintain that delirious images of 
paranoia and schizophrenia are the opposite poles of psychoanalysis and schizoanalysis 
dealing with the breakdown between subject and its familial and social setting. Without 
entering here the full scale social-political agenda that Deleuze-Guattari have in mind, I 
pursue only the thread relevant for my construct of schizoid constellation. In their 
introduction of the regime of schizoanalysis, Deleuze-Guattari propose that the 
unconscious runs through a cycle of types of delirium. These they conceive as 
polarizing yet often coinciding oscillations (Deleuze and Guattari 2004a, p. 305) and the 
objects of schizoanalysis.
16
 
 
Parallel to the two potential types of delirious reactions, paranoia and schizophrenia ‒ 
also termed social investments and adversary reactions (Deleuze and Guattari 2004a, p. 
305) ‒ Deleuze-Guattari construct two types of physical responses, molar (outward-
bound, massive, broad-based, appearing in large numbers) and molecular (inward-
bound, singular, minute, of infinitesimal character) (Deleuze and Guattari 2004a, p. 
308). Following their construct so far as it concerns the literary project, I single out here 
                                                                                                                                               
(2000/1972). In the concluding plateau, ‟Concrete rules and abstract machines‟, Deleuze and Guattari 
attempt a typological analysis of abstract machines embracing all plateaus and completing the circle: 
„There are different types of abstract machines that overlap in their operations and qualify the 
assemblages: abstract machines of consistency […]; abstract machines of stratification […] ; and 
axiomatic or overcoding abstract machines […] . Every abstract machine is linked to other abstract 
machines, not only because they are inseparably political, economic, scientific, artistic, ecological, 
cosmic – perceptive, affective, active, thinking, physical, and semiotic – but because their various types 
are as intertwined as their operations are convergent. Mechanosphere‟ (Deleuze and Guattari 2004b, p. 
566). See also Massumi‟s foreword to his translation of A thousand plateaus „Translator‟s foreword: 
Pleasures of philosophy‟ (Deleuze and Guattari 2004b, pp. ix-xvi and notes, pp. xvii-xx), the inserted 
annotations in the concluding „Notes‟ (Deleuze and Guattari 2004b, pp. 567-647) and Massumi 
(2003a/1992).  
16
 I note here that Deleuze-Guattari take the notion of unconscious on an argumentative level as indicating 
both the psychoanalytic observations and their own critique.  
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the second type of response, the molecular, the schizo‟s reaction, evoked as a wavelike 
reaction of flows and described as the affectivity characteristic of schizophrenia. 
Deleuze-Guattari propose that the molecular unconscious (Deleuze and Guattari 2004a, 
pp. 311-24) ‒ in contrast to a (psychoanalytic, oedipalized) molar unconscious ‒ can be 
viewed as the two (possible) sides of the Body without Organs, not understood 
metaphorically but literally (Deleuze and Guattari 2004a, p. 309). Admittedly, this is a 
rather difficult and circumventory method to introduce their critique of the underlying 
principle of a materialist vitalism (Deleuze and Guattari 2004a, p. 313) and to link 
machine and desire (Deleuze and Guattari 2004a, p. 314), but its speculative (and 
literary experimental) value as will be seen late. Desiring-machines then are of a 
molecular order (Deleuze and Guattari 2004a, p. 315) and their productivity is a 
generalized schizo-genesis producing schizze-flows (Deleuze and Guattari 2004a, p. 
315). Further, the molecular desiring-machines follow the regimes of synthesis, as laid 
out before (Deleuze and Guattari 2004a, p. 317). They function and produce but do not 
represent or signify (Deleuze and Guattari 2004a, p. 317). Overall, then, the 
schizoanalytic machine in its aspects of the machinic and dynamic principles postulates 
a specific regime of desiring-machines which is defined by three tasks: to recognize the 
driving forces and motivations of one‟s own desiring-machines; to question their 
functioning and evolving syntheses, that is their affective responses; and to take full 
advantage of their productivity (Deleuze and Guattari 2004a, p. 319). If I set Deleuze-
Guattari‟s conception of the schizoanalytic machine, its regime of schizoanalytically 
monitored, machinic and dynamic desiring-machines into the frame of a libidinal theory 
of subjectivity, it amounts to deconstructing the oedipal unconscious and doing away 
with the (Lacan‟s) rock of castration. 
 
Further principles can also be inferred from Deleuze-Guattari‟s discussion of 
schizoanalysis. The molecular unconscious and its desiring-machines escape 
„anthropomorphic representation of sex‟ (Deleuze and Guattari 2004a, pp. 324-5).17 I 
                                                 
17
 Deleuze-Guattari‟s lauding consideration of Marx can be traced throughout Anti-Oedipus anchored in 
the parallel of desiring-production and social production. „If we wish to have some idea of the forces that 
the body without organs exerts later on in the uninterrupted process, we must first establish a parallel 
between desiring-production and social production. We intend such a parallel to be regarded as merely 
phenomenological […] This socius may be the body of the earth, that of the tyrant, or capital. […] Capital 
is indeed the body without organs of the capitalist, or rather of the capitalist being‟ (Deleuze and Guattari 
2004a, pp. 10-1). The parallel status is further detailed: „The truth of the matter is that social production is 
purely desiring-production itself under determinate conditions. We maintain that the social field is 
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propose that in this manner their schizoanalytic construct ventures into saying that 
machinic, dynamic, productive and creative desiring-machines are of an infinitesimal 
non-human sex, pre-individual, impersonal, extracting out of chaos thought and 
creation. As bold as the construct is, I view this conclusion as a necessary outcome of 
Deleuze-Guattari‟s argumentation and as part of Deleuze-Guattari‟s critique of 
psychoanalysis and its notion of oedipalized unconscious. The castration hypothesis, 
read in the Freudian sense ‒ entangling subjectivity with sexuality as I discussed earlier 
‒ is thus not only overthrown, but in Lacan‟s re-assessment of the Freudian hypothesis, 
to which Deleuze-Guattari pay attention, the inter-dependence of subjectivity and 
sexuality is diffused through a shift toward the functionality of desire as lack. Indeed, 
Deleuze-Guattari refute this latter as a negative, non-productive theory, caught in the 
individualistic and anthropomorphic scheme of representation. In contrast, the 
schizoanalytic construct condenses multiple aspects: subjectivity is replaced by 
becoming, sexuality replaced by a dispersed non-anthropocentric notion of „sex‟ and 
representation is replaced by creativity drawn out of chaos.
18
 
                                                                                                                                               
immediately invested by desire, that it is the historically determined product of desire, and that libido has 
no need of any mediation or sublimation, any psychic operation, any transformation, in order to invade 
and invest the productive forces and the relations of production. There is only desire and the social, and 
nothing else‟ (Deleuze and Guattari 2004a, p. 31; original emphases). See Deleuze and Guattari (2004a, 
pp. 10-2, pp. 30-4, pp. 64-5, pp. 153-4, pp. 240 seq., pp. 280-2, pp. 323-5, pp. 332-3) for further 
comments on Marx (and Deleuze-Guattari‟s  references to Kapital and Grundrisse). Cf. Marx Capital: A 
critique of political economy [c. 1857-8], vol. 1, trans. Fowkes, 1976; Marx Grundrisse: Foundations of 
the critique of political economy [1867], trans. Nicolaus, 1973. See also for a recent exploration of Marx‟ 
position in Anti-Oedipus, Tynan (2009, pp. 28-52). The political Deleuze-Guattari, and the political 
Deleuze, cannot here be fully considered. See for instance, Hardt (1999/1993), the work of Jameson 
(1999, Buchanan (ed.), pp. 13-36; 2006b, an interview with Jameson in Buchanan, pp. 120-33) and the 
work by Patton ((ed.) 2000; 2009/2005, Boundas (ed.), pp. 187-203). 
18
 The creative impulse can be grasped in terms of fulguration, or rather of its infinitive „to fulgurate‟ 
[fulgurer]. Sauvagnargues (Sasso and Villani (eds), 2004, pp. 163-70) circumscribes the action as 
follows: „Verb which signals the difference in intensity between two “multiplicities” (or “divergent 
series”) in that they enter in “resonance”, form a system and resolve their “difference of difference” in 
“fulgurating” as sign. The “disparate” produces the phenomenon which fulgurates “between” two 
disparate series, affirming itself as difference of difference which resolves (while simultaneously 
recoversing it) the initial difference.‟ [„Verbe qui signale la différence d‟intensité entre deux 
“multiplicités” (ou “séries divergentes”) en tant qu‟elles entrent en “résonance”, forment système, et 
résolvent leur “différence de différence” en “fulgurant” en signe. Le “dispars” produit le phénomène qui 
fulgure “entre” deux séries disparates, s‟affirmant comme différence de différence, qui résout (en même 
temps qu‟elle le recouvre) la différence initiale.‟] (p. 163). The notion can be traced to Deleuze‟s work on 
Nietzsche and Leibniz. The fulgurating instance can be physically, materially, grasped as the „zigzag‟ of 
lightning (Deleuze Difference and repetition (1968, p. 155)), the stoic arrow (The logic of sense (1969, p. 
172)), the brush stroke of the zen master (The logic of sense (1969, p. 162)) or the whip lash (A thousand 
plateaus (1980, p. 347)) (Sauvagnargues 2004, p. 163). Sauvagnargues extracts some characteristics of 
the image of lightning (p. 163) to exemplify Deleuze‟s understanding: (1) the lightning fulgurates as 
singularity in the mode of the event; (2) this establishes son „milieu‟ as force field; (3) the lightning‟s 
fulguration discharges intensity as „difference of difference‟ while its appearing light functions as the 
second difference; (4) the intensity fulgurates in the mode of becoming as singular, rapid, brief and 
unforeseeable event and (5) the becoming takes the form of the actualization of virtual (p. 164). In her 
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The regime of desiring-machines: The production of the BwO 
 
In following the regime of desiring-machines I also need to establish some guiding 
principles as to approach the writing and reading process within the schizoid 
constellation. In this context, I discern discontinuity as the primary characteristic of 
desiring-machines since the elementary aspect of their functioning is the machinic 
rhythm of flow and break whereby the break figures as the instigator or motivator of 
production. The second characteristic is the irregularity of their functioning. They break 
down, misfire or stop altogether, producing in Deleuze-Guattari‟s construct a type of 
(catatonic, mal-functioning) Body without Organs. I read such lapses in the functioning 
of desiring-machines as dynamic spurts of energies, as responses directed to the outside 
and resulting in fragmentation (Deleuze and Guattari 2004a, pp. 1-57). These two 
parameters of the regime of desiring-machines, discontinuity and fragmentation, are in 
my view comparable to some characteristics of Lacan‟s understanding of perpetual 
subjective dispersion and dissociation, which I discussed earlier, the difference being 
that this dissociation is theorized by Lacan in terms of the individual, not (as in 
Deleuze-Guattari‟s understanding) happening on a pre-individual, impersonal plane. 
Taken together, the primary characteristics of the regime of desiring-machines propose, 
in my understanding, a functional model which is not governed by any of the logical 
principle or any individual rules proposed for the oedipal unconscious. 
 
The regime of desiring-machines presents itself as a chaotic process which allows both 
dissociation and simultaneous, free, productive re-arrangements. Such a characterization 
fits Deleuze-Guattari‟s postulate that desiring-machines constitute the non-oedipal life 
                                                                                                                                               
critique (pp. 167-9) Sauvagnargues points to the ensuing network between fulguration, the disparate 
which makes for communicating series and the simulacrum as a „differential system of disparate and 
resonating series, with dark precursor and forced mouvement‟ [„système différential à séries disparates et 
résonnantes, à précurseur sombre et mouvement forcé‟] (Difference and repetition (1968, p. 165)) and its 
replacement (after 1976; I assume after the third revision of the Proust treatise (1973, not 1976) and 
Deleuze-Guattari‟s Kafka treatise (1975)) by images drawn from biology (rhizome), cinema (egg, de 
l‟oeuf) and ethology (wound, cicatrice, blessure). Fulguration transforms into fold (Foucault (1986, pp. 
118-26)); The fold: Leibniz and the baroque (1988, chapter VII)) and into becoming (A thousand plateaus 
(1980, pp 342-3)); What is philosophy? (1991, p. 149); Essays clinical and critical (1993, p.11)) 
(Sauvagnargues 2004, p. 169). A vast range of notions are associated (difference, the disparate and 
disparity, intensity, the meeting-point and becoming as process) and form an inter-dependent network 
which only can be read contextually. Cf. Deleuze‟s work on Nietzsche (2006e/1962) and on Leibniz 
(2006f/1988a). See also Sauvagnargues‟ work on art (Zourabichvili/Sauvagnargues/Marrati, 2005a, pp. 
117-227); Sauvagnargues (2005b). 
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of the unconscious (Deleuze and Guattari 2008a, p. 468; Guattari 2009a, p. 95).
19
 The 
determining aspect in the regime of desiring-machines is their machinicity as the 
enigma or aporia of their productivity. Erratic as this activity may be, it is self-
originating and perpetual and thus stands in for a self-generating life force. The 
governing aspects of the schizoanalytic machine which I introduced earlier, the 
machinic and the dynamic principles, if considered with regard to the regime of 
desiring-machines, are thus instantiations of the self-originating and self-generating 
forces in Deleuze-Guattari‟s construct. If the mode of operation of desiring-machines is 
erratic and chaotic, the question arises how this perpetual creativity can be channelled 
into a comprehensible and legible scheme, whether vocally, gesturally, or linguistically.  
Deleuze-Guattari propose (and this might help in deciding the question of chaotic 
irregularity of the production) that the motivating, instigating breaks of the flow are 
executing inscriptions on the Body without Organs, the postulated affective network 
encircling the process. I infer from this proposition that the ultimate purpose of the 
regime of desiring-machines is the production of the Body without Organs. 
 
Deleuze-Guattari also postulate a process of registration or recording (reminiscent of 
Freudian memory traces) and a process of distribution, as if there were an inherent 
purposefulness governing the production. Such a proposition evokes in my view the 
principle of autopoiesis, an organic self-motivating, self-governing process of functional 
and directed unfolding. However, inclusive disjunction is the over-riding principle 
within the series of related processes which form a system of passive synthesis, and 
govern the stages of production. In my view this makes it impossible to speak of 
distribution which could eventuate either way. Although the functional model 
establishes an irrational progression, an enfolded order insists and moves the process 
forward in terms of autopoiesis. 
                                                 
19
 Deleuze-Guattari‟s postulate that the desiring-machines constitute the non-oedipal life of the 
unconscious can be followed in more detail in the text „Balance-sheet for “Desiring-machines”‟ which is 
attached to the revised version of Anti-Oedipus and also included in the text collection of Guattari texts by 
Lotringer. Cf. Deleuze and Guattari (2008a, pp. 463-87); Guattari „Balance-Sheet for “Desiring-
machines”‟ (Lotringer (ed.), 2009a, pp. 90-115). Guattari‟s individual work cannot be entered into, 
however, I have considered the major writings. Cf. Guattari (1995a) which presents: „On the production 
of subjectity‟; „Machinic heterogenesis‟; „Schizoanalytic metamodelisation‟; „Schizo chaosmosis‟; 
„Machinic orality and virtual ecology‟; „The new aesthetic paradigm‟; „The ecosophic object‟. Genosko 
((ed.) 1996) presents further comments on: „Microphysics of power/Micropolitics of desire‟; „A 
Liberation of desire‟. Of particular interest because of its impact on the ideas developed in Anti-Oedipus 
are Guattari The Anti-Oedipus Papers 1969-1973 (2006) and Guattari Cartographies Schizoanalytiques 
(1989b). Of interest is also Guattari (trans. Adkins, 2011/1979) which cannot be integrated in the frame of 
this thesis. 
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On occasion, Deleuze-Guattari draw on the notion of libido and even some (rewritten) 
form of subjectivity. The margin is at times minimal between the regime of desiring-
machines and their production of the Body without Organs, and the postulate of an 
individual subjectivity produced by (impersonal) desiring-machines. For instance, 
within the process of propelled libido or life force, a subject is postulated as circling 
through the inclusive disjunctions and consuming, or consummating, the process. I read 
subjectivity in this construct as a product of desiring-machines, in contrast to the 
psychoanalytic rendering where processes of desire are theorized as inhering in 
individual persons, in their unconscious and their consciousness. However, the 
consuming or consummating subject as postulated in this instance by Deleuze-Guattari 
does not have an independent status, but is evoked as a residual outcome of desiring-
production, a larval subject. 
 
At this point, some observations on Deleuze-Guattari‟s proposition in contrast to the 
psychoanalytic understanding are in place. In desiring-production the movement of the 
processes is not directed toward the interior (as is the case in psychoanalytic theory) but 
toward the exterior (the social-political and cultural domain), thus the trigger for 
production is viewed as coming from outside. Also desiring-production is held in a state 
of full suspension through the principle of inclusive disjunction; no logical or rational 
decision is made. Desiring-machines are also paradoxical in that they work, or are 
instigated, through the interruption, the break of flow which I assume is occasioned by 
the milieu. For my purposes of establishing principles of composition and reading 
literary texts, the relations between desiring-production and larval subjectivity are 
salient points. Since the orientation of the desiring-machines is toward the outside, I 
expect that inter-relations (including contact or exchange) determine the potential Body 
without Organs as the affective networks established by desiring-machines.                      
 
The regime of desiring-machines thus constructs a libidinal system to dismantle the 
assumed oedipalization of the Freudian unconscious. Such a dismantling does away 
with the necessity of repression. The conception of productive desiring-machines 
replaces the idea of repressed elements re-appearing in the form of complexes. The 
proposed characteristics of desiring-machines, their mode of operation, their 
functionality and their productivity, work to oppose a repressive, negative 
psychoanalytic construct and replace it with a liberating, affirmative one. In the wider 
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frame of my schizoid constellation this impacts on the status of subjectivity and 
sexuality, and their inter-dependence. Most importantly, the regime of desiring-
machines and their production of the Body without Organs impact on the 
conceptualization of desire. 
 
To emphasize the machinic and dynamic character of desiring-machines cuts away from 
evaluating desire as being directed at other objects. The postulate of desiring-machines 
dissolves the opposition of subject and object and replaces a dialectical play with a 
focus on perpetual becoming. I contend that doing away with oedipalization amounts to 
a re-fashioning of desire enforcing an ontological re-visioning which entails the 
replacement of subjectivity by singularities, of fixed identity by impermanent states of 
becoming, of interiority of repression by exteriority and affectivity directed at inter-
relations. Such a re-assessment of desire as an experimental, productive, creative force 
lends itself to a desiring practice which focuses on actualization and enactment of 
events in literary texts rather than on the depiction of characters and storylines in the 
representational mode.            
 
I have on various occasions also approached the difficult notion of the Body without 
Organs which fulfils in my view a range of (at times) paradoxical functions. It is 
misleading to associate it with any concept of corporeality; rather, it is best evoked as a 
concept figuring intensities which in Deleuze-Guattari‟s understanding manifest in 
levels and thresholds marking the actual body and are traceable by symptoms as bodily 
signs of affective reactions. To associate the Body without Organs solely with Artaud‟s 
schizophrenic experiences is in my view not helpful since it only presents one form, one 
avatar of the desiring-machines, a body experienced without the organization and 
mastery of organs. This avatar of desiring-machines manifests in vocalization or orality 
while the becoming-avatar of the Body without Organs (BwOs in A thousand plateaus) 
is directed at, as I read it, transient stages of dying-death, zero-intensity as a necessary 
preliminary halt of affectivity. Here the Body without Organs is a measure of the 
changing dynamic of the affective system. This impersonal avatar of desiring-machines 
is liminal, understood as an immanent limit of the lived body. As a model of death but 
nevertheless as the avatar of the productive desiring-machines, the Body without 
Organs replays the Freudian idea of Eros and Thanatos which Deleuze evokes on other 
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occasions.
20
 For the purposes of my argument, the Body without Organs is used in the 
sense of the avatar of becoming which is best evoked as a network of connected points 
of affectivity that can be palpated, touched upon, in literary texts (as initiated in the 
treatise on Proust‟s oeuvre).  
 
Assemblages of desire 
 
Within my strategic construct I read assemblages of desire as extensions of desiring-
machines. Assemblages of desire and abstract machines correspond conceptually to the 
schema of desiring-machines (in the frame of A thousand plateaus by contrast to Anti-
Oedipus),
21
 however they differ in my view in that the notion of desiring-machines 
focuses on the process while the notion of assemblages of desire anchors the process in 
relations and inter-connections. The process of desire shifts from the evocation of one 
momentum to the actions taking place between responding parts of the assemblage. The 
assemblage expresses a form of connectivity but more importantly the enactment, the 
actualization of desire between and among the bodies entering the assemblage. The 
assemblage in its transitional status becomes in a sense the field of observation where 
desire can be displayed, acted out and palpated. The notion of assemblage opens the 
potential for theorizing the space in-between which Deleuze-Guattari propose as the 
doubling of content and expression, of machinic assemblage of desire and collective 
assemblage of enunciation. Each interacts with the other and relates to the other, 
establishing Deleuze-Guattari‟s notion of diagram or abstract machine.  
 
                                                 
20
 Thanatos, the Greek term for Death, either personified and not, (sometimes used by analogy with Eros 
according to Laplanche and Pontalis (2006, p. 447) is used to designate the death instinct; „its use 
underscores the fundamental nature of the instinctual dualism by lending it a quasi-mythical sense‟ (p. 
447). Further, „[T]his name is not to be found in Freud‟s writings, but according to Jones (his colleague 
and biographer) he occasionally used it in conversation. Seemingly Federn introduced it into the psycho-
analytical literature.‟ However, Freud used the term Eros in the context of his theory of the life and death 
instincts. The main references are chapter VI of Beyond the pleasure principle and „Analysis terminable 
and indeterminable‟, section 7, where Freud draws arttention to Empedocles‟s antithesis of θιλία [phylia 
(love)] and νεĩχος [neixos (discord)]. „The two fundamental principles of Empedocles – philia and neixos 
– are, both in name and function, the same as our own two primal instincts, Eros and destructiveness‟ (p. 
447). Cf. Jones (1953-57, vol. III, p. 295); Freud Beyond the pleasure principle (SE, vol. XVIII, pp. 7-
64); Freud „Analysis terminable and interminable‟ (SE, vol. XXIII, pp. 209-564). 
21
 Assemblages of desire and abstract machines correspond conceptually to the schema of desiring-
machines (in the frame of A thousand plateaus by contrast to Anti-Oedipus), however they differ in my 
view in that the notion of desiring-machines focuses on the process while the notion of assemblages of 
desire anchors the process in relations and inter-connections. 
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The notion of assemblage conjoins a range of meanings: the combining of elements, 
their enhanced functionality, but at the same time the heterogeneity of these elements. I 
view it as not so much a theoretical construct but a potential tool of literary practice as 
demonstrated by Deleuze-Guattari in their Kafka text. To exemplify their procedure 
briefly, Deleuze-Guattari differentiate between a horizontal and a vertical axis whereby 
on the horizontal axis the assemblage of bodies with their actions and affectivity 
combine and respond to each other. Content and expression (taken in the traditional 
version) are played out as machinic assemblage (of desire) and as collective assemblage 
of enunciation, expressing more than the individual body could express. On the level of 
enunciation the unexpressed, or not yet expressible, takes shape in incorporeal 
transformations. On the vertical axis the setting or territory becomes unstable and 
undergoes deterritorialization(s), a re-aligning of the original territory or setting. 
Deleuze-Guattari‟s odd terminology for shifts and changes in the combination attempts 
in my view to prevent the concepts from falling into established images of thought since 
„change‟ rather than „deterritorialization‟ seems a completed set of stages and thus does 
not evoke the disturbance of the odd new formula for which there does not yet exist any 
image of thought (except perhaps in terms of colonization).
22
 „Assemblages‟ place the 
emphasis on connectivity and mutual responses, do away with individualizing isolation 
and display the mutually affective responses of desire. Abstract machines, in which 
creative and artistic assemblages prominently figure, are pure assemblages in the sense 
that they set out to evoke and exercise a full disequilibrium in the quadruple 
arrangement of assemblages: content – machinic assemblage, expression – collective 
assemblage of enunciation, horizontal axis, vertical axis. Abstract machines, or 
diagrams,
23
 fulfill the potential of playing out the states of perpetual becoming, non-
                                                 
22
 The difficulty of pinning down concepts (more so „key concepts‟ which promises an opening of a 
problematic) in Deleuze and Deleuze-Guattari comes to the fore in attempting to set up dictionaries or 
vocabularies. Cf. for instance: Stivale (2005) where I find some articles helpful, for instance: Holland 
„Desire‟ (pp. 53-62); Bogue „The minor‟ (pp. 110-20 (in Kafka)); Conley „Fold and folding‟ (pp. 170-81); 
DW Smith „Critical, clinical‟ (pp. 182-93). Another effort in conceptualization is Parr ((ed.) 2005). By 
contrast, French vocabulaires which work across the toality of Deleuze‟s and Deleuze-Guattari‟s work 
and conclude their surveys with an evaluative critique seem to be more productive. For instance: 
Zourabichvili (2003) and Sasso and Villani et al. ((eds) 2003). 
23
 Abrioux (Sasso and Villani (eds), 2004, pp. 107-13) states that Deleuze‟s idea of the diagram is 
anchored in Foucault‟s work (Discipline and punish (1972, p. 272)) where the panopticon exemplifies a 
power mechanism in its ideal form as a diagram. The link between power and diagram finds its 
expression in Deleuze‟s notion of abstract machine. Deleuze takes up the discussion of the diagram in his 
work on Foucault (1986, p. 42, p. 79) where he expands, according to Abrioux, the notion of diagram to 
describe power relations as such (p. 44) (Abrioux 2004, p. 108). The later notion of the diagram maintains 
the signification of power relations and force field but transfers it to the affective fields of desire and 
sensation (Francis Bacon: The logic of sensation (1981, p. 46)) (Abrioux 2004, p. 109). Cf. also Deleuze 
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subjectivity, a-subjectivity, collectivity, and communal inter-relations. This difficult but 
important notion for desiring practice will be taken up later in more detail. 
    
Exemplification 
 
The schizoanalytic conceptualizations of Anti-Oedipus and A thousand plateaus are in 
my understanding not meant to be read as contradictory or exclusive. For this reason I 
turn briefly now to Deleuze-Guattari‟s Kafka treatise (discussed later in more detail) to 
evaluate the practical and literary impact of some of Deleuze-Guattari‟s ontological and 
aesthetic constructs. I read the treatise as an exemplification since it puts into practice 
the schizoanalytic terminology and the goals of schizoanalysis as set out in Anti-
Oedipus. The literary exemplification revolves around the notion of a tetravalency of 
assemblages of desire whose four components are content (also conceptualized as 
machinic assemblage), expression (also conceptualized as collective assemblage of 
enunciation) and two further assemblages concerned with borderlines and going beyond 
their set limits. 
 
Deleuze-Guattari propose order out of chaos through creation, composition and some 
rules and regimes, as the double pincer articulation which shapes strata and milieus. The 
double pincer articulation in content and expression is not to be equated with form and 
substance. In the context of this chapter I cannot resolve the complication Deleuze-
Guattari introduce, that both content and expression may have form and both content 
and expression may have substance. It is more important that the materialization of 
content in the literary text follows the machinic principle of desiring-production and 
that the eventuation of expression is also conceptualized as impersonal, as collective 
expression in the sense of assemblages relating and reacting to each other. I contend that 
the linguistic qualification of expression as an enunciative procedure points to 
establishing the minor understood as an original, new language formation splitting off 
from the actually employed (major) language. Deleuze-Guattari view expression as an 
                                                                                                                                               
„Michel Foucault‟s main concepts‟ (2006g, pp. 241-60). The notion of the diagram has been explored in 
aesthetic and artistic contexts. Cf. for instance, Ambrose and Khandker ((eds) 2005); O‟Sullivan (2006 
and 2009) „From stuttering and stammering to the diagram: Deleuze, Bacon and contemporary art‟. 
Watson (2009a, 2009b) sets her tracing of Guattari‟s position between Lacan and Deleuze under the 
determining feature of Guattari‟s diagrammatic thought. Cf. also works on abstract machines and on art 
which explore the connections: Zepke (2005); Sauvagnargues (2005b); also Sauvagnargues (one part of 
the collaboration), Zourabichvili/Sauvagnargues/Marrati (2005a). 
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assemblage of enunciation directed at incorporeal transformations, also conceptualized 
as an autonomous zone of changes which I read as not being attached to bodies but 
focused on inter-relationality, connectivity and affectivity. I look at this problematic 
later on. 
 
Since any assemblage is anchored in a territory, a milieu, the territory makes the 
assemblage a functional if transitory agency. However the machinic impact of content 
and the dynamic, willed impact of enunciation exceed the territory, the autonomous 
zone of incorporeal transformations, which becomes, in Deleuze-Guattari‟s terms, de-
territorialized. I view this movement beyond the set borders of the territory as the 
creative impulse of the desiring-machines. Within Deleuze-Guattari‟s postulate of the 
tetravalency of literary assemblages, the assemblages of content and expression (also 
imaged as horizontal axis of the literary creation) are supported and made dynamic 
through the assemblages of (existing) territory or territoriality and the urge toward de-
territorialization (also imaged as vertical axis of the literary creation), that goes beyond 
the set limits of borderlines. 
 
In speaking of the Kafka-machine Deleuze-Guattari take in my view a more distant 
approach to the complete Kafka oeuvre, the total literary output which includes  (for 
instance) the Letters to Felice (Heller and Born (eds), trans. Stern and Duckworth, 
1999) and Diaries (Brod (ed.), trans. Kresh, 1948), the „novels‟ The castle (trans. W and 
E Muir, 1974; trans. Underwood, 2000a) and The trial (trans. Mitchell, 1998; trans. 
Parry, 2000b)
24
 and the „stories‟ (trans. W and E Muir, 1981; trans. and ed. Hofmann, 
2007)
25
 before entering the individual literary analysis of a specific Kafka text.
26
 Such 
                                                 
24
 Bogue notes Deleuze-Guattari‟s apparent lack of interest in the special case of the (unfinished) „novel‟ 
America/The man who disappeared. W Benjamin  proposes in his commentaries on Kafka that there are 
several impersonations of K. and that Karl Rossmann (the „hero‟ of the unfinished „novel‟ America/The 
man who disappeared ) is „the third and more fortunate incarnation of K.‟ (trans. Underwood, 2009, p. 
203; trans. Zohn, Arendt (ed.), 2007, p. 119). Cf. W Benjamin „Franz Kafka: On the tenth anniversary of 
his death‟ [1934] (trans. Underwood, 2009, pp. 193-227; trans. Zohn, Arendt (ed.), 2007, pp. 111-140); 
„Some reflections on Kafka‟ (trans. Zohn, Arendt (ed.), 2007, pp. 141-5). Cf. also Kafka „The stoker: A 
fragment‟ (trans. Hofmann, 2007, pp. 51-83) which is an extract from America/The man who 
disappeared. 
25
 There are other collections of „stories‟, fragments and sketches such as Kafka Wedding preparations in 
the country (trans. Kaiser and Wilkins; trans. W and E Muir, 1982). 
26
 A generic definition (novel, story or even parable) does not make sense in Deleuze-Guattari‟s reading. 
They consider the texts on a par with each other and disregard „incompleteness‟ (as just another attempt 
to interpret). They focus on a problematic and then draw the text into the discussion, for instance, the 
„novels‟ The trial or The castle; the „parables‟ „Investigations of a dog‟, „A report to the academy‟ (by an 
ape) or „Josephine the singer, or The mouse folk‟; or again the „stories‟ Metamorphosis, The verdict, The 
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an approach does away with any interest in interpretation, putting the emphasis rather 
on experimentation in the sense that the selected „content‟ (read as machinic 
assemblage) and the (assumedly) aligned „expression‟ (read as collective assemblage of 
enunciation) override literary categorization in form of genres (novels, parables, stories, 
letters, diaries) and any focus on the „meaning‟ of the texts held within the genres as 
expressive scaffolding. 
 
Deleuze-Guattari‟s method, I argue, is determined by their preoccupation to detect 
desiring-machines in the textual fabric. These desiring-machines can be indicated by 
„ruptures‟, breaks in the logical lines of pursuit, the detection of „speaking‟ symptoms 
and gestures (bent or straight head). Since Deleuze-Guattari propose as the effective 
characteristics of the Kafka-machine the tetravalency of assemblages, the internal 
regimes of assemblages of desire become the governing principles of their treatise. 
These internal regimes include childhood blocks (rather than oedipal childhood 
memories), dramatization and actualization.
27
 Rather than identifying the potentiality of 
Kafka‟s (individual or personal) Imaginary, Deleuze-Guattari foreground the processes 
of becoming in the existing assemblages (of characters and locations, or rather of 
transitional impersonations and milieus) and their ruptures (or de-territorialization, 
crossing the border to a new territory). 
 
                                                                                                                                               
hunger artist or In the penal colony. More important is the problematic (for instance the becoming-
animal) which binds them. 
27
 Dramatization and actualization become the governing principles of their treatise(s). Cf. also 
Deleuze „A method of dramatization‟ [1967] (2004a, pp. 94-116). Deleuze‟s presentation is followed by a 
discussion with a panel consisting of: Alquié, Beaufret, Gandillac, Merleau-Ponty, Mouloud, Schuhl, 
Wahl and others (members of the French Society of Philosophy). Deleuze takes up some ideas which he 
(the year after) presents in Difference and repetition in chapters IV and V („Ideas and the synthesis of 
difference‟ and „Asymmetrical synthesis of the sensible‟).  The introductory argument sets out the 
following propositions: (1) Rather than focusing an enquiry on the object (what is this?) it should be 
focused on the subjective situation (who? how much? how? where? when?). (2) Such a (discursive) shift 
of focus sets up a spatio-temporal dynamism with a range of properties (I leave aside the first three 
properties). The fourth property entails and designates a subject, „though a “larval” or “embryonic” 
subject (2004a, p. 94). The fifth property constitutes „a special theatre‟ (2004a, p. 94). The sixth property 
allows that Ideas can be expressed. (3) „It is through all these different aspects that spatio-temporal 
dynamisms figure the movement of dramatization. Through dramatization, the Idea is incarnated or 
actualized, it differentiates itself. […] In other words, the Idea is fully differential in itself, before even 
differentiating itself in the actual. This status of the Idea explains its logical value, which is not clear and 
distinct, but rather as Leibniz sensed, the distinct-obscure. The method of dramatization as a whole is 
represented in the complex concept of differentiation (differential/differentiation), which gives an 
orientation to the questions from which I began‟ (2004a, p. 94; original emphases). Despite its 
complexity, the outline of Deleuze‟s argument on the differential method of dramatization and 
actualization allows to locate the „vanishing‟ importance of the subject, i.e. its larval or embryonic status, 
and also the transition (or better the enmeshing) of the actual and virtual (although not mentioned here as 
such).      
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In other words, the Kafka-machine marks a preliminary halting point in the transient 
assemblages of machinic, dynamic, impersonal, pre-individual desire, creating a diverse 
range of expression(s) (understood as collective assemblages of enunciation). Any 
generic or interpretative „unriddling‟ of the textual fabric is misguided in that it 
dissipates the revolutionary force of desiring-machines. Venturing into another potential 
reading of Kafka‟s existential or absurd „monstrosities‟ does not open the literary 
oeuvre in Deleuze-Guattari‟s understanding but closes it down as self-fulfilling oedipal 
representation.
28
 In this sense I argue that the logical gaps, breaks, ruptures, „narrative‟ 
impasses and enigmatic doubling or serializing effects (in characterization) in Kafka‟s 
oeuvre need attention to do justice to the notion of assemblages of desire as their 
governing literary principle.                         
 
Abstract machines  
 
The notions of assemblages of desire and abstract machines are linked in that the 
abstract machines function as underlying „structure‟ which needs actualization to 
appear. On occasion abstract machine and diagram are equated although they differ in 
terms of fluidity. The notion of assemblages thus does away with the division between 
subject and object and focuses on the inter-relations between transitory subjects in the 
perpetual state of becoming and the changing repercussions in the network of 
affectivity. The plateaus presented in A thousand plateaus are conceptualized as planes 
of consistencies with an inherent cohesion of concepts; or as a Body without Organs 
with an inherent cohesion of affectivity (Deleuze and Guattari 2004b, p. 558), or can be 
                                                 
28
 Deleuze-Guattari take a stand against generic or interpretative „unriddling‟ of Kafka‟s texts, of 
existential or absurdist readings of „monstrosities‟ such as cockroach/beetle Gregor Samsa in 
Metamorphosis, the academic ape in „A Report to the Academy‟; the dancing dogs in „Investigations of a 
dog‟, or of a surface understanding of libidinal figures such as „prostitute‟ Fräulein Bürstner and 
„pederast‟ painter Titorelli and his coven of perverse little girls in The trial; „homosexual‟ Barnabas in 
tight black leather and enigmatic Klamm in The castle, or of the deadly tattooing machine in The penal 
colony. Interpretation is viewed as libidinal dissipation and textual closure rather than as rendering access 
to Kafka‟s texts. For other contemporary readings of Kafka, see: Bataille „Kafka‟ (1986b, pp. 149-69); 
Camus „Hope and the absurd in the work of Franz Kafka‟ (1983a, pp. 112-24). In contrast, Borges „Kafka 
and his precursors‟ (1981b, pp. 242-3) states that Kafka‟s precursors are: (1) Zeno (referring to Zeno‟s 
paradox against movement as in Aristotle), (2) Chinese writer HanYu (9th century, the mysterious 
Unicorn), (3) Kierkegaard (religious parables), (4) Browning (impossibilities), (5) Bloy (short stories, 
never reaching an envisaged goal). The editors/translators point out that this very brief text can be traced 
through literary criticism from Genette (1964) to H Bloom (1970) who have detected literary principles 
and extended them (Borges 1981b, p. 356, note 73). While Camus adheres to the absurdist „interpretation‟ 
of Kafka‟s work (in alignment with his ideas in The mythos of Sisyphos), Borges identifies „structural‟ 
aspects such as the idling movement which is later identified by Deleuze-Guattari as the method of 
„dismantling‟. 
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read in the sense of constructed, selected assemblages. Assemblages such as the 
machinic assemblage, or content, of literary texts and the collective assemblage of 
enunciation, or expression, of literary texts, which introduced earlier, interact and relate 
to each other. 
 
The notion of abstract machine, also termed diagram
29
 ‒ if I follow Deleuze-Guattari‟s 
conceptual conclusion in Plateau 15
30
 ‒ condenses the rules and operations of the inter-
relations, of the composition at work in concrete assemblages. Deleuze-Guattari refute 
the understanding that the notion of abstract machine parallels the notion of a „Platonic 
Idea‟ as a transcendent and universal entity (Deleuze and Guattari 2004b, p. 562). The 
abstract machine operates at the „cutting edge‟ (Deleuze and Guattari 2004b, p. 562) of 
assemblages, meaning that they embody the point of liminality, the point of creation. I 
propose to read the notion of abstract machine in the sense of a logical anchoring or 
instantiation of becoming. It is in this sense that Deleuze-Guattari speak of Kafka-
machine, or K-machine (Deleuze and Guattari 2004b, p. 556). 
 
In my understanding, then, the notion of abstract machine,
31
 if truncated in all its 
multiple functions, could stand in for a creative principle, as for instance intimated by 
                                                 
29
 Abstract machines are „a consolidated aggregate of matters-functions (phylum and diagram)‟ (Deleuze 
and Guattari 2004b, p. 562). This corresponds to Guattari‟s presentation in Cartographies 
schizoanalytiques (1989a) on which I shall comment in the next section of this chapter.  
30
 Deleuze-Guattari theorize and cross-connect in their conceptual conclusion in Plateau 15 their 
idiosyncratic terminology in „counter-alphabetical articles‟: S Strata, stratification; A Assemblages; R 
Rhizome; C Plane of consistency, Body without Organs; D Deterritorialization; M Abstract machines 
(diagram and phylum).  
31
 Among the characteristics of the abstract machine are a decoding (and deterritorializing) mechanism 
(Deleuze and Guattari 2004b, pp. 562-3); an opening device toward the cosmic and the chaos (Deleuze 
and Guattari 2004b, p. 561, p. 562, p. 564); machines of singular and immanent regimes (Deleuze and 
Guattari 2004b, pp. 562-4), formless and insubstantial and consisting of „un-formed matters and 
nonformal functions‟ (Deleuze and Guattari 2004b, p. 562). However, looking at specific abstract 
machines, for instance in the regime of signs („Plateau 5: 587 B.C. to A.D. 70: On several regimes of 
signs‟, Deleuze and Guattari 2004b, pp. 123-64; see p. 562, p. 563, p. 566), Deleuze-Guattari 
conceptualize the relations between matter and functions in terms of phylum (defining matter) and 
diagram (defining functions) where the diagram stands in for the abstract machine. There appears to me a 
conceptual impasse with regard to focusing solely on functionality, although Deleuze-Guattari insist that 
the diagrammatic function captures the differential processes of affectivity, also termed tensors (in 
alignment with Lyotard) (Deleuze and Guattari 2004b, p. 562). Abstract machines are singular, creative, 
instances of the event, „haecceities‟ (Deleuze and Guattari 2004b, p. 558), real (Deleuze and Guattari 
2004b, p. 563), actual (Deleuze and Guattari 2004b, p. 563), and since they propel themselves 
spontaneously, in a machinic and dynamic manner, I propose that they are another avatar of desiring-
machines, in a parallel or alternative conceptualization to the different types of Body without Organs 
(which is the only plateau not cross-referenced to abstract machines). 
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Deleuze-Guattari referring to the Einstein abstract machine (for science, physics),
32
 the 
Webern abstract machine (for music), the Galileo (for astronomy), the Bach and 
Beethoven machines (for music). Since the abstract machine is also equated with the 
notion of the plateau, the dating, at first obscure, and naming of the plateaus points to 
creative moments ‒ „events‟ in Deleuze-Guattari‟s understanding ‒ in the history of 
(Western) civilization. The abstract machine evolves and produces „becomings‟ 
(Deleuze and Guattari 2004b, p. 558, p. 562) and thus is „a revolutionary machine‟ 
(Deleuze and Guattari 2004b, p. 564), yet still understood as singular and immanent. 
 
I propose that becoming, as the further if unreachable goal of schizoanalysis, and set 
into the context of the abstract machine, can be approached from the inside of the 
assemblage as the abstract machine allows for the discernment of traits in the mapping 
of intensities (Deleuze and Guattari 2004b, p. 563, p. 565). Deleuze-Guattari point for 
instance to Woolf‟s Waves-machine (Woolf 1992/1931) (Deleuze and Guattari 2004b, 
p. 564; p. 278). As foreshadowed by the accumulated characteristics of the notion of 
abstract machine, which is a creative and productive principle, I propose a direct 
relation between Deleuze-Guattari‟s abstract machine and schizoanalysis and thus 
between assemblages and schizoanalysis. Without wanting to be reductive or to dismiss 
the complications and shortfalls of Deleuze-Guattari‟s constructs, I propose that 
assemblages are governed by the regime of abstract machines which in their turn qualify 
and quantify schizoanalysis, mapping the schizoanalytic trajectory, in particular in 
literary texts. While the notion of the schizoanalytic machine in my understanding is the 
core of postulating productive desiring-machines and setting up an anoedipal 
unconscious, as explored earlier, the notion of abstract machine in the diagrammatic 
sense is employed to support the mapping of literary texts.
33
      
                                                 
32
 Plateau 15 paradigmatically features a digital image, „Computer Einstein‟ (Deleuze and Guattari 2004b, 
p. 552).  
33
 The notion of the diagram (adapted by Deleuze (and Guattari) from Foucault) has various connotations 
which cannot here be followed in detail, however three prominent aspects can be pointed out: (1) the 
diagram as artistic principle (and then called abstract machine); see for instance, O‟Sullivan „From 
stuttering and stammering to the diagram: Deleuze, Bacon and contemporary art‟ (2009, pp. 247-58); 
O‟Sullivan „Guattari‟s aesthetic paradigm: From the folding of the finite/infinite relation to schizoanalytic 
metamodelisation‟ (Tynan (ed.), 2010, pp. 256-86). (2) As a functional principle in the original sense of 
Foucault‟s panopticon; see for instance Deleuze 2006c/1986. (3) Specifically deployed as a principle in 
the process of becoming. See, for instance, Rajchman „Diagrams and diagnosis‟ (Grosz (ed.), 1999, pp. 
42-54); De Landa „Deleuze, diagrams, and the open-ended becoming of the world‟ (Grosz (ed.), 1999, pp. 
29-41); Watson „Introduction: Schizoanalysis as metamodeling‟ (2009b, pp. 1-14). De Landa frames his 
understanding in terms of intensive science and proposing a (Deleuzian) virtual philosophy, Watson 
unfolds Guattari‟s diagrammatic thought, tracing a line between Lacan and Deleuze. 
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Schizoanalytic mapping of subjectivity 
 
In Cartographies schizoanalytiques (Guattari 1989a)
34
 Guattari explores the practices of 
subjectivity through an examination of the problematic of enunciation within a matrix 
of fourfold parameters: sensible and signaling fluxes (F); existential territories (T); 
phyla of machinic propositions (Φ); and incorporeal universes of reference (U), for 
which he uses the acronym FTΦU. His idiosyncratic use of language complicates and at 
times obscures such difficult and also hermetic notions. The core of his examination 
revolves around the production of subjectivity. He asks which processes of enunciation, 
speech and discourse can help explaining the process of subjectification. Guattari 
expresses his dissatisfaction with rational modes of discursive knowledge which cannot 
adequately grasp the activities which singularize. He proposes to use the speculative 
tool of schizoanalytic cartographies to approach the notion of self-reference. Such a 
notion develops a processual self-founding subjectivity (also described as experiential 
group-subject). In Guattari‟s understanding schizoanalytic cartographies apprehend the 
affective order supporting the processes of subjectification. Self-reference is also termed 
a Body without Organ(s) without form or ground. „The Body without Organ, without 
form or ground, of self-reference, by contrast, opens to us the quite different horizon of 
a processuality which can be considered as continuous point of emergence for all types 
of creativity‟ (Guattari 1989a, p. 14; my translation).35 
 
                                                 
34
 I focus on Cartographies schizoanalyticques (1989a) and cannot at this stage of my work integrate The 
machinic unconscious: Essays in schizoanalysis [1979] (trans. Adkins, 2011). Although I cannot enter 
into a detailed discussion of Guattari‟s individual work, an awareness of Guattari‟s major domains of 
exploration considerably enhances an appreciation of Deleuze-Guattari‟s collaborative works. The work 
by Genosko ((ed.) 1996; 2002) and Watson (2009a, 2009b) opens the field. Bosteels „From text to 
territory: Felix Guattari‟s cartographies of the unconscious‟ (Kaufman and Heller (eds), 1998, pp. 145-74) 
and Genosko „Guattari‟s schizoanalytic semiotics: Mixing Hjelmslev and Peirce‟ (Kaufman and Heller 
(eds), 1998, pp. 175-90) unravel specific aspects of Guattari‟s sources and thought. So far three phases 
can be distinguished in Guattari‟s work. (1) The early work in psychiatry with Oury at the La Borde 
clinic: Guattari (2003 [1972]), prefaced by Deleuze and dealing with the notion of transversality; Guattari 
(1984 [1977]) where the English translation also offers some of the early essays; Guattari (2011 [1979]) 
exploring the machinic unconscious in the framework of Guattari‟s understanding of schizoanalysis; and 
Cartographies schizoanalyticques (1989a) on which I focus. (2) The collaboration with Deleuze 
accompanied by The Anti-Oedipus papers, 1969-1973  (trans. Gotman, Nadaud (ed.), 2006); Guattari 
(2009a) and (2009b) covering texts and interviews from 1972-1977 and 1977-1985. (3) Guattari‟s later 
(visionary) work around issues of ecology, chaosmosis and chaosophy (1995a [1992], 1995b [1972-
1992], 2005b [1989]).                            
35
 „Le Corps sans organe, sans figure ni fond, de l‟autoréférence, de son côté, nous ouvre l‟horizon tout 
différent d‟une processualité considérée comme point d‟émergence continue de toute forme de créativité‟ 
(Guattari 1989a, p. 14).  
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The Body without Organ(s) stands in here for the regime of affectivity and is connected 
with the principle of creativity. Guattari follows the history of capitalist subjectivity so 
as to demonstrate the insufficiency of the governing principles of subjectification. The 
Enlightenment falls under his critique in secreting an obtuse, asocial, infantilizing 
subjective background, in wearing the mantle of freedom but drawing on an archaic, 
irrational mastery of „unconscious subjectivity‟ („subjectivité inconscient‟, Guattari 
1989a, p. 21; my translation). Responsibility and culpability, self-punishing 
compulsions, introduce a morbid cult of fault and guilt in subjectivity.  
 
In introducing the regime of schizoanalysis, Guattari proposes an instrument to decipher 
the diverse systems of modelization in power around us. A provisional definition of the 
notion of schizoanalysis can be summarized as follows: to analyse the impact of 
assemblages of enunciation (speech and discourse) on the semiotic and subjective 
productions. Two characteristics can be established: schizoanalysis is both a tool for 
observing processes and a contact point between sign systems (language) and the 
subject. At the same time, Guattari expresses his caution that schizoanalysis attempts to 
avoid a focus on the unconscious, its impulses and its affects which are considered of 
limited importance. Apparently, any individualization is circumvented by Guattari or 
the sake of the processes within assemblages that reach beyond the individual subject. 
 
Schizoanalysis is thus totally focused on connectivity within assemblages; it is a tool for 
analysing not facts, but effects of processes. Speech is considered as an archaic form of 
enunciation and thus the sense of enunciation is shifted. As a new form of 
schizoanalytic subjectivity in the process of continuous becoming, the relationships 
between assemblages replace the fixed form of established individuality. Guattari‟s 
refutation of the psychoanalytic version of the unconscious is based on his critique of 
the reductionist structures of the oedipal triangle and the structures of symbolic 
castration. The assumption of the notions of subject, language or conscience to analyse 
the processes of the production of subjectivity is not necessary in Guattari‟s opinion. 
 
Schizoanalytic cartographies are conceived by Guattari as non-structural mappings of 
the molecular „unconscious‟. Such a molecular „unconscious‟ is contrasted with Freud‟s 
proposition in his interpretations of dreams where the „unconscious‟ is a-signifying, not 
thinking, calculating nor judging but purely involved in transforming activities (the so-
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called dream work). To detect meaning, signification, is not part of the mapping within 
schizoanalytic cartographies. The functors FTΦU (that is fluxes, territories, phyla and 
universes) are functors of deterritorialization, describing four domains of activities and 
mapping the configurations of subjectivity, desire, impulses and their aligned modalities 
of discourses and conscience. It is not clear why, despite his rejection of the 
psychoanalytic categories of impulses and conscience, Guattari re-introduces them into 
the mapping process. His emphasis is on tracing the streaming of the processes of 
discursivity of which four categories emerge: an energetic discursivity, a propositional 
discursivity, a subjective enunciation and an objective expression (as content). All four 
domains, FTΦU, are in exchange and contribute to the outcome of the process of 
enunciation, thus establishing the production of subjectivity.  
 
The process of subjectification is viewed as one of continuous deterritorialization. In a 
complicating move Guattari introduces the four time structures of possible, real, actual 
and virtual which disperses the four domains and multiple combinations: the flux is real 
and actual; the territory is real and virtual; the phylum is possible and actual, and the 
universes are possible and virtual. Thus an attempt is made to ground the unconscious in 
the processes of deterritorialization. Both psychoanalysis and schizoanalysis are viewed 
as forms of semiotics, sign systems, symptomatology, as well as discourse.   
 
The literary machine of symptomatology in the critical-clinical 
 
The critical-clinical assumes in my evaluation a special place in the schizoid 
constellation read as embodying Deleuze-Guattari‟s version of desiring practice. It 
methodologically expands the notion of the schizoanalytic machine, incorporates and 
generalizes the notion of the body without organ in its diverse avatars of desiring-
machines, and most prominently, inquires into the potential of a corporeal reading of 
literary texts under the umbrella of symptomatology. I propose four characteristics as 
marking the critical-clinical approach to literary texts: its emphasis on the creative 
principle, taking language to its outer limits, towards the „outside‟; its inclusion of the 
schizoid condition as an indicator of the working of desire (or rather desiring-
machines); its specific linguistic-literary instantiation of the schizoid state of becoming, 
for instances in pre-linguistic visions and auditions; and finally, its attention to the 
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writer‟s sensibility in evoking states of becoming for which there does not yet exist a 
language.  
 
The first characteristic, the doubling of language (as if another language grows out of 
the body of the language in circulation and creates a parallel, or minor language) I read 
as anchored in Deleuze-Guattari‟s proposition that schizoanalysis is directed at the 
detection of one‟s own desiring-machines, their nature, formation and functioning. In 
this sense the creative act extracts intensities out of the chaos of an impersonal, pre-
individual unconscious and thus runs alongside the diverse avatars of the desiring-
machines which are engaged in states of becoming. In this sense I understand the 
literary machine of symptomatology as the organizing principle of the critical-clinical 
and another avatar of desiring-machines. I read it as a type of assemblage of desire 
which shifts the focus from process to functionality, as discussed earlier. The creative 
principle is in my view concerned with the critical side of the literary machine, or 
critique in the sense of creating and reading the literary text. The other characteristic, 
the clinical aspect of the literary machine draws in the creative act its force out of the 
delirium, the unordered intensities of the anoedipal unconscious. I propose to read the 
clinical, schizoid aspect of the literary machine as anchoring the writing and reading 
process in the corporeal. Despite the difficulties of drawing clear lines between the 
theorized types of body of organs (as full, empty, catatonic, decaying-cancerous, dying 
or dead) I argue that the clinical as observing, presenting and acknowledging the 
corporeal side of the literary machine with its shifting intensities, shares a plane of 
consistency with the body without organs. 
 
The notion of the „outside‟ of language which, as Deleuze-Guattari insist is nevertheless 
within language (Deleuze 1997, p. 112-3),
36
 is an attempt in my view to theorize the 
possibility of corporeal, yet non-linguistic symptoms which convey these shifting 
                                                 
36
 Deleuze refers to a specific „style as stuttering‟ which creates a foreign, not-yet-existing, „new‟ 
language within the established (or major) language (which is one of the artistic principles of the minor as 
in Kafka) and which becomes „nonstyle‟, a language-to-come. Style as „nonstyle‟ reaches a liminal 
expression: „to push language as a whole to its limit, to its outside, to its silence‟. „Style as stuttering‟ 
affords „digging under the stories, cracking open the opinions, and reaching regions without memories, 
when the self must be destroyed‟ (Deleuze 1997, p. 113).The self as organising principle is questioned, 
abolished and an impersonal expression or free discourse created. See Deleuze Essays critical-clinical 
(1997). Cf. also Blanchot‟s work which explores the notion of the „outside‟ of language (1989, 1993, 
2003) and the double-homage: Foucault/Blanchot (1987) where Foucault presents „Maurice Blanchot: 
The thought from outside‟ and Blanchot „Michel Foucault as I imagine him‟. 
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intensities either in the productive desiring-machines or in the inter-relationality of 
assemblages of desire. A range of non-linguistic „visions and auditions‟ (Deleuze 1997, 
pp. 158-60 )
37
 can be determined as they appear in literary texts of a schizoid nature: 
bodily expressions such as gesturing; inter-relational expressions such as movements; 
voice projections such as murmurs, stuttering and howls;
38
 and the collapse of 
intensities in silences and gaps (topographically evoked). Although I read the „outside‟ 
of language predominantly in the sense of a not-yet existing language, the material 
textual fabric has to find means to instantiate the visual and aural „images‟ (Deleuze 
1997, p. 159). So far the aesthetics of the critical-clinical draws in my understanding on 
the regime of desiring-machines, the triangulation of unconscious, desire and becoming, 
on the machinic and the dynamic principles of the schizoanalytic machine and thus 
figures within the schizoid constellation. It is the fourth characteristic that the critical-
clinical is apt through its symptomatological method to transfer the writer‟s sensibility 
into the textual fabric which in my view cannot be contained within the tetravalent 
diagram or abstract machine as set out, for instance, in the Kafka treatise. The words, 
including those which have not yet been used, hold the textual fabric in place, providing 
it with scaffolding but it is the colouring, the tints of sensibility shining through and the 
rhythms which demonstrate the play of intensities. 
 
 
                                                 
37
 With regard to Beckett, Deleuze conceptualizes attempts at accessing the outside of language in 
proposing several meta-languages (I, II, III) (1997, p. 158). Such a „language‟ is rather a nonlanguage, a 
linguistic medium to express the inner libidinal forces, rising, fading and resurfacing, and it functions as a 
symptomatological instrument of becoming. Deleuze speaks of an „Image, a visual or aural Image, 
provided it is freed from the chains in which it was bound by the other two languages‟ (referring to meta-
language I and II) (Deleuze 1997, p. 158); „Images‟ such as fleeting colours (dim white, a little blue) and 
bodily parts (a hand, a mouth, eyes), not attached to memories or inventing stories. Since „(t)he image is 
not an object but a “process”‟ (Deleuze 1997, p. 159), it fluctuates in the form of visual and aural 
„ritornellos‟ (Deleuze 1997, pp. 159–60) which are at times supported (in Beckett) by „motor ritornellos‟ 
(Deleuze 1997, pp. 160). Meta-language III encompasses a system of symptomatological exhaustion, in 
unlimited enumeration (I), in silencing voices (II), and in contracting images and space (III). In such a 
manner libidinal intensities and the process of becoming can be expressed and modulated in the textual 
fabric. Non-linguistic „visions and auditions‟ of course refer to simulacral „lightning(s)‟, (fulgurations) 
and „inner voices‟ which break out (as known of creative schizos, for instance the Brüllenwunder, 
bellowing miracle Schreber experiences, which I explored earlier, or Artaud‟s „howls‟. Cf. Deleuze 
Essays critical-clinical (1997), in particular: Deleuze „Louis Wolfson; or, The procedure‟ (1997, pp. 7-
20); „He stuttered‟ (1997, pp. 107-14); „The exhausted‟ (1997, pp. 152-173). 
38
 Deleuze evokes a range of affective degrees of „stuttering‟ such as the stutter per se (not as linguistic 
failure but as artistic production), the murmur, the quiver, the tremolo, the vibrato (Deleuze 1997, p.108) 
which can be considered as stylistic modulations of „affective stuttering‟ (i.e. affects breaking through in 
the sense of the schizo‟s „organ language‟) since these tremors reverberate in the syntax but also affect the 
progression of the text. The stuttering evokes (or creates) „gaps‟ (lacunae, ellipses) through which affects 
can break forth to the textual surface.These stylistic events reflect on the libidinal mechanism theorised as 
desiring-production. 
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A libidinal theory of subjectivity 
 
Overall then my intent in discussing the schizoanalytic machine in its triangulation of 
unconscious, desire and becoming, and its machinic and dynamic principles, has been to 
establish some elements which justify naming Deleuze-Guattari‟s construct of desiring-
machines and their variant, assemblages of desire, an attempt to ground a libidinal 
theory of subjectivity. Since for Deleuze-Guattari the schizoid state of subjectivity 
inheres in the regime of desiring-machines as chaotic, impersonal pre-individual agents 
of desiring-production, it appears paradoxical to grant the status of subjectivity to 
Deleuze-Guattari‟s triangulated relational and inter-dependent assembly of unconscious, 
desire and becoming. I take into account, however, that Deleuze-Guattari‟s critique 
evolves in dialogue with the theory of psychoanalytic subjectivity grounded in Freudian 
and Lacanian notions of oedipalization. Deleuze-Guattari thus re-assess the libidinal 
constructs which underlie Freudian and Lacanian understanding in setting out the tasks 
of schizoanalysis and these are in the first place directed at the personal task of clearing 
one‟s own consciousness (the primary task of schizoanalysis within the libidinal theory 
which later evolves into a second differential take of libido). The notion of subjectivity 
can solely function as a transitory working term with the proviso that I read subjectivity 
here in the schizoid, inclusive disjunctive sense of either and or, in an aporetic stance. 
 
My earlier exploration of Freudian and Lacanian theories of subjectivity led to the 
proposal that Lacan‟s re-assessment of Freud‟s legacy, the oedipalization of the subject, 
shifted focus to a fragmented and split subject and the Freudian topological 
understanding of the unconscious faded in favour of an emphasis of the functionality of 
desire. I reassessed Deleuze-Guattari‟s move to impersonal states of desiring-production 
in Anti-Oedipus, and then (in A thousand plateaus) the postulate of states of perpetual 
becoming as a second theory of subjectivity where larval fragments of subjects undergo 
incorporeal transformations. At this stage of proposing a schizoid constellation for 
Deleuze-Guattari‟s libidinal constructs I hold on to the notion of subjectivity, in 
particular as the status of the body without organs needs to re-viewed. All of this will 
enable me to engage with literary analysis in Deleuze-Guattari and Deleuze in chapters 
four and five.  
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Chapter four: Enacting desiring practice 
 
So far I have been concerned with laying some foundations in theories of subjectivity in 
Freud and Lacan and in Deleuze and Deleuze-Guattari so as to establish a working base 
for developing a Deleuze inspired differential desiring practice. Taking the schizoid 
weave further and expanding it into a schizoid constellation, I probed into the promises 
of a desiring practice inspired by Deleuze and Deleuze-Guattari in exploring multiple 
aspects of the schizoanalytic machine. In this second part of the thesis I now turn to 
interrogating the process of enacting desiring practice, building on but moving beyond 
my explorations in the frame of the schizoid constellation in Deleuze-Guattari. Hence 
while in the previous chapters I focused on theories of subjectivity and questions of 
representation, I now draw on Deleuze‟s works which explore in particular processes of 
actualization and temporality relevant to becoming. This involves repositioning my 
project to the differential. In this process I shall develop some principles of desiring 
practice such as the enactment of the event
1
 as originary instance of becoming. Central 
                                                 
1
 Sasso (Sasso and Villani (eds), 2004, pp. 138-52) follows the evolution of the notion of event (and pure 
event) through Deleuze‟s oeuvre, in philosophical and literary terms which affords a decisively different 
perspective on my project in that it demonstrates the inter-relations between their philosophical and 
literary deployment and the particular literary aspects and modes of event (and pure event): from 
Deleuze‟s early work on Hume, Nietzsche, Proust and Bergson to Difference and repetition, The logic of 
sense, the later treatise on Proust and The fold as well as Deleuze-Guattari‟s A thousand plateaus and 
What is philosophy?. Sasso takes note of other literary sources of Deleuze‟s understanding of event (and 
pure event) such as Blanchot, L‟espace littéraire; Bousquet Traduit de silence and Les capitales; Péguy 
Clio, and another important philosophical source, Bréhier La théorie des incorporels dans l‟ancien 
stoicisme (p. 153). The notion of event (and pure event) connects to haecceity (momentary subjectivity), 
singularity (pointlike subject), meeting point and fulguration and thus draws multiple strands of Deleuze‟s 
and Deleuze-Guattari‟s recasting of ontology together. Sasso summarizes the main features thus: „Not 
that what happens (in the sense of accident), but the eternal and ineffectual part of all what happens; 
impassible entity always already happened as well as still to come, which subdivides itself incessantly 
into multiple singular events, and reunites them into one and only Event; to confront it in all that happens 
to us, and to be worthy of it, constitutes morality‟ [„Non pas ce qui arrive (l‟accident), mais la part 
éternelle et ineffectuable de tout ce qui arrive, entité impassible toujours déjà advenue, aussi bien 
qu‟encore à venir, se subdivisant sans cesse en de multiples événements singuliers, et les réunissant en un 
seul et  meme Événement; l‟affronter dans tout ce qui nous arrive, et en être digne, constitue la morale‟] 
(p. 138). Not all of the features of this central notion can here be followed, I focus on two points Sasso 
makes: (1) the event is „the paradoxical instance‟ [„l‟instance paradoxale‟] where „all events 
communicate and are distributed, the Unique event of which all the others are fragments and pieces‟ 
[„tous les événements communiquent et se distribuent, l‟Unique événement dont tous les autres sont les 
fragments et les lambeaux‟], quoting from The logic of sense (1969, p. 72) (Sasso 2004, p. 142). (2) „The 
event […] is in that what happens as the pure expressed which gives us a sign and expects us‟  
[„L‟événement […] est dans ce qui arrive le pur exprimé qui nous fait signe et nous attend‟], quoting 
from The logic of sense (1969, p. 175) (Sasso 2004, p. 145). In his critique Sasso proposes that the event 
as actualization of the virtual of Difference and repetition re-appears as fulguration ‒ under the name of 
dark precursor and the disparate ‒ in Deleuze-Guattari‟s A thousand plateaus which then leads to the 
notions of line of flight and fold in Deleuze‟s The fold (Sasso 2004, p. 148). Sasso discerns a double 
dimension of the event, an ontological dimension (in that the event captures incessant difference and 
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to my perspective will be the major shift in Deleuze‟s image of thought, from 
subjectivity and individuation to haecceities and multiplicities as foreshadowed in the 
previous chapters, and how this impacts on the writing and reading strategies of literary 
practice.   
 
The aims of the chapter 
 
Exploring the process of the enactment of desiring practice reflects back on Deleuze-
Guattari‟s initial notions of desiring practice in the schizoid weave and the schizoid 
constellation such as desiring-machines, an anoedipal unconscious and assemblages of 
desire. I now set these notions into the context of Deleuze‟s innovative image of thought 
of difference and repetition. One of the aims of this chapter is thus to examine the 
potential of differential aspects of desiring practice, how they maintain the schizoid 
modes, yet further affirm their positivity, productivity and creativity. This involves, as a 
further aim of the chapter, anchoring both the processes of enactment of desiring 
practice and actualization of the event in Deleuze‟s shifted time concepts. These 
concepts constitute the link to Deleuze-Guattari‟s understanding of becoming. My third 
aim to be pursued in this chapter is, as a consequence of exploring the link between 
different/ciation, time and becoming, a re-appraisal of the process of becoming in its 
different instantiations: as Body without Organs and „spider‟s web‟ („toile d‟araignée‟) 
(Deleuze 2000, pp. 170-82; pp. 181-2)
2
 of affectivity; as degrees of hallucinated 
corporeal transformations (into animal-child-woman-molecule); and as always different 
instantiations of the literary machine (Kafka-machine, Proust-machine).     
 
Differential aspects of desiring practice 
 
The three inter-related Deleuzian notions of event („meeting point‟), haecceities 
(pointlike „subjects‟) and becoming (process and trajectory), as principles of enacting 
                                                                                                                                               
becoming) and an ethical dimension (in that one has to measure up to the event to become a free (and 
genuine) subject through the counter-actualization of the event (p. 149). Cf. also Zourabichvili / 
Sauvagnargues / Marrati (2005). Zourabichvili presents Deleuze‟s throught as a philosophy of the event 
(an aspect which is further explored by Laporte (2005)); Sauvagnargues examines Deleuze‟s artistic 
principle(s) and Marrati focuses on Deleuze film philosophy.  
2
 The process of becoming in its different instantiations presents itself: (1) as Body without Organs (in 
various stages of imperfection); (2) as models of affectivity where becoming is the trajectory; (3) as 
degrees of hallucinated corporeal transformations (in form of simulacra); and in particular, (4) as literary 
machine(s) in always different forms. 
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desiring practice, can be put into perspective when drawing on Difference and repetition 
(Deleuze 2004b, pp. 164-213; pp. 174 seq. and p. 207)
3
 and The logic of sense (Deleuze 
2004c, pp. 169-75; pp. 241-9; pp. 86-94).
4
 The notion of event allows access to the 
process of enactment conceived as event, while the notion of haecceities (for instance, 
Deleuze and Guattari 2004b, pp. 287-92)
5
 opens an understanding of transitory 
subjectification in the stages of becoming; and the process of becoming can be doubly 
theorized as process and impermanent „goal‟ of desiring practice.6 For Deleuze and 
                                                 
3
 Cf. Chapter III „The image of thought‟ (Deleuze 2004b, pp. 164-213; esp. pp. 174 seq. and p. 207) 
which provides a summary of the eight postulates of the dogmatic image of thought. 
4
 Cf. in order of relevance for the question under consideration: „Twenty-first series of the event‟ 
(Deleuze 2004c, pp. 169-75); „Thirtieth series of the phantasm‟ (pp. 241-9); „Twelfth series of the 
paradox‟ (pp. 86-94). 
5
 I have pointed out in chapter one that the term haecceity takes a specific position in Plateau 10 in the 
sub-section titled „Memories of a haecceity,‟ „Plateau 10: 1730: Becoming-Intense, Becoming-Animal, 
Becoming-Imperceptible…‟ (Deleuze and Guattari 2004b, pp. 287-92) and refers to a specific type of 
„individuation‟ inter-dependent with event and becoming. To return to Sauvagnargues‟ article (Sasso and 
Villani (eds), 2003, pp. 171-80), several points are noteworthy: (1) drawing on Dialogues (1977; 2nd edn 
1996, p. 111) haecceity circumscribes an „individuation‟ which is not related to either subject or object, 
and drawing on The logic of sense (1969, pp. 124-5) serves to determine a transcendental impersonal and 
pre-individudal field (Sauvagnargues 2003, p. 172); (2) drawing again on Dialogues (1977; 2nd edn 1996, 
p. 111) haecceities instantiate as degrees of force [puissance] to which corresponds a power [pouvoir] to 
affect and to be affected, that is active or passive affects, or intensities (Sauvagnargues 2003, p. 173); (3) 
drawing on a range of sources (Deleuze‟s work on Spinoza, Difference and repetition, The logic of sense 
and Deleuze-Guattari‟s A thousand plateaus and What is philosophy?) the term now draws together (at 
least) three „folds‟, namely event and becoming, affectivity and intensity, and singularity and multiplicity 
(Sauvagnargues 2003, p. 174).  Sauvagnargues views the term as theoretically completed in A thousand 
plateaus („Critique‟, pp. 175-80). In contrast and complementing Sauvagnargues‟ approach, Zourabichvili 
(2003) subsumes the notion of haecceity under several entries, among them event („Evénement‟, pp. 36-
40) anchored in The logic of sense and A thousand plateaus, and becoming („Devenir‟, pp. 29-30) 
anchored in Anti-Oedipus, Kafka: Toward a minor literature and A thousand plateaus. The event 
encompasses the double-mouvement of actualization and counter-actualization and creates the moment of 
instantiation (of „individuals‟ and of „things‟) (pp. 36-8). Zourabichvili draws a parallel to Heidegger‟s 
Ereignis (p. 39) in its double-articulation of event and appropriation. As I have pointed out earlier 
(chapter one), Zourabichvili aligns haecceity with assemblage(s) of desire and multiplicities as well as the 
virtual (aïon). He also proposes the idea of a „hierarchy of becoming(s)‟ in Kafka and A thousand 
plateaus (p. 30-1). Cf. Deleuze‟s work on Spinoza (1988b/1970, 2005b/1968) is ever-present, for 
instance, as pointed out earlier, Deleuze-Guattari draw on Spinoza‟s Ethics (trans. Boyle, 1967; trans. 
Shirley, 1991), „the great book of the Body without Organs‟ (Deleuze and Guattari 2004b, p. 170), 
for their double-pronged theory of fabrication-production of the Body without Organs. Deleuze‟s early 
work on Spinoza and the later critical-clinical (as well as to Deleuze-Guattari‟s What is philosophy?) 
serve as foundation for the (multiple) readings of affect (and „passion(s)‟). See Garrett ((ed.) 1996) and 
Nadler „The geometric method‟ (2006, pp. 35-51) and „The passions‟ (2006, pp. 190-212) where affects 
are classified according to the changes in an individual‟s power (or conatus), active and passive affects 
(i.e. joy and sadness) are differentiated and desire (together with joy and sadness) are presented as the 
three primary affects in Spinoza‟s thought. (pp. 202-8). See also Deleuze (1988b/1970, pp. 48-51 on 
„Affections‟ and „Affect‟); Deleuze (1988b/1970, pp. 97-104 on „Power‟ and „conatus‟); Deleuze 
(2005b/1968, pp. 217-34: „What can a body do?‟). 
6
 The process of becoming and the „goal‟ (or trajectory) are inseparable in Deleuze and Deleuze-Guattari 
as is desiring-production and affectivity (as „product‟). Early responses to this problematic of folding of 
process and product are: Ansell Pearson ((ed.) 1997); 1999) and Antonioli (1999). Early studies are 
directed at the impact of Nietzsche on Deleuze‟s work. Khalfa (ed.) n.d [2000] presents Simont (pp. 26-
49) on intensity and encounter; Khalfa (pp. 64-82) on impersonal consciousness; Bryden (pp. 105-13) on 
Anglo-American literature, esp. Melville; Bogue (pp. 114-32) on Kafka („minority / territory / music‟); 
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Deleuze-Guattari, ontological questions around the notions of event, haecceity and 
becoming take on a different slant in that they are not oriented toward enquiry and 
discovery of ways of being but rather aim at processes without existant terminology, 
thus the need arises for creating new concepts (or reviving old concepts). Within 
Deleuze‟s frame of argument in Difference and repetition on the necessity of a new 
image of thought ‒ or even the absence of an image of thought ‒ he concludes (Deleuze, 
chapter III „The image of thought‟, 2004b, pp. 164-213) with the following provocative 
statement and final question: 
 
Together they (the eight postulates) form the dogmatic image of thought. They crush thought 
under an image which is that of the Same and the Similar in representation, but profoundly 
betrays what it means to think and alienates the two powers of difference and repetition, of 
philosophical commencement and recommencement. The thought which is born in thought, the 
act of thinking which is neither given by innateness nor presupposed by reminiscence but / 
engendered in its genitality, is a thought without image. But what is such a thought, and how 
does it operate in the world? (Deleuze 2004b, pp. 207-8). 
 
Notions such as virtuality / potentiality, actuality, becoming, folding, intensities, 
multiplicities and the all-encompassing plane of immanence,
7
 need to be understood as 
                                                                                                                                               
and Imbert (pp. 133-48) on Deleuze between Carroll and Francis Bacon (from The logic of sense to The 
logic of sensation) with the aim to reconsider empiricism as unhinged. In early collection on Deleuze (and 
Deleuze-Guattari) no specific aesthetic orientation can be detected. 
7
 Since not all notions can here be followed in detail, I focus on the double-term of actual-virtual. The 
appendix to Deleuze and Parnet (2006) points to an earlier draft related to Deleuze‟s work on Cinema 2: 
The movement-image. I follow here the evolution and critique of the double-term by Sauvagnargues 
(Sasso and Villani (eds), 2004, pp. 22-9). Sauvagnargues dates the term back to Deleuze‟s work on 
Bergson and his article on structuralism. „[T]hey [ontological categories] possess the same reality, but 
exclude each other. The actual designates the material and present state of things. The virtual the 
incorporeal, past and ideal event. Their exchange translates the dynamics of becoming as differenciation 
and creation‟ [„[E]lles [catégories ontologiques] possèdent la même réalité, mais sont exclusives l‟une de 
l‟autre. L‟actuel désigne l‟état de choses matérial et présent. Le virtuel, l„évenément incorporel, passé, 
idéel. Leur échange traduit la dynamique du devenir comme différenciation et création‟] (Sauvagnargues 
2004, p. 22). The virtual is the pure past as proposed by Deleuze in Différence et répétition (1968, pp. 
134-5; p. 22) and „the subjective, or the duration, […] is the virtual in the sense that it actualizes itself, is 
in the process of actualizing, inseparable from the mouvement of its actualization‟ [„le subjectif, ou la 
durée, […] c‟est le virtuel en tant qu‟il s‟actualise, en train de s‟actualiser, inséparable du mouvement de 
son actualisation‟], quoting from Deleuze Le bergsonisme (1966, p. 36) (Sauvagnargues 2004, p. 23). 
Sauvagnargues also points out that Deleuze views the process of actual-virtual executed in Proust‟s 
Search (cf. Le bergsonisme (1966, p. 99); Différence et répétition (1968, p. 269)). Further, „[T]he virtual 
is “Idea”, “real without being actual, differentiated without being differenciated, complete without being 
whole”‟ [„Le virtuel est “Idée”, “réelle sans être actuelle, différentiée sans être différenciée, complète 
sans être entière”‟], quoting from Deleuze Différence et répétition (1968, p. 276) (Sauvagnargues 2004, 
p. 24). These early statements evolve in The logic of sense („incorporeal‟, „pure event‟ ‒ „incorporel‟, 
„évenément pur‟) and A thousand plateaus („multiplicity‟ ‒ „multiplicité‟) to What is philosophy ? (1991, 
p. 198) („pure event‟ or „the reality of  the concept‟ ‒ „évenément pur‟ ou „la réalité du concept‟) 
(Sauvagnargues 2004, p. 24). Sauvagnargues considers these transformations a secure path to study 
Deleuze‟s metaphysics (p. 24) and that the theorized relation between the virtual and the actual is the 
centre piece of Deleuze‟s ontology (p. 25). Cf. also an early explorative work by Alliez (2004). Laporte 
(2005) explores time and temporality in Deleuze in three stages which lead from an exposition of the 
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an effort to construct a thought that escapes the stranglehold of representation (of 
identity, analogy, resemblance and recognition (Deleuze 2004b, pp. 174 seq.)) and can 
thus be only of preliminary use. Deleuze is recasting the traditional ontological 
framework; entailing major shifts in understanding language and its function in literary 
texts in that both language and texts are put into the service of expanding the limits of 
the unsaid and unsayable.
8
  
 
Rather than assuming static being which can be explored, discovered and defined, and 
fixed identity which can be relied on, Deleuze‟s ontological strategies9 aim at the 
                                                                                                                                               
modes of temporality („A presentation of time in Deleuze‟ [„Une présentation du temps chez Deleuze‟]; to 
an ontological questioning („Ontological liberation and experimentation‟ [„Affranchissement ontologique 
et expérimentation‟]; and then to a consideration of the crystal of time,  predominantly in Deleuze‟s 
cinematic works („The question of falsification‟ – „The parodic paradox of eternal return‟ [„La question 
de la falsification‟ – „Le paradoxe parodique de l‟éternel retour‟]. Laporte proposes three temporal 
systems in Deleuze‟s thought on temporality, based on Bergson: (1) the three syntheses of time (as 
developed in Difference and repetition), (2) the two modes of time (or temporal modes) of aion and 
chronos (as developed in The logic of sense) and (3) the eventual modalities of the actual and the virtual, 
the one and the multiple (Laporte 2005, pp. 15-56). Laporte anchors the notion of the virtual in the 
Bergsonian three paradoxes: contemporaneity of all presents, their coexistence and pre-existence (Laporte 
2005, pp. 22-3). He presents the temporal modes of aion and chronos as the two (simultaneous) aspects of 
the present (as two different orders of time) and thus not being equated with the (assumed) successive 
three dimensions of time (present, past, future) (Laporte 2005, pp. 29 seq.): „Chronos, embodied and 
successive, and Aion, mimed and impenetrable. The latter, “paradoxically empty time where nothing 
happens”, is then the time of the pure future where the present cannot pass without making appear its 
passage, returns and limits itself in the instantaneity of the event where finally the future and the past 
happen to coincide‟ [„Chronos, incarné et successif, et Aiôn, mimé et impénétrable. Ce dernier, “temps 
paradoxalement vide où il ne se passe rien”, est donc le temps de l‟avenir pur où le présent ne peut pas 
passer sans rendre compte de son passage, se retourne et se limite dans l‟instantanéité de l‟événement, 
où viennent finalement coïncider en lui le futur et le passé‟] (2005, p. 36). Laporte is quoting from 
Zourabichvili (1996/1994, p. 92) (Laporte 2005, p. 36). 
8
 The question is how can this be reconciled with established literary approaches? Cf. for instance, 
Buchanan and Marks ((eds) 2000) with the following essays approaching the „literary Deleuze‟ von 
various angles: Surin „“A question of an axiomatic of desires”: The Deleuzian imagination of 
geoliterature‟ (Buchanan and Marks (eds), 2000, pp. 167-93); Murphy „Only intensities subsist: Samuel 
Beckett‟s Nohow On‟ (Buchanan and Marks (eds), 2000, pp. 229-50); EW Holland „Nizan‟s diagnosis of 
existentialism and the perversion of death‟ (Buchanan and Marks (eds), 2000, pp. 251-62); Conley „I and 
my Deleuze‟ (Buchanan and Marks (eds), 2000, pp. 263-82). See also for a contrasting view: Badiou 
(1995) Beckett: L‟increvable désir [The inexhaustible desire]. 
9
 Here I am following Bergen (2008/2001) working across philosophy and literature (Deleuze, Badiou, 
Sartre; Genet, Bataille) who argues for naming Deleuze‟s creation of a new image of thought, an 
„ontologie événementielle‟, an „ontology of the event‟ where time and difference function as the main 
pillars. In her concluding chapter, „L‟image de la pensée,‟ on „the image of thought‟, she draws parallels 
to Kant and Hegel which Deleuze might have discarded. Zourabichvili (2003) and Laporte (2005) come 
to comparable conclusions. Cf. also Bergen „The precariousness of being and thought in the philosophies 
of Gilles Deleuze and Alain Badiou‟ (Boundas (ed.), 2006, pp. 62-73); Bergen „Deleuze and the question 
of ontology‟ (trans. Boundas and Dyrkton, Boundas (ed.), 2009/2004, pp. 7-22). Deleuze-Guattari‟s 
provocative body of thought, in their collaborative work as well as their individual work, has (so far) been 
cast in often contradictory terms reaching from („unhinged‟, superior, transcendental) empiricism, 
metaphysics to ontology and geophilosophy, surely a sign of the complexity, the originality and the vast 
scope of their thought. J. Williams (2006) proposes transversal metaphysics (because of the many 
transversal connections to other philosophers); Colebrook (2005/2001) follows Deleuze‟s proposition 
with transcendental empiricism; Hallward (2006) evaluates Deleuze‟s thought as creationism; Zepke 
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fluidity and mobility of becoming, less a state to be determined than a movement to be 
followed and traced. To support such a strategy of an immediate encounter with being, 
Deleuze recasts all ontological observations in terms of difference. The newly created 
concepts such as virtuality / potentiality and actuality, becoming and folding, intensities 
and multiplicities are drawn into the force field of difference which sustains them. 
These concepts are mutually supportive as belonging to a shared plane of immanence 
and being compatible within difference (understood as a process of continual becoming 
and unfolding). Since such a process and perpetual change cannot be halted, much less 
described and pinned down in meaning, other ways of detection in language and literary 
texts need to be sourced such as paying attention to speaking and revealing signs in 
symptomatic shadows, or developing methods of sensing and palpation. Such a recast 
ontology, founded in becoming and difference, does not direct itself at gathering 
knowledge but at searching for the „Interesting, Remarkable or Important‟ (Deleuze and 
Guattari 1996, p. 82), not in the mundane sense but in the sense of an „event‟ coming 
about. Thus observations of the processes in language and literary texts stretch beyond 
recognition and acknowledgement of familiar categories such as narrative structures of 
suspense or characters. Newly created concepts such as resonances (in the sense of 
affective responses), linkages, connections and assemblages (of desire) take precedence. 
Adventurous methods such as the discursive diagram (adapted from Foucault)
10
 and the 
                                                                                                                                               
(2005) speaks about ontological aesthetics with regard to the arts; Antonioli (2003) evaluates Deleuze-
Guattari‟s approach as geophilosophy; Lambert (2002), being more sceptical, refers to non-philosophy; 
Agamben (1999) circumvents the decision between transcendence and immanence with absolute 
immanence; Lorraine (1999), comparing Deleuze and Irigaray, subsumes both under visceral philosophy; 
Hayden (1998) refers to the multiple aspects with pluralist empiricism; Badiou (2000) ventures into 
defining  Deleuze‟s thought as revival of metaphysics; Zourabichvili (1994) focuses on one dominating 
aspect with philosophy of the event; Alliez (2004) correspondingly heighlights yet another dominant 
aspect with virtual philosophy and Foucault (1972) evaluates Deleuze-Guattari‟s thought as an effort to 
establish a modern ethics (with specific reference to Anti-Oedipus). J Williams (2003) and Beistegui 
(2004), together with Laporte (2005), reframe Deleuze‟s understanding of time into an ontology. Cf. also 
the work of Faulkner (2006) and (2007) whose examination goes beyond the exploration of difference 
and repetition in establishing a link to Deleuze‟s work on Proust and time. 
10
 As pointed out before, Deleuze-Guattari deploy a range of notions from Foucault‟s work (regime of 
discourse, diagram) which attend to (always changing and contingent) power relations rather than to 
concepts fixing structural „sites‟ (cf. Foucault (1972 and 2009b). Deleuze also deploys the (abstract) 
notion of artistic graph (or diagram) in his work on Francis Bacon where the diagrammatic is seized by 
the haptic („touching‟) sight (Deleuze 2005c, pp. 70-7; pp. 108-13). Cf. also Foucault „Maurice Blanchot: 
The thought from outside‟ [1966; 1986] (trans. B Massumi, 1987, pp. 7-58), in particular the section „The 
experience of the outside‟: „We are standing on the edge of an abyss that has long been invisible: the 
being of language only appears for itself with the disappearance of the subject […] A thought that stands 
outside subjectivity, setting its limits as though from without, articulating its end, making its dispersion 
shine forth, taking in only its invincible absence; […] to regain the space of its unfolding, the void serving 
as its site, [...] what in a word we might call “the thought from the outside”‟ (pp. 15-9, esp. pp. 15-6). 
Tanke (2009) specifically explores Foucault‟s contribution to the arts. 
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machinic attempt to deal with the complexities of perpetual interactions and exchange 
of bodies rather than with circumscribed identities or subjects. 
 
The question is how within such a recast ontological framework schizoid and 
schizoanalytic approaches can be proposed so as to open pathways into perplexing 
modern literary texts which refute a representational reading. Ways of initiating 
strategies have to be thought out for detecting and palpating literary machines in 
Deleuze-Guattari‟s sense. I propose that Deleuze-Guattari‟s radical idea of an anoedipal 
unconscious can be made productive for such a differential desiring practice of literary 
texts, beyond the psychoanalytic literary-critical apparatus in the Freudian oneiric 
(referring to the theory of the imagery of dream studies such as condensation and 
displacement, and representability) and the Lacanian libidinal modes (referring to the 
Imaginary, the Symbolic and the Real). This obliges me to examine how such a 
liberated unconscious fits into the recast ontological framework and which pathways 
can be opened for a differential libidinal desiring practice if representation and its 
support in subjectivity have to give way to style and expression as decisive modes of 
reading.                             
 
As seen, the challenge of Deleuze‟s ontology lies in its anchoring in a philosophy of 
difference and repetition: in affectivity and becoming as degrees of hallucinated 
corporeal transformations (for instance, animal-child-woman-molecule); and as always 
different instantiations of the literary machine (Kafka-machine, Proust-machine). From 
this centre, recast concepts of time and temporality such as duration and an immemorial 
past are introduced which affect language and its function in literary texts and the 
composition of literary works. Difference, a perpetual shift which denies the fixity of 
substances, implicates our understanding of the subject and the status of subjectivity in 
literary texts. Beyond the refashioning of the status of being, of temporality as duration 
and eternal return and subjectivity as an ephemeral principle, Deleuze rethinks the 
notion of expression and its function in literary works. Expression underlies and gives 
body to the inter-related notions of folding, unfolding and refolding as if continual 
changes and modulations follow inherent creative principles. This will come into its 
power when considering language and its function in literary texts. 
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Deleuze-Guattari project a plane of immanence or consistency, which holds together, if 
in a preliminary equilibrium, related and transversally connected concepts, interacting 
and resonating. All being is of one and the same and indivisible nature, termed the 
univocity of being. While concepts such as duration are borrowed and adapted from 
Bergson, the concepts of expression and univocity lean towards Spinoza. The all-
encompassing principle of immanence contains all its potentiality which is 
conceptualized as virtuality. Rather than being, becoming in its continual flux expressed 
in difference evolves out of the realm of virtuality, is actualized and thus appears and 
manifests, if ever only fleetingly. Expression can be noticed, or rather touched upon, 
palpated as intensity, speed and slowness, and rhythmic movement. This again will 
have to be kept in mind for my path into literary texts. 
  
Deleuze is not held by established categories, but aims at circumventing boundaries. In 
Difference and repetition (Chapter III, Deleuze 2004b, pp. 164-213) he terms such an 
adherence to predefined categories, the dogmatic image of thought. Categories set 
boundaries, impose order and measurements and operate as templates to keep our 
understanding meaningful and purposeful and thus establish common sense and 
particularly good sense. At the very heart of the dogmatic image of thought lies 
representation of the world „as it is,‟ the world modelled according to presupposed, 
meaningful, sense-making categories. 
 
Representation fails to capture the affirmed world of difference. Representation has only a single 
centre, a unique and receding perspective, and in consequence a false depth. It mediates 
everything, but mobilizes and moves nothing. Movement, for its part, implies a plurality of 
centres, a superposition of perspectives, a tangle of points of view, a coexistence of moments 
which essentially distort representation (Deleuze 2004b, p. 67).
11
 
 
Representation „mediates‟, it streamlines everything to a single perspective while 
differential presentation „superposes‟ multiple perspectives and thus (deliberately) 
„distorts‟ the mediated single line of thought. Adhering to the rules of common sense 
                                                 
11
 I am referring here, in parallel, to the French text of Difference and repetition (Deleuze 2008) that 
allows me at instances to tease out specific details and also to follow Bergen‟s work more closely. This 
does in no way imply disrespect for Patton‟s fine translation. „La représentation laisse échapper le monde 
affirmé de la différence. La représentation n‟a qu‟un seul centre, une perspective unique et fuyante, par 
là même une fausse profondeur; elle médiatise tout, mais ne mobilise et ne meut rien. Le mouvement pour 
son compte implique une pluralité de centres, une superposition de perspectives, un enchevêtrement de 
points de vue, une co-existence de moments qui déforment essentiellement la representation‟ (Deleuze 
2008, p. 78). 
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and good sense
12
 maintains the categories and therefore offers stability, order and 
reliance, granting identity to objects and subjects. This runs counter to the principle of 
difference and repetition which does not ever allow for identity but only for a continual 
process of movement and change. There is admittedly repetition but never the repetition 
of the same, even though it might appear so to our limited understanding. Thus the 
representational dogmatic image of thought (Deleuze 2004b, p. 134) stands in 
contradiction to Deleuzian ontology which demands a freeing of thinking from the 
shackles of (pre-determined) thought. 
 
The four aspects which hold representation in place are, according to Deleuze, the 
identity of the concept, the analogy of judgement, the opposition of the predicate and 
the resemblance of the object to perception (Deleuze 2004b, p. 37).
13
 In particular the 
aspect of analogy cannot be reconciled with the idea of immanence or univocity. The 
proposition to replace a regime of „organic representation‟ (Deleuze 2004b, pp. 43-4)14 
with a system of „orgiastic representation‟ (Deleuze 2004b, pp. 52-4)15 enables a 
contrived hold on a notion of representation, however with a distinctly different 
connotation as will be seen. Although I cannot enter into the full details of this 
problematic within the frame of this chapter, two main points which grow out of the 
refutation of (organic) representation impact on my examination of enacting desiring 
practice: firstly, the shift from static (organic) representation to (orgiastic) 
representation as „experience‟ (Deleuze 2004b, p. 68)16 and secondly, as a consequence 
of overturning Platonism (Deleuze 2004b, pp. 71 seq.),
17
 the postulate of parodic 
simulacra (Deleuze 2004b, pp. 80-3)
18
 sustaining (orgiastic) representation. 
 
The first of these points has ontological, epistemological and aesthetic implications 
since, as pointed out above, (organic) representation mediates and thus freezes what 
                                                 
12
 Adhering to the rules of common sense and good sense maintains the categories and thus offers 
stability, order and reliance, it grants identity to objects and subjects.  
13
 The French text reads: „la quadruple racine de l‟identité et de l‟opposition, de l‟analogie et de la 
resemblance‟ (Deleuze 2008, p. 45). 
14
 The French text reads: „la différence et représentation organique‟ (Deleuze 2008, pp. 51-3). 
15
 The French text reads: „la différence et la représentation orgique‟ (Deleuze 2008, pp. 61-3). Patton 
translates „orgique‟ (not „orgiaque‟) as „orgiastic‟; the sense is of excess, superabundance but also 
dissoluteness. 
16
 The French text reads: „L‟œuvre d‟art quitte le domaine de la représentation pour devenir 
“expérience”, empirisme transcendantal ou science du sensible‟ (Deleuze 2008, p. 79).  
17
 The French text reads: „La tâche de la philosophie moderne a été définie: renversement du platonisme‟ 
(Deleuze 2008, pp. 82 seq.). 
18
 Cf. Deleuze (2008, pp. 91-5; p. 92). 
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might be represented while an orgiastic version becomes experiential and opens to the 
world of the sensible. 
 
The work of art leaves the domain of representation in order to become “experience”, 
transcendental empiricism or science of the sensible. […] It is strange that aesthetics (as the 
science of the sensible) could be founded on what can be represented in the sensible. […] 
Empiricism truly becomes transcendental, and aesthetics an apodictic discipline, only when we 
apprehend directly the sensible that which can only be sensed, the very being of the sensible: 
difference, potential difference and difference in intensity as the reason behind the qualitative 
diversity. […] The intense world of differences, in which we find the reason behind qualities and 
the being of the sensible, is precisely the object of superior empiricism. This empiricism teaches 
us a strange „reason‟, that of the multiple, chaos and difference (nomadic distributions, crowned 
anarchies) (Deleuze 2004b, pp. 68-9). 
 
Deleuze‟s demands that the sensible be directly apprehended touches on the very core 
of difference which is grounded in difference in intensity. It is the intense world of 
differences which is the wider plane of consistency for a superior or transcendental 
empiricism, and with the multiple re-appearing. This experiential, orgiastic aesthetics of 
the sensible as a superior empiricism grounded in difference and repetition, follows 
principles of (non-)representation: being completed yet unlimited (Deleuze 2004b, p. 
69), chao-errant, non-coherent (Deleuze 2004b, p. 69) and disparate [dispars] (Deleuze 
2004b, p. 69).
19
 This appears at first sight inherently paradoxical (to prevent any 
                                                 
19
 The French text reads: „achevé et illimité‟, „chao-errant, non cohérent‟, „dispars‟ (Deleuze 2008, p. 
80). Villani (Sasso and Villani (eds), 2004, pp. 124-6) draws for the evolution and critique of the notion 
of disparity on Deleuze Difference and repetition [1968], The logic of sense and also his early work on 
Hume, Empiricism and subjectivity [1953]. He reads the notion of disparity, or rather of the disparate 
[épars] as  follows: „Doubled difference, resonating to infinity, constituting the precursor (“sombre”) of 
the metamorphosizing fulguration, and serving as the unity of measure of the simulacrum‟ [„Différence 
redoubleé, résonnant à l‟infini, constituant le précurseur (“sombre”) de la fulguration métamorphosante, 
et servant d‟unité de mesure au simulacre‟] (p. 124). In his critique Villani points to the paradoxical and 
(inclusive) disjunctive features of the notion; the disparate is a binding and separating force in the 
disparate elements of the fulguration which is named „sign‟ (p. 125). With regard to the connecting notion 
of the „dark precursor‟ of fulguration, he notes that the term refers to the Latin fuscum subnigrum which 
describes the tint of the sky on which the flash of the lightning traces its mark (p. 124). The notion of the 
disparate, or disparity, draws together perpetual difference, event and becoming, fulguration and 
evanescent meeting. Deleuze presents the idea of signs or signals („as flashing between series‟) in his 
introduction to Difference and repetition. He states (as against Lévi-Strauss‟ proposition of symmetry in 
Tristes tropiques (1973, p. 191)): „For it is not the elements of symmetry present which matter for artistic 
or natural causality, but those which are missing and are not in the cause; what matters is the possibility 
of the cause having less symmetry than the effect. Moreover, causality would remain eternally 
conjectural, a simple logical category, if that possibility were not at some moment or other effectively 
fulfilled. For this reason, the logical relation of causality is inseparable from a physical process of 
signalling, without which it would not be translated into action. By “signal” we mean a system with 
orders of disparate size, endowed with elements of dissymmetry; by “sign” we mean what happens within 
such a system, what flashes across the intervals when a communication takes place between disparates. 
The sign is indeed an effect, but an effect with two aspects: in one of these it expresses, qua sign, the 
productive dissymmetry; in the other it tends to cancel it. The sign is not entirely of the order of the 
symbol; nevertheless, it makes way for it by implying internal difference (while leaving the conditions of 
its reproduction still external) (2004b, p. 22; original emphases). 
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fixture), an aesthetics of excess and dissolution, however Deleuze‟s emphasis lies on 
capturing the spectrum of intensity and the propulsion of desire while his insistence 
upon disparity points to its fundamental schizoid regime. 
 
The second point postulating the regime of simulacra as a consequence of the eternal 
return in the system of difference and repetition, impacts on my examination of enacting 
desiring practice in three ways. The simulacral supports the double-play of the virtual 
and the actual and thus the actualization of the event. It parallels the aïonic register of 
the event as an instantiation of becoming. Its parodic quality shapes style and 
expression of the literary text(s) and the composition of the literary work. These 
characteristics of the simulacra offer valuable insights into how to set parameters for a 
differential desiring practice. The simulacrum
20
 becomes the pivot for the system of 
difference and repetition in that it resists as there is a pursuit of differences of 
differences, never allowing a definition or pinning down a model or a copy. The 
simulacrum‟s main characteristic is its nature as vanishing point. The resistance of the 
simulacrum warrants also the principle of unlimited completion and thus the return. 
Deleuze explores the vanishing yet insisting power of the simulacrum at other instances 
                                                 
20
 Villani (Sasso and Villani (eds), 2004, pp. 314-7) relates the notion of simulacrum to the notion of the 
disparate (which it expands), the event (as the larger epistemological frame) and most importantly to un-
grounding [effondement]. The textual sources are: Deleuze‟s Difference and repetition and The logic of 
sense and Deleuze-Guattari‟s Anti-Oedipus. A summary approach of the traits of the simulacrum reads as 
follows: „“A differential system of a disparate and resonating series, of a dark precursor and a forced 
mouvement”, that is a meeting of a fold by another fold, taking the form of a shock wave which continues 
to run at infinite speed through both folds and redefines them‟ [„“Système différential à série disparate et 
résonnante, à precurseur sombre et mouvement force”, c‟est-à-dire rencontre d‟un pli par un autre pli, 
formant comme une onde de choc, qui ne cesse de parcourir à vitesse infinie les deux plis et les redéfinit‟] 
(Villani 2004, p. 314; the quote in the summary refers to Difference and repetition (1968, p. 165)). 
Noteworthy is that Deleuze equates at this instance simulacrum and phantasm while in The logic of sense 
the simulacrum plays the part of being a measure of the disparate (The logic of sense (1969, p. 202)). 
Approaching the notion of simulacrum through a focus on its traits allows envisaging its textual 
relevance: the simulacrum is a demonic image [„image démoniaque‟] (Difference and repetition (1968, p. 
166)); it contains free oceanic differences [„différences libres océaniques‟], nomadic distributions 
[„distributions nomades‟], crowned anarchies [„anarchies couronnées‟] (p. 341); it mines the ground, 
absorbs it and shatters it into groundlessness [effondement] (p. 352); it reveals a world of impersonal 
individuations and pre-individual singularities, a world as true nature of the groundless which reaches 
beyond representations (p. 355). The following traits make the simulacrum the centrepiece of a system of 
thought contravening representation: the different relating to the different in terms of (1) depth [spatium] 
where intensities originate; (2) disparate series; (3) dark precursor which puts the series into 
communication; (4) couplings, internal resonances and forced mouvements; (5) the constitution of the 
passive self, larval subjects and pure spatial-temporal dynamisms; (6) qualities and extensions, species 
and parts; and (7) centres of evolution (Difference and repetition (1968, p. 355)). Several levels of vision 
are drawn together, of dynamic, spatial and temporal order as well as individual and even evolutionary 
order. Read this way, the simulacrum stands for the process of pure becoming in all its manifestations.  
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as the excessive element of „escape‟.21 The idea of a difference between the original and 
copy of things is given up; original and copy are robbed of their distinction and thus 
their meaning; similarly the idea of a difference between model and image fades. In the 
cycle of eternal return, that which is and that which returns cannot be separated. One 
parodies the other in the sense of a dissimilar repeat, a difference of difference. 
Consequently neither the assumption of identities nor subjective coherence is possible. 
A further consequence of the postulate of the eternal return is the loss of a grounding or 
foundation;
22
 the regime of difference leads to a „universal ungrounding‟ (Deleuze 
2004b, p. 80). This can be viewed as claiming that chaos and eternal return (as proposed 
by Nietzsche) may be equated (Deleuze 2004b, p. 81). A range of parallels to describe 
the nature of simulacra, as opposed to (organic) representation, such as dreams, 
shadows, reflections and paintings (Deleuze 2004b, p. 81), point to the impossibility of 
drawing a distinct line between formed and formless images, or between their 
imaginings (as and in phantasm(s)). The return of the simulacra eventuates in series: 
 
What matters is the divergence of series, the decentring of circles, „monstrosity‟. The totality of 
circles and series is thus a formless ungrounded chaos which has no law other than its own 
repetition, its own reproduction in the development of that which diverges and decentres. We 
know how these conditions are already satisfied in such works as Mallarmé‟s Book or Joyce‟s 
Finnegan‟s [sic] Wake: these are by nature problematic works (Deleuze 2004b, p. 82; original 
emphases and titles).
23
 
 
Further principles of desiring practice can be extracted, here postulated as 
characteristics of simulacral literary works: divergence of series, circularity, decentring, 
serialization, absence of a (consolidating) centre, insisting disparity (Deleuze 2004b, p. 
83), and monstrosity, here understood in the sense of coming to the surface for 
(excessive and provocative) display.  
 
Enactment and actualization: Counter-actualization 
 
The first aim of my chapter was to explore the potential of differential aspects of 
desiring practice and how they support and affirm schizoid modes and present them as 
productive. I now turn to considering the process of enactment of desiring practice as 
                                                 
21
 The object x, the phallus, the empty square and other descriptors are used to circumscribe the 
functionality of the elusive but essential element in the creative process (also named the „dark precursor‟) 
22
 The French text reads: „le sans-fond et le non-fondé‟; „l‟effondement universel‟ (Deleuze 2008, p. 92). 
23
 Deleuze‟s reference is to Joyce (1975/1923-39) and Mallarmé‟s Book [Un coup de dés jamais n‟abolira 
le hazard, A dice throw will never abolish chance]. Cf. Mallarmé (Mondor and Jean-Aubry (eds), 1945). 
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anchored in Deleuze‟s time concepts. The process of enactment of desiring practice and 
the actualization of the event need to be viewed as inter-related, conditioning Deleuze-
Guattari‟s notion of becoming. Enacting desiring practice relies on two related levels, 
the level of actualization of the event, in chronos, physical, measureable time, and its 
counter-actualization, in aïon, timeless time.
24
 These two inter-connected time-levels 
are also described in terms of actuality and virtuality. The enactment as event carries its 
own full sense and meaning, not needing any further attribution of meaning. The 
doubling of the moment of actualization points to the transitory nature of the event but 
also to repetition as its governing principle. In the moment of actualization, while an 
action takes place, a transitory individuation eventuates as haecceity or ephemeral 
subjectification; yet the present moment of the event „escapes‟ and with it the ephemeral 
subject which is caught in the movement of becoming. How this postulate of escape 
relates to haecceity as subjectification and to becoming, as well as to the „outside of 
language‟, will be considered later in the context of a re-appraisal of the process of 
becoming in its instantiations as Body without Organs, as corporeal metamorphoses in 
degrees and as instances of literary machine. The notion of an unidentifiable „seed‟ of 
escape is part of Deleuze‟s construct of linking different/ciation, time and becoming, 
and can be paralleled to Derridean aporia,
25
 the enigmatic or unsolvable question always 
pointing forward. 
                                                 
24
 Mengue (Sasso and Villani (eds), 2004, pp. 41-7) anchors the double-notion of Aion and Chronos in 
Deleuze‟s The logic of sense, in particular, the ‟23rd series of aion‟ (cf. Deleuze 2004c, pp. 186-93), its 
recurrence in A thousand plateaus and in Deleuze-Guattari‟s  What is philosophy?; in all instances the 
double-notion is associated with becoming (p. 47). Mengue summarizes its aspects as follows: „In the 
splitting of time, Chronos represents the present of bodies and causes while Aion represents the time 
which assembles the events or the surface effects, the becomings. Chronos has only one time level, the 
“living present”; Aion possesses two, the past and the future, but has no present. That means it is of 
incorporeal, unlimited, infinitely divisible nature‟ [„Dans le clivage du temps, Chronos représente le 
présent des corps et des causes, tandis qu‟Aiôn représente le temps qui recueille les événements ou effets 
de surface, les devenirs. Chronos n‟a qu‟un temps, le “present vivant”; Aiôn en possède deux, le passé et 
l‟avenir, mais n‟a pas de présent. C‟est dire que‟il est un incorporel, illimité, infiniment divisible‟] (2004, 
p. 41). Mengue states (p. 46) that the double-notion of Aion-Chronos underlies Deleuze‟s theory of event 
and of becoming which sets out a different understanding of history but also impacts on the relations 
between event and sense (pp. 43-4) ‒ as elaborated in The logic of sense ‒, thus opens relations to other 
aesthetic principles such as the fold and resonance, and to schizoanalysis.     
25
 For the Derrida-Deleuze connection, see Patton and Protevi ((eds) 2003a); Patton and Protevi (2003b, 
pp. 1-14); Lawlor „The beginnings of thought: The fundamental experience in Derrida and Deleuze‟ 
(Patton and Protevi (eds), 2003a, pp. 67-83) and Protevi (2001) with regard to their political positions. 
For critical assessments of Derrida, see Lawlor and Direk ((eds) 2002). For Derridean deconstruction and 
différance, see Derrida (trans. Johnson, 1981/1972); „Différance‟ (trans. Bass, 1982a/1968, pp. 1-27); 
„Signature, event, context‟ (trans. Bass, 1982b/1972, pp. 307-30); „Desistance‟ (trans. Fynsk, 1998a/1969, 
pp. 1-42); „Structure, sign, and play in the discourse of the human sciences‟ (trans. Bass, 2009c /1966, pp. 
351-70). McQuillan (2000), Norris (2002/1982) and Cohen ((ed.) 2001) provides guidance in theory and 
practice of deconstruction and its impact on the humanities. 
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With regard to the literary text and its language, the event can be captured in a 
movement of language, in the moment of making sense.
26
 Only the discursive act of 
textualization grasps the event as a succession of present moments while also drawing 
the other two levels of time, future and past, onto the same discursive plane, if 
momentarily. This fusion of future and past, as „pure duration‟ („pure durée‟) (Deleuze 
2004b, pp. 92-4; pp. 103-5; passim)
27
 in the present moment of actualization, 
                                                 
26 The observation of these processes asks for specific critical methods which can handle the virtual-
actual fold, the event of actualization and counter-actualization on the discursive plane. See for instance 
the comments by Boundas „Deleuze-Bergson: An ontology of the virtual‟ (Patton (ed.), 1996, pp. 81-
106); Boundas „Introductory essay: What difference does Deleuze‟s difference make?‟ (2006b, pp. 3-28); 
Boundas ((ed.) 2006a) and ((ed.) 2009/2004); Egyed „Counter-actualization and the method of intuition‟ 
(Boundas (ed.), B 2006, pp. 74-84); Burns „Becoming-Bertha: Virtual difference and repetition in 
postcolonial „Writing Back‟, a Deleuzian reading of Jean Rhys‟s Wide Sargasso Sea‟ (2010, pp. 16-41). 
Also new aesthetic regimes have to be envisaged such as those by Buydens, Sahara: L‟esthétique de 
Gilles Deleuze (2005/1990). Three trajectories can be followed which offer potential for my enquiry. 
(1)Bogue proposes that „Deleuze‟s way‟, that is his approach to the arts (which include literature, fine 
arts, film and music) is a „transverse‟ practice which encompasses ethical and aesthetic dimensions. 
Bogue‟s intention then is to explore diverse pathways so as to conceive of a Deleuzian method. This is 
done in exploring the minor (in Kafka), the notion of fabulation, systems of signs and images (in Proust), 
symptomatology in Masoch and different approaches to nomadology. In his introduction, „Du côté de 
chez Deleuze‟ (2007, pp. 1-5), Bogue offers several lines of circumscribing his approach. „Transversals 
provide communication among incommunicables‟ (2007, p. 2), thus attempting in a paradoxical manner 
the impossible. „Deleuze‟s transverse way is methodic and systematic, but open-ended in its method and 
system, only to be seized in its ongoing practice‟ (2007, p. 5). Thus a Deleuzian method proves its 
functioning in freeing itself from its own shackles (and, as I assume, leaving the domain of practical 
criticism). (2) In contrast, Colebrook characterizes Deleuze‟s approach to literature as minor literature 
under the regime of the (Nietzschean) power of eternal return (2005 /2002, pp. 103-23) and points to 
indirect discourse (free indirect style) as a specific tool to „diagnose […] affects and intensities‟ (2005 
/2002, p. 114) and how Deleuze‟s notion of the infinitive (to green and to tree rather than the tree is 
green) functions as an expressive means of becoming (2005 [2002], p. 110). (3) Rajchman sets Deleuze‟s 
relation to literature into the wider context of his philosophy with the result that labels and categories such 
as poststructuralism and postmodernism fall away. Cf. for instance, chapter one: „Connections‟ (2000, pp. 
3-13); on Deleuze‟s demand for a new image of thought (2000, pp. 45-7); on Deleuze‟s semiotics (2000, 
pp. 67-9); on the impersonality, neutrality or anonymity of (literary) discourse (2000, pp. 83-8) and in 
particular chapter six: „Sensation‟ (2000, pp. 113-42) which can be considered an outline of a Deleuzian 
aesthetics. 
27
 Cf. also Deleuze (2006a, pp. 59-7) for the Bergsonian metaphor of the cone of pure duration. Deleuze, 
in chapter V „Elan vital as movement of differentiation‟ (2006a, pp. 91-113, esp. pp. 95-6) points to the 
two types of division in Bergson, the first type opposing „pure matter and pure duration, or else pure 
present and pure past‟, the second type actualizing the virtual enclosed in a unity: „at each instant pure 
duration divides into two directions, one of which is the past, the other the present; or else the élan vital at 
every instant separates into two movements, one of relaxation (détente) that descends into matter, the 
other of the tension that ascends into duration‟ (p. 95). Deleuze (2004b, pp. 158-9, notes 5 and 6) refers to 
Bergson Matter and memory (trans. Paul and Palmer, 2005/1896) with regard to repetition in 
psychological life, and the sections and levels of the Bergsonian cone. Deleuze (2004b, p. 279, note 23) 
refers to Time and free will (trans. Mitchell, 2001/1888), Matter and memory (trans. Paul and Palmer, 
2005/1896) and Creative evolution (trans. Mitchell, 2011/1907) with regard to the persistence of the 
notion of duration. Deleuze (2004b, pp. 328-9, note 14) draws out the relations between duration as 
multiplicity and maintains that intensities are reintroduced within duration. In The logic of sense (for 
instance, „Twenty-third series of the aion‟, 2004c, pp. 186-93) the notion of actualization (in and as 
chronos) and counter-actualization (in and as aion) present a parallel line of thought, however with the 
difference that the emphasis falls on the „becoming-mad of the depths. Between the two becomings, of 
surface and depth, we can no longer say that they have in common the side-stepping of the present‟. Aion 
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circumscribes Deleuze‟s notion of „intensity‟ as the defining characteristic of the event. 
Introducing the levels of time and the doubling of time-levels in chronos and aïon, 
physical measured time and timeless time, allows a distanciation from the 
representational mode in that the mimetic effect, the simple mirroring of the state of 
worldly affairs, is circumvented. Also by introducing the aïonic timeless register, the 
focal point of the counter-actualization (that is, the impersonal, the pre-individual, the 
unconscious)
28
 can be drawn into the discursive process. Libidinal propulsion is the 
driving device to uphold the process of becoming. 
 
Several parameters of Deleuze‟s recast ontological shift (understood here as thought 
circling around event, eventuation, actualization and, as I prefer, enactment) directly 
impact on the proposed differential desiring practice for the reading of literary texts. 
These parameters are the centrality of the notion of event, consequently resetting the 
notions of time, the dispersion of the subject and the shift from the stasis of point-like 
achievement to the flux of the process of becoming. These three inter-related and 
mutually supportive aspects, split time, dispersed „subject‟ and resulting vectorial 
becoming, serve as expressive moments in the reading of literary texts through a 
differential desiring practice. The event is conceived as a double and reciprocal 
movement of virtual and actual (a Stoic model). This movement is understood as 
moment of enactment or actualization (in the measurable order of time of chronos) with 
a corresponding counter-actualization (in the durative order of time of aïon). The event 
                                                                                                                                               
is „populated by effects‟, presents „pure empty form of time‟. „It is this new world of incorporeal effects or 
surface effects which makes language possible‟ (Deleuze 2004c, p. 189).   
28
 Deleuze repeatedly raises the problematic of the Freudian unconscious and repression („the return of 
the repressed‟) in opposing it to his notion of repetition (for instance, 2004b, pp. 18-20 („Introduction: 
Repetition and difference‟); pp. 119-41 (chapter II „Repetition for itself‟; passim). In the introduction he 
states: „The turning point of Freudianism appears in Beyond the pleasure principle: the death instinct is 
discovered, […] as a result of a direct consideration of repetition phenomena. […] From the theory of 
repression, Freud indicated another path: [the case of Dora; K., Frau K., the governess …] […] This path 
would have been able to lead to the analysis of the unconscious towards a veritable theater. […] Even 
beyond the pleasure principle, the form of a bare repetition persists, since Freud interprets the death 
instinct as a tendency to return to the state of inanimate matter, one which upholds the model of a wholly 
physical or material repetition. […] Death has nothing to do with a material model. On the contrary, the 
death instinct may be understood in relation to masks and costumes. […] [the example of Proust‟s In 
search of lost time] […] repetition is in its essence symbolic; symbols or simulacra are the letter of 
repetition itself. Difference is included in repetition by way of disguise and by the order of the symbol. 
[…] [the example of Nerval‟s Sylvie and Freud‟s/Jensen‟s Gradiva] In the analysis of obsession, the 
appearance of the theme of death coincides with the moment at which the obsessed has command of all 
the characters of his drama and brings them together in a repetition of which the “ceremony” is only the 
external envelope. The mask is the true subject of repetition. Because repetition differs in kind from 
representation, the repeated cannot be represented: rather, it must always be signified, masked by what 
signifies it, itself masking what it signifies (2004b, pp. 18-20; original emphases). 
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is thus made the initializing, and grounding, act of becoming. Thought, and with it the 
enactment of the event, is extracted out of chaos, out of emptiness, the infinite. Thus 
empty, infinite chaos and the plane of immanence are in exchange although the actual 
bringing forth of the event, its genesis, cannot be spoken about and its grounding 
[fondement] aporetically escapes determination.
29
 The initializing event of becoming 
follows the operation of passive syntheses, connection, disjunction and conjunction and 
its production in the form of serialization. Here is the anchoring point for the notion of 
an anoedipal unconscious which is theorized as a processual yet passive progression of 
three syntheses which I explored earlier within the schizoid modes. The event is 
mirrored in actualization and counter-actualization and thus doubled or folded in actual 
and virtual, time split into chronos and aïon, a here and an always. Our conditioned 
understanding of time in the modes of lived present, remembered past and expected or 
foreseen future is also recast within Deleuze‟s philosophy of difference and repetition. 
The projection of the immanence of a system demands the eternal return not of the same 
but of the different. This is a self-referential difference which is projected as always 
beginning a new. 
 
                                                 
29
 Deleuze explores the notion of „universal ungrounding‟ in Difference and repetition (2004b, pp. 80-3). 
Cf. also Deleuze‟s propositions in The logic of sense. „Fifteenth series of singularities‟ (2004c, pp. 116-
25; esp.120-2) deals with the subject as singularity and the alternatives metaphysics and transcendental 
philosophy impose on us: „either an undifferentiated ground, a groundlessness, formless nonbeing, or an 
abyss without differences and without properties, or a supremely individuated Being and an intensely 
personalized Form. Without this Being or this Form, you will have only chaos. […] Always extraordinary 
are the moments in which philosophy makes the Abyss (Sans-fond) speak and finds the mystical language 
of its wrath, its formlessness, and its blindness: Boehme, Schelling, Schopenhauer, Nietzsche […] Being 
not an undifferentiated abyss, it [Nietzsche‟s Dionysian or will to power, a free and unbound energy] 
leaps from one singularity to another […] It is a Dionysian sense-producing machine, in which nonsense 
and sense  are no longer found in simple opposition, but are rather co-present to another within a new 
discourse. The new discourse is no longer that of the form, but neither is it that of the formless: it is rather 
that of the pure unformed‟ (2004c, pp. 122-3). This sets out the frame for a new aesthetics which pursues 
other literary practices than those imposed by representation, for instance, those practised by Kleist and 
Hölderlin (as mentioned before) or Blanchot and Bataille, and leaves structuralist, semiotic (and also 
poststructuralist) practices (Barthes, Genette, Todorov) behind. Cf. for instance: (1) Blanchot The space 
of literature (trans. Smock, 1989/1955); The book to come (trans. Mandell, 2003,/1959); The infinite 
conversation (trans. Hanson, 1993 /1969); Foucault/Blanchot (trans. Mehlman, 1987/196; 1986) and its 
proposition of the „thought from outside‟. (2) Bataille Visions of Excess: Selected Writings 1927-1939 
(ed. and trans. Stoeckl et al.,1985); Eroticism: Death and sensuality (trans. Dalwood, 1986a /1957). (3) 
Kleist „On the gradual formulation of thoughts while speaking‟ (ed. and trans. Wortsman, 2010, pp. 255-
63); „On the theater of marionettes‟ (ed. and trans. Wortsman, 2010, pp. 264-73). (4) Hölderlin Essays 
and letters on theory (trans. Pfau, 1988); The death of Empedocles (fragments) (trans. Farrell Krell, 
2008/1797 seq.). Cf. Shaviro (1990) for commentaries on Blanchot, Bataille and literary theory; Hegarty 
(2000) on Bataille; Lacoue-Labarthe (trans. Barnand and Lester, 1988) on the theory of literature in 
German romanticism; Kaufman (2001) on Bataille, Blanchot, Deleuze, Foucault and Klossowski; 
Kaufman „Klossowski or thoughts-becoming‟ (Grosz (ed.), 1999, pp. 141-57).  
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In Deleuze‟s construct of time registers affecting the sense-producing event,30 future 
and past only exists in the durative register of aïon. The present does not regain the past 
nor can it project the future; conversely the present moment is infinitely subdivided into 
past and future. Further, this subdivision eventuates in both directions at once. Thus the 
present moment, and with it the ephemeral subjectification taking place as haecceity, is 
the thinnest of instants: 
 
In accordance with Aion, only the past and future inhere and subsist in time. Instead of a present 
which absorbs the past and the future, a future and past divide the present at every instant and 
subdivide it ad infinitum into past and future, in both directions at once. Or rather, it is the 
instant without thickness and without extension, which subdivides each present into past and 
future, rather than vast and thick presents which comprehend both future and past in relation to 
each other. […] in the case of Aion, the becoming-mad of the depth was climbing to the surface, 
the simulacra in turn were becoming phantasms, the deep break was showing as a crack in the 
surface (Deleuze 2004b, p. 188).
31
 
 
The present is a vanishing instant through the continuous and instantaneous process of 
subdivision, to such a degree that the instant loses any „presence‟ at all. While 
unhinging time concepts Deleuze simultaneously draws the forces of the depth into 
play; the syntheses of time are aligned with the syntheses of the unconscious, a point I 
will take up later on, particularly with respect to the form this alignment takes and how 
this impacts on the writing and reading of literary texts. If the interplay of time registers 
in Deleuzian understanding is taking into account, enacting desiring practice is removed 
from representational understanding of temporality. In this non-representational context, 
the layering of motifs, for instance in Proust, can be read as layers of related moments 
of time, and thus an interpretive understanding of Proust‟s work as a regaining of time 
seems to be out of question. The core events in the form of crystallization (as the 
reverse process of actualization) in Proust
32
 then exemplify the connections of schizoid 
transversality rather than a metaphoric process of condensation as read in the 
                                                 
30
 Cf. „Fifth series of sense‟ (Deleuze 2004c, pp. 35-43), „Twenty-first series of the event‟ (pp. 169-75), 
„Twenty-third series of aion‟ (pp. 186-93), „Twenty-fourth series of the communication of events‟ (pp. 
194-202). 
31
 I am referring here, in parallel, to the French text of The logic of sense (Deleuze 1969) for my reading 
of specific details. In all other instances I keep to the translation by Lester and Stivale of Boundas‟ edited 
text. „D‟après Aion, seuls le passé et le futur insistent ou subsistent dans le temps. Au lieu d‟un présent 
qui résorbe le passé et le futur, un futur et un passé qui subdivise à chaque instant le présent, qui le 
subdivisent à l‟infini en passé et en futur, dans les deux sens à la fois. Ou plutôt, c‟est l‟instant sans 
épaisseur et sans extension qui subdivise chaque présent en passé et futur, au lieu de présents vastes et 
épais qui comprennent les uns par rapport aux autres le futur et le passé‟ (Deleuze 1969, p. 193).  
32
 For instance: the taste of the Madeleine biscuit „evoking‟ the place of Combray; the unevenness of the 
cobblestones actualising the place of Venice; the sound of Vinteuil‟s little phrase materializing the 
assemblage of desire. I shall return to this question in the next chapter in the discussion of Deleuze‟s 
Proust exegeses. 
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psychoanalytic mode. While the compositional rules are set by connectivity, the 
linguistic and literary processes, evoking, actualizing and materializing, are governed by 
„involuntary memory‟, the processes of the unconscious. The processes of enactment of 
desiring practice are thus grounded in the act of involuntary memory triggering off the 
direct experience of the sensible (the taste, the unevenness-touch, the sound) in an act of 
pure simulacrum. This act of pure simulacrum eventuates both in (and as) phantasm. I 
will return to this in more detail in the next chapter. 
 
The collapse of the three orders of chronological time, past, present and future, as 
conceived in representational practice, does away with narrative progression and gives 
way to the infinitesimal subdivision of the Deleuzian event. I read this as an inverted 
„narrative process‟, an infinite unfolding of the core event from the inside out which is 
dispersion. I propose for this process of progressive splintering the term schizodicity 
since it is occasioned by the abolition of time constructs, yet also anchored in the 
combined syntheses of time and the unconscious, as will be seen. The term of 
schizodicity captures the complexity of the process of actualization of the event as 
originating the process of becoming. Schizodicity also encompasses the process of 
actualization of the event in corporeal and affective terms (Body without Organs, 
hallucinatory metamorphoses into animal, child-woman) and in literary terms as always 
different and multiple instantiations of the literary machine (Kafka-machine, Proust-
machine). A more detailed examination of the Deleuzian take on Proust which runs 
counter to representational interpretive modes and progressively moves away from 
metaphoricity and sign systems will be part of the next chapter.  
 
Enactment of desiring practice, understood in the Deleuzian frame of thought, is not just 
shifting literary practice sideways in complicating the libidinal structures and dissolving 
a taken-for-granted subjectivity in literary texts. In contrast, in following the process of 
subdivision of time in the present moment, the „subject‟ eventuates as an expression of 
time.
33
 Further, the expressive modes of the writing process are defined by the postulate 
of the sense-making process in the event and its actualization, that is, language grasps 
the event and makes it subsist, or rather insist. Both outcomes of the Deleuzian 
                                                 
33
 Deleuze comments at many instances on the parallels, and the differences, between his own 
understanding of time and event and that of Heidegger. Cf. „Note on Heidegger‟s Philosophy of 
Difference‟, in chapter I „Difference in itself‟ (Deleuze 2004b, pp. 77-9); in chapter IV „Ideas and the 
synthesis of difference‟ (pp. 250-2). 
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rethinking of time constructs, the „dissolution‟ of the „subject‟ and the literary 
instantiation of the event, will be taken up later. Fully to appreciate Deleuze‟s 
understanding of the inter-relations of event, its actualization or enactment, and 
temporality, the double-fold of time as proposed in The logic of sense needs to be 
considered together with constructs of the three syntheses of time elaborated in 
Difference and repetition
34
 which reaches beyond the frame of the thesis. However, 
some points of relevance for the process of becoming and its relation to the postulated 
notion of an anoedipal unconscious will be explored. 
 
Actualization of the event 
 
The relations between time and „subject‟, their mutual conditioning in the actualization 
of the event, need to be viewed within the frame of the three syntheses of time and their 
corresponding three syntheses of the unconscious.
35
 Although the details of Deleuze‟s 
argument cannot be entered into here, I do follow the lines of thought which impact on 
my argument for a differential desiring practice. As stated earlier, the differential 
aspects of desiring practice, maintaining the schizoid modes, are connected and related 
to the processes of enactment of desiring practice and the actualization of the event. 
Both of these are grounded in Deleuze‟s shifted time concepts, developed and recast in 
the frame of difference and repetition. These shifted time concepts, the abolition of a 
chronological sectioning into present, past and future and its replacement with a 
differentially read „past‟, constitute the link to an understanding of the processes of 
becoming. Deleuze initially postulates three syntheses of time in „Repetition for itself‟ 
(Deleuze 2004b, pp. 90-163),
36
 evolving out of his reading of Bergson
37
 and Hume
38
 but 
                                                 
34
 The three syntheses of time are elaborated in Difference and Repetition along with some consideration 
of the crystal of time and the process of crystallization as later developed in Cinema 2: The Time-Image, 
Deleuze (1989, chapter four). 
35
 Cf. Chapter II „Repetition for itself‟ (Deleuze 2004b, pp. 90-163; esp. pp. 103-14; pp. 140-8). 
36
 Deleuze repeatedly points out that there is no difference between repetition and difference, but rather a 
sliding and that their „opposition‟ is rather to be understood as a thinking unfolding: repetition is itself in 
essence imaginary (Deleuze 2004b, p. 97). Repetition for itself is difference in itself (Deleuze 2004b, p. 
118). 
37
 Cf. Chapter II „Repetition for itself‟ (Deleuze 2004b, pp. 92-4; cf. also endnotes 1, 5 and 6). Deleuze 
refers to chapter two of Bergson Time and free will: An essay on the immediate data of consciousness 
(Bergson 2001/1888) where Bergson distinguishes between fusion (or contraction) in the mind and 
deployment in space. The notion of contraction as the essence of duration is discussed in Bergson Matter 
and memory (2005/1896). 
38
 Cf. Chapter II „Repetition for itself‟ (Deleuze 2004b, pp. 90-4; cf. endnote 1, p. 157) where Deleuze 
refers to Hume A treatise of human nature, part III, section 16, book 1, with regard to the distinction 
between the fusion in the imagination, and the separation in memory and understanding, of cases, events, 
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he moves beyond their argumentation in integrating the libidinal aspects and his 
understanding of unconscious processes into the (adapted Humean-Bergsonian) 
threefold process of temporality. In doing so, Deleuze‟s cast of the actualization of the 
event which is the originary „moment‟ of becoming extracts itself from any temporality. 
I follow the points (without wishing to condense the argument too much) which relate 
to my pursuit below. 
 
The living present as the first synthesis of time presents itself as a passive synthesis of 
contraction and contemplation, as habitus; habit-forming sustains the illusion of a 
determined self but is rather a demonstration of „larval selves‟.39 The second (active and 
passive) synthesis of time (Deleuze 2004b, p. 102) presents itself as pure past, as 
memory which is a representation of all presents. Within the frame of the second 
synthesis of time Deleuze evolves the three paradoxes of the past which are the 
contemporaneity with the present, its co-existence and pre-existence (Deleuze 2004b, 
pp. 103-4).
40
 A fourth paradox supersedes the three original ones, the Bergsonian cone 
of „metempsychosis‟ (Deleuze‟s terms: Deleuze 2004b, p. 105).41  
 
These statements set the frame for two points relating to the mutuality of time and 
„subject‟ to which I now turn as they impact on the actualization of the event and the 
enactment of desiring practice. The experience of time, the pull of present and past, 
splits and breaks the „I‟ (fêlure, je fêlé). This split, divided, schizoid „I‟ falls into a 
broken consciousness and a passive self (le moi passif) which stands in for the 
unconscious which is machinic, libidinal. In Deleuze‟s understanding it is the „pure and 
empty form of time‟ which enters the „subject‟, thus difference is interiorized into being 
and thought and pulls them asunder. This recalls Lacan‟s (and others‟) proposition of 
the impossibility of simultaneously „performing‟ your being, living and existence while 
                                                                                                                                               
happenings. Hume serves Deleuze as a source for rethinking the problem of habit. Cf. Deleuze 
Empiricism and subjectivity: An essay on Hume‟s theory of human nature (1991/1953). 
39
 Deleuze points to Beckett‟s ritualised figures: Molloy‟s series of stones which are sucked; Murphy‟s 
biscuits which are counted this way and that; Malone‟s possessions spread out and reviewed (Deleuze 
2004b, p. 100). 
40
 The three paradoxes of the past (contemporaneity, co-existence and pre-existence with the present) are 
discussed in chapter III in Bergson Matter and memory (2005/1896). Cf. Deleuze Bergsonism 
(2006a/1966). 
41
 Chapter II „Repetition for itself‟ (Deleuze 2004b, pp. 158-9, endnote 6), quoting from Bergson Matter 
and memory: „The same psychical life, therefore, must be supposed to be repeated an endless number of 
times on the different stories of memory, and the same act of the mind may be performed at varying 
heights‟ (p. 105); „there is room […] for a thousand repetitions of our psychical life, figured by as many 
sections A‟B‟, A”B”, etc., of the same cone‟ (p. 162). Cf. Bergson (2005/1896); Deleuze (2006a/1966). 
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thinking: one prevents the other.
42
 While the split (fêlure) „produces‟ or effects the 
broken I, the experience of time as caesura, as instance of „pure and empty time‟ 
(Deleuze 2004b, p. 111), allows access to aïon, timeless time; such a moment is 
experienced by Hölderlin („Apollo struck me down‟), Schreber („God has intercourse 
with me by means of rays‟), Artaud („I am my son, my father and myself‟), Proust („I 
was there‟) and Kafka („I will send my body and stay here in bed‟). Fêlure and caesura, 
the breaking of conscious subjectivity and the halting of time, establish schizodicity as a 
positive, affirmative state, anchored in an anoedipal unconscious, and allow the 
actualization of event as the originary moment of becoming. Since the fusion of fêlure 
and caesura as expressed in language runs counter to the representational mode, 
escaping the categories of sense and non-sense, „schizoid processes‟ take the form of 
what I shall term „discursive dissociation‟. The experience of the sensible world 
outgrows the available wording in communicative discourse. It is in this sense that 
Deleuze (and Deleuze-Guattari) understand the instantiations of the literary machine 
(Kafka-machine, Proust-machine, Beckett-machine) as the creative form of the 
processes of becoming. 
 
To speak of schizoid processes of discursive dissociation and of schizodicity points to 
the unsettling of the postulates of a Freudian unconscious (oedipalization as guarantee 
of subjectivity and sexuality), and the Lacanian postulates (desire as lack and forever 
postponed), though in a different measure which will be discussed later. Here I turn to 
Deleuze‟s questioning of the Freudian assumptions. Deleuze establishes a correlation 
between the split I (je fêlé) and the passive self (le moi passif). The split I is the timed 
passive self, the self as it appears in time. With regard to the actualization of the event, 
which stands in for the continuity of the processes of becoming, in Deleuze‟s vision 
three (or more) events follow each other, in life as in literary works, with progressive 
rapprochement to the „living up to the moment‟. 
 
The caesura, along with the before and after which it ordains once and for all, constitutes the 
fracture in the I (the caesura is exactly the point at which the fracture appears). 
Having abjured its empirical content, having overturned its own ground, time is defined not only 
by a formal and empty order but also by a totality and a series. In the first place, the idea of a 
totality of time must be understood as follows: the caesura […] must be determined in the image 
of a unique and tremendous event, an act which is adequate to time as a whole. [ …] [Such] a 
symbol adequate to the totality of time may be expressed in two ways: to throw time out of 
                                                 
42
 Lacan expresses it as the (inevitable) formula of alienation: „I think where I am not, therefore I am 
where I do not think‟ (trans. Sheridan, 1987, p. 166). 
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joint,
43
 to make the sun explode,
44
 to throw oneself into the volcano,
45
 to kill God or the father.
46
 
[…] In effect, there is always a time at which the imagined act is supposed “too big for me”. 
This defines a priori the past or the before. […] The second time, which relates to the caesura 
itself, is thus the present of metamorphosis, a becoming-equal to the act and a doubling of the 
self, and the projection of an ideal self in the image of the act […]. As for the third time in which 
the future appears, this signifies that the event and the act possess a secret coherence which 
excludes that of the self; that they turn back against the self which has become their equal and 
smash it to pieces, as though the bearer of the new world were carried away and dispersed by the 
shock of the multiplicity to which it gives birth: what the self has become equal to is the unequal 
in itself (Deleuze 2004b, pp. 111-2).  
 
The theoretical construct is played through in the examples of Oedipus (the action has 
taken place) and Hamlet (the action has been reneged upon and postponed) (Deleuze 
2004b, pp. 111-2). In the first round the action needed for the event and its actualization 
is considered too large; the event is not lived but rejected into the past, a point to which 
I return with regard to Proust in the next chapter. The second round of the repetition of 
the event establishes itself as caesura, an experience of the pure and empty form of 
time. This is the „present of metamorphosis‟, or at least its beginning, „a becoming-
equal to the act‟, to the actualization of the event. It is the moment of enabling the 
action of becoming in the event. In the third round of the repetition of the event which 
projects the future, the event-action-actualization has a dissolving effect; it is a 
liberating moment of dissolution in that a multiplicity evolves, marking the moment of 
becoming-imperceptible, a far-out unreachable goal, comparable to Lacan‟s never-
attained „Real‟.47 
                                                 
43
 The reference is to Shakespeare‟s Hamlet. 
44
 The reference is to Hölderlin walking in France and being struck (Bordeaux, 1802). Cf. also Hölderlin‟s 
fragments, The death of Empedocles, Empedocles on the Etna: the question of becoming-mature for 
death. Deleuze recalls: „In the famous Empedoclean alternation, in the complementarity of hate and love, 
we encounter, on the one hand, the body of hatred, the parcelled-out body-sieve: “heads without a neck, 
arms without a shoulder, eyes without a face”; but on the other hand, we encounter the glorious body 
without organs: “formed in one piece”, without limbs, with neither voice nor sex. Likewise, Dionysus 
holds out to us his two faces, his open and lacerated body, and his impassible organless head: Dionysus 
dismembered, but also Dionysus the impenetrable‟ (Deleuze 2004c, p. 147). 
45
 The reference is to Empedocles throwing himself into the Etna (Deleuze 2004c, pp. 146-7). „In a deluge 
of water and fire, the volcano spits up only a single reminder of Empedocles – his lead sandal. To the 
wings of the Platonic soul the sandal of Empedocles is opposed, proving that he was of the earth, under 
the earth, and autochthonous‟ (p. 146). 
46
 The reference is to Oedipus which concludes the line of inevitable return. 
47
 I am referring here to the Lacanian orders of the Imaginary, Symbolic and the Real as explored earlier. 
Deleuze discusses Lacan‟s take, pp. 125-7, in particular, in endnote 15: on serialization, Lacan‟s „Seminar 
on “The purloined letter”‟, „Le mythe individuel du névrosé‟ [the Freudian “Rat Man case”]; 
in endnote 17: Lacan‟s „The function and field of speech and language in psychoanalyis‟, „The direction 
of the treatment and the principles of its power‟, „The significance of the phallus‟. Deleuze discusses 
Lagache‟s take, pp. 159-160, endnote 13: „The problem of transfert‟. He examines Leclaire‟s take, p. 160, 
p. 17: „La mort dans la vie de l‟obsédé‟. Then he turns to Laplanche and Pontalis‟s take, p. 27: „Fantasme 
originaire, fantasmes des origines, origine du fantasme‟, trans. ‟Fantasy and the origins of sexuality‟. 
Finally, Deleuze comments on Freud‟s take: pp. 131-3, pp. 137-9, endnotes 20 and 21: Beyond the 
pleasure principle, The ego and the id, Inhibitions, symptoms and anxiety, [the Freudian “Wolf Man 
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The trajectory which Deleuze outlines here is a contraction of the experiential stages of 
becoming, evoked in the fates of schizoid cases as lived (and suffered) experience of the 
sensible world
48
 and as re-created in literary works.
49
 The threefold process of the 
syntheses of the unconscious are thus an apt evocation of the molecular, anoedipal 
unconscious while linking these processes to the event in its distinct stages as well as to 
the stages of becoming which progressively lead to dispersion and dissociation, to the 
stage of schizodicity. The notion of triadic syntheses also lends itself to extracting 
principles for the ways in which a differential desiring practice „enacts‟ and „revives‟ 
the corporeal, affective, hallucinatory, phantasmatic or simulacral metamorphoses that 
literary works can display. 
 
In considering temporality and the libidinal layering of a molecular, anoedipal 
unconscious in their inter-relations, time appears the trigger for a transitory 
„subjectification‟, or rather time instantiates itself in the form of an ephemeral haecceity 
as a point of reference and not a „substance‟. The unconscious is drawn into action, or in 
Deleuzian terms into actualization or (my preferred term) enactment, through repetition. 
In the first instance this occurs habitually in a passive manner; in the second instance 
libidinally and in memory (evoked as Eros and Mnemosyne; Deleuze 2004b, pp. 133-
39, passim) and finally in the third instance obeying the death drive (evoked as 
Thanatos; Deleuze 2004b, pp. 135-40, passim).
50
 The unfolding of the correlation 
between passive self (le moi passif) and the broken, ruptured, splintered „I‟ (je fêlé) 
exacted in the second synthesis by libido and memory can also be understood as time 
                                                                                                                                               
case”] and concludes with Jung‟s take, p. 17 [the notion of the questioning unconscious] and Derrida‟s 
take, p. 28: Writing and difference (Deleuze 2004c, pp. 159-63). Without the knowledge of the case 
studies and their cross-connection between Freud and Lacan (and Lacan‟s disciples Lagache, Leclaire, 
Laplanche and Pontalis) is it difficult to fathom Deleuze‟s line of thought. 
48
 For instance, in Artaud  and in Schreber. 
49
 For instance, Ahab in Melville‟s Moby Dick [The whale], Severin/Gregor in Masoch‟s Venus in furs, 
Lenz in Büchner‟s novella-fragment. Büchner‟s literary account of Lenz‟s „madness‟ is based on letters 
and pastor Oberlin‟s diaries. Lenz stayed with the pastor until being committed to an asylum; he later 
returned home to Lithuania. Lenz is aSturm und Drang playwright of many comedies: Der Hofmeister, 
Die Soldaten. 
50
 In The logic of sense Deleuze speaks of libido and libidinal drives (Deleuze „Twenty-ninth series – 
Good intentions are inevitably puished‟, 2004c, pp. 233-40) and death (Deleuze „Twenty-first series of 
the event‟, 2004c, pp. 169-75, esp. 172-4) rather than Eros and Thanatos. (Freud did not use the term 
Thanatos or rarely, according to Laplanche-Pontalis (2006, p. 447). The Twenty-ninth series examines the 
Oedipus problematic drawing on Freud [1920] Beyond the pleasure principle and Freud [1923] The ego 
and the id. The Twenty-ninth series examines Blanchot‟s double-notion of death. Cf. Blanchot L‟espace 
littéraire (2009/1955); Blanchot The space of literature (trans. Smock, 1989).  
Here Deleuze plays through Freud‟s later essay Beyond the pleasure principle which he explored in detail 
in his work on Masoch (Deleuze 2006d). 
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breaking being and thinking, or the internalization of time as molecular, anoedipal 
unconscious. Since the nature of the unconscious is shaped by the time event, Deleuze 
can lend the unconscious the parameters of being serial, differential and questioning. 
These parameters also anchor the processes of enactment of desiring practice and the 
actualization of the event and link them, via the shifted Deleuzian time concepts, to 
becoming. Out of the serial, differential and questioning (molecular, anoedipal) 
unconscious eventuates becoming. 
 
Deleuze‟s complex construct of paralleling, and finally equating, the three syntheses of 
time with the three syntheses of the unconscious takes in the Freudian and Lacanian 
theories of the unconscious and deploys them for his own discursive purpose. Thus he 
moves his own considerations of difference and repetition from the philosophical, 
empirical (and phenomenological) stance (Hume, Bergson) to the psychoanalytic 
position(s) (Freud, Jung, Lacan, Lacanian disciples Lagache and Leclaire) and back to 
his own position. 
 
Freud supposes the unconscious to be ignorant of three important things: Death, Time and No. 
Yet it is a question only of time, death and no in the unconscious. Does this mean merely that 
they are acted [agis] without being represented? Furthermore, the unconscious is ignorant of no 
because it lives off the (non)-being of problems and questions, rather than the non-being of the 
negative which affects only consciousness and its representations. It is ignorant of death because 
every representation of death concerns its inadequate aspect, whereas the unconscious discovers 
and seizes upon the other side, the other face. It is ignorant of time because it is never 
subordinated to the empirical contents of a present which passes in representation, but rather it 
carries out the passive syntheses of an original time. It is these three syntheses which must be 
understood as constitutive of the unconscious. They correspond to the figures of repetition which 
appear in the work of a great novelist: the binding, the ever renewed fine cord; the ever displaced 
stain on the wall; the ever erased eraser. The repetition-binding, the repetition-stain, the 
repetition-eraser: the three beyonds of the pleasure principle (Deleuze 2004b, p. 140; original 
emphases).    
 
In Deleuze‟s understanding the „structure of the unconscious is not conflictual, 
oppositional or contradictory but questioning and problematizing‟ (Deleuze 2004b, p. 
137), thus Freud‟s contention that the unconscious is ignorant of negation is in 
Deleuze‟s terms rather a characteristic of representational consciousness. The pivot of 
the argumentation lies in Deleuze‟s refutation of the representational construct. No 
representations of death can match the moves of the unconscious towards „the other 
side, the other face‟, an indication of the „groundlessness‟ and the „abyss of chaos‟ to 
which Deleuze refers. Similarly, empirical representations of timely events do not affect 
the aïonic register of the unconscious. The Deleuzian rewriting of the unconscious, in 
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paralleling and then equating the three syntheses of time with the three syntheses of the 
unconscious, reverses the inter-relations of consciousness and unconscious, of Freudian 
Id and Ego, the assumptions of the beyond(s) of the pleasure principle; and above all, in 
an a-representational move, resets the parameters for creating and reading literary work, 
that is: „the figures of repetition which appear in the work of a great novelist: the 
binding, the ever renewed fine cord; the ever displaced stain on the wall; the ever erased 
eraser. The repetition-binding, the repetition-stain, the repetition-eraser: the three 
beyonds of the pleasure principle‟ (Deleuze 2004b, p. 140). 
 
The example of the governing rule of repetition, as binding, as stain, as eraser, points to 
the principle of serialization whereby the „dark precursor‟ (Deleuze 2004b, pp. 145-51) 
functions as the communicative and connecting device. The dark precursor, object=x, 
Lacanian phallus, empty square, elusive placeholder, is „difference in itself or difference 
in the second degree‟ (Deleuze 2004b, p. 147), the functioning device of discursive and 
literary disparity and thus a principle of schizodicity. „These differential systems with 
their disparate and resonating series, their dark precursor and forced movements, are 
what we call simulacra or phantasms. The eternal return concerns only simulacra, it 
causes only such phantasms to return‟ (Deleuze 2004b, p. 154). Drawing together the 
rewriting of the unconscious and aligning its libidinal power with the creative act and 
the perpetual process of becoming prepares the way for setting out principles of a 
differential desiring practice which will be examined in Deleuze‟s and Deleuze-
Guattari‟s practical exegesis of literary works in the next chapter. 
 
Enactment / actualization vs representation      
 
In introducing the Deleuzian notions of event, haecceity and becoming, the interpretive 
system of representation is put into question. Since difficult or perplexing literary texts 
refute a representational approach, the task at hand is to probe into the productivity of 
the introduced Deleuzian notions and to test their viability by first comparing their 
functionality. Can the difficult notion of haecceity replace the convenient category of 
subject in the interpretation of literary texts? How could its modes be firstly described 
and secondly used to advantage, that is for opening resistant texts? Or is it possible to 
do away with the notion of subjectivity and re-focus attention on the transitional modes 
of becoming as grounded in the event which, in the Deleuzian understanding, only ever 
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assumes transitory subjectification? To support these thoughts on shifting away from an 
interpretive representational mode to a differential desiring practice, I draw on the 
examination in previous chapters of the Deleuzian notions of an anoedipal unconscious 
and the functioning of desiring-machines. The reason for doing this is that the process 
of enactment can be supported by the notions of event and becoming, however, the 
modality of the practice as desiring or libidinal asks for two things: the forces behind 
the process of actualization of events to be grounded, and the reasons given for drawing 
these events from the virtual into the actual state. I propose that what is at stake here is a 
necessary re-thinking of the writing process or process of literary creation. I already 
introduced earlier three parameters: the delirium as the schizoid state at the margins of 
the unconscious; its liminality, that is drawing on the outside of language, the not-yet-
created; and as third parameter the simulacrum which deals with the abolition of the 
guiding principles of representation (identity, analogy, semblance, and recognition in 
images). In Deleuzian understanding there is no possibility of deciding on the 
originality or non-originality of images, their being copies or not. For the act of literary 
creation this opens the potential of drawing on the unlikely, in the sense of being freed 
from any obligation to comply with pre-existing worldly realities. The writing process 
or the process of literary creation can then be termed as freed fabulation,
51
 a process of 
experimentation in linguistic and imaginary terms, a process where the phantasms 
produced by the delirium nascent in the unconscious have priority over the reality check 
of representability (as is the case in Freudian dream-work). 
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 The literary notion of fabulation has a complex (and at times confounding) definitional nexus. I follow 
here only one strand which supports my project. Brooke-Rose (1988) sets out Genette‟s basic distinction 
between story and discourse (fabula-sjužet) which can be read as an opposition of content and form but 
also as a balanced dependence. Discourse overrides story, the story being reconstructed by the reader 
through engaging with the provided discourse. Roose-Brooke sets out Genette‟s three categories of time, 
mood and voice: time eventuates as order, duration and frequence; mood as distance and perspective, and 
voice as time of narration, narrative levels and as personal presentation. The function of the narrator may 
switch from providing the narrative as such, or being a metanarrative, communicative, testimonial or 
ideological tool. I cannot follow here the details but these categories re-appear (if in a different wording) 
in Deleuze‟s treatises on Proust and Masoch. Cf. Brooke-Rose, chapter twelve „Transgressions‟ (1988, 
pp. 311-38) where she explores the nouveau roman, and Beckett, Joyce and Proust. See also Bogue 
„Bergsonian fabulation and the people to come‟ (2007, pp. 91-106) and the earlier version: Bogue 
„Fabulation, narration and the people to come‟ (Boundas (ed.), pp. 202-23). As pointed out earlier, new 
critical criteria and new aesthetic regimes have to be considered, for instance, the potential of indirect 
discourse or free indirect style (see Colebrook 2005/2002, pp. 103-23, p. 114), parody evoked through the 
eternal return (of the always different) pp.141-55) and particularly a free indirect discourse as „impersonal 
appropriation‟ [„Discours indirect libre: l‟appropriation impersonnelle ou le travail de la temporalité‟] 
(see Laporte 2005, pp. 157-72) where fabulation stands against fictionalization. 
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How then would a differential desiring practice approach perplexing literary texts? As I 
have shown, it would refute the representational modes of subject, plot and narration. 
Instead it would ground itself in the differential libidinal modes of becoming, event and 
haecceity. In the first instance, since these texts are of an experimental nature, the most 
confounding and obscure elements have to be detected, palpated, that is touched upon. 
Then, themes, or rather intentional strands, can be located, relying not on their 
signification but rather on their insistence in the literary text. Here the differential aspect 
of the proposed desiring practice shows its power by focusing on the Deleuzian notion 
of serialization in the sense of themes or core events re-appearing, re-eventuating in a 
modified (differential, never identical) version. Deleuze (in Proust) and Deleuze-
Guattari (in Kafka) have developed specific ideas on how various types of serialization 
connect by means of transversality and layering associative techniques which will be 
looked at in more detail in the next chapter.  
 
With regard to the reading process as enacting differential desiring practice, the leading 
principle could be a diagrammatic approach which procedes in a cross-related fourfold 
mode, termed by Deleuze-Guattari a form of abstract machine which I explored in 
chapter three. The abstract machine consists of the expressive vectors of content and 
expression which are supported (as well as detracted) by the vectors of „individual‟ and 
collective enunciation. The terms of „content‟ and „expression‟ may seem to be reviving 
interpretative elements of representation. They are meant, however, to evoke with 
respect to content, the material, corporeal instances of the event in its actualization, and 
with respect to expression, to capture the affective, emotive and inter-relational 
instances of the transitional moments of becoming. The supporting (and detracting) 
vectors of enunciation demonstrate the straining of the literary text against the 
established linguistic and imaginative borders which find an approximate description in 
the Deleuzian lexicon. As to be expected, this is in an alien terminology: lines of flight 
or escape, nomadic distribution, childhood-blocks, perversions (not used in the negating 
psychoanalytic but in the affirmative schizoid sense as productive and creative 
bifurcations). Here again the vectors of enunciation are pulling in both directions at 
once, supporting and detracting, in a schizoid paradox. As pointed out before, Deleuze-
Guattari‟s level of abstraction in modeling the diagrammatic four-fold mode of the 
abstract machine strains against (or seems to contain) the fluidity of the processes of 
becoming.     
  
 
 
143 
In order to anchor desiring practice and event, their relations and their modes as 
processes of enactment and actualization within Deleuze‟s shifted image of thought, I 
situate them initially within the context of The logic of sense. The event does not have a 
sense, a meaning, but the event is the sense itself, the sense-making enactment (Deleuze 
2004c, p. 34). The event does take place in language, it is a linguistic event, and more 
specifically, it is in an immediate relation to language. This takes place, however, under 
specific conditions. The event taking place in language, that is the linguistic creation, is 
taking place in the „language of things‟ („le language est ce qui se dit des choses‟) 
(Deleuze ‟Twenty-sixth series of language‟, 2004c, pp. 208-13). The conclusion to be 
drawn is that the sense-making process of the event foregoes metaphoricity, being 
postulated as a process of literality. A further aspect of the event which ties it to 
enactment is that each event proceeds in the mode of actualization („effectuation‟) 
(Deleuze „Twenty-first series of the event‟ Deleuze, 2004c, pp. 169-75). The event 
needs an „embodiment‟, either as a complex change or shift in „milieu‟, „state of affairs‟ 
(„état de choses‟) or in an individuum or a person who becomes the (momentary) 
incarnation of the event. It is this momentary status of the event which prevents fixed 
individuation in the sense of laying claim to the moment of actualization and enactment. 
Something escapes the moment of the present (tense). The „escaped something‟ is held 
in a postulated counter-actualization („contre-effectuation‟) being part of the aïonic time 
register. This double-structure, or folding, of any event captures one of the characteristic 
elements of becoming in that it is momentarily actualized yet not completed, but in a 
way postponed, and thus re-appears in a differential series. The implications for the 
process of literary desiring practice are far-reaching since the enactment or actualization 
of the event happens in language, yet also ‒ if only in a momentary transitional „swerve‟ 
(„clinamen‟) ‒ in the material world. While the actual is conceived as material level, the 
virtual (being its „double‟ or „underside‟) is not conceived in „imaginary‟ terms but as 
material as the actual; in effect it is the aspect of (timely) duration of past-future. The 
fluctuations of these momentary events parallel the appearances of „signs‟, or 
„symptoms‟ carrying desirous impacts, in literary texts such as those of Proust, Kafka 
and Beckett which will be looked at in the next chapter. The postulated momentary 
nature of the event, on the other hand, has implications for rethinking subjectivity and 
the „subject‟ in becoming since the event seems to cancel out any affirmation of 
„agency‟ in the sense of decision-making or recognition. The parameters of the 
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representational mode (identity, analogy, resemblance and recognition) have lost their 
functionality in the Deleuzian understanding of the process of enactment and 
actualization.   
 
As I pointed out, the modality of the practice as desiring or libidinal asks for reasons for 
drawing the events from the virtual into the actual, which I have approached, but also 
inquires into the forces behind the process of actualization of events. This other aspect 
in the enactment of desiring practice is the libidinal force propelling the act of 
becoming. The actualization of desire (which becomes the „content‟) is the process of 
becoming whereby the desiring-machines or assemblages of desire are the instantiations 
of the process. The enactment of desire, or the actualization of the event, is thus desire 
moving through the thresholds of becoming(s). This movement involves shifts in 
intensities, speed and slownesses, and various levels of connectivity which are realized 
in assemblages. Enactment of desiring practice builds on the process of actualization but 
is directed at the continuity of becoming in its various transformations: such as 
becoming-animal, becoming-child, becoming-woman, becoming-molecular. Although 
there seems to be postulated an inherent gradual „refinement‟ of becoming toward the 
infinitesimal, (and also a triad of becoming), more decisive is the level of intensities and 
their reciprocity. Deleuze‟s (and Deleuze-Guattari‟s) projection toward a „dissolution‟, 
becoming-intense, becoming-molecular, becoming-imperceptible, points in the direction 
of the Body without Organs as perfected model of affectivity which I have explored 
earlier. 
 
If the enactment of desiring practice is held within the bounds of the actualization of the 
event and the stages of becoming, where can a remnant of subjectivity be located? In 
Deleuzian terms, haecceities as „pre-individual singularities‟, or „multiplicities‟, have no 
functionalities beside punctual eventuation; they are, to the contrary, treated as 
speculative instantiations rather than effective individuals (Deleuze 2004c, p. 345; 
Deleuze and Guattari 2004a, p. 369n28, p. 387; Deleuze and Guattari 2004b, p. 318 
seq.). 
 
To the question “Who is speaking?”, we answer sometimes with the individual, sometimes with 
the person, and sometimes with the ground which dissolves both. […] No, singularities are not 
imprisioned within individuals and persons; and one does not fall into an undifferentiated 
ground, into groundless depth, when one undoes the individual and the person. The impersonal 
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and pre-individual are the free nomadic singularities. Deeper than any other ground is the surface 
and the skin. A new type of esoteric language is formed here which is its own model and reality. 
Becoming-mad changes shape in its climb to the surface, along the straight line of the Aion, in 
eternity; and the same thing happens to the dissolved self, the cracked I, the lost identity, when 
they cease being buried and begin, on the contrary, to liberate the singularities on the surface. 
Nonsense and sense have done away with their relation of dynamic opposition in order to enter 
into the co-presence of a static genesis – as the nonsense of the surface and the sense which 
hovers over it. The tragic and the ironic give way to a new value, that of humor. For if irony is 
the coextensiveness of being with the individual, or of the I with representation, humor is the 
coextensiveness of sense with nonsense. Humor is the art of the surfaces and of the doubles, of 
nomad singularities and of the always displaced aleatory point; it is the art of the static genesis, 
the savoir-faire of the pure event, and the “fourth person singular” – with every signification, 
denotation, and manifestation suspended, all height and depth abolished („Nineteenth series of 
humor‟, Deleuze 2004c, pp. 159-60).       
 
The release of singularities from their „imprisionment‟ within individuals and persons is 
thus perceived as an act of empowerment, a liberation into the fluidity of the „nomadic‟; 
and with this freeing, the oppositional force of sense and nonsense is overcome. This 
manifests in „humor‟ as the voice of the unconscious. Singularities appear, as they are 
anchored outside the pronominal system (I, you, he, she, it) in the fourth person singular 
(one, they or approximation(s)) which literally instantiates as free indirect style. 
 
Stages of becoming: Desire in action     
 
Having explored the link between different/ciation, time and becoming, my third aim in 
this chapter leads me to a re-appraisal of the process of becoming in its different 
instantiations. These instantiations take the form of the Body without Organs and 
„spider‟s web‟ („toile d‟araignée‟) of affectivity; degrees of hallucinated corporeal 
transformations (for instance, animal-child-woman-molecule) and always different 
literary machines (Proust-machine, Kafka-machine). The range of different 
instantiations of becoming indicates the expanse and malleability of the concept in 
Deleuze and Deleuze-Guattari and its strategic value. There is no single characteristic of 
becoming to be isolated because all processes of becoming are utterly differential, never 
to be repeated. This allows for a renewed notion of „subjectification‟ in the sense of 
shifting from a fixed identity and a substantial embodiment to the process and its 
fluidity. Your own becoming is yours, belongs to you, if only for an infinitesimal 
moment, a thinnest slice of present time. Thinking about becoming then involves 
thinking about the libidinal processes involved in becoming. Becoming is at the very 
centre of desire, of desiring-machines and assemblages of desire. Desire flows through 
the momentarily embodied instantiations and this passing through encompasses its 
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becoming. Becoming is thus a differential term in that it cannot be repeated, but moves 
from difference to difference in an endless chain of becoming. 
 
Becoming does not have a beginning and an end, or a final concluding moment, but 
besides being a continuous process can be grasped in the instances of connectivity when 
assemblages of desire are formed and take place before being instantaneously 
dismantled again for further becoming(s). Becoming conceived under this aspect of 
connectivity is always instantiated in an event-actualization-enactment. Its characteristic 
of being „actualized‟, „realized‟, „performed‟, can be palpated in literary works and thus 
serves as an indicator for becoming(s) taking place. In the case of assemblages of desire, 
the moment of actualization takes place as a meeting of disparate elements which 
impact on each other and change each other, or rather together. Desire can be grasped in 
its outcome, its instantiations in the form of becoming(s). Deleuze-Guattari speak about 
the power of becoming(s) in the encounter of heterogeneous elements and their mutual 
impact as act(s) of deterritorialization which propels both elements in their assemblage 
outside their own position(s). Under the processual aspect of becoming, the connectivity 
plays itself out as a reciprocal if asymmetrical act. The instantiations of becoming, such 
as becoming-animal, becoming-child, becoming-woman, becoming-imperceptible, are 
forms of encounters or assemblages where the threshold of intensity changes, intensity 
here understood as the effect of desire propelled from the unconscious. Within Deleuze-
Guattari‟s fourfold diagrammatic understanding of content-expression and doubled 
enunciation („individual‟ and collective), the vectorial content of becoming can be 
grasped as corporeal metamorphosis and the vectorial expression as shift in intensity. In 
the instance of becoming-spider the (libidinal) dynamism lies in its responsiveness to 
the slightest „vibrations‟ of its „web‟; the level of intensity finds expression in its 
ubiquity of awareness; its preliminary instantiation (as spider) or transitory singularity 
lies in its trapping force and its devouring capacity. In the instance of becoming-wolf 
(not to be confused with a werewolf shape-shifter under the full moon), the libidinal 
force or dynamism lies in its power and its stealth, the intensity in its swiftness and its 
preliminary singularity in its rapaciousness (becoming-teeth and becoming-eye). A 
„hierarchy‟ of progressive stages of becoming can be constructed, ascending (in 
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complexity)
52
 or descending (in molecularization),
53
 for a purely exploratory purpose, 
since this runs counter to Deleuze-Guattari‟s emphasis on degrees of intensification (or 
molecularization) rather than on achieving certain stages of becoming. If I place the 
focus on the shifting thresholds of intensity, becoming can be circumscribed within the 
parameters of changes in intensities, changes in speed and slowness, in the form of 
affective waves and threshold crossings. The question still stands, however, as to how 
these parameters can be detected, or palpated, in literary texts. In their own literary 
practice, as will be seen in the next chapter, Deleuze-Guattari point to a range of 
measures for the detection of intensities such as gaps and blanks to indicate speed and 
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 Cf. Plateau 10: The individual sections 1-13 are set discursively into the form of „memories‟ while the 
sections 14 and 15 discursively turn to sections on becoming: „Becoming is antimemory‟ (p. 324). 
„Memories of a …‟ (1) Moviegoer (pp. 257-8), (2) Naturalist (pp. 258-61), (3) Bergsonian (pp. 261-3), 
(4) Sorcerer I (pp. 264-8), (5) Sorcerer II (pp. 268-74), (6) Sorcerer III (pp. 274-8), (7) Theologian (pp. 
278-80), (8) Spinozist I (pp. 278-83), (9) Spinozist II (pp. 283-97), (10) Haecceity (pp. 287-92), (11) 
Plan(e)Maker (pp. 292-300), (12) Molecule (pp. 300-16), (13) Secret (pp. 316-20) , (14) Memories and 
becomings, points and blocks (pp. 320-9), (15) Becoming-music (pp. 329-41) (Deleuze and Guattari 
2004b, pp. 256-341). Deleuze-Guattari present here in (not necessarily consecutive) stages a genealogy of 
their notion of haecceity, that is a range of modalities of „individuation‟, yet related to stages of 
becoming. The notion of becoming has evolved into multiple (and at times not easily reconciled) 
readings. For early feminist inflections of Deleuze-Guattari‟s proposition of the necessary transition of  
becoming-woman (as condition for any further stages  of becoming), see for instance Braidotti‟s 
extensive work organized around the notion of the nomadic subject and the ethical implications of 
Deleuze‟s notion of becoming: „Embodiment, sexual difference, and the nomadic subject‟ (1993, pp. 1-
13); „Toward a new nomadism: Feminist Deleuzian tracks, or, metaphysics and metabolism‟ (Boundas 
and Olkowski (eds), 1994, pp. 159-86); Metamorphoses: Towards a materialist theory of becoming 
(2002); Transpositions: On nomadic ethics (2006b); „The ethics of becoming-imperceptible‟ (Boundas 
(ed.), 2006a, pp. 133-59). In contrast, for other applications, in accordance with Deleuze-Guattari‟s 
extension of becoming as a processual principle to becoming-book, becoming-thought and other modes, 
see: Olkowski „Flows of desire and the body-becoming‟ (Grosz (ed.), 1999a, pp. 98-116); Casey „The 
time of the glance: Toward becoming otherwise‟ (Grosz (ed.), 1999, pp. 79-97); Kaufman „Klossowski or 
thoughts-becoming‟ (Grosz (ed.), 1999, pp. 141-57); Murphy „Quantum ontology: “A virtual mechanics 
of becoming‟ (Kaufman and Heller (eds), 1998, pp. 211-29); and with special attention to literary style as 
well as sexual difference, Colebrook‟s earlier and more recent work: „A grammar of becoming: Strategy, 
subjectivism, and style‟ (Grosz (ed.), 1999, pp. 117-40); „From radical representations to corporeal 
becomings: The feminist philosophy of Lloyd, Grosz, and Gatens‟ (2001, pp. 76-93); „Is sexual difference 
a problem?‟ (Buchanan and Colebrook (eds), 2000b, pp. 110-27). The processual notions of diagram, 
abstract machine, becoming, the machinic and the dynamic, the virtual and the actual, and other, have 
undergone shifts in critical understanding (and at the mercy of contingency) as demonstrated in the many 
efforts to garner the essential features in vocabularies and dictionaries (Zourabichvili (2003), Sasso and 
Villani (eds) (2004), Parr (ed.) (2010/2005), Stivale (ed.) (2005)). 
53
 Cf. esp. chapter two ‟An exaggerated Oedipus‟ and chapter four „The components of expression‟ 
(Deleuze and Guattari 2006, pp. 9-15 and pp. 28-42): chapter two focuses on Kafka „Letter to the father‟ 
(trans. Kaiser and Wilkins, 1982, pp. 30-75) and Metamorphosis (trans. W and E Muir, 1981, pp. 7-63; 
trans. Hofmann, 2007a, pp. 85-146), a case of re-oedipalization and a mis-firing of becoming-animal. 
Chapter four focuses on Letters to Felice (trans. Stern and Duckworth, Heller and Born (eds), 1999), 
stories: „The judgement‟ (trans. W and E Muir, 1982, pp. 107-117; trans. Hofmann, 2007a, pp. 35-50); „In 
the penal colony‟ (trans. Hofmann, 2007a, pp. 147-80), also as „ In the penal settlement‟ (trans. W and E 
Muir, 1981, pp. 167-99), but also on the „novels‟, The trial (trans. Mitchell, 1998; trans. Parry, 2000b) 
and The castle (trans. W and E  Muir, 1974; trans. Underwood, 2000a) and elaborates a system of 
becoming(s).  
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slownesses in the syntax, shifting forms of assemblages (in doubles, triples and 
multiples) to follow affective networks and compositional changes in serialization.  
The instantiations of the process of becoming, as Body without Organs focusing on 
affectivity and responsiveness or as hallucinated corporeal transformations (animal-
child-woman), actualize a libidinal charge or dynamism while sharing the moment of 
event-actualization-enactment. Since the processes of becoming are outside 
representational scope, to ask for their meaning is misleading, as is assuming any 
familiarization (for instance equating the becoming-animal with becoming (a) 
domesticated animal). Deleuze-Guattari emphasize that what counts in understanding 
becoming(s) is to fathom the complexity of the event and the process of singularization: 
its power of coming about, its dynamism and its intensity. All becoming(s) then lead 
back to the event as their enactment. Transformations, for example into animals 
(wolves, rats, birds in Kafka), into child or woman (the twittering flock of birds-girls on 
the beach in Proust,
54
 Schreber hallucinating breasts on his torso) are to be read neither 
metaphorically nor literally but in the sense of phantasms. It is in this sense of 
simulacral phantasm and its serialization that I shall deploy the stages of becoming in 
texts read through differential desiring practice. Correspondingly, the stages of 
dissolution evoked in becoming-intense, becoming-molecular and becoming-
imperceptible, becoming-the-whole-world, are to be read as forms of contraction or 
crystallization (as the other face of actualization) where the event has been „perfected‟. 
With regard to the process of becoming instantiated as literary machines (Kafka-
machine, Proust-machine, Beckett-machine), Deleuze-Guattari conceive the totality of a 
writer‟s work as the process of moving from one libidinal threshold to the next. In 
Kafka‟s case, this takes the form of personal letters as demonical assemblages of 
becoming(s) to animal-becoming(s) in the stories, to becoming-intense and becoming-
the-whole-world in the „novelistic‟ work, a progressive intensification of visions and 
phantasms which I explore in the next chapter in more detail.  
 
The writing process: A process of experimentation   
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 Cf. Proust, In search of lost time, Part II Within a budding grove (2000, pp. 425-37). „They walked on a 
little way, the stopped for a moment in the middle of the road, oblivious of the fact that they were 
impeding the passage of other people, in an agglomerate that was at once irregular in shape, compact, 
weird and shrill, like an assembly of birds before taking flight; then they resumed their leisurely stroll 
along the esplanade, against the background of the sea‟ (p. 430).  
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Differential desiring practice engages with resistant literary texts, texts which are 
perplexing since they undermine the modes of meaning-making as established in 
representational interpretive practice. Literary texts withdrawing from the 
representational modes of identity, analogy, resemblance and recognition challenge the 
reader and critic to rethink the function of literary texts. Alternative writing and reading 
practices such as post-structuralist and deconstructive approaches offer different 
strategies: locating lacunae and contradictions in the textual fabric and in the case of 
deconstruction using strategic „différance‟ to refuse the text‟s original integrity. The 
most important shift in post-structuralist and deconstructive writing and reading 
practices lies in the move away from the notion of „text‟ and „textuality‟ as a coherent 
totality toward the activities of writing and reading as „interpretive‟ processes. Desiring 
practice as enactment or actualization of event(s) is also characterized by this move 
away from the substantial mode of the completed „product‟ to the processual mode of 
never achievable completion, to the continuity and perpetual recommencement of 
„production‟. Conceived in the Deleuzian frame of thought, differential desiring practice 
can only ever happen as transitional enactment directed at, or rather projected toward, 
„states‟ of becoming in their fluidity. This means that the writing and reading practice 
must not propose or expect ready-made characters and subjects with whom enjoyable 
and flattering identification(s) can be achieved. Rather its focus, for instance, on 
assemblages of desire invites „fabulation‟. Since differential desiring practice concerns 
transitional enactments as becoming(s), it also imposes a compositional framework 
which captures the libidinal eruptions in the „textual‟ fabric, rather than working 
towards the thematic completion of plot and narrative. The writing and reading process 
becomes a process of experimentation in the sense that associative techniques such as 
„transversality‟ and „vertical streaming‟ replace the modular techniques of 
representational, mimetic textuality. Thus enacting desiring practice anchored in the 
Deleuzian frame of thought demands an un-learning of identificatory structures in 
literary texts, a resistance against the demand of „finished‟ (or ‟finishing‟) characters 
and a re-thinking of the productive void of „phantasm‟ and „simulacrum‟.  
 
How then can a differential desiring practice be situated within the spectrum of 
contemporary literary practices? Since it leaves any concern with textuality behind, 
structuralist intentions to follow patterns and their codifications, in the Barthesian sense, 
do not seem to be helpful in situating desiring practice, although the initial Deleuzian 
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literary practices, as evidenced in his early versions of Proustian analysis, lean towards 
semiotics as study of signs and can be related to Deleuzian symptomatology. If post-
structuralist experimental writing and reading techniques are considered in their 
tendencies to deal with literary „surfaces‟, some elements of Deleuzian literary practices 
can be related such as the emphasis on simulacral and serial play. The use of 
experimental forms, the denial of order and in particular the tendency towards 
fragmentation in postmodern writing practices and nouveau roman
55
 also invite 
comparisons with the discursive strategies (schizodicity) and textual techniques 
(assemblages of desire) of differential desiring practice and its enactment. The main 
difference and break-away point lies in the libidinal propulsion toward becoming. If on 
occasion surrealist techniques such as expressing the liberated imagination come to 
mind in enacting desiring practice, the textual realization of surrealist texts tends toward 
dreamscapes conceived in the Freudian sense as condensation and displacement 
(metaphoric and metonymic processes). These interpretive techniques rather belong to 
psychoanalytic literary practices, not to schizoid and even less to differential desiring 
practices as I envisage them. A relationship to romanticism in its anarchic elements 
could be constructed as Deleuze-Guattari often point to the literary techniques of Kleist 
and Hölderlin as representatives of German romanticism.
56
 However, in my view it is 
not so much techniques such as irregularity and abandonment of composition which 
intrigue Deleuze-Guattari as the processes of becoming-intense and in particular the 
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 Sarraute, Robbe-Grillet, Truffaut, Butor, Simon represent the French nouveau roman; Pynchon as a 
postmodernist (in some critics‟ view). 
56
 Kleist with his tragedy Penthesilea figures prominently in A thousand plateaus, in „Plateau 1: 
Introduction: Rhizome‟ (Deleuze and Guattari 2004b, pp. 3-28), in „Plateau 10: 1730: Becoming-intense, 
becoming-animal, becoming-imperceptible…‟ (Deleuze and Guattari 2004b, pp. 256-341) and, in 
particular, in „Plateau 12: 1227: Treatise on nomadology: The war machine‟ (Deleuze and Guattari 
2004b, pp. 387-467). „Kleist and a mad war machine, Kafka and a most extraordinary bureaucratic 
machine‟ (Deleuze and Guattari 2004b, p. 5) and „Kleist and Kafka against Goethe‟ (Deleuze and 
Guattari 2004b, p. 27) are two examples of rhizomatic writing. In „Memories of a plan(e) maker‟ 
(Deleuze and Guattari 2004b, pp. 292-300), Hölderlin, Kleist and Nietzsche figure as makers of planes of 
consistency or composition (Deleuze and Guattari 2004b, pp. 295-7). In Kleist, „[n]o form develops, no 
subject forms; affects are displaced, becomings catapult forward and combine into blocks, like the 
becoming-woman of Achilles and the becoming-dog of Penthesilea. [...] It is odd how Goethe and Hegel 
hated this new kind of writing‟ (Deleuze and Guattari 2004b, p. 296). Haecceities (not subjects), events 
(not evolution) make up Kleist‟s writing. His tragedy of Achilles and the Amazon queen Penthesilea is set 
as an example of (already ruinous) state and war machine (Deleuze and Guattari 2004b, pp. 391-3). „He 
[Kleist] presents us with a becoming-weapon of the technical element simultaneously to a becoming-
affect of the passional element (the Penthesilea equation)‟ (Deleuze and Guattari 2004b, p. 441). Kleist 
embodies for Deleuze-Guattari the cultural (and emotional) counter-current: „the Gemüt that refuses to be 
controlled, that forms a war machine‟ (referring to Kleist‟s „On the gradual formation of ideas in speech‟, 
„Über die allmähliche Verfertigung der Gedanken beim Reden‟) (Deleuze and Guattari 2004b, pp. 417-8). 
At other instances they also refer to Kleist‟s essay on the marionette (or puppet) theatre where dance and 
dancer are inseparably fused. 
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detection of „caesurae‟ in the textual fabric of these writers. Caesurae, cuts or scissions, 
as well as paradoxical inclusive disjunctions (either and or), point to the enactment and 
actualization of events and momentary halting, and doubling, of time as in-between-
time („entre-temps‟), floating or indefinite time („temps flottant‟, Deleuze and Parnet 
2002, p. 111) which circumscribes in Deleuzian terms the punctual but ephemeral 
instant of haecceity or „individuation‟.          
 
Some elements of stream-of-consciousness invite support for differential desiring 
practice in that such a literary writing and reading technique encompasses all levels of 
sensibility from the pre-speech level to articulated expression and also opens space for 
the upsurge of unmotivated and irrational, illogical and paradoxical expression. The 
shifting inclusion of all levels of awareness, feelings, sensations, associations, 
memories, reflections, thoughts and their combinations, is part of the textual fabric in 
stream-of-consciousness. Their blended levels also emulate the process of 
consciousness as a perpetual flow in shifting, disjointed modes and particularly in a 
display of interferences. Their modes of expression are comparable, but where this 
literary technique parts with enactment of desiring practice is that stream-of-
consciousness generally stands in for, or is meant to evoke, one particular subject‟s full 
range of consciousness while in the Deleuzian frame of thought such an anchor is 
circumvented with the focus shifting to the process of becoming. In shifting focus away 
from the link to representation and identification, Deleuze severs the idea of 
consciousness as centre of awareness and expression in representational imagery. 
Although the irregularities and even the intensities of the flow in stream-of-
consciousness techniques can be paralleled to the writing and reading strategies of 
differential desiring practice, in the Deleuzian frame of thought it is the force of 
anoedipal unconscious which propels flow and libidinal eruptions, cutting out 
identification and recognition as part of literary practice. What sets differential desiring 
practice apart, even in the case of multiple and joining stream-of-consciousnesses (in 
the cases of Joyce, Faulkner and Woolf) reflecting one or more characters in unison, is 
that it defies using imagery as metaphorical level of expression (capturing the myriads 
of aspects of the flow) and for the purpose of presentation(s) of characters with their 
defined individuality. This becomes obvious in Deleuze‟s second and third revision of 
his original semiotic take on Proust‟s work, where it is not the flow of memory recalled 
by association which intrigues Deleuze, nor the connection of metaphoric levels, which 
  
 
 
152 
would force the reading of the work back into the representational interpretative mode. 
Instead Deleuze‟s focus is on the over-arching process of becoming-writer (in Marcel) 
which progressively unravels, thus shifting from a reading of character(s) and narration 
to an exploration of differential processes in the sense of time and becoming. I return in 
the next chapter to a more detailed consideration of how Deleuze‟s (shifting) practices 
in his reading of Proust help develop my own differential desiring practices. 
 
Phantasm and simulacrum    
 
Earlier on I discussed Deleuze‟s proposition to replace a regime of „organic 
representation‟ (Deleuze 2004b, pp. 43-4) with a system of „orgiastic representation‟ 
(Deleuze 2004b, pp. 52-4) within the frame of differential aspects of desiring practice 
(event-haecceity-becoming). I singled out two points impacting on the enactment of 
desiring practice under examination: the shift from static, organic representation to 
orgiastic representation as „experience‟ (Deleuze 2004b, p. 68) and, as a consequence of 
overturning Platonism (Deleuze 2004b, pp. 71 seq.), the postulate of parodic simulacra 
(Deleuze 2004b, pp. 80-3) sustaining orgiastic representation.
57
 Turning to the first 
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 Deleuze proposes the disparate as measure of the simulacra. What is here called the disparate (le 
dispars) I term (taking into account the schizoanalytic) schizodicity. Deleuze concludes chapter I 
„Difference in itself‟ with an outline of how the abandonment of representation leads to new artistic 
principles: „The sophist is not the being (or the non-being) of contradiction, but the one who raises 
everything to the level of simulacra and maintains them in that state. Plato should push irony to that point 
– to parody? Was it not inevitable that Plato should be the first to overturn Platonism, or at least to show 
the direction such an overturning should take? We are reminded of the grand finale of The Sophist: 
difference is displaced, division turns back against itself and begins to function in reverse, and, as a result 
of being applied to simulacra themselves (dreams, shadows, reflections, paintings), shows the 
impossibility of distinguishing them from originals or from models. The Eleatic Stranger gives a 
definition of the sophist such that he can no longer be distinguished from Socrates himself: the ironic 
imitator who proceeds by brief arguments (questions and problems). Each moment of difference must 
then find its true figure: selection, repetition, ungrounding, the question-problem complex. […] We have 
contrasted representation with a different kind of formation. The elementary concepts of representation 
are the categories defined as the conditions of possible experience. These, however, are too general or too 
large for the real. The net is so loose that the largest fish pass through. No wonder, then, that aesthetics 
should be divided into two irreducible domains: that of the theory of the sensible which captures only the 
real‟s conformity with the possible experience; and that of the theory of the beautiful, which deals with 
the reality of the real in so far as it is thought. Everything changes once we determine the conditions of 
real experience, which are not larger than the conditioned and which differ in kind from the categories: 
the two senses of the aesthetic become one, to the point where the being of the sensible reveals itself in 
the work of art, while at the same time the work of art appears as experimentation. The fault of 
representation lies in not going beyond the form of identity, in relation to both the object seen and the 
seeing subject. Identity is no less conserved in each component representation than in the whole of 
infinite representation as such. Infinite representation may well multiply points of view and organise these 
in series; these series are no less subject to the condition of converging upon the same object, upon the 
same world. Infinite representation may well multiply figures and moments and organise these into circles 
endowed with self-movement; these circles no less turn around a single centre which is that of the great 
circle of consciousness. By contrast, when the modern work of art develops its permutating series and its 
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point, the experiential is here understood as empirical but, as Deleuze emphasizes, with 
an opening to the sensible. The work of art shifts from representing the „resemblance of 
the object to perception‟ (Deleuze 2004b, p. 37) to „experience‟ (Deleuze 2004b, p. 68), 
as a direct apprehension of the sensible, „that which can only be sensed, the very being 
of the sensible‟ (Deleuze 2004b, p. 68). Here Deleuze opens the door to „potential 
difference and difference in intensity‟ (Deleuze 2004b, p. 68). The experiential, 
orgiastic aesthetics of the sensible, as a superior empiricism, does not limit itself to 
„what can be represented‟ (Deleuze 2004b, p. 68), as identical, analogous, predicative, 
and especially perceptually resembling, but reaches out to the (always repeated yet) 
different, the unlimited, the non-coherent, the disparate. Thus the differential „orders‟ of 
„nomadic distributions, crowned anarchies‟ (Deleuze 2004b, p. 69), serialization and 
proliferation of series, offer a changed set of artistic criteria for creating, writing and 
reading texts. 
 
Turning now to the second point impacting on the enactment of desiring practice under 
examination, postulating the regime of simulacra as a consequence of the eternal return 
in the system of difference and repetition, the changed set of artistic criteria can be 
further refined. The simulacral drawing on Deleuze‟s notions of the unlimited virtual 
and its (always partial but complete) complement, the actual, can be viewed as a 
parameter of the actualization of the event which is the initial instantiation of becoming 
triggering off the creative act of writing. Since in Deleuzian understanding the event 
supersedes a separation of chronological and aïonic registers of time, the simulacral can 
                                                                                                                                               
circular structures, it indicates to philosophy a path leading to the abandonment of representation. It is not 
enough to multiply perspectives in order to establish perspectivism. To every perspective or point of view 
there must correspond an autonomous work with its own self-sufficient sense: what matters is the 
divergence of series, the decentring of circles, “monstrosity”. The totality of circles and series is thus a 
formless ungrounded chaos which has no law other than its own repetition, its own reproduction in the 
development of that which diverges and decentres. We know how these conditions are already satisfied in 
such works as Mallarmé‟s Book or Joyce‟s Finnegans wake: these are by nature problematic works. The 
identity of the object read really dissolves into divergent series defined by esoteric words, just as the 
identity of the reading subject is dissolved into the decentred circles of possible multiple readings. 
Nothing, however, is lost; each series exists only by virtue of the return of the others. Everything has 
become simulacrum, for by simulacrum we should not understand a simple imitation but rather the act by 
which the very idea of a model or a privileged position is challenged and overturned. The simulacrum is 
the instance which includes a difference within itself, such as (at least) two divergent series on which it 
plays, all resemblance abolished so that one can no longer point to the existence of an original and a copy. 
It is in this direction that we must look for the conditions, not of possible experience, but of real 
experience (selection, repetition, etc.). It is here that we find the lived reality of a sub-representative 
domain. If it is true that representation has identity as its element and similarity as its unit of measure, 
then pure presence such as it appears in the simulacrum has the “disparate” as its unit of measure – in 
other words, always a difference of difference as its immediate element‟ (2004b, pp. 81-3). Deleuze refers 
to Eco The open work (trans. Cancogni, 1989, chapters one and six). 
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be situated beyond a timeframe. In particular, as a further refinement of artistic criteria, 
the simulacral under the differential regime is parodic, shaping style and expression as 
well as the composition of literary works. The simulacrum is thus the fitting literary 
instantiation of Deleuze‟s differential approach and it will be in my Deleuze inspired 
differential desiring practice. The simulacrum‟s characteristics as parodic and 
performative, dissimilar and dissimulating, divergent and decentred, groundless and 
ungrounded, serialized and proliferating, and thus tending to excess, provocation and 
monstrosity, lend themselves to the schizoid mode of enacting desiring practice.  
     
There is in Deleuze‟s understanding no strict line of discrimination between simulacrum 
and phantasm, taking Difference and repetition and The logic of sense as a measure.
58
 
Rather, there is a sense of gliding between an epistemological aspect (simulacrum, 
situated in ancient philosophy, in particular Lucretius and Epicurus) and a creative 
aspect (phantasm, situated in modern literature, in particular Klossowski
59
 and 
Tournier
60
). Deleuze develops an intriguing if speculative notion of the simulacrum-
phantasm which impacts on my examination of differential desiring practice. I follow 
here some of the traits to be taken up later in more detail. 
 
First to be examined are the „Twenty-third series of the aion‟ (Deleuze 2004c, pp. 186-
93) and the „Thirtieth series of the phantasm‟ (Deleuze 2004c, pp. 241-9) before I turn 
to the appendices on simulacrum and phantasm in The logic of sense since they 
introduce decisive aspects of the simulacrum. Although couched in an ironic discourse 
on Greek mythos, on Chronos, Zeus, Saturn, Hercules, and Aion, Deleuze develops a 
philosophical scheme (or in his terms a plane of consistency or plane of immanence) of 
time, event, sense and sense-event, actualization and becoming whose discursive centre 
is the „becoming-mad of depths‟ (Deleuze 2004c, p. 187, p. 188) and which sparks off a 
chain reaction in bodies: „Bodies have lost their measure and are now but simulacra‟ 
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 The appendices to The Logic of Sense, I „The simulacrum and ancient philosophy‟ and II „Phantasm 
and modern literature‟ could support such a proposition. However, the annotations can be at times read in 
a different sense, for instance Deleuze points to Blanchot‟s description (Le rire des dieux (1965)) of an 
„eternal scintillation, where the absence of origin, in the splendour of diversion and reversion, is 
dispersed‟ (Deleuze 2004c, note 8, p. 318). Visual simulacra are accorded by Epicurus greater velocity 
than deep emanations such as noises since they detach themselves from the surface (note 34, p. 319); 
simulacra and atoms are „as swift as thought‟ (note 35, p. 319). Lucretius claims two coexisting elements 
– the mobility of the phantasms and the permanence of the celestial order (note 37, p. 319).    
59
 Klossowski Roberte ce soir, La révocation de l‟Edit de Nantes, Le souffleur, Les lois de l‟hospitalité, 
Le bain de Diane, Un si funeste désir, Le Baphomet.  
60
 Tournier Vendredi ou les limbes de Pacifique, Friday or the limbs of the Pacific.Cf. Bogue‟s reading.  
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(Deleuze 2004c, p. 187). The next step leads to a new orientation: „in the case of Aion, 
the becoming-mad of the depth was climbing to the surface, the simulacra in turn were 
becoming phantasms, the deep break was showing as a crack in the surface‟ (Deleuze 
2004c, p. 188). „Between the two becomings, of surface and depth, we can no longer 
say that they have in common the sidestepping of the present‟ (Deleuze 2004c, p. 198). 
While so far time and event and becoming played out their relations, it is now that 
sense, sense-event and language step in. „It is this new world of incorporeal effects or 
surface effects which makes language possible‟ (Deleuze 2004c, p. 189). 
 
The relation between event and language is the act of creation, of enacting desiring 
practice. „Pure events ground language because they wait for it as much as they wait for 
us, and have a pure, singular, impersonal, and pre-individual existence only inside the 
language which expresses them‟ (Deleuze 2004c, p. 189). The becoming-mad of the 
depths, the ensuing fusion of the phantasms of the depth and the simulacra of the 
surface are grounded in the pure, singular, impersonal, pre-individual unconscious. How 
does the surface organization proceed? The paradoxical instance, the aleatory point, the 
quasi-cause sets the starting point; the instant (atopos, without a place) extracts 
singularities in a pure event (which is the creative act); two series respond to each other 
by means of the aleatory (random) point (Deleuze 2004c, p. 190), bringing about 
(actualizing) „sense and event‟ (which are the same) and thus the „entire organization of 
the sense-event‟ (Deleuze 2004c, p. 191). Further, to bring the act of creation (which is 
never fully completed) to a „preliminary end‟ or halt, the „event implies something 
excessive in relation to its actualization‟ (Deleuze 2004c, p. 191) and this „excessive in 
the event‟ waits for its accomplishment (in the return). Deleuze then presents here an 
aesthetics of creation, of enactment, of actualization, which is removed from 
representational or mimetic theories and in turn provides the inspiration for my own 
differential desiring practice. At the same time Deleuze brings an innovative notion of 
an (anoedipal) unconscious into play in proposing that the rising phantasms turn into 
simulacra, that these simulacra trace the „frontier between bodies and language‟ 
(Deleuze 2004c, p. 190) and are (in measures and preliminarily) „caught‟ in language 
and expression, in a „sense-event‟, a literary work. I extract from this speculative but 
inspiring proposition the relations between simulacra and phantasms and their creative 
deployment in literary texts which differential desiring practice can emulate in its 
processes of reading. 
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In the „Thirteenth series of the phantasm‟ Deleuze develops a theory of surface and 
depth, of simulacrum and phantasm, of becoming in contradistinction to the 
psychoanalytic scheme of id and ego. Nor does it fully correspond to the aïonic 
proposition (as to be expected). It does however introduce the phantasm as a schizoid 
structure. The phantasm has three main characteristics. The first characteristic of the 
phantasm is directed towards the relations between phantasm and event and the role of 
affectivity in their connection. „It (the phantasm) represents neither an action nor a 
passion, but a result of action and passion, that is, a pure event‟ (Deleuze 2004c, p. 
241). This I read as presenting the phantasm as an affective event which propels desire. 
„The phantasm, like the event which it represents, is a “noematic attribute” […] It 
belongs as such to an ideational surface over which it is produced as an effect. […] This 
is why the phantasm-event is submitted to a double causality, referring to the external 
and internal causes whose result in depth it is‟ (Deleuze 2004c, pp. 241-2). This I read 
as presenting the phantasm as encapsulating the event, doubling it, in both directions, 
towards the inside and the outside. These characteristics, being impassionate, inactive, 
noematic („experiential‟), ideational, make the phantasm a cold, impassible instant of 
„unbearable waiting‟ (Deleuze 2004c, p. 242). The Oedipus complex, in Deleuze‟s 
understanding, represents a perfect example of phantasm. 
 
The second characteristic of the phantasm is directed towards explaining its libidinal 
charge. The phantasm functions as a position for the ego which opens to the surface and 
merges with the event of the phantasm; the ego is neutralized, symbolized and 
sublimated (Deleuze 2004c, p. 244). The third characteristic of the phantasm is directed 
towards the relation of event and becoming as the movement the phantasm enacts. The 
phantasm is inseparable from the infinitive mode of the verb (the pure, undetermined 
infinitive) and thus a witness to the pure event (Deleuze 2004c, pp. 244-5). Since „[T]he 
phantasm is a surface phenomenon‟, Deleuze decides to use „simulacrum‟ to designate 
the objects of depth and correspondingly becoming and reversal as characteristic of the 
simulacrum (Deleuze 2004c, p. 247). 
 
In summary, then, the Freudian id corresponds to the simulacrum as object of depth 
with becoming (and reversal), the Freudian ego corresponds to the phantasm (or image) 
as partial corporeal surfaces and their (phallic) coordination and the Freudian super-ego 
(or idol) corresponds to objects of height and its adventures, a point which is here not 
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explored. This theory which is developed in parallel with the Freudian notions is not in 
agreement with the theory based on the stoic model of depth and surfaces but clarifies 
the position of the Oedipus and its biased stance with regard to the unconscious. 
 
Turning now to the appendices to The logic of sense dealing with ancient simulacrum 
and modern phantasm,
61
 a different philosophical scheme evolves. I cannot enter into 
detailed discussion of the Platonic version of the simulacrum as mirage, counterfeit, and 
false pretender (dissimilar, perverted, deviant), which makes it suspect and expendable 
(cast out of the city). Deleuze comments on another distinction, between copies-icons 
and simulacra-phantasms (Deleuze 2004c, p. 294) which clarifies the difference: copies 
are well-founded, „good images‟, guaranteeing resemblance, while simulacra are 
dissimilar and thus liable, lacking resemblance. In this manner, Deleuze can now, in a 
turnaround from his own philosophy of difference, set up a positive characterization of 
the simulacrum: „The simulacrum is built upon a disparity or upon a difference. It 
internalizes a dissimilarity‟ (Deleuze 2004c, p. 295). 
 
Representation stands against a-representation, resemblance against disparity; two 
different aesthetic schemes are standing against each other. Deleuze often expresses his 
discomfort with the aesthetic indecisiveness which ensues from this internal duplicity. 
 
Aesthetics suffers from a wrenching duality. On one hand, it designates the theory of sensibility 
as the form of possible experience; on the other hand, it designates the theory of art as the 
reflection of real experience. For these two meanings to be tied together, the conditions of 
experience in general must become conditions of real experience; in this case, the work of art 
would really appear as experimentation. We know, for example, that certain literary procedures 
[…] permit several stories to be told at once. […] [A] chaos perpetually thrown off center which 
becomes the Great Work. This unformed chaos, the great letter of Finnegans Wake, is not just 
any chaos: […] Between these basic series, a sort of internal resonance is produced; and this 
resonance induces a forced movement, which goes beyond the series themselves. These are the 
characteristics of the simulacrum, when it breaks its chains and rises to the surface: it then 
affirms the phantasmatic power, that is, its repressed power. […] The affective charge associated 
with the phantasm is explained by the internal resonance whose bearers are the simulacra. […] 
Thus the conditions of real experience and the structures of the work of art are reunited: 
divergence of series, decentering of circles, constitution of the chaos which envelops them, 
internal resonance and movement of amplitude, aggression of the simulacra (Deleuze 2004c, pp. 
297-8).    
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 I „The simulacrum and ancient philosophy‟: (1) „Plato and the simulacrum‟, (2) „Lucretius and the 
simulacrum‟ (Deleuze 2004c, pp. 291-320). II Phantasm and modern literature‟: (3) Klossowski or 
bodies-language‟, (4) „Michel Tournier and the world without others‟, (5) „Zola and the crack-up‟ (pp. 
321-74).  
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Deleuze thus contrasts two different types of aesthetics corresponding to a world of 
copies or representations and a world of simulacra for which the world itself is a 
phantasm (Deleuze 2004c, p. 299). Some parameters and „literary procedures‟ for a 
work of art as experimentation are projected whereby the decentering forces are 
„balanced‟ or rather „reviewed‟ by means of differential criteria. The multiple and often 
contravening strands of „stories‟ introduce „unformed chaos‟, yet a network of „internal 
resonances‟ between the parallel stories, which are now conceived as „series‟, 
introduces a „forced movement‟ which overarches the communicating series. The 
descriptors, series, internal resonances and forced movement are the „characteristics of 
the simulacrum‟. The simulacra as the „bearers‟ of the internal resonance break the 
chains of repression, thus rising to the surface. Once risen, the simulacra affirm their 
„phantasmatic („repressed‟) power‟, that is, their libidinal charge (or in Freudian terms, 
their „cathectic‟, affective charge).62 Read in the context of Deleuze‟s rewriting of the 
unconscious, the forced movements induced by the resonances between the series point 
to the libidinal charges of the liberated, anoedipal, molecular unconscious. The 
resonances which induce the liberating movements point to the serialized repetition of 
events while the phantasm (conceived as a totality) integrates the imaginary power of 
the simulacra (conceived as the phantasmagoric „images‟). 
 
In this differential simulacral reading practice of a „Great Work‟ of art (exemplified 
here by Joyce‟s Finnegans wake) which moves beyond the representational regime, the 
tenor of violence is noteworthy: breaking chains, affirming its repressed power, forced 
movement, which is confirmed in speaking of the „aggression of the simulacra‟. The 
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 I have explored earlier (in chapters one and two) how Deleuze-Guattari and Deleuze engage with the 
Freudian libidinal concepts of cathexis and anti-cathexis. Laplanche and Pontalis point out that Freud was 
unhappy with J Strachey‟s coinage cathexis since he disliked technical terms (2006, note, p. 65). The 
German term Besetzung is better conveyed with „investment‟. While the early Freudian economic 
concepts (for instance, „quota of affect‟ as the „amount of psychical energy‟ or the „sum of excitation‟) 
are anchored in neurological ideas, these hypotheses about the functioning of the unconscious system are 
transferred to The interpretation of dreams and then later into the second theory of the psychical 
apparatus. Laplanche and Pontalis state that „such an expression as „libidinal cathexis‟ means cathexis by 
the energy of the sexual instincts. In the second theory of the psychical apparatus, it is the id, as the 
instinctual pole of the personality, which is seen as the origin of all cathexes, and the other agencies draw 
their energy from this primary source‟ (2006, p. 63). In contrast, anti-cathexis underpins the defensive 
activities of the ego (or repression). „The notion of anticathexis is mainly utilised by Freud in the context 
of his economic theory of repression. In so far as the ideas to be repressed are permanently cathected by 
the instinct and constantly seeking to break through into consciousness, they can only be kept in the 
unconscious if an equally constant force is operating in the opposite direction‟ (Laplanche and Pontalis 
2006, pp. 36-7). The two main Freudian texts which encompass the shifts in his understanding are The 
interpretation of dreams, parts 1-2 and Beyond the pleasure principle. 
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motivation behind it is to align, „reunite‟, aesthetics as a theory of sensibility with „real 
experience‟ and (in an understanding of immanent processes) to constitute the chaos 
within the work of art while being aware that the chaos envelops it. Although series, 
circles, resonances and movements are established, simultaneously these „structuring‟ 
devices are given to dissolution: the series undergo divergence(s), the circles are 
decentered, the resonances „fire‟ the forced movements, further dispersing the series. 
The work of art as experimentation thus deals with „unformed chaos‟ which „is not just 
any chaos‟ since there is great immanent order. „The form of time is there only for the 
revelation of the formless in the eternal return. The extreme formality is there only for 
an excessive formlessness (Hölderlin‟s Unförmliche). In this manner, the ground has 
been superseded by a groundlessness, a universal ungrounding which turns upon itself 
and causes only the yet-to-come to return‟ (Deleuze 2004b, p. 114).63 Deleuze often 
expresses this paradoxical immanent principle in relating the three syntheses of time to 
the three syntheses of the unconscious, „formlessness‟ to groundlessness and 
ungrounding, and proposing that the overarching principle is that of the world being 
held in the precarious balance of the eternal return of the already-been. 
                                                 
63
 Hölderlin‟s Unförmliche (untranslatable) can be circumscribed as a notion of the formless viewed in 
terms not of form or un-form but of affect. In another context, Deleuze-Guattari state: „how the 
succession of the seasons and the superposition of the same season from different years dissolves forms 
and persons and gives rise to movements, speeds, delays, and affects, as if as the narrative progressed 
something were escaping from an impalpable matter‟ (Plateau 10, Deleuze and Guattari 2004b, p. 295). 
Deleuze-Guattari put the emphasis on the relational modes („movements, speeds, delays, and affects‟), not 
on (ephemeral) individuation and (preliminarily perceived) „forms‟. In Difference and repetition Deleuze 
speaks of death-inspiring language (as presented by Roussel and Péguy) and artistic principles delineated 
from repetition (as understood in the eternal return). „Raymond Roussel and Charles Péguy were the great 
repeaters of literature, able to lift the pathological power of language to a higher artistic level. Roussel 
takes ambiguous words or homonyms and fills the entire distance between their meanings with a story 
presented twice and with objects themselves doubled. He thereby overcomes homonymity on its own 
ground and inscribes the maximum difference within repetition, where this is the space opened in the 
heart of a word. This space is still presented by Roussel as one of the masks and death, in which is 
developed both a repetition which enchains and and a repetition which saves – which saves above all 
from the one which enchains. Roussel creates an after-language where once everything has been said, 
everything is repeated and recommenced. […] [Deleuze draws on Foucault Death and the labyrinth: The 
world of Raymond Roussel (1987, p. 24; pp. 45-6) and Butor, an author of nouveau roman „novels‟, 
commenting on Roussel]. Péguy‟s technique is very different: it substitutes repetition not for homonymity 
but for synonymity; it concerns what linguists call the function of contiguity rather than that of similarity; 
it forms a before-language, an auroral language in which the step-by-step creation of internal space within 
words proceeds by tiny differences.  […] Both Péguy and Roussel take language to one of its limits; in 
the case of Roussel, that of similarity and selection, the “distinctive feature” between billard and pillard; 
in the case of Péguy, that of contiguity or combination, the famous tapestry points. Both substitute a 
vertical repetition of distinctive points, which takes us inside the words, for the horizontal repetition of 
ordinary words repeated. Both substitute a positive repetition, one which flows from the excess of a 
linguistic and stylistic Idea, for a repetition by default which results from the inadequacy of nominal 
concepts or verbal representations. How does death inspire language, given that it is always present when 
repetition is affirmed?‟ (2004b, pp. 24-5). Deleuze alludes to Lacan‟s „points de capiton‟, quilting points 
where „meaning‟ is (peremptorily) drawn together, also comparable to the Deleuzian notion of dark 
precursors. 
  
 
 
160 
Overall, this chapter, then, marks my repositioning of my project from the 
schizoanalytic, libidinal and symptomatological strands to the differential strand of 
schizodicity. Other differential aspects of desiring practice such as event, haecceity and 
becoming have been explored allowing a questioning of representation by focusing on 
the Deleuzian processes of enactment and actualization. I thus set up a Deleuzian frame 
for my project of a differential desiring practice which I shall develop in the next 
chapter in that I align the stages of becoming as desire in action with the writing process 
as a process of experimentation.   
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Chapter five: Engaging with literary analysis in Deleuze and Deleuze-   
Guattari 
 
In the previous chapter I developed the notion of a Deleuze inspired literary discourse, 
by focusing on Deleuze‟s critique of representation in Difference and repetition and The 
logic of sense. The concern of this chapter is to test the premises I infer from Deleuze-
Guattari‟s and Deleuze‟s literary treatises, and to consider the potential of literary 
machines. To do this, I re-visit my earlier take on their treatise on Kafka (chapter three) 
‒ now within the reset hermeneutic frame of the differential and the libidinal ‒ and 
explore Deleuze‟s treatise on Proust in its several evolving instantiations, reaching from 
the semiological to the symptomatological. I further explore the frame of the 
symptomatology of the critical-clinical through an engagement with Deleuze‟s 
commentaries on Beckett and his treatise on masochism. In the section on Kafka I also 
revisit and rethink points of my earlier Freudian critique (chapter two) with regard to the 
process of oedipalization as well as in the section on Proust and on Masoch with regard 
to Deleuze‟s notion of the three libidinal machines (of impulses, Eros and Thanatos in 
Difference and repetition). Thus while chapter four set up the theoretical frame of my 
project of differential desiring practice, chapter five mounts further parameters for 
specific schizoid processes. In this way Deleuze‟s and Deleuze-Guattari‟s philosophical 
and literary considerations are complemented with processual and discursive 
parameters.
1
 This chapter, then, approaches the extraction of literary techniques of 
desiring practice from two angles. First I extend the speculative-philosophical 
viewpoint, as presented in Anti-Oedipus, A thousand plateaus and Essays critical and 
clinical (taken up in chapters two and three) and second I explicate the literary-critical 
angle of differential desiring practice, its characteristics being intensities, a-
metaphoricity, the simulacral, the dynamic principle, and the (abstract) literary machine.  
I re-examine the notion of a Kafka-machine and the literary machine of 
symptomatology within the critical-clinical. I further test my premises in the context of 
                                                 
1
 In directing  my attention to Deleuze and Deleuze-Guattari‟s engagement with literary practice, I focus 
particularly on longer essays and independent treatises on Kafka by Deleuze-Guattari, on Masoch, Proust 
and Beckett by Deleuze although literary commentaries sustain all their writing to a remarkable degree 
which cannot be followed in the frame of the thesis. While Deleuze‟s and Deleuze-Guattari‟s extensive 
and widely dispersed commentaries on a large variety of writers from eighteenth century romanticism 
(Hölderlin, Kleist) through to twentieth century modernist writers (Joyce, Woolf) point to their interest in 
shared literary practices such as experimental style and transgressive expression, any distinct criteria for a 
Deleuzian literary practice, or even an outline of a Deleuzian literary theory, have so far not eventuated. 
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Deleuze-Guattari‟s reading of Kafka as minor (or minoritarian) literature, of Deleuze‟s 
reading of Proust as a complex and multi-layered system of signs, assemblages and 
sensation(s), of Beckett as critical-clinical symptomatology and of Masoch with a 
different sexualized emphasis.  
 
The aims of the chapter 
 
Since Deleuze and Deleuze-Guattari devote a special place to literary exemplification in 
their work, it establishes a literary sub-text which functions as an ad hoc enactment of 
their philosophical attitude in that their thought processes receive immediate literary (or 
artistic) instantiations. Although I attend to this intriguing double-layering in their work, 
it cannot be fully explored within the frame of this chapter where my focus stays on the 
specific literary essays and treatises which, despite their different methodologies, are 
inter-related and cross-referenced. I would suggest, however, that this inter-relatedness 
points to a core of shared principles based in their philosophical and social-political 
vision of the schizoanalytic machine. In chapter three this took the form of the schizoid 
constellation as triangular interdependence of anoedipal, schizoid unconscious – desire 
– becoming. In this chapter, however, I use the notion of schizoanalysis to circumscribe 
a proposed desirable and thus speculative process of cultural-social-political change in 
Deleuze and Deleuze-Guattari while I refer with the notion of the schizoid more 
specifically to the libidinal, desirous responses of a postulated anoedipal unconscious. 
 
In particular I examine both notions further here, suggesting that the schizoid 
(ephemeral) „state‟ as the mode of becoming of the schizo transpires in the literary texts 
under consideration as a-subjectivity, pan- or trans-sexuality, liminal states of delirium, 
hallucination, and „madness‟, taken here in the sense of resisting re-presentation. I 
propose to discuss these modes of becoming – which can be detected and palpated on 
the stylistic and discursive levels – as general dismantling („démontage‟, Deleuze and 
Guattari 2006, p. 45)
2
 of literary texts. More specifically, I develop these techniques of 
dismantling as forms of syntactical and semantic dissociation, productive dispersion and 
abandonment of spatial and temporal coordinates, transversal refraction and collapse of 
                                                 
2
 There are various descriptors for the techniques of „dismantling‟ (Deleuze and Guattari 2006, p. 46, p. 
47, p. 59, p. 81); „active dismantling‟ (p. 48); „démontage‟ (p. 45, p. 48); „dissecting the mechanism‟ (p. 
43); „even […] demolition‟ (p. 45); „disassembly‟ (p. 82). 
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viewpoints. I propose that, while these schizoid processes of discursive dissociation take 
place, thus keeping representational modes of reading literary texts at bay and a-
functional, other productive schizoid, libidinal, desirous principles take over. These are 
modes of fusion for which I draw on Deleuze-Guattari‟s notions of assemblages of 
desire, their proliferation and serialization, and forms of connectivity such as 
transversality. I subsume these a-representational modes for the purposes of this chapter 
as compositional techniques. 
 
Given my purpose of extracting literary strategies, in this chapter I explore the 
productive dispersion of spatial and temporal coordinates, and their abandonment. I 
draw on Deleuze-Guattari‟s notion of Kafka‟s topography3 which can build perspectives 
(rather than „locations‟), and on Deleuze‟s notion of Proustian involuntary memory 
which progressively builds an idiosyncratic system of signs – hieroglyphs – symptoms. 
I re-visit the discussion of schizoid processes of discursive dissociation to discuss how 
they dismantle representational schemes in substituting them with strategies of 
differential desiring practice.  
 
The central aims for this chapter, then, are firstly to profile and accentuate these literary 
strategies of differential desiring practice anchored in the notion of the schizoid 
understood as a force field of desiring-machines and Body/ies without Organs, and of 
larval subject(s) in states of becoming. My second aim is to examine how the effected 
discursive, expressive and thematic shifts taking place under the schizoid pressure relate 
to the postulated Deleuzian anoedipal, schizoid unconscious. I pursue this profiling on 
three mutually supportive levels which have been used in previous chapters as guiding 
parameters for literary practice: on the level of compositional techniques (assemblages 
and serialization, transversality and connectivity); on the level of stylistic and discursive 
criteria (dissociation, refraction of viewpoints, paradox); and, folded as the reverse side 
of expression, on the level of thematic preoccupations (schizoid states of subjectivity 
                                                 
3
 Kafka‟s topography concerns evocations of perspectives rather than „locations‟.  For the potential of 
approaching Deleuze and Deleuze-Guattari‟s (innovative) aesthetic criteria in a topical manner, for 
instance, in focusing on „space‟ (rather than by concepts), see: Buchanan and Lambert ((eds) 2005) who 
offer the following essays: Bensmaïa „On the “Spiritual automaton”, Space and time in modern cinema 
according to Gilles Deleuze‟ (2005, pp. 144-58); Lorraine „Ahab and becoming-whale: The nomadic 
subject in smooth space‟ (2005, pp. 159-75); Colebrook „The space of man: On the specificity of affect in 
Deleuze and Guattari‟ (2005, pp. 189-206); Conley „The desert island‟ (2005, pp. 207-19).  
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and sexuality, delirium, madness, transgendering, and becoming). I keep my focus on 
literary practices as they evolve in Deleuze and Deleuze-Guattari as minor / 
minoritarian literature with a schizoid social-political focus; as different modes of 
schizoid semiology and as schizoid symptomatology within the critical-clinical.
4
 A 
further aim of this chapter is, however, to attend to methodological shifts and how they 
affect and question the notion of literary representation. I raised this question in chapters 
two and three in the frame of the schizoid weave and while discussing the schizoid 
constellation in Deleuze and Deleuze-Guattari, and will take it up again in the next 
chapter in my attempt to offer a more distinct outline of a differential desiring practice 
with regard to its characteristics, its literary mode and its aspects.  
    
Compositional techniques: The process of dismantling  
 
Deleuze-Guattari‟s treatise Kafka: Toward a minor literature (Deleuze and Guattari 
2006) is a short but challenging essay which overturns the representational model of 
literary exegesis and does away with interpretation, signification and subjectivity.
5
 
While doing this, it aborts the well-established grand interpretative schemes of Kafka‟s 
work as an interrogation of Law and Guilt, subdued in existential despair, as a prophetic 
vision (a work written between 1905 and 1924)
6
 of alternatively judiciary, economic, 
                                                 
4
 Cf. Deleuze‟s Essays critical and clinical (1997), esp. „Literature and life‟ [1993], „Louis Wolfson, or, 
The procedure‟ [1970], „Lewis Carroll‟ [1986], „Representation of Masoch‟ [1989], „Bartleby, or, The 
formula‟ [on Melville] [1993], „An unrecognized precursor to Heidegger: Alfred Jarry‟ [1993], „He 
stuttered‟ [on Beckett] [1993], „The exhausted‟ [on Beckett] [1992]. I am indebted to DW Smith‟s 
generously annotated introduction: „Introduction: “A life of pure immanence”: Deleuze‟s “Critique et 
Clinique” project‟ (1997b, pp. xi-Iiii [pp. 11-53]). I am also drawing on my Beckett paper where I explore 
Deleuze‟s symptomatological critique in the frame of the critical-clinical hypothesis with regard to some 
works by Beckett: „Stuttering in Beckett as liminal expression within the Deleuzian critical-clinical 
hypothesis‟ (Tynan (ed.), special issue, Deleuze and the symptom, 2010, Deleuze Studies, vol. 4, no. 2, pp. 
183-205). 
5
 Cf. the introduction by Bensmaïa: „The Kafka Effect‟ (Foreword) in Deleuze and Guattari Kafka: 
Toward a theory of Minor Literature (2006/1975, pp. ix-xxi). Cf. Camus „Hope and the absurd in the 
work of Franz Kafka‟ (1983, pp. 112-24); Bataille „Kafka‟ (1986b, pp. 149-69); Blanchot The space of 
literature, for instance, „“Kafka” and the work‟s  demand‟ (1989, pp. 57-83); „The two versions of the 
imaginary‟ (pp. 254-63); „Les deux versions de l‟imaginaire‟, (pp. 266-77); Smock „Translator‟s 
Introduction‟ (1989, pp. 1-15); Borges „Kafka and his precursors‟ (1982, pp. 234-7); Bogue „Minor 
writing and minor literature‟ (2004,  pp. 63-81). See also Benjamin (Arendt (ed.), 1973) which contains 
essays on Kafka and Proust; Benjamin (2006 and 2009). 
6
 Deleuze-Guattari work across a variety of Kafka‟s texts, disregarding any divisions by „genre‟or status 
of „finalization‟. The following texts reappear in their exegesis: „Description of a struggle‟ (trans. W and 
E Muir, 1982, pp. 77-86); „Wedding preparations in the country‟ (trans. Kaiser and Wilkins, 1982, pp. 7-
29); The judgement (trans. W and E Muir, 1982, pp. 107-17; trans. Hofmann, 2007a, pp. 35-50); „In the 
penal colony‟ (trans. Hofmann, 2007a, pp. 147-80), also as „ In the penal settlement‟ (trans. W and E 
Muir, 1981, pp. 167-99); „The giant mole‟ (trans. W and E Muir, 1981, pp. 201-18); Metamorphosis  
(trans. W and E Muir, 1981, pp. 7-63; trans. Hofmann, 2007a, pp. 85-146); „The great wall of China‟ 
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capitalist or socialist bureaucracies, holocaust gas and Vietnam napalm scenarios, as 
absurd anguished allegories of man‟s / woman‟s quest for god and the mystery of life. 
Deleuze-Guattari refute these interpretative schemes as misleading, inattentive and 
„useless‟. 
 
The three worst themes in many interpretations of Kafka are the transcendence of the law, the 
interiority of guilt, the subjectivity of enunciation. They are connected to all the stupidities that 
have been written about allegory, metaphor, and symbolism in Kafka. And also, the idea of the 
tragic, of the internal drama of the intimate tribunal, and so on. […] It is absolutely useless to 
look for a theme in a writer if one hasn‟t asked exactly what its importance is in the work – that 
is, how it functions (and not what its „sense‟ is) (Deleuze and Guattari 2006, p. 45). 
 
Their perception of Kafka as a „comic and joyous author‟ (Deleuze and Guattari 2006, 
p. 42) flies in the face of established Kafka interpretations which highlight his persistent 
misery, perpetual insomnia and ill-health.
7
 So too does Deleuze-Guattari‟s inclusion of 
autobiographical sources such the Letters to Felice (Kafka, trans. Heller and Born, 
1999),
8
 breaking a taboo of representational literary practice. 
 
Writing for Kafka, the primacy of writing, signifies only one thing: not a form of literature alone, 
the enunciation forms a unity with desire, beyond laws, states, regimes. Yet the enunciation is 
always historical, political and social. A micropolitics, a politics of desire that questions all 
situations. Never has there been a more comic and joyous author from the point of view of 
desire; never has there been a more political and social author from the point of view of 
enunciation. Everything leads to laughter, starting with The trial. Everything is political, starting 
with the letters to Felice (Deleuze and Guattari 2006, pp. 41-2). 
 
For Deleuze-Guattari, Kafka‟s singular status lies in taking the innovative stance of 
developing a desiring practice which functions as a „politics of desire‟ (Deleuze and 
Guattari 2006, p. 42), in the sense in which they define in Anti-Oedipus the political, 
                                                                                                                                               
(trans. W and E Muir, 1981, pp. 65-81); „A report to an academy‟ (trans. W and E Muir, 1982, pp. 147-
55; trans. Hofmann, 2007a, pp. 225-35); „A hunger artist‟ (trans. W and E Muir, 1982, pp. 156-90; trans. 
Hofmann, 2007a, pp. 237-83); „Investigations of a dog‟ (trans. W and E Muir, 1981, pp. 83-126); „The 
burrow‟ (trans. W and E Muir, 1981, pp. 127-63); „Josephine the singer, or The mouse-folk‟ (part four of 
„A hunger artist‟) (trans. W and E Muir, 1982, pp. 174-90), also as „Josephine, the singer, or The mouse 
people‟ (trans. Hofmann, 2007a, pp. 264-83); The trial [unfinished] includes „Before the law‟ (trans. W 
and E Muir, 1982, pp. 127-9; trans. Hofmann, 2007a, pp. pp. 197-8); The castle [unfinished]; America / 
The man who disappeared [unfinished]. For my own project I draw on the following references: Kafka 
(1948, Brod (ed.)); (1973; 1974 trans. Muir/2000a trans. Parry); (1981 trans. Muir/2007a trans. 
Hofmann); (1982; 1998 trans. Mitchell/2000b trans. Parry); (1999). I quote from the recent translations, 
however consult the previous ones. 
7
 Deleuze-Guattari‟s perception of Kafka as „comic and joyous author‟ flies into the face of established 
Kafka interpretations which highlight his persistent misery, perpetual insomnia and ill-health. 
8
 Kafka‟s Letters to Felice Bauer (they were twice engaged before separating) were written between 1912 
and 1917, covering the time of writing The judgement; „In the penal colony‟; „The giant mole‟; 
Metamorphosis; „The great wall of China‟; „A report to an academy‟. Several female „characters‟ in The 
trial (F.B., Fräulein Bürstner) and The castle (F., Frieda) are assumed to evoke his (twice lost) fiancée. 
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social and personal (speculative) goals of schizoanalysis. Deleuze-Guattari point to 
Kafka‟s fearlessness and audacity in his novels (Deleuze and Guattari 2006, p. 46), the 
pornographic undertones in The trial (Deleuze and Guattari 2006, pp. 49-51) and in The 
castle (Olga serving the camp of man servants at the Count‟s Arms hotel-bar), the 
eroticization of the „novels‟ through the triangular and inter-related female „connectors‟ 
as sisters, maids and whores (Deleuze and Guattari 2006, p. 65), and the intensities of 
mannerisms which define his „schizo-buffoonery‟ (Deleuze and Guattari 2006, p. 80). 
 
[T]ogether, the two mannerisms (the worldly mannerisms of exaggerated politeness and the 
mannerisms of childhood), the two poles of mannerism, constitute Kafka‟s schizo-buffoonery. 
Schizophrenics are well acquainted with both mannerisms: that‟s their way of deterritorializing 
social coordinates. It is probable that Kafka made ample use of them in his life as well as in his 
work: the machinic art of the marionette (Kafka often talks about his mannerisms – the 
tightening of the jaw that almost leads to catatonia) (Deleuze and Guattari 2006, p. 80).
9
  
 
The Kafka emerging in Deleuze-Guattari‟s vision is a bold, comical and ribald author, a 
schizo-buffoon who does not shy away from sexual innuendos,
10
 or from depicting 
transgressive desires
11
 and overt promiscuity.
12
 All this runs counter to the (mundane) 
usage of the term kafkaesque as absurd, irrational, mired in darkness and despair.  
    
Deleuze-Guattari grant Kafka the privilege of initiating a form of writing which is his 
signature, his style. This consists in not just overturning representation and 
                                                 
9
 Deleuze-Guattari draw on functional parallels between Kafka‟s and Proust‟s work. With regard to 
mannerisms their note says: „Once again, we should compare him (Kafka) to Proust, who also makes 
ample use of the two poles of mannerisms: worldly mannerism as an art of the faraway, an exaggeration 
of the phantom-obstacle, and the childhood mannerism as an art of the contiguous (not only are the 
famous involuntary memories real childhood blocks, but so is the uncertainty of the narrator‟s age at 
various points in the text). In other arrangements, the two mannerisms also operate in the work of 
Hölderlin or Kleist‟ (Deleuze and Guattari 2006, Notes, p. 98). Cf. also the comparison between Kafka 
and Proust with regard to the fluid proliferation of figures in „nebulae‟ (Deleuze and Guattari 2006, p. 
12); „letters of desire‟ (Deleuze and Guattari 2006, p. 31) or „letter machine‟ (Deleuze and Guattari 2006, 
p. 33; pp. 33-4).  
10
 The group of girls led by a 13-year-old hunchback at the peephole observing K. with Titorelli (who 
receives him barefoot, in nightgown and loose trousers) in the artist‟s studio rejoicing: „He has taken his 
jacket off!‟  „Advocate – Manufacturer – Painter‟, The trial (Kafka 2000b, p. 123; pp. 89-129; esp. pp. 
111-29). 
11
 The wife of a court usher (a young washerwoman with black lustrous eyes (p. 29)) services red-bearded 
student Berthold (p. 44), shows K. the pornographic court diaries, engages with Josef K. and is then 
carried by the student to the magistrate for service. „First Examination‟, The trial (Kafka 2000b, pp. 25-
38); „In the Empty Assembly Hall – The Student – The Offices‟, The trial  (pp. 40-6; pp. 39-58). 
12
 Leni (with the web-fingered right hand and the bitter peppery smell) cares for, and caresses, the bed-
ridden advocate, engages in an affair with Josef K. and also attends to Block‟s multifarious needs. „The 
Uncle – Leni‟, The trial (pp. 86-7; pp. 72-88); „Merchant Block – Dismissal of the Advocate‟, The trial 
(pp. 130-73). 
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signification, doing away with metaphoricity
13
 and dispersing subjectivity, but involves 
complex paradoxical strategies executed on multiple levels. There is no question of 
replacing „a collective assemblage of enunciation‟ with „a machinic assemblage of 
desire‟ (Deleuze and Guattari 2006, p. 81), instead they are viewed as mutually 
supporting sides of writing. Such a compositional method follows Deleuze-Guattari‟s 
notion of folding, however it needs to be understood as an ongoing process in the sense 
of the becoming-text. Thus while a collective assemblage of enunciation and a machinic 
assemblage of desire respond to each other with their libidinal forces, the folded 
assemblage(s) are instantaneously dismantled. This event of dismantling characterises 
the schizoid processes of discursive dissociation; the writing and the reading moves 
forward-backward while being caught in their own vortex of abolition. The schizoid 
processes happen on multiple textual, discursive and expressive levels simultaneously, 
on the level of composition (assemblage and dis-assemblage, connecting and dis-
connecting), on the stylistic level („factual‟ statement, „doubtful‟ retraction, paradoxical 
double-statement) and on the discursive level (dissociation through refracting 
accumulative viewpoints). The double-functionality of dismantling affects in the first 
instance the (artificial) separation of content and expression, which cannot be upheld 
since the extravagance of the expressive level(s) absorbs, or rather engulfs, any content 
or thematic fixtures. This justifies calling the writing and reading desiring practice 
differential since the process of double-sided unraveling is at the very core of the 
process of difference and different/ciation. Any thematic preoccupations or topicality 
within the textual fabric of Kafka‟s „novels‟ receives the schizoid styling or signature 
and becomes a fluctuating force field in perpetual transition, resulting in what I term 
discursive dissociation. In asserting that „the machinic assemblage of desire is also the 
collective assemblage of enunciation‟ (Deleuze and Guattari 2006, p. 82), Deleuze-
Guattari justify the collapse of the (artificial) separation of content and expression. They 
acknowledge here the paradoxical status of folded, inter-related assemblage, or rather 
                                                 
13
 Deleuze-Guattari refute any metaphoricity, symbolism, signifying or designating use of language in 
Kafka in keeping with his own intent as expressed in his diaries. „Diaries, 1921: “Metaphors are one of 
the things that make me despair of literature.” Kafka deliberately kills all metaphor, all symbolism, all 
signification, no less than all designation. Metamorphosis is the contrary of metaphor. There is no longer 
any proper sense or figurative sense, but only a distribution of states that is part of the range of the word. 
The thing and other things are no longer anything but intensities overrun by deterritorialized sound or 
words that are following their line of escape‟ (Deleuze and Guattari 2006, p. 22); cf. Kafka (1948, Brod 
(ed.), trans. Kresh). 
  
 
 
168 
point to the power of the machinic (stop-start) of desire which overrides defined 
signification.          
 
Deleuze-Guattari initially name the principle of dismantling a „basic segmentation‟ 
(Deleuze and Guattari 2006, p. 8), a type of disintegration, dissociation in its syntactical 
instantiation where desire transpires. The working of the desiring-machine(s) is 
palpable in (preliminary) halts, (enduring) stops and (sudden) starts, with gears and 
cogs in operation appearing as „segments‟. The libidinal forces pass through the gaps 
which dissolve the syntactical fabric from within. Gasping, crying and stuttering are 
related expressive forms. While this segmentation takes place at the syntactical level, or 
even further downward into the lexical and sound levels, it operates also within the 
textual fabric of sections or chapters as well as between chapters in their (non-
)progression and as a principle between letters and diaries, stories and novels for the 
totality of Kafka‟s oeuvre. Deleuze-Guattari consider the principle of segmentation 
which is exemplified through the multiple unsuccessful attempts of land surveyor K. in 
The castle to get to the castle: 
  
In his present state, if he pushed himself to extend his walk as far as the castle entrance at least, 
that would be more than enough.[…] On he went, then, but it was a long way. This road, the 
village high street, did not in fact lead to Castle Hill, it only went close to it but then curved 
away, as if on purpose, and although it took one no farther from the castle, nor did it come any 
nearer. K. constantly expected the road to turn in the direction of the castle at last, surely it 
would, and it was only because he expected it that he kept going; obviously, given his weariness, 
he was reluctant to leave the road, he was also surprised at how long the village was, it went on 
and on, nothing but tiny houses and iced-up windowpanes and snow and nobody around – finally 
he tore himself loose from the grip of the high street, a narrow lane swallowed him up, even 
deeper snow, his feet sank in, it was hard work extracting them, he began to perspire, abruptly he 
came to a halt and could go no farther ‒ (Kafka, trans. Underwood, 2000a, p. 11). 
 
At the super-textual (discursive) level, the surface of the text is marked by realistic 
sobriety while on the sub-textual level, contrary or paradoxical points show up, in such 
a manner that realistic progression gets tied in the line-up of paradoxes: K. is on his way 
to the castle (or castle entrance at least) yet this road does not lead to the castle; the road 
went close to the castle but then turned away as if on purpose; the road doesn‟t take him 
any farther from the castle nor any nearer. While this movement goes forward and 
backward and finally comes to a halt, a precarious balance of sense and nonsense is 
established, a sense of vacillation or vertigo which expresses frustrated desire (stage 
one: „it only went close to it‟), unfolding of hope (stage two: „surely it would‟) and then 
  
 
 
169 
comical abandon (stage three: „finally he tore himself loose from the grip of the high 
street‟). On the discursive level, while the text establishes a free indirect style, at the 
beginning K. converses with himself („that would be more than enough‟), then the street 
assumes the power of action („curved away, as if on purpose‟) and takes over („expected 
the road to turn‟, „finally he tore himself loose from the grip of the high street, a narrow 
lane swallowed him up‟). The deliberations attributed to the street and the lane 
confound the boundaries between subject and object; instead a force field which 
encompasses both insists. 
 
Despite the realistic sobriety at the surface level the textual fabric vibrates with 
reversible intensities, conjunctions of flux: an assemblage of desire becomes and un-
becomes. A collective machine of enunciation (the sober super-text) and a machinic 
assemblage of desire (the vacillating libidinal sub-text) build the textual fabric, folded 
into each other, while simultaneously unraveling themselves in paradoxes and thus 
dismantling sense, meaning (signification) and subjectivity for the benefit of an 
experimental display of libidinal forces. A range of critical notions such as „desirous 
indicator(s)‟ (Deleuze and Guattari 2006, p. 5),14 „force field of intensities‟ (Deleuze 
and Guattari 2006, p. 13),
15
 „reversible intensities‟ (Deleuze and Guattari 2006, p. 22),16 
„tensors‟ (Deleuze and Guattari 2006, p. 22),17 „mutual becoming of multiple or 
                                                 
14
 Deleuze-Guattari observe for instance „two new forms‟, a visual (bent head/portrait-photo) and an aural 
or sonorous (straightened head/musical sound) desirous indicator with a libidinal fusion of content (the 
first element) and expression (the second element); the „bent head‟ indicates „a blocked, oppressed or 
oppressing, neutralized desire‟ and the „straightened head‟ „a desire that straightens up or moves forward, 
and opens up to new connections‟. The examples are taken from Metamorphosis (trans. W and E Muir, 
1981, pp. 7-63; trans. Hofmann, 2007a, pp. 85-146). 
15
 „To become animal is to participate in movement, […] to reach a continuum of intensities […] to find a 
world of pure intensities where all forms come undone […] Kafka‟s animals never refer to a mythology 
or to archetypes but correspond solely to new levels, zones of liberated intensities where contents free 
themselves from their forms as well as from their expressions, from the signifier that formalized them‟ 
(Deleuze and Guattari 2006, p. 13). 
16
 The processes of becoming are detected as in their „structure‟ and mutual exchanges: „There is no 
longer man or animal, since each deterritorializes the other, in a conjunction of flux, in a continuum of 
reversible intensities. Instead, it is now a question of a becoming that includes the maximum of difference 
as a difference of intensity‟ (Deleuze and Guattari 2006, p. 22). 
17
 „Generally, we might call the linguistic elements, however varied they may be, that express the 
“internal tensions of a language” intensives or tensors‟ (Deleuze and Guattari 2006, p. 22). Deleuze-
Guattari note that they have taken the term tensor from Lyotard „who uses it to indicate the connection of 
intensity and libido‟ (Deleuze and Guattari 2006, p. 93; note 15 to chapter three). They refer to Lyotard‟s 
Libidinal economy (2004). Intensives or tensors thus outgrow the linguistic modality and become part of 
the apparatus of a libidinal sign system. Cf. Lyotard, chapter two „The tensor (2004, pp. 42-93); esp.the 
comments (pp. 53-64) which take up Freud‟s Schreber case study. Lyotard proposes the proper name of 
„Flechsig‟ (Schreber‟s first analyst) as a tensor, a libidinally charged sound (or vocal) which is strictly 
speaking not of the linguistic order. „[W]e quit signs, we enter the extra-semiotic order of tensors‟ 
(Lyotard, 2004, p. 49). 
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collective assemblage(s)‟ (Deleuze and Guattari 2006, p. 37)18 (organic-anorganic in 
nature) can then be extracted which are of use for making pathways into perplexing 
literary texts by means of desiring practice.    
 
If the schizoid process of dismantling functions as the very core of Kafka‟s oeuvre (as 
Deleuze-Guattari suggest, making it the main argument for their notion of minor 
literature), the focus of literary practice shifts from considerations of content to 
expression. „Only expression gives us the method‟ (Deleuze and Guattari 2006, p. 16; 
original emphasis). The process of dismantling, the assemblages of desire and 
serialization, the literary techniques of blockages and connections make up the range of 
what I term, for my purpose of delineating literary strategies of desiring practice, 
compositional techniques. To examine these techniques requires setting out, as the 
frame in which they operate, some of the principles of Deleuze-Guattari‟s equation of 
collective enunciation and a-subjective enunciation of desire, or libidinal enunciation. 
Since collective enunciation is understood here as revolutionary practice, Deleuze-
Guattari‟s demand for schizoanalytic purging of individual consciousness and desire as 
expressed in Anti-Oedipus provides a grounding for their argumentation. 
 
Three characteristics of a minor literature can be delineated in Deleuze-Guattari‟s view 
in the context of Kafka‟s work, „the deterritorialization of language, the connection of 
the individual to a political immediacy, and the collective assemblage of enunciation‟ 
(Deleuze and Guattari 2006, p. 18). These characteristics go to the core of the schizoid 
processes of discursive dissociation and Kafka‟s style and signature as they draw 
together linguistic-discursive changes, communal responses and a shift toward a new, 
minor collective enunciation. The use of deterritorialized language, „alienated‟, divorced 
from the current major language within which it lives, becomes over-determined, 
schizoid.
19
 A politicization of writing ensues in the sense that this hybrid language 
                                                 
18
 „[I]n the exact moment Kafka begins the novels […] he abandons the becomings-animal in order to 
substitute for them a more complex assemblage. […] the molecular multiplicity tends itself to become 
integrated with, or make room for, a machine, or rather a machinic assemblage, the parts of which are 
independent from each other, but which functions nonetheless‟ (Deleuze and Guattari 2006, p. 37). The 
stages of progressive becoming are aligned with the expansion into assemblages: „Fear, flight, 
dismantling ‒ we should think of them as three passions, three intensities, corresponding to the diabolic 
pact, to the becoming-animal, to the machinic and collective assemblages‟ (Deleuze and Guattari 2006, p. 
46). 
19
 In Kafka‟s case, this is a hybrid language, Prague German as spoken by Jewish-Czechs in the former 
Austrian-Hungarian empire after the turn of the century (1905-1925) (Deleuze and Guattari 2006, p.16). 
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reacts to the (major) values and socio-political pressure from outside (Deleuze and 
Guattari 2006, p. 17). A shift from individual authorial performance to a collective 
value of writing eventuates, thus performing in the writing a revolutionary enunciation 
through the hybrid language (Deleuze and Guattari 2006, pp. 17-8). Minor language 
takes on a range of expressive modes of over-determination as reaction to the enforced 
aridity or „sobriety‟ and makes language „vibrate with a new intensity‟ (Deleuze and 
Guattari 2006, p. 19).
20
 The a-metaphoricity of Kafka‟s language, the a-representational 
mode of his writing as well as its inner convolutedness (moving forward while retracing 
its turns and undermining its own intended enunciation) are postulated as libidinal 
effects of deterritorialized, politicized and collective minor writing. 
 
Kafka‟s style or signature is thus theorized as flowing from the specific milieu created 
by a usage of minor language and its libidinal pressures on expression. However, taking 
into account the creative aspects of writing, there is another experimental layer to 
writing in a minor language and producing minor literature: linguistic fluidity from 
administrative, commercial and scholarly
21
 German to vernacular Czech and back to 
rudimentary, barely mastered, disdained and suspect
22
 Yiddish provokes (as viewed in 
Deleuze-Guattari‟s theory of the minor) beyond the aridity of style, a scouring of sense. 
Kafka‟s minor machine of expression strips language to its bare bones: „he (Kafka) 
retains only the skeleton of sense, or a paper cut […] bringing about a neutralization of 
sense‟ (Deleuze and Guattari 2006, p. 21). Kafka‟s nearly impossible task consists in 
converting, „deterritorialising‟, a stripped Prague German with „a withered vocabulary, 
an incorrect syntax‟ (Deleuze and Guattari 2006, p. 22) with a feel for the impenetrable 
Yiddish to „make it cry with an extremely sober and rigorous cry […] To bring 
language slowly and progressively to the desert‟ (Deleuze and Guattari 2006, p. 26). 
                                                 
20
 Deleuze-Guattari mention as parallel to Kafka being a Czech minor, Joyce and Beckett being Irish 
minors, living in France, Italy and Germany while using a „hybrid‟ or „foreign‟ language (Deleuze and 
Guattari 2006, p. 19). 
21
 Kafka studied law at the German university of Prague receiving a doctorate and followed courses in 
German literature and art history. Taking up Hebrew later in life, he knows French, Italian and some 
English. Kafka belongs to the few Jewish writers in Prague fluent in written and spoken Czech. Deleuze-
Guattari follow the linguistic implications of minor language and literature in detail (Deleuze and Guattari 
2006, pp. 22-6). 
22
 Prague (as well as Bohemian and Moravian) Yiddish is grafted onto Middle High German (12th-15th 
century), neither independent from German nor fully equatable to modern German, thus „untranslatable‟ 
and frightful. „One can understand Yiddish only by “feeling it” in the heart‟ (Deleuze and Guattari 2006, 
p. 25). Deleuze-Guattari propose that „using the path that Yiddish opens up to him, he [Kafka] takes it in 
such a way as to convert it into a unique and solitary form of writing‟ (Deleuze and Guattari 2006, p. 25).  
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This process of desertification,
23
 an attempt at linguistic and discursive liminality, is the 
core of the schizoid machine of expression, which Deleuze-Guattari also detect in 
Artaud‟s howls, Beckett‟s stuttering, Joyce‟s syntactical emotional vortex, even 
Mallarmé‟s white still anguish. What produces the howling, stuttering, whirling and 
falling into catatonia is the freeing of the powers of desire (as law, as justice, Deleuze 
and Guattari 2006, p. 50). „Justice is no more than the immanent process of desire‟ 
(Deleuze and Guattari 2006, p. 51). The Kafka-machine, like the Artaud-machine or the 
Beckett-machine, works in the form of writing as a transient assemblage of flows (and 
breaks) of desire directed toward becoming.  
 
Beyond the withering of vocabulary and the dissolution of proper Prague German 
syntax, Deleuze-Guattari debate intricate linguistic levels as the expressive origin of the 
shifting intensities and affectivity in Kafka‟s texts.24 What appears as sobriety, stripping 
of language, expressive „poverty‟ (Deleuze and Guattari 2006, p. 23) originates in 
aspects of the linguistic hybridity of Prague German: „incorrect‟ use of prepositions 
(resulting in shifting angles and distorted view points), „abuse‟ of pronouns (resulting in 
de-subjectification), accumulative adverbs (resulting in loss of verbal action and 
dispersal of descriptions), a concentration on colourless verbs (an English equivalent 
would be „to put‟) which have a vast range of applications and result through 
accumulation and repetition in building intensities, as Deleuze-Guattari claim. These 
hybrid descriptors are viewed by them as expressing the „internal tensions of a 
language‟ (Deleuze and Guattari 2006, p. 22), functioning as „intensives or tensors‟ 
(Deleuze and Guattari 2006, p. 23) which allow a direct access to the libidinal play of 
                                                 
23
 The process of desertification takes several forms: (1) as stylistic determinant: „sobriety of style‟ 
(Deleuze and Guattari 2006, p. 7, p. 25); „dryness and sobriety, a willed poverty‟ (Deleuze and Guattari 
2006, p. 19); „he [Kafka] will always take it [Prague German] farther, to a greater degree of intensity, but 
in the direction of a new sobriety, a new and unexpected modification, a pitiless rectification, a 
straightening of the head. Schizo politeness, a drunkenness caused by water‟ (Deleuze and Guattari 2006, 
pp. 25-6); „effacing them [early influences] to the benefit of a sobriety, a hyper-realism, a machinism„ 
(Deleuze and Guattari 2006, p. 70); (2) as deterritorialization: „the desert world invested in by Kafka‟ 
(Deleuze and Guattari 2006, p. 13); (3) as exile in language and belonging: „finding his own point of 
underdevelopment, his own patois, his own world, his own desert‟ (Deleuze and Guattari 2006, p. 18); „to 
bring language slowly and progressively to the desert‟ (Deleuze and Guattari 2006, p. 26); „to find points 
of nonculture or underdevelopment, linguistic Third World zones‟ (Deleuze and Guattari 2006, p. 27); (4) 
as libidinal escape: “(Kafka always defined literary creation as the creation of a desert world populated by 
his sisters where he would enjoy an infinite liberty of movement.)‟ (Deleuze and Guattari 2006, p. 65; 
original parenthesis). Cf. Buydens 2005, Sahara: L‟esthétique de Gilles Deleuze [1990] [Lettre-Préface 
de Gilles Deleuze] which proposes a specific aesthetic principle of form for Deleuze‟s approach. 
24
 Deleuze-Guattari draw on Wagenbach 1958 Franz Kafka, eine Biographie seiner Jugend 1883-1912, in 
the French translation: Wagenbach  Franz Kafka, années de jeunesse (1967, pp. 78-88, esp. p. 78, p. 81, 
p. 88) and further specific linguistic studies by Henri Gobard, published in the 1970s.  
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affects. Further, just at the limit of language, or at the „outside of language‟, intensities 
find their expression in the manipulative distribution of vowels and consonants „as part 
of internal discordance‟ (Deleuze and Guattari 2006, p. 23), in sighs, cries, exclamations 
and interjections.  Taken together, this effects „an asignifying intensive utilization of 
language‟ (Deleuze and Guattari 2006, p. 22) on the linguistic and discursive levels. 
 
At the heart of Kafka‟s writing thus lies the process of bi-directional dismantling on 
multiple levels of expression, compositionally, stylistically, discursively and 
thematically. Consequently the exercise of desiring practice is to follow, or rather to 
detect, the process of dismantling in the act of reading, and that of moderated critique. 
Deleuze-Guattari reject the established form of criticism and propose to replace it by 
experimentation.
25
 The process of dismantling (démontage) can be theorized as 
performing three simultaneous tasks. It replaces on a secondary level the representative 
act of established criticism in that there is no concern with the primary level of 
assemblage. Shifting the focus of functionality to the progression of the process, to the 
act of its dismantling, unleashes the path for libidinal flows. The „method of active 
dismantling‟ (Deleuze and Guattari 2006, p. 48) circumvents the fixtures of established 
criticism and does not get trapped in repetitive representational modes of genre, 
narrative structure, character, chronology and location. On the contrary, it takes hold of 
the kernel of libidinal friction in the „social field‟. This can be called a 
symptomatological leap within the method of experimentation in that it requires 
becoming alert to the revolutionary movement which can be „prolonged‟ or 
„accelerated‟ (Deleuze and Guattari 2006, p. 48) or both. As discussed in the previous 
chapter when I examined the processes of enacting desiring practice, the event insists in 
the domain of the virtual while not-yet-being-actual, both encompassing the real. I 
assume thus that in the act of writing, and consequently in the act of reading, criticism is 
                                                 
25
 „It [the assemblage] works only through the dismantling (démontage) that it brings about on the 
machine and on representation. And, actually functioning, it functions only through and because of its 
own dismantling. It is born from this dismantling (it is never the assembling of the machine that interest 
Kafka). This method of active dismantling doesn‟t make use of criticism that is still part of representation. 
Rather, it consists in prolonging, in accelerating, a whole movement that already is traversing the social 
field. It operates in a virtuality that is already real without yet being actual (The diabolical powers of the 
future that for the moment are only brushing up against the door). The assemblage appears not in a still 
encoded and territorial criticism but in a decoding, in a deterritorialization, and in the novelistic 
acceleration of this decoding and this deterritorialization […]. This method is much more intense than any 
critique‟ (Deleuze and Guattari 2006, p. 48). 
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withheld, actualization and counter-actualization take place, both held in the mode of 
experimentation.  
 
Focusing on the process of dismantling, in writing and in reading, guarantees that the 
neglected, disregarded assemblage does not get caught in encoding („this means that‟, 
Deleuze and Guattari 2006, p. 7) and „territorial criticism‟ („this belongs to that genre‟, 
Deleuze and Guattari 2006, p. 3)
26
 but also undergoes decoding („this is something new, 
not yet encountered, thus “without sense”‟, Deleuze and Guattari 2006, p. 20-1)27 and 
„deterritorialization‟ („a new concept is needed for this unheard of thing‟, Deleuze and 
Guattari 2006, p. 48). The method of active dismantling does away with the categories 
and modes of representational critique; instead it ferrets out indicative disturbances and 
traces intensities. 
 
We won‟t try to find archetypes that could represent Kafka‟s imaginary, his dynamic, or his 
bestiary (the archetype works by assimilation, homogenization, and thematics, whereas our 
method works only where a rupturing and heterogeneous line appears). Moreover, we aren‟t 
looking for any so-called free associations (we are well aware of the sad fate of these 
associations that bring us back to childhood memories or, even worse, to the phantasm, not 
because they fail to work but because such a fate is part of their actual underlying principle). We 
aren‟t trying to interpret, to say that this means that. And we are looking least of all for a 
structure with formal oppositions and a fully constructed Signifier; […] We believe only in a 
                                                 
26
 Signification operating by means of encoding and drawing on established literary genres (for instance 
such as parable in the case of Kafka) and interpretation must be countered from the very start: „Only the 
principle of multiple entrances prevents the introduction of the enemy, the Signifier and those attempts to 
interpret a work that is actually only open to experimentation‟ (Deleuze and Guattari 2006, p. 3).  
27
 „[H]e [Kafka] will abandon sense, render it no more than implicit; he will retain only the skeleton of 
sense, or a paper cutout‟ (Deleuze and Guatatri 2006, pp. 20-1). Deleuze-Guattari propose four inter-
connected processes of fresh decoding and „deterritorialization‟ (read firstly as absence and secondly as 
transitory „new‟ territory‟): (1) the abandonment of (ordinary, i.e. common sense or good sense) since the 
„true‟ sense has been  confused through the hybrid state of language; (2) the fusion of the subject of 
enunciation and the subject of statement (i.e. making sense „implicit‟); (3) the creation of a „new‟ (mad, 
raw or private) sense. Deleuze-Guattari explicate three of these processes in the specific „desert‟ condition 
of the hybrid language Kafka struggles with: „Ordinarily, […] language compensates for its 
deterritorialization by a reterritorialization in sense. Ceasing to be the organ of one of the senses, it 
[language] becomes an instrument of Sense [original capitalization]. And it is sense, as a correct sense, 
that presides over the designation of sounds (the thing or the state of things that the word designates) and, 
as figurative sense, over the affectation of images and metaphors (those other things that words designate 
under certain situations or conditions). Thus, there is not only a spiritual reterritorialization of sense, but 
also a physical one. Similarly, language only exists through the distinction and the complementarity of a 
subject of enunciation, who is in connection with sense, and a subject of the statement, who is in 
connection, directly or metaphorically, with the designated thing. This sort of ordinary use of language 
can be called extensive or representative – the reterritorializing function of language […] Now something 
happens:  […] he [Kafka] will abandon sense, render it no more than implicit; he will retain only the 
skeleton of sense, or a paper cutout‟ (Deleuze and Guattari 2006, pp. 20-1). (4) Language overcoming 
representation and becoming liminal. The fourth and decdisive process moves beyond desertification, 
withdrawal into implicitness and „new‟ („minor or intensive‟, Deleuze and Guattari 2006, p. 27) use of 
language and establishes liminality (which can be read as either excess or „neutralization of sense‟ 
(Deleuze and Guattari 2006, p.21). „Language stops being representative in order to now move toward its 
extremities or its limits‟ (Deleuze and Guattari 2006, p. 23; original emphasis). 
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Kafka politics that is neither imaginary nor symbolic. We believe only in one or more Kafka 
machines that are neither structure nor phantasm. We believe only in a Kafka experimentation 
that is without interpretation or significance and rests only on tests of experience (Deleuze and 
Guattari 2006, p. 7; original emphases).   
 
In this programmatic, emphatic statement, Deleuze-Guattari refute a range of 
established modes of literary criticism: Jungian archetypal criticism, Freudian 
psychoanalytic criticism of free associations and oedipal retracing of childhood 
memories, and structural criticism based in formal oppositions and structural Lacanian 
psychoanalytic criticism turning around the phallic Signifier. Deleuze-Guattari have no 
interest in interpretation and signification („this means that‟); they refute the relevance 
of the Lacanian individual Imaginary and social-cultural Symbolic. In contrast, they 
ground their threefold „method‟ in Kafka‟s politics, Kafka‟s machines, and Kafka‟s 
experimentation. This „method‟ is the kernel of social-political friction without any 
critique, the libidinal responses of the desiring-machines and assemblages of desire, and 
the experimental projective process of immediate dismantling of assemblages in 
formation. A method of experimental desiring practice thus affords complex literary 
strategies and operates on simultaneous, mutually supportive levels, stylistically, 
discursively, compositionally, and to a degree thematically. Central to its operation is 
the assumption of libidinal flows (and breaks), instantiated in desiring-machines, or 
alternatively in a postulated anoedipal, schizoid unconscious.    
       
Assemblages of desire and serialization  
 
Deleuze-Guattari foreground the schizoid process of dismantling as Kafka‟s major 
compositional technique for his later, unfinished or rather „unlimited‟ (Deleuze and 
Guattari 2006, p. 73)
28
 longer works since these works are governed by the double-
sided, folded processes of collective assemblage of enunciation (which is the forward 
movement of establishing the textual fabric) and machinic assemblage of desire (which 
is its backward unraveling). With regard to the two other expressive components of 
                                                 
28
 Deleuze-Guattari reject attempts (as done by Brod, Kafka‟s friend and executor of his works) to 
rearrange the material for the „unfinished‟ Castle since in their understanding it is meant to be „an 
unterminable novel, necessarily indefinite‟ (Deleuze and Guattari 2006, p. 44). They regard Kafka‟s often 
fragmentary works as „unlimited‟: „(Continuity will always seem to him [Kafka] to be the condition of 
writing, not only for writing the novels but also for writing the short stories such as „The verdict‟. The 
unfinished work is no longer a fragmentary work but an unlimited one)‟ (Deleuze and Guattari 2006, p. 
73; original parenthesis). Cf. Kafka „The verdict‟ (also as „The judgement‟) (trans. W and E Muir, 1982, 
pp. 107-17; trans. Hofmann, 2007a, pp. 35-50). 
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Kafka‟s work, his letters (and diaries) and his stories, functioning as the testing ground 
for developing his writing machine, Deleuze-Guattari emphasise as compositional 
techniques a method of entering a „diabolical pact‟ in letters and a method of staging a 
„becoming-animal‟ in stories. The Kafka-machine then, the totality of his oeuvre is 
conceived as an experimental inter-dependent literary machine where each of the 
expressive layers executes specific patterns of desire and reflects different forms of 
intensities. „Fear, flight, dismantling – we should think of them as three passions, three 
intensities, corresponding to the diabolical pact, to the becoming-animal, to the 
machinic and collective assemblage‟ (Deleuze and Guattari 2006, p. 46). The schizo-
method, or literary schizoanalysis, of desiring practice concentrates on the movements 
within texts, the shifting levels of intensities and how these fluctuating intensities shape 
the styles of passions transpiring in the text, as fear banished by the exorcism of pacts, 
as flight, escape or mutiny into a morphing corporeal transformation, or as entrance into 
assemblages of desire thereby circumventing detection. While the schizoid mode 
generally defines the manner of dissociation, the schizo-method as unraveling internal 
textual movements is functional and processual. The more complex procedure or 
process of experimentation, directed at social, political, cultural, linguistic and 
discursive change, is exemplified by the method of schizoanalysis. 
 
Kafka‟s letters and diaries, stories and novels are the inter-dependent products of 
shifting levels of desiring production and thus the experimental exercise of desiring 
practice consists in establishing maps of shifting intensities. Deleuze-Guattari consider 
the epistolary component of expression to be a specific schizoid technique of exorcism 
of desire, a form of desiccation of desire, which cannot be separated from the writing 
process. Kafka‟s copious correspondence29 as part of the writing machine thus stands in 
constant transversal communication with its other components of expression. His style 
or signature is marked by the letters‟ specific schizoid modes of dissociation, as pact 
(sealing off, desiccation and suffocation), as becoming (threshold-crossing(s)) and dual 
machine(s) of assemblages-dis-assemblages, playing through all stances of affectivity 
on the stylistic, discursive and expressive levels. 
  
                                                 
29
 Kafka‟s correspondence includes Letters to Felice, Letters to Melina, „Letter to the father‟ (also as 
„Letter to his father‟) (trans. Kaiser and Wilkins, 1982, pp. 30-75), as well letters to his friends, especially 
to Brod. Deleuze-Guattari point to the letters of Flaubert, of Kleist to his sister, and of Hebbel which they 
consider an integral and initiatory part of the writing machine. Cf. also Proust‟s correspondence.   
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To acknowledge the creative inter-dependence and affective inter-relatedness of these 
expressive components (letter and diaries, stories and novels) opens insight into the 
process of experimentation at the heart of the schizoid method of desiring practice. Only 
a practice of experimentation which follows the lines of desire in locating, sounding out 
and identifying ruptures, unevenness, heterogeneous lines and proliferation can do 
justice to the writing machine conceived as consisting of inter-dependent parts. Literary 
proliferation in Kafka takes the form of serialized „characters‟, beyond twinning and 
doubling.
30
 Serialization takes the shape of series, and subseries, which indicate points 
of intensities; they are at times interrupted, momentarily stalled or finally halted by 
blocks or blockages of „childhood memory‟ standing in for an „oedipal-negative‟ 
libidinal force or „childhood blocks‟ and „animal blocks‟ standing in for „schizo-
positive‟ libidinal forces. „Characters‟ or serial persons, impersonations or 
embodiments, express affective gestures and in a symptomatic manner eventuate as 
expressive events. Serialization thus functions as a libidinal patterning rather than a 
structure. The functional blockages (either oedipal-negative or schizo-positive) in the 
machine of desire, in the sense of impasse or release of the libidinal flow, are conceived 
as parts of the machines, their cogs. The blockages function as breaking and re-starting 
points in the flow while assemblages of desire and their serialization replace any form 
of subjectivity.     
 
An investigation of the functioning of assemblages in Kafka‟s „novels‟ requires 
examination of the linkages between them. Here Deleuze-Guattari propose the quasi-
structural notion of a proliferation of series, large series sub-dividing into subseries and 
again these subseries undergoing a different type of „unlimited schizophrenic 
proliferation‟ (Deleuze and Guattari 2006, p. 53). The diverse forms of multiplication 
(as doubles, triplets, or multiples) have the function of unblocking impasses in the 
libidinal flow. Judges, lawyers, bailiffs, policemen, Titorelli‟s little girls in The trial 
(Kafka, trans. Mitchell 1998; trans. Parry, 2000b) multiply as if distorted in view, as 
                                                 
30
 Joseph K. is visited by two impertinent warders, Franz and Willem, in his room in the boarding-house, 
in „Arrest – Conversation with Frau Grubach – The Fräulein Bürstner‟, The trial (Kafka 2000b, pp. 1-24). 
Joseph K. finds this pair of warders being punished by a leather-clad official in a concealed lumber-room 
at his workplace, in „The Whipper‟, The trial (Kafka 2000b, pp. 66-71). Joseph K. is taken by identical 
black-clad guards to his execution in the quarry, in „The End‟, The trial (Kafka 2000b, pp. 174-8). K., 
posing as land surveyor, has to deal against his will with two identical assistants, Arthur and Jeremiah, 
assigned to him in The castle (Kafka 2000a, p. 16). Cf. also chapter twelve „The Assistants‟ (Kafka 
2000a, pp. 121-53).   
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though the textual fabric is internally defused. The dismantling of the text and the 
unblocking of the libidinal impasses thus happen in tandem but this process of 
multiplication also reflects the draining of subjectivity out of the text. The triangular 
configuration ‒ which is of special interest because of its oedipal inferences ‒ is evoked 
with the purpose of defusing power in the process of becoming-unlimited, as the 
doubles proliferate until they become indistinguishable. Characters become functional 
elements of the process, whereby the remaining „individuals‟ reflect momentary 
stagnation or blockages. The „figures‟ thus operate as „connective cogs‟ of an 
assemblage of justice, each cog responding to a position of desire, all the cogs and all 
the positions communicating with each other through successive continuities‟ (Deleuze 
and Guattari 2006, p. 55). The proliferation of series has two functions, unblocking text-
internal impasses and executing the undoing of the text in draining it of its remaining 
subjectivities. 
 
A gigantic desiring-machine with cogs, gears, components as its material and 
functioning parts over-arches the proliferation of series. This desirous machine 
functions in terms of desire as power, desire as plenitude (not lack); acting and 
functioning desire which instigates the process of becoming.  
 
One would be quite wrong to understand desire here as a desire for power, a desire to repress or 
to be repressed, a sadistic desire and a masochistic desire. Kafka‟s idea has nothing to do with 
this. There isn‟t a desire for power; it is power itself that is desire. Not a desire-lack, but desire 
as plenitude, exercise, and functioning, even in the subaltern of workers (Deleuze and Guattari 
2006, p. 56). 
 
I read this paradigmatic evaluation of the literary process in Kafka‟s oeuvre as a 
programmatic outline of Deleuze-Guattari‟s understanding of experimentation within 
texts, as thereby offering guidance on how to exercise desiring practice in the 
schizoanalytic reading of texts. It is a preliminary definition of literary schizoanalysis in 
approaching its two or three main aspects, the individual and communal functions. It 
offers a social-political model, not in the interpretative sense but in the sense of its 
functioning. Four stages can be extracted for desiring practice: identifying the gears and 
components of the desirous machine; examining their linkages; locating the 
proliferation in series, subseries and their inter-connections; and, if possible, deciding 
on the functionality of the movements within the assemblage that is establishing the 
stage of becoming transitionally held as positions of desiring-machines. Rejecting a 
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psychoanalytic interpretative procedure since the model of the dialectic of repression 
and submission in sadism and masochism already encages the flow of desire, Deleuze-
Guattari maintain in contrast that „[D]esire is fundamentally polyvocal, and its 
polyvocality makes it a single and unique desire that flows over everything‟ (Deleuze 
and Guattari 2006, p. 57). Deleuze-Guattari accord women several, at times 
contradictory, functions in their system of serialization. Series, or serialization as a 
differential strategy and a mode of desiring practice can take three forms: proliferating, 
that is spreading and augmenting in an auto-productive sense; linking and establishing 
transversal connections; and transforming. Women take part in all three forms of 
serialization. Functioning as „connectors‟, as linkages in the play of transformations and 
proliferation of series, they augment the connections of desire in The trial (Kafka, trans. 
Mitchell 1998; trans. Parry, 2000b)
31
 and establish a similar scheme of serialized 
connections in The castle (Kafka, trans. W and E Muir, 1974; trans. Underwood, 
2000a).
32
 Women thus appear at turning points in the series and subseries; they are 
carefree, strong, in the know. Their power lies in their multiple connections and in their 
sexuality which they exploit for themselves but also in the service of others. While they 
provide and serve, they still appear in a stronger and more independent position. Blindly 
drawn into the administrative, supervisory or judicial desiring-machines, K., for 
instance, depends on women‟s collaboration.33 
     
The two assumed simultaneous movements within the text, one layer developing, the 
other dismantling, can be read as the two coexistent states of desire, two states of law, 
„paranoiac transcendental law‟ (Deleuze and Guattari 2006, p. 59) and „schizo-law‟ as 
„justice‟, „antilaw‟ (Deleuze and Guattari 2006, p. 59),34 in a process of contact and 
                                                 
31
 The line of Elsa, K.‟s prostitute girlfriend, the washerwoman and Leni is multiply connected to 
segments of the over-arching judicial desiring-machine: Elsa to banking, the washerwoman to 
functionaries, bailiffs and judges and Leni to a network of lawyers. 
32
 Frieda links the secretaries and functionaries; Olga services the man servants of the functionaries; and 
the landlady Amelia entertains multiple connections. 
33
 K.‟s relationships reveal him as a lecher, even a libertine, taking advantage of any opportunity to 
engage with women although he projects his own libidinous, often lewd attitude onto them. In The castle 
K. turns out to be an imposter, a liar, a trickster, a calculating manipulator, turning all situations to his 
advantage. In The trial Joseph K. presents himself as arrogant, indifferent, negligent, and self- regarding. 
Kafka refrains from critique but the obvious contradiction between K.‟s allures and his fate provokes 
hilarious situations.   
34
 „These two coexistent states of desire are the two states of law. On the one hand, there is the paranoiac 
transcendental law that never stops agitating the finite segment and making it into a completed object, 
crystallizing all over the place. On the other hand, there is the immanent schizo-law that functions like 
justice, an antilaw, a „prodecure‟ that will dismantle all the assemblages of the paranoiac law. Because 
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dispersal. These two coexistent movements postulated by Deleuze-Guattari are caught 
up in each other. I regard this entanglement as the core of desiring practice with its 
schizoid processes of discursive dissociation. While in the first instance the schizoid 
principle reigns and the folding principle governs the advanced stage, in the final stage 
the dismantling is completed. Deleuze-Guattari regard the fact of withholding critique 
within the writing process and making it part of the structure of the texts as Kafka‟s 
strength and innovation. The critique is withheld in content but made part of expression 
in the process of doubled dismantling. „It is by the power of his noncritique that Kafka 
is so dangerous. We can simply say that there are two coexistent movements, each 
caught up in each other‟ (Deleuze and Guattari 2006, p. 60). This non-involvement is 
supported by the proliferation of characters who escape. Even K. who is regarded as the 
protagonist, has his several doubles
35
 to schizoanalytically evade and remain in the flow 
of desire. Again, the rule of contact and continuity applies and they are „active and 
continuous line(s) of escape‟ (Deleuze and Guattari 2006, p. 61). Paranoia stands 
against schizophrenia, the transcendental law against the immanent law, completed 
objects and fused and fixed subjects against dismantled assemblages. Schizo-law 
understood as „justice‟ (Deleuze and Guattari 2006, p. 59) functions as anti-law. The 
processes of dissociation are stronger as the processes of fusion and contraction. The 
schizoid processes of discursive dissociation affect all parameters of expression (non-
composition, a-subjectivity, serialization and proliferation of series). These forms of 
dissociation on the compositional, stylistic and discursive levels affect the spatial 
unfolding of literary texts. For my purposes of extracting and delineating literary 
strategies in Deleuze-Guattari‟s Kafka treatise, I term this spatial unfolding perspectival 
topography, an attempt to instantiate in literary texts a-representational perspectives and 
locations. 
 
While the pervasive processes of dissociation in Kafka‟s texts evoke in the reader a 
feeling of vertigo, of groundlessness, Deleuze-Guattari attempt to formalise these 
impressions by proposing two functional „architectural states‟ (Deleuze and Guattari 
2006, p. 75), an „astronomical model‟ and an „earthly or underground model‟ which 
operate separately, simultaneously, and disjunctively in an oppositional yet folded 
                                                                                                                                               
once again, this is what it is all about – the discovery of assemblages of immanence and their dismantling‟ 
(Deleuze and Guattari 2006, p. 59). 
35
 For instance Barnabas the messenger in The castle or the student in The trial. 
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manner,36 as expression of mutually penetrating powers (of desire, of laws, of 
bureaucracies). This type of spatial understanding, they propose, works equally well for 
the „novels‟, The trial, The castle, America, and other texts such as Metamorphosis 
(Kafka, trans. W and E Muir, 1981; trans. and ed. Hofmann, 2007a). 
 
The astronomical model partly emulates Foucault‟s panopticon: a central tower higher 
up allows supervision of the surrounding cells or blocks which are modeled as 
„discontinuous block-arches‟, and a multitude of „stairs‟ connects the blocks which 
function as thresholds of intensities or cogs of the totality of desiring-machines.37 The 
                                                 
36
 Deleuze-Guattari initially deduce these spatial models (used for libidinal purposes) from Kafka‟s text 
„The great wall of China‟ (trans. W and E Muir, 1981, pp. 65-81) in an attempt to get to the core of the 
two mutually penetrating bureaucracies, an old imperial despotic form as against a modern capitalist 
and/or socialist form. They thus align Kafka‟s literary texts with their social-political notion of minor 
language and literature. See Deleuze-Guattari (2006, pp. 43-53, esp. p. 46; pp. 72-3; p.77 (cf. „An 
imperial message‟); p. 83). Deleuze-Guattari repeatedly refer to „The great wall of China‟ as 
exemplifying the libidinally ruled power mechanism (as does „In the penal colony‟ (trans. Hofmann, 
2007a, pp. 147-80), or „In the penal settlement‟ (trans. W and E Muir, 1981, pp. 167-99), and in a much 
larger and thus diffused frame, The trial (trans. Mitchell 1998; trans. Parry, 2000b)). „[…] in “The great 
wall of China” – the law is examined in terms of its connections to the parties that the different 
commentators belong to. But politically, the important things are always taking place elsewhere […] 
where people confront he real, immanent problems of desire and of power – the real problem of justice‟ 
(Deleuze and Guattari 2006, p. 50). This particular Kafka text exemplifies the equation of law, justice and 
desire. Several traits can discerned: (1) The aporetic character of law/justice/desire (in their proposed 
equation): „the law as a pure and empty form without content, the object of which remains unknowable: 
thus, the law can be expressed only through a sentence, and the sentence can be learned only through a 
punishment. No one knows the law‟s interior. […] In “The great wall of China”: “[I]t is an extremely 
painful thing to be ruled by laws that one does not know … [T]he essence of a secret code is that it should 
remain a mystery” (Deleuze and Guattari 2006, p. 43; quoting from Kafka‟s text, original ellipsis). (2) 
The processual nature of law/justice/desire: „justice as desire‟ (Deleuze and Guattari 2006, p. 49, p. 51) 
and „law as desire‟ (Deleuze and Guattari 2006, p. 60, p. 61) turn formless: „Desire is not form, but a 
procedure, a process‟ (Deleuze and Guattari 2006, p. 8), „where one believed there was the law, there is in 
fact desire and desire alone. Justice is desire and not law (Deleuze and Guattari 2006, p. 49; referring to 
The trial, original italics). (3) The resulting immanence of desire: „if justice doesn‟t let itself be 
represented, that is because it is desire […] If everything, everyone, is part of justice, […] this is […] 
because of of the immanence of desire‟ (Deleuze and Guattari 2006, p. 50). (4) The textual implications 
of libidinal aporia, process and immanence: „schizophrenic‟ (Deleuze and Guattari 2006, p. 53) 
proliferation of series (chapter six of Deleuze-Guattari‟s Kafka exegesis): „This method (referring 
specifically to The trial) of segmentary acceleration or proliferation connects the finite, the contiguous, 
the continuous, and the unlimited‟ (Deleuze and Guattari 2006, p. 58; original  italics). The challenge of 
reading Kafka‟s text lies in separating the text‟s („descriptive‟ or „narrative‟) surface level from its 
(„relational‟ or „libidinal‟) subtext which is handled by Deleuze-Guattari in their spatial (astronomical and 
subterranean) models. 
37
 I illustrate Deleuze-Guattari‟s astronomical model with a text passage from The trial: „He had thought 
he would recognize the house from a distance by some sign, which he himself had not visualized exactly, 
or by some movement around the entrance. […] K. penetrated further into the alley, slowly, […] The 
house was some way down and was rather unusually extensive, the main entrance being particularly high 
and wide. […] he stayed for a while at the courtyard entrance. […] K. turned to the stairs to go to the 
room where the examination would take place, then he stopped, for in addition to these stairs he saw in 
the courtyard three other flights of stairs and, apart from these, a little passage at the end of the courtyard 
seemed to lead to a second courtyard. […] The real search began on the first floor. […] Before reaching 
the fifth floor he made up his mind to give up the search, […] and started downstairs. […] he went back 
again and knocked at the first door on the fifth floor. […] and she pointed […] to the open door of the 
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libidinal movement in this model is circular, discontinuous, jarring between distant and 
close, high-angle and low-angle perspectives, the impossibility of obtaining a full view. 
The reader seems to be under the impression of craning up or down which provokes the 
nauseating groundlessness of progressive-regressive textual flow that mirrors the actual 
working of the desirous machine. 
 
The earthly or underground model evokes unlimited hallways, on the horizontal plane, 
from which „separated doors‟ open up further corridors, either ascending or descending, 
yet leading „somewhere‟, to „imagined exits‟ which at times eventuate but do not make 
sense in terms of the voyage towards them. In contrast to the circular astronomical 
model, there are no connecting stairs. Instead „low ceilings‟ are evoked as if in 
underground tunnels or „burrows‟. The corresponding libidinal movement in this model 
is stretching into the distance, as if emulating protracted longing, pointing to the 
faraway where contiguity holds out a promise. The craning up and down of the 
astronomical model gives way here to the horizontal span of a (cinematic) „wide angle‟ 
and vast stretches of (cinematic) „depth-of-field‟.38 The individual architectural or 
topographical descriptors, stairs, arches, cells/blocks, ceilings, hallways, corridors, 
doors, are not metaphorical (stairway to heaven, heavenly door) but expressive elements 
for the complex network of libidinal flows. Thus they function as literary strategies of 
desiring practice. 
 
                                                                                                                                               
adjoining room. K. had the impression he was walking into a great assembly‟, „First Examination‟ (Kafka 
2000b, pp. 5-38; esp. pp. 27-9). 
38
 I illustrate Deleuze-Guattari‟s earthly or underground model with a text passage from The castle: „A 
servant [Momus, secretary to Erlanger] met them in the hallway and led them along the route K. already 
knew across the courtyard, then through the door and into the low, slightly downhill passage. Clearly, 
only the higher officials stayed on the upper floors, while the secretaries stayed on this passage, Erlanger 
too, even though he was one of the highest of them. […] Everything here was small but daintily 
constructed. The best possible use was made of space. The passage was just high enough for a person to 
walk upright. Down the sides, the doors almost touched. The walls on either side stopped off the ceiling; 
this was no doubt for ventilation purposes, because in this deep, cellar-like passage the tiny rooms 
presumably had no windows. The disadvantage of these not quite complete walls was the noise in the 
passage and inevitably also in the rooms. […] The passage itself was empty except for a tall pale thin man 
sitting outside one of the doors in a fur, under which his nightclothes showed, […] Eventually, they came 
to a door that was no different from the rest but behind which, the servant informed him, Erlanger stayed‟, 
chapter 21 (Kafka 2000a, pp. 216-7). Chapters 21, 22 and 23 are set in the underground passages of the 
Count‟s Arms hotel-bar. Deleuze-Guattari draw here on the films of Orson Welles, Citizen Kane, The 
magnificent Ambersons, The lady from Shanghai, The third man and his cinematic version of Kafka‟s The 
trial (with Welles as judge and Romi Schneider as Leni). Welles‟s style of wide-angle and depth-of-field 
parallels Deleuze-Guattari‟s evocation of the two models of desiring-machines, demonstrating the 
„affinity of Welles‟ genius with Kafka‟ (Deleuze and Guattari 2006, p. 76). 
  
 
 
183 
Finally I consider perspectival topography as an enlargement of paradoxical syntactical 
structure and thus of the regime of stylistic and discursive dissociation. Deleuze-
Guattari parallel the states of intensities and desire illustrated in their architectural 
models with the folded co-existence of „transcendental law‟ (Deleuze and Guattari 
2006, p. 72) as an „astronomical construction‟ and „immanent justice‟, an „immanent 
assemblage of justice‟ (Deleuze and Guattari 2006, p. 73) as earthly or underground 
construction. K.‟s libidinal „voyage‟, either circular or (infinitely) extending, leads 
through progressive-regressive dismantling to a final solution: in the case of The trial to 
the live execution by knifing his heart twice,39 in the case of The castle to a (dim and 
idling) awareness of the equation of law and justice.40 
 
Perspectival topography functions in Kafka‟s texts as a strategy to map the serialization 
of (libidinal) blocks and passages, „intensive thresholds‟ of libidinal intensities, evoked 
as „spatial progression‟ through the offices leading nowhere but to his death in The trial, 
or through spatial errant movements of voyaging and journeying in The castle. In both 
cases, reaching beyond partial perspectives becomes impossible: Joseph K.‟s attempts 
to obtain a view, an „examination‟ and a „verdict‟ (guilty or innocent?) in The trial 
before his execution are frustrated; K.‟s struggle to be granted an „encounter‟ and a „life 
task‟ (a purposeful assignment) in The castle falters. Yet their libidinal trajectories can 
be traced and palpated in their minutest shifts and turns. In this sense, perspectival 
topography is a useful method and literary strategy to test shifts in intensities when 
reading perplexing literary texts by means of desiring practice. 
    
 
 
                                                 
39
 The text passage from The trial reads: „But the hands of the one gentleman were at K.‟s throat while 
the other drove the knife into his heart and turned it there twice. With his failing sight K. could still see 
the gentlemen right in front of his face, cheek pressed against cheek, as they observed the decisive 
moment. “Like a dog!” he said. It was as if the shame would outlive him‟ (Kafka 2000b, p. 178). 
40
 The text passage from The castle reads: „Only very slowly did K. come to see the whole thing. He‟d 
had no right to be in the passage, […] but he should remain aware – presumably he possessed at least the 
usual amount of common sense? – that he was in a place where he did not really belong, […] so had he 
not, there in the passage, had a feeling of severe impropriety? […] What, K. still didn‟t get it? […] They 
[the gentlemen of the castle working on the “papers”] were simply not up to it. What sort of person would 
fail to respect that? Well, it had to be someone like K. Someone who disregarded everything, the law as 
much as the most ordinary human consideration, with this dull indifference and sleepiness, […] K. 
literally collapsed on one of the barrels. There in the half-dark, he felt contented. […] in reality he had 
been quite incapable of seeing anything at all, […]‟ (Kafka 2006a, pp. 250-4).  
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Polyvocality of desire     
 
While the process of dismantling drains the textual fabric of subjectivity, Deleuze-
Guattari maintain that „[D]esire is fundamentally polyvocal, and its polyvocality make 
of it a single and unique desire that flows over everything‟ (Deleuze and Guattari 2006, 
p. 57).
41
 This observation can be understood in the sense that the complex assemblages 
of desire and variously connected desiring-machines are multiply voiced, thus retaining 
in a muted form some subjectivity or reduced individuality. It can also be read in the 
sense that desire finds its expression in a schizoid, dispersed, dissociated manner. In 
another sense, Deleuze-Guattari point to two „lines‟ of desire, an oedipal and a schizoid, 
„struggling‟ with each other. They differentiate between three levels of intensities or 
styles of expression of passion: the complex „novels‟ as machinic and collective 
assemblages (third expressive style), the initiating letters and diaries as diabolic dual-
faced pacts (first expressive style) and the stories as desiring-machines in the process of 
becoming-animal (second expressive style). They propose that the struggle between 
oedipal and schizoid „lines‟ of desire eventuates on the second, intermediate level of 
intensities, thus determining the second style of expression of passion. As examples for 
such a different explication of desire and how to make sense of it with respect to 
Kafka‟s oeuvre, Deleuze-Guattari draw up a theory of experimental writing focusing on 
the question of which desirous scheme promotes or hinders the development of complex 
assemblages of desire. This theory leads to the very core of the libidinal differences in 
texts constructed in the oedipal or schizoid desiring mode. It can thus be of value for 
profiling literary strategies of differential desiring practice.  
 
Deleuze-Guattari propose five separate scenarios for the development of complex 
assemblages of desire depending on the status of de-oedipalization (Deleuze and 
Guattari 2006, pp. 38-40). The first scenario occurs when a text dealing with a specific 
case of becoming-animal loses its potential for a novel.
42
 The second scenario 
                                                 
41
 Cf. Guattari‟s individual work on polyvocality in his Anti-Oedipus papers: „Psychoanalysis and 
polyvocality‟ (Guattari, St Nadaud (ed.), 2006, pp. 70-8); „Of anxiety, the phallic object and 
interpretation‟ (pp. 103-6); on the diagram in „Eros /bi-univocality-death drive/polyvocality (p. 103); „Of 
the narcissistic machine‟ (pp. 135-42) which deals with a comparison of Cocteau Infernal machine, 
Oedipus, and Lacan „Kant with Sade‟ (pp. 137-8); „Of a machinic interpretation of Lacan‟s “a”‟ (pp. 152-
8). 
42
 Deleuze-Guattari‟s example is Metamorphosis [1915] where they detect full oedipalization which 
prevents the evolution of assemblage(s) of desire. The libidinal relation(s) thus decide the potential of the 
literary „structure‟ of the work. 
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eventuates if the case of becoming-animal „includes sufficient machinic indexes that go 
beyond the animal‟ (Deleuze and Guattari 2006, p. 38), thus affording an opening into a 
novel.
43
 In the third scenario the novelistic project is abandoned if the animal 
„escapes‟.44 Fourthly, a novel is halted in its completion „unless the machinic indexes 
organize themselves into a real assemblage that is self-sufficient‟ (Deleuze and Guattari 
2006, p. 38).
45
 Fifthly, a text with an explicit machine cannot develop „unless it 
succeeds in plugging into a concrete socio-political assemblage‟.46 Since there is no 
space to follow their argument in detail, here I conclude my discussion to two important 
„oedipal‟ texts so as to clarify how they differentiate schizo-incest from oedipal-incest. 
 
First Metamorphosis [1915] and „Letter to the father‟ are early works47 where Kafka 
experiments with writing and attempts to find his style or signature. Deleuze-Guattari 
question the critical acclaim of Metamorphosis as Kafka‟s perfected story (Deleuze and 
Guattari 2006, p. 39) and execute a detailed explication in line with their proposal of 
minor language and literature. They assert that Metamorphosis unfolds and reflects the 
desirous move from „plastic and still oedipal incest‟ between brother and sister to a later 
„schizo-incest‟, that is a freed desire pattern, and then in the resolution abolishing („re-
oedipalising‟) the situation.48 In the wider social and political perspective, Deleuze-
Guattari name the two states oppression and freedom, reterritorialization (as capture) 
and deterritorialization (as opening and setting up new connections). Instead of offering 
an interpretation of the textual fabric, they observe the functional blockages in the 
                                                 
43
 Their example is „Investigations of a dog (hound)‟ [1922] (trans. W and E Muir, 1981, pp. 83-126) 
where the process of oedipalization is overcome by an assemblage of dogs. The becoming-animal thus 
operates as facilitator of the assemblage.  
44
 Their example is „In the penal colony‟ [1914] (trans. Hofmann, 2007a, pp. 147-80), or „In the penal 
settlement‟ (trans. W and E Muir, 1981, pp. 167-99) where they evaluate a too strong oedipalization in the 
commandant-officer/father-son complex rendering the ending difficult. The struggle to resolve the 
libidinal scheme(s) undercuts the freeing of an anoedipal unconscious. 
45
 Deleuze-Guattari cite several examples: The trial [unfinished, 1925], The castle [unfinished, 1926], 
America [unfinished, 1927] are „incomplete‟ or rather „interminable works‟ (Deleuze and Guattari 2006, 
p. 39) since they cannot achieve the self-sufficiency of the assemblage, they become instead one-sided 
social assemblages of bureaucracies. In this case libidinal and the social desiring-production split apart 
and result in indeterminacy.  
46
 Their examples are „In the penal colony‟ [1914] and „The cares of a family man‟ [n.d.], or „Troubles of 
a householder‟ (trans. W and E Muir, 1982, pp. 137-8), „The worries of a head of household‟ (trans. 
Hofmann, 2007a, pp. 211-2). In these cases the libidinal desiring-production is halted by the missing 
social desiring- production. Editor‟s note: „Odradek means in Czech something like „outside the law‟ 
(trans. W and E Muir, 1982, p. 137).  
47
 The same experimental style applies to „Description of a struggle‟ [1904/05] (trans. W and E Muir, 
1982, pp. 77-86), The judgement [1912] (also as „The verdict‟) (trans. W and E Muir, 1982, pp. 107-17; 
trans. Hofmann, 2007a, pp. 35-50), „In the penal colony‟ [1914] (trans. Hofmann, 2007a, pp. 147-80), or 
„In the penal settlement‟ (trans. W and E Muir, 1981, pp. 167-99). 
48
 Dung beetle Gregor Samsa dies, is discarded and the sister looks forward to spring and marriage. 
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machines of desire, the neutralization and impasses in experimental desire. They align 
these observations with the patterns of desire in masochism, which is here interpreted in 
the original sense as a willing contract system based on submission.
49
 In Deleuze-
Guattari‟s view, Kafka relates to the originary cartography of masochism (of pact, 
deliberate submission and denial of the father)
50
 and cannot be aligned with its 
psychoanalytic reading. Kafka‟s openings and desirous moves forward take the form of 
states of becoming, as becoming-child, becoming-animal and finally becoming-
imperceptible. The schizo, as here in the schizo-incest between the sister and Gregor, 
escapes oedipalization in becoming-animal (and dying). The line of escape in 
becoming-animal is thus led ad absurdum, and the experiment must be viewed as failed. 
Deleuze-Guattari are inclined, however, to view Kafka as engaging in a struggle and 
thus propose that his Oedipus is an absurd, comical and self-mocking figure and 
through its exaggeration exorcises the familial situation from inside and beneath its 
pressure in an experimental process of schizoanalysis and hyperbolic diffusion. If then 
the so-called Kafkaesque domains, judiciary, economic, bureaucratic, political, colonial, 
and discursive, are displayed as under the sway of a general dominant oedipalization 
(inherent in the major enforced language), dismantling techniques such as serialization 
and proliferation invade the texts and comically defeat Oedipus on its own terrain. 
There are two paths Kafka is seen to take for a comical enlargement of Oedipus, either 
to dissolve the original triangle (mother-father-child) into competing proliferating 
series, or to attempt the line of escape in states of becoming. Since Kafka establishes a 
„whole zoo of animals‟ (warbling beetles, singing mice, dancing dogs, academic dogs, 
learned apes, tunneling moles), Deleuze-Guattari question any resolution of the struggle 
between „schizo-escape‟ and „Oedipal impasse‟. 
 
                                                 
49
 Deleuze-Guattari devote in their chapter on „The Connectors‟ (women) (Deleuze and Guattari 2006, pp. 
63-71) a short parenthesis to masochism (pp. 66-7), drawing on Deleuze‟s study Masochism: Coldness 
and cruelty [1967] (Deleuze 2006d) and other short essays by Deleuze on Masoch. Cf. „De Sacher-
Masoch au masochisme‟ [1961] (untranslated); „Mysticism and masochism‟ [1967] (Deleuze 2004a, pp. 
131-4) [after the publication of Masochism]; „Re-presentation of Masoch‟ [1989] (1997b, pp. 53-5). 
Of interest for my exegesis among the comparisons between Masoch and Kafka are: (1) the diabolic pact 
in Kafka‟s letters parallels the masochist contract; (2) both communicate in letters; (3) both have an 
inclination towards becoming-animal (for instance exemplified in Masoch‟s love of fur and becoming-
bear); (4) both demonstrate the triangular categories of women as sister/mother-maids-whore; (5) both 
Kafka and Masoch build a minor literature, in Masoch‟s case of the people of the puszta, the Hungarian 
steppe.  
50
 Deleuze‟s study Masochism: Coldness and cruelty [1967] and other short essays (1961, 1967, 1989) 
explore a quite distinct symptomatology which bears no resemblance to psychoanalytic masochism, in 
fact overturns it. 
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Second Deleuze-Guattari consider K.‟s relationships with women in The trial and The 
castle as forms of a combined formula of schizo-incest since all three types of 
relationships with the women, as sisters for emotional (and sexual) support, as maids 
(for householding services and sex) and as whores (for quasi-conjugal continuous 
sexual services) are anti-familial and anti-conjugal but retain an element of (mocked) 
motherly care. Deleuze-Guattari also draw connecting lines between oedipal incest and 
transcendental law, and between schizo-incest and immanent schizo-law. They also 
view different artistic features as aligned with oedipal incest (photos, portraits, 
visualization, the gaze) and schizo-incest (bells, music, sound, the aural scape). Oedipal 
incest brings up childhood memories of guilt and repression; schizo-incest brings up 
childhood blocks which are memoryless and full of vitality. Schizo-incest is thus 
evaluated as a maximal connectivity of polyvocality of desire. This connectivity at 
times translates in Kafka to promiscuity which is frowned upon but accepted.
51
 
Deleuze-Guattari also raise the question of censorship of Kafka‟s texts where either the 
author himself or the later editors cut out any explicit homosexual effusion and explicit 
sexual activities but there are many instances of overt eroticization in K.‟s attitudes in 
the „novels‟ and in the stories.  
          
Sign systems: From semiology to symptomatology 
 
Deleuze‟s literary treatises on Proust, Masoch and Beckett approach the literary oeuvre 
with very different critical methods from those used in Deleuze-Guattari‟s treatise on 
Kafka. In the case of Proust, Deleuze develops a complex multi-layered systems of 
signs, hieroglyphs and symptoms. These move through several different stages of 
revision, spanning from semiology with structural elements to literary symptomatology 
set under very different premises. With regard to compositional techniques, the schizoid 
approach utilized here is not in the first instance concerned with the linguistic and 
discursive dismantling, as in Deleuze-Guattari‟s Kafka treatise, although this is also of 
interest. Instead it focuses on techniques of style based on a multiplicity of viewpoints 
which disperses any defined subjectivity and dissociates the textual fabric. Deleuze‟s 
literary analysis is furthermore governed by his concern for detecting desiring-
machines, assemblages of desire, and how these desirous machines connect with each 
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 Olga provides free services to the camp of man servants in The castle; Leni entertains multiple 
simultaneous relationships in The trial. 
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other. In contrast, then, to the literary analysis of Kafka‟s works, Deleuze‟s focus with 
regard to the schizoid processes of discursive dissociation in Proust‟s works is a 
complex temporal system built on involuntary memory which eventuates in a layered 
system of signs re-connecting vast spans of lifetime. These signs are inter-related and 
inter-responsive, reach over multiple volumes of text and are anchored in the deeply felt 
sensual lived experiences of taste, sight, smell, posture, touch / feeling of balance and 
sound. They establish an affective network of compositional value and a gigantic 
desirous machine.  
 
Deleuze‟s treatise on Proust, being a threefold exercise utilising quite different methods 
and strategies, shifts from a structurally-semiotically inspired analysis of sign systems; 
to the notion of a literary machine which produces friezes of hieroglyphs; and then to 
Deleuze‟s proposition of Proust‟s work being an exploration of schizoid states of mind 
in madness and trans-sexuality.
52
 As the complete system of inter-related sign systems 
across many tomes cannot be approached and discussed within the frame of this chapter, 
I focus here on four aspects of Deleuze‟s threefold treatise which I consider productive 
for delineating, profiling and accentuating literary strategies of differential desiring 
practice. The first of these is Deleuze‟s deduction of a dissociated time concept which 
affects the denial of representation evolving out of his considerations of sign systems 
and the notion of involuntary memory. The second aspect is Deleuze‟s proposition that 
Proust‟s style of retracing the time layers re-invoked by involuntary memory consists in 
a multiplicity of viewpoints and thus a dispersal of characters. Third is Deleuze‟s 
unfolding of the literary machine and its further development into the proposition of the 
three libidinal machines of impulses, Eros and Thanatos which produce the 
corresponding orders of truth of time regained (for impulses) and the flux of time lost 
                                                 
52
 Cf. Deleuze et al „Proust Round Table‟ [1975] (Deleuze 2006g, pp. 29-60); „Occupy without Counting: 
Boulez, Proust and Time‟ [n.d.] (Deleuze 2006g, pp. 292-9). Cf. Bataille „Proust‟ [1957] (1986b, pp. 131-
47). For an overview of Proust‟s Search, see: Brée Du temps perdu au temps retrouvé: Introduction à 
l‟œuvre de Marcel Proust (2nd edn 1969); Kristeva (trans. Guberman,1996/1994); for a range of essays 
on Proust, see: Houppermans et al. (eds) 2007. Cf. also Bogue‟s evolving commentaries while revisiting 
Deleuze‟s Proust essay, for instance, „Introduction‟ (2004, pp. 1-6); „Word, image, and sound: Deleuze 
and semiosis‟ [1991] (2004, pp. 109-26); „Deleuze‟ s style‟ [1996] (2004, pp. 9-26); „Introduction: The 
transverse way: du côté de chez Deleuze‟ (2007, pp.1-5); „Search, swim and see: Deleuze‟s 
apprenticeship in signs and pedagogy of images‟ [2004; mod.] (2007, pp. 53-67). For an alignment of the 
three synthesis of time (as conceived by Deleuze) with Proust, see: Faulkner 2006 and 2007. Beckett‟s 
early work on Proust analyses sign systems which parallel (if not equate) Deleuze‟s. Cf. Beckett Proust 
[1931] (1999, pp. 7-93). For a comparative analysis of Beckett and Proust, see: Bryden and Topping 
Beckett‟s Proust / Deleuze‟s Proust (2009); Reid Proust, Beckett, and narration (2010). See also for other 
approaches to a Proust exegesis (which cannot here be entered into), for instance: Bataille „Proust‟ 
[1957], Literature and evil (1986d, pp. 131-47). 
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(for inseparable Eros and Thanatos, love and death). Both levels, the level of the 
libidinal machines and that of discovery of truth, are supported by reflections on art 
(music, writing and literature, painting and theatre) and reflections on sexuality in the 
forms of heterosexuality, homosexuality and trans-sexuality. Finally the fourth aspect I 
consider is the overarching function of the invisible, imperceptible narrator as sensating 
spider and Body without Organs reflecting the presence of madness and delirium: 
Charlus and Albertine combining schizoid states and schizoid sexuality, Sodom and 
Gomorrah (the title of volume 4 of In search of lost time; trans. Scott and Kilmartin, 
2000b).
53
 To begin with, involuntary memory resurrects the childhood scene of 
Combray through the taste of the madeleine dipped into a cup of lime blossom tea.
54
 
The recollection progresses in several stages: the present scene triggers off synaesthetic 
libidinal impressions („the fluted valve of a scallop shell‟, morsel of cake, warm liquid, 
crumbs on the palate) which are followed by a feeling of bliss (jouissance). In a sudden 
flash of involuntary recall the phantasmatic fusion of present and past eventuates, 
spreading out all details (tisane of lime blossom ‒ grey house ‒ towns and gardens) of 
the past which appears as if unchanged. This scene, an actualization of a timeless event, 
sets the precedent for the literary procedure of multi-layering sign systems, dispersion 
of viewpoint and libidinal machines filtering through the momentous Proustian work, 
                                                 
53
 Deleuze quotes from the Pléiade edition of Proust‟s work (1954, 3 vols) from which Howard translates. 
For my own project where I trace the particular incidences used by Deleuze to support his semiotic and 
later symptomatological axioms I refer to the translations by Scott Moncrief and Kilmartin, rev. by 
Enright (with the exception of the last volume, translated by Mayor and Kilmartin, rev. Enright). For 
cross-references between the volumes I referr to Kilmartin (comp.) In search of lost time: VI Time 
regained (2000, pp. 461-693). 
54
 „Many years had elapsed during which nothing of Combray […] had any existence for me, when one 
day in winter […] my mother […] offered me some tea […] She sent for one of those squat, plump little 
cakes called “petites madeleines,” which look as though they had been moulded in the fluted valve of a 
scallop shell. And soon, mechanically, […] I raised to my lips a spoonful of the tea in which I had soaked 
a morsel of the cake. No sooner had the warm liquid mixed with the crumbs touched my palate than a 
shiver ran through me and I stopped, intent upon the extraordinary thing that was happening to me. An 
exquisite pleasure had invaded my senses, something isolated, detached, with no suggestion of its origin. 
[…] – this new sensation having had the effect, which love has, of filling me with a precious essence; or 
rather this essence was not in me, it was me. […] Whence could it have come to me, this all-powerful 
joy? I sensed that it was connected with the taste of the tea and the cake, but that it infinitely transcended 
those savours, could not, indeed be of the same nature. Where did it come from? What did it mean? How 
could I seize and apprehend it? […] And suddenly the memory revealed itself, the taste was that of the 
little piece of madeleine which on Sunday mornings at Combray […] my aunt Léonie used to give me, 
dipping it first in her own cup of tea or tisane. […] And as soon as I recognized the taste of the piece of 
madeleine soaked in her decoction of lime-blossom which my aunt used to give me […] immediately the 
old grey house upon the street, where her room was, rose up like a stage […] sprang into being, towns and 
gardens alike, from my cup of tea‟, In search of lost time, vol. I, Swann‟s way, 1 „Combray‟ (Proust 2005, 
pp. 51-5). 
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constituting proliferations of series which inter-connect and establish a dense, multi-
layered textual fabric. 
 
In proposing several inter-related complex systems of signs, hieroglyphs and symptoms 
as producing the Proustian oeuvre, which spans the lifetime of the narrator and his 
society in many volumes of written recollections, Deleuze shifts the reading of Proust‟s 
works away from an often assumed interpretation that the work comprises an attempt to 
search for and regain lost time. Instead, in Deleuze‟s view – which itself expands across 
the three versions written between 1964 and 1973 – interpretations grounded in memory 
and recollection, searching and regaining time, have little to do with the works except to 
circulate within the representational, self-gratifying scheme. In introducing the notion of 
involuntary memory anchored in his re-written notion of an anoedipal unconscious 
which produces the signs, hieroglyphs and symptoms as libidinal surges, Deleuze thus 
shifts the assumed (chronological) time registers of lived present, remembered past and 
envisioned future to the notion of pure past, understood here in the adapted Bergsonian 
sense (this was explored in the previous chapter). Pure past presents the pure and empty 
form of time which characterizes the anoedipal unconscious. Thus the signs, 
hieroglyphs and symptoms produced by the involuntary memory flowing out of the 
unconscious are, in Deleuze‟s understanding, the rising simulacra making up the totality 
of phantasm of the literary work.  
 
Deleuze partly equates signs, hieroglyphs and symptoms
55
 since they arise from the 
unconscious, yet differentiates them in their function; empty, ritualized or formalized 
signs stand against affective symptoms of deceptions while hieroglyphs need intense 
deciphering. The explication of signs lies within the realm of representation, of logos 
and reasoning, while deciphering symptoms and hieroglyphs shifts the reading process 
into the affective realm of pathos and a-representation.  
 
What unites the scent of a flower and the spectacle of a salon, the taste of a madeleine and the 
emotion of love is the sign and the corresponding apprenticeship. The scent of a flower, when it 
constitutes a sign, transcends at once the laws of matter and the categories of the mind. We are 
not physicists or metaphysicians; we must be Egyptologists. […] The Egyptologist, in all things, 
is the man who undergoes an initiation – the apprentice. […] It will come as no surprise that the 
hysteric makes his body speak. He discovers a primary language, the true language of symbols 
and hieroglyphs. His body is Egypt (Deleuze 2000, pp. 93-4). 
                                                 
55
 There is a shift from early to later statements (Deleuze 2000, p. 4, p. 9; pp. 92-3, p. 101, p. 102). 
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In pointing to the hieroglyphical obscurity and complexity (if not inaccessibility) of 
signs and bodily hysterical symptoms and the necessity of initiation, Deleuze moves 
beyond a representational reading practice into symptomatology to which I shall return 
in more detail.  
 
Deleuze‟s study takes Proust‟s work as a totality,56 not in its regressive narrative tracing 
of individual destinies in separate volumes.
57
 The two levels of his exegesis, semiotic-
structural and ideogrammatic-hieroglyphic, of the inter-related sign systems focus on 
the „emission and interpretation of signs‟58 and the „production and multiplications of 
signs‟.59 This focus indicates a re-orientation in approach from the idea of an artistic 
apprenticeship explored on the content level to the idea of a Proustian literary machine 
explored on the stylistic level of expression. Deleuze‟s final essay60 recasts the original 
exegeses in superseding content and expression (style) by extracting as the innovative 
core of the monumental creation the inter-dependence of madness and sexuality. The 
exegesis thus shifts from a representational mode of interest in characters and their sign-
emitting function to a differential mode of interest in the artistic writing process and its 
sign-producing function, and finally to an exegesis within the frame of an affective 
literary symptomatology pursued by Deleuze in the critical-clinical, which I look at later 
in this chapter. 
 
Style as multiplicity of viewpoints 
 
The schizoid processes of discursive dissociation, as I pointed out with regard to Kafka 
‒ there concerning compositional dismantling and perspectival topography, here the 
complex temporal system built on involuntary memory ‒ propel the rising simulacra, so 
that on the stylistic and discursive level a shattering of viewpoints takes place, either 
topographically or temporally. This can be observed in Proust as multiple, not 
contradicting but accumulating, versions of one particular event. In the syringa 
                                                 
56
 I Swann‟s way, II Within a budding grove, III The Guermantes way, IV Sodom and Gomorrah, V The 
captive; The fugitive, VI Time regained. 
57
 For instance, Swann and Odette; Marcel and Gilberte; Marcel and Albertine, Andrée, etc.; Françoise; 
Saint-Loup and Rachel; Marcel and Saint-Loup; Gilberte and Saint-Loup; Marcel and Charlus, Charlus 
and Jupien. 
58
 Cf. Part I „The Signs‟ [1964] (Deleuze 2000, pp. 3-102). 
59
 Cf. Part II „The Literary Machine‟ [1972] (pp. 103-69). 
60
 Cf. Conclusion to Part II „Presence and Function of Madness: The Spider‟ [1973] (pp. 170-82). 
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incident,
61
 Marcel‟s viewpoint or reading sets the template (Albertine must be spared 
the overpowering scent she abhors), while Andrée‟s account (after Albertine‟s death) 
modifies the template (Marcel was deceived into believing Albertine‟s claim of disgust, 
she actually favoured the scent). Dispersion and splintering continues, preventing any 
rapprochement to the unreachable truth of the matter. The multiplicity of viewpoints 
determining style and discourse arises out of the temporal structure but also out of the 
libidinal diffraction as it occurs in assemblages of desire forming and reshaping 
continuously, which inter-act, inter-connect and inter-relate cross-generationally and 
cross-sexually.
62
 
 
The evolution of the three levels of exegesis from emitted signs to produced hieroglyphs 
and affective symptoms cannot be followed here in detail. However, since they share 
their origin as libidinal surges of an anoedipal unconscious propelled by involuntary 
memory and throw a light onto the stylistic genesis of the multiplicity of viewpoints, 
some delineation is required. On the semiological level, Deleuze proposes four 
categories of signs: firstly, worldly empty signs for classes of society, for instance, 
Mme Verdurin „dislocating her jaw‟;63 secondly, deceptive, inconclusive signs of love 
exploring sexuality, for instance, Albertine refusing to be kissed.
64
 The third category, 
sensuous, experiential signs of taste, scent, touch, sound, sight and posture evoking the 
experiential lived past, increasingly draws on serialization in difference and repetition 
and becomes the grounding of the following multiplication and proliferation of series, 
which I observed in the corresponding exploration of Deleuze-Guattari‟s Kafka treatise 
as one of the parameters of the schizoid processes of discursive dissociation. 
 
                                                 
61
 Cf. V The captive; The fugitive (Proust 2000, p. 54, pp. 688-9, pp. 701-2). 
62
 For instance, Marcel‟s line of relationships with Gilberte, Rachel, Albertine, and Andrée; Odette‟s 
several marriages with Crécy, Swann, and Forcheville; Gilberte‟s several relationships and marriages 
with Léa, Marcel, Saint-Loup, and Guermantes; Charlus‟ (assumed and rumoured) conquests of Marcel, 
Jupien, and Morel; and Albertine‟s (inferred) network consisting of Andrée, Gisèle, Léa, and Gilberte as 
well as Marcel.  
63
 „Mme Verdurin, who had such an inveterate habit of taking literally the figurative descriptions of her 
emotions that Dr Cottard […] had once had to reset her jaw, which she had dislocated from laughing too 
much‟, I 2 „Swann in love‟ (Proust 2005, p. 226). 
64
 „I found Albertine in bed. […] The sight of Albertine‟s bare throat, of those flushed cheeks, had so 
intoxicated me […] I bent over Albertine to kiss her. […] “Stop it or I‟ll ring the bell!” cried Albertine, 
seeing that I was flinging myself upon her to kiss her. But I told myself that not for nothing does a girl 
invite a young man to her room in secret, […] Albertine had pulled the bell with all her might‟, II 2 
„Place-Names: The place‟ (Proust 2005, pp. 592-4). 
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In the third category, the complex sensuous sign of the madeleine
65
 encompasses taste-
scent-touch-sight and hallucinatory phantasm. Other smells and scents attach 
themselves to places or characters such as the hawthorn
66
 or Odette‟s scents,67 replacing 
substantial objects and subjects by hallucinated sensation as demonstrated in the 
experience of the touch of the cobblestones,
68
 on a par with the evocation of the 
scalloped cake. In contrast to the experience of the madeleine where a phantasmatic 
fusion of present and past takes place, an actualization of a timeless event, here the 
rising simulacra obtain an inner voice; auditions and visions are integrated in the 
sensuous recall, characteristic of Deleuze‟s literary practice of the critical-clinical which 
eventuates as a libidinal and symptomatological practice, as will be seen later. Visions 
and auditions break forth from the anoedipal, freed unconscious and are connected to 
the progressing artistic apprenticeship of the writer. Sounds, particularly of music as in 
Vinteuil‟s „little phrase‟69 and sights such as the steeples of Martinville70 inter-connect 
and inter-relate between time levels and levels of experience, thus accumulating as 
layers of recalled pasts. The body has a deeper memory than the mind or consciousness, 
as demonstrated in the incident of Marcel‟s bending down to buckle his boots (on his 
second visit to Balbec). There posture, fetishistic recall of an object and the suffering 
attached to it, fuse to bring up the accumulated but nevertheless unchanged 
experience.
71
 Comparable to the evocation sparked by the uneven cobblestones, this 
                                                 
65
 Cf. I Swann‟s way, 1 „Combray‟ (Proust 2005, pp. 51-5, p. 60) through to VI Time regained  (Proust 
2000, p.  216; cf. footnote p. 398). 
66
 The hawthorn smell: „a bitter-sweet scent of almonds emanating from the hawthorn-blossom‟ (next to 
the altar in the church), I Swann‟s way (Proust 2005, pp. 134-5). 
67
 Odette‟s scents: I Swann‟s way (Proust 2005, p. 264) (chrysanthemums); II Within a budding grove 
(Proust 2005, p. 87, p. 95, p. 245): „I would make my way along the tortuous path of a corridor perfumed 
for the whole of its length with the precious essences which ceaselessly wafted from her dressing-room 
their fragrant exhalations‟ (p. 95). 
68
 „[…] I had entered the courtyard of the Guermantes mansion […] I tripped against the uneven paving-
stones in front of the coach-house. And at the moment when, recovering my balance, I put my foot on a 
stone which was slightly lower than its neighbour […] Every time that I merely repeated this physical 
movement, I achieved nothing; but if I succeeded, forgetting […] again the dazzling and indistinct vision 
fluttered near me, as if to say: “Seize me as I pass if you can, and try to solve the riddle of happiness 
which I set you.” And almost at once I recognized the vision: it was Venice […] the sensation which I had 
once experienced as I stood upon two uneven stones in the baptistery of St Mark‟s […]‟, VI Time 
regained (Proust 2000, pp. 216-8). 
69
 Vinteuil‟s „little phrase‟: I Swann‟s way (Proust 2005, pp. 250-4); Swann-Odette‟s love theme: I 
Swann‟s way (Proust 2005, pp. 284-6, pp. 317-8, p. 415, pp. 418-24); II Within a budding grove (Proust 
2005, pp. 122-3); Marcel-Albertine‟s love: V The captive; The fugitive (Proust 2000, pp. 424-5, pp. 639-
40).  
70
 The steeples of Martinville: I Swann‟s way (Proust 2005, pp. 215-8); III The Guermantes way (Proust 
2000, p. 459, p. 633); V The captive; The fugitive (Proust 2000, p. 294, p. 428; VI Time regained (Proust 
2000, pp. 216-7, p. 232). 
71
 „Upheaval of my entire being. On the first night as I was suffering from cardiac fatigue I bent down 
slowly and cautiously to take off my boots, trying to master my pain. But scarcely had I touched the 
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hallucinatory evocation concerns a vision which is both the other, fleetingly envisaged 
as his grandmother, and the self, confounded and inseparable, yet schizoid in that it is 
dissociating and diffracting the experience. 
 
Deleuze‟s fourth category of signs, artistic signs connected to the successful artistic 
apprenticeship of the „narrator‟ (Marcel), subsumes in Deleuze‟s exegesis the other 
three categories of signs (the empty-ritualistic, deceptive-libidinal and sensuous-
experiential regimes). The emission of signs as proposed by Deleuze can be read as a 
symptomatological diagnostic of the crumbling pre-World War II society in social, 
sexual, experiential and artistic terms where order, reason and logos give way to an 
anarchic, chaotic universe. 
 
Shifting from the emission [1964] to the production of signs in his second Proust 
exegesis [1970] lends a sharper profile to the libidinal surges propelled by involuntary 
memory. Deleuze‟s focus exemplifies the Proustian literary machine in introducing the 
notions of multiplication of transversals (in jealousy, travel and sleep (Deleuze 2000, 
pp. 124-6)), schizoid consciousness (Deleuze „Levels of the search‟, 2000, p. 132), 
partial objects and trans-sexuality (Deleuze 2000, pp. 136-7), machines of resonance or 
desire, and Joyce‟s notion of epiphany (Deleuze „The three machines‟, 2000, pp. 151-6), 
and most importantly the notions of fragmentation and crystallization (Deleuze 
„Antilogos‟, 2000, p. 115) as two methods leading to schizodicity as demonstrating the 
force of desire (Deleuze „Cells and vessels‟, 2000, p. 120). These notions of dissociation 
open pathways into differential desiring practice in terms of composition, style, 
discourse and themes. The production of signs runs counter to the emission and 
explication of signs in that Deleuze‟s focus shifts from the textual level to the sub-
textual, pre-simulacral level. The notions of symptoms and hieroglyphs, of gestures and 
their ritualization or visions, of vocal signs or auditions as resonances (Vinteul‟s „little 
                                                                                                                                               
topmost button than my chest swelled, filled with an unknown, a divine presence, I was shaken with sobs, 
tears streamed from my eyes. The being who had come to my rescue, saving me from barrenness of spirit, 
was the same who, years before, in a moment of identical distress and loneliness, in a moment when I had 
nothing left of myself, had come in and restored me to myself, for that being was myself and something 
more than me […] I had just perceived, in my memory, stooping over my fatigue, the tender, 
preoccupied, disappointed face of my grandmother, as she had been on that first evening of our arrival 
[…] I now captured the living reality in a complete and involuntary recollection‟, IV Sodom and 
Gomorrah (Proust 2000, pp. 179-80). 
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phrase‟) function as schizoid descriptors which I consider productive for delineating, 
profiling and accentuating literary strategies of differential desiring practice. 
 
Libidinal machines: Art and sexuality         
 
Deleuze‟s final exegesis [1973] moves in a simulacral mode of interest in the totality of 
Proust‟s schizoid phantasm of trans-sexuality. 
 
The logos is a huge Animal whose parts unite in a whole and are unified under a principle or a 
leading idea; but the pathos is a vegetal realm consisting of cellular elements that communicate 
only indirectly, only marginally, so that no totalization, no unification, can unite this world of 
ultimate fragments. It is a schizoid universe of closed vessels, of cellular regions, where 
contiguity itself is a distance: the world of sex. This is what Charlus himself teaches us beyond 
his speeches.
72
 As individuals possessing both sexes, though „separated by a partition‟, we must 
cause the intervention of a galactic structure of eight elements, in which the male part or the 
female part of a man or woman can enter in to relation with the female part or the male part of 
another woman or man (ten combinations of eight elements: […]) Aberrant relations between 
closed vessels (Deleuze 2000, p. 175).     
 
The vegetal realm of pathos, the „silent vegetal universe, the madness of the Flowers‟ 
(Deleuze 2000, p. 174),
73
 points not so much to poignancy or pity as to the power of 
intense and excessive emotion (pathos read in the French sense
74
). Here the world of 
sex is characterized as an ultimately fragmented, schizoid, closed world of isolation as 
experienced by Charlus and Albertine, embodying male and female homosexuality 
where only „indirect‟ and „marginal‟ communication(s) eventuate. Deleuze plays 
through the human potential of a hermaphroditic double-nature in its combinations 
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 Charlus‟ speeches: II 2 „Place-Names: The place‟ (Proust 2005, pp. 391-5 ) (myosotis-Forget-me-nots); 
III 1 The Guermantes way (Proust 2000, pp. 326-40) (squeezing Marcel‟s arm); III 2, 2 The Guermantes 
way (Proust 2000, pp. 638-51) (Marcel trampling his hat); first encounter in Balbec: II 2 „Place-Names: 
The place‟ (Proust 2005, pp. 383-400). 
73
 Deleuze refers in the first instance to the relationship between Charlus and Jupien; however, in Proust‟s 
work the presence of flowers evolves as a symptomatological, libidinal, inter-related, inter-connected, 
resonating and ideogrammatic sign system of flowers and their varieties as vegetal sexual organs. Cf. I 
Swann‟s way: lime blossoms (Proust 2000, pp. 54-5) (aunt Léonie‟s tea-tisane); lilacs (p. 162, p. 222 
(Tansonville); white and pink hawthorn (pp. 164-8) (Tansonville); violets (p. 200) (spring flowers), (p. 
289, p. 511) (Odette‟s style); water-lilies (pp. 202-4); chrysanthemums (p. 264) (in Odette‟s house); 
cattleyas (pp. 279-82, p. 327, pp. 447-8) (Odette-Swann making love); II Within a budding grove: Parma 
violets and chrysanthemums (Proust 2005, pp. 193-8) (Odette-Swann); III The Guermantes way: 
„botanics at the Guermantes‟ (Proust 2000, pp. 596-8); IV Sodom and Gomorrah: pollination of flowers, 
orchid and bee, hermaphroditism, Charlus‟ homosexuality (Proust 2000, pp. 2-3, pp. 7-8, pp. 31-8); 
hawthorn and apple blossoms (p. 214, pp. 630-1); V The captive; The fugitive: the strong-scented syringa: 
(Proust 2000, p. 54, pp. 688-9, pp. 701-4). 
74
 „Pathos: ton pathétique excessif, dans un discours, un écrit‟ (Micro Robert 1971, p. 766). 
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rather than insisting on a dualistic model of sexual difference. He proposes that the 
composition of Proust‟s work as a totality follows such a principle of closed galaxies.75  
 
Deleuze‟s unfolding of the literary machine develops into the proposition of three 
libidinal machines which produce the corresponding orders of truth of time regained 
and the flux of time lost. Both levels, the level of the libidinal machines and the level of 
discovery of truth, are supported by reflections on art (Vinteuil for music,
76
 Bergotte for 
writing and literature,
77
 Elstir for painting,
78
 Berma for theatre)
79
 and reflections on 
sexuality in assumed but never guaranteed forms of heterosexuality, homosexuality and 
trans-sexuality.  
 
                                                 
75
 Cf. „Charlus-galaxy‟ (Deleuze 2000, p. 175); the „galaxy of girls‟ (around Albertine) (Deleuze 2000, p. 
176). A discussion of these points can be found in: Deleuze „Proust round table„ [1975] (participants: 
Barthes, Genette, Doubrowsky, Richard, Ricardou, and audience) (2006g, pp. 29-60).  
76
 These reflections on art in its various forms establish a cross-referential network which follows on the 
one hand a life under its specific conditions, but on the other, and more importantly, it marks and mirrors 
the creative (and libidinal) progress of the „writer‟ or „artist‟. In compositional terms then these instances 
are serial components, transversally connected and where in each series a system of dark precursors alerts 
the reader to libidinal shifts. I cannot follow here in detail the process and the functionality of these series, 
however I return to this issue in chapters seven and eight. Musician Vinteuil: I Swann‟s way (Proust 2005, 
p. 132) (his daughter Mlle Vinteuil), p. 178 (Vinteuil meeting Swann), pp. 191-2 (Vinteuil‟s 
compositions); 2 „Swann in love‟ (Proust 2005, p. 250 (Vinteuil‟s sonata at the Verdurins‟), pp. 262-3, p. 
284, p. 317 (Vinteuil‟s „little phrase‟ for Odette-Swann), p. 415, p. 419 (lost love); II 1 „Madame Swann 
at home‟ (Proust 2005, p. 118, p. 123 (Odette playing the Vinteuil‟s „little phrase‟); IV 2 Sodom and 
Gomorrah (Proust 2000, p. 309) (Vinteuil a great composer); 2,4 (pp. 595-6) (Marcel-Albertine); V The 
captive; The fugitive (Proust 2000, p. 173) (Marcel playing Vinteuil‟s sonata), p. 426 (Albertine playing 
Vinteuil‟s sonata; expressing the inexpressible); p. 639 (Albertine and Vinteuil‟s „little phrase‟).  
77
 Writer Bergotte: I Swann‟s way (Proust 2005, p. 106) (Bloch lends him a book by Bergotte), p. 110 
(Bergotte‟s style), p. 115 (Swann‟s admiration for Bergotte); 3 „Place-Names: The place‟ (Proust 2005, 
pp. 492-3) (Marcel-Gilberte; Berma, Racine); II 1 „Madame Swann at home‟ (Proust 2005, pp. 138-54) 
(Bergotte at Swanns‟), 2 „Place-Names: The place‟ (Proust 2005, p. 400) (Charlus lends him a book by 
Bergotte); III 2,1 The Guermantes way (Proust 2000, p. 373) (Bergotte‟s fame, his illness); IV 2,1 Sodom 
and Gomorrah (Proust 2000, pp. 165-9) (Bergotte  at Mme Swann‟s salon), 2,2 Sodom and Gomorrah 
(Proust 2000, p. 427) (Bergotte‟s illness); V The captive; The fugitive (Proust 2000, p. 202) (Bergotte‟s 
death), p. 410 (Marcel-Albertine); VI Time regained (Proust 2000, p. 242) (Marcel‟s disappointment), p. 
250 (Bergotte become unfashionable). 
78
 Painter Elstir: I Swann‟s way (Proust 2005, pp. 301-2) (Swann‟s criticism of Elstir); II Within a 
budding grove (Proust 2005, p. 468) (Marcel-Saint-Loup), p. 478 (at Elstir‟s studio), pp. 519-22 (party to 
meet Albertine), pp. 552-7 (Venice, Albertine‟s Fortuny costumes); III 1 The Guermantes way (Proust 
2000, pp. 137-9) (Marcel‟s admiration, Guermantes‟ Elstirs); 2,2 Sodom and Gomorrah (Proust 2000, pp. 
483-7) (Marcel sees Guermantes‟ Elstirs), p. 532 (Swann‟s unfavourable judgement of Elstir); V The 
captive; The fugitive (Proust 2000, p. 151, p. 154 (love of violets). 
79
 Actress Berma: I 1 „Combray‟ (Proust 2005, p. 87 (Berma‟s standing), p. 115 (writer Bergotte‟s 
admiration for Berma), 3 „Place-Names: The place‟ (Proust 2005, p. 473) (Marcel to see Berma‟s 
performance); II 1 „Madame Swann at home‟ (Proust 2005, pp. 10-17) (Berma‟s performance in Racine‟s 
Phèdre, Marcel‟s disappointment), pp. 155-7 (writer Bergotte‟s opinion of Berma); III 1 The Guermantes 
way (Proust 2000, pp. 42-57) (another Phèdre performance by Berma), p. 187 (actress Rachel‟s 
comments on Berma); IV 2,1 Sodom and Gomorrah (Proust 2000, p. 155 (Berma‟s ageing and failed 
party); VI Time regained (Proust 2000, p. 407) (Berma‟s death). 
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The Deleuzian rewriting of the unconscious, in paralleling and equating the three 
syntheses of time with the three syntheses of the unconscious, which I explored in the 
previous chapter, resets Freud‟s unconscious, his scheme of Id and Ego and his 
assumptions with regard to the pleasure principle and its beyond(s).
80
 As this rewriting 
involves a move into a differential frame of exegesis, leaving the representational 
scheme behind, it resets at the same time the parameters of creating and reading texts. 
The living present as the first synthesis of time unfolding the world of habitus, of 
contraction and contemplation, parallels Deleuze‟s first and (partially) second exegesis 
of Proust‟s work, while the pure past, memory, reminiscence and the representation of 
(foregone) presents as the second synthesis of time parallels the greater part of the 
second exegesis of Proust‟s work. The four paradoxes of the past ‒ contemporaneity, 
co-existence and pre-existence of the present with the past, and the Bergsonian cone of 
inter-related levels of all presents-pasts ‒ explicated earlier thus particularly impact on 
these literary exegeses. Deleuze‟s third version of the Proust treatise evokes the third 
synthesis of time, as pure and empty time, annihilation (or death), and as the dispersion 
into utter fragmentation. Here he proposes the narrator‟s affective dissolution as Body 
without Organs and presents Time regained (volume VI; Proust, trans. Mayor and 
                                                 
80
 Cf. the essential texts: Freud „Beyond the pleasure principle‟ [1920] deals with libido and 
Eros/Thanatos; „The ego and the id‟ [1923] ditto; „Inhibitions, Symptoms, and Fear‟ [1926] deals with 
symptoms; cf. also „Remembering, repeating, and working through‟ [1914] which deals with memory and 
repetition; „The unconscious‟ [1915]; „Drives and their fates‟ [1915]. Deleuze comments on Masoch by 
means of Freud as filtered through Lacan (and some of Lacan‟s disciples). As I stated earlier, the 
problematic of the Freudian unconscious and repression („the return of the repressed‟) as set against the 
Deleuzian repetition runs through Difference and repetition. Eros and Thanatos make an earlyappearance. 
Deleuze states in the introduction: „I do not repeat because I repress. I repress because I repeat, I forget 
because I repeat. I repress, because I can live certain things or certain experiences only in the mode of 
repetition. […] Eros and Thanatos are distinguished in that Eros must be repeated, can be lived only 
through repetition, whereas Thanatos (as transcendental principle) is that which gives repetition to Eros, 
that which submits Eros to repetition. Only such a point of view is capable of advancing us in the obscure 
problems of the origin of repression, its nature, its causes and the exact terms on which it bears. For when 
Freud shows – beyond repression “properly speaking”, which bears upon representations – the necessity 
of supposing a primary repression which concerns first and foremost pure representations, or the manner 
in which the drives are necessarily lived, we believe that he comes closest to a positive internal principle 
of repetition. This later appears to him determinable in the form of the death instinct, and it is this which, 
far from being explained by it, must explain the blockage of representation in repression properly 
speaking. This is why the law of the inverse relation between repetition and remembering is in every 
respect hardly satisfactory, in so far as it makes repetition depend upon repression. […] it was necessary 
to seek out the memory there where it was, to install oneself directly in the past in order to accomplish a 
living connection between knowledge and the resistance, the representation and the blockage. […] The 
more theatrical and dramatical operation by which healing takes place – or does not take place – has a 
name: transference. Now transference is still repetition: above all it is repetition. If repetition makes us ill, 
it also heals us; if it enchains and destroys us, it also frees us, testifying in both cases to its “demonic” 
power. All cure is a voyage to the bottom of repetition‟ (2004b, pp. 20-1; original emphases). Note that 
Deleuze draws here on Freud „Remembering, repeating and working through‟ [1914] (SE vol. XII, pp. 
147-56) and Beyond the pleasure principle [1920] (SE, vol. XVIII, pp. 1-64). 
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Kilmartin, 2000c) as reflections on decline, decay, dying and death (his own and 
others‟), on a common race to death. The equation of the three syntheses of time with 
the three syntheses of the unconscious which Deleuze develops in Difference and 
repetition, dialogues with Freud‟s life-long revisions on the libidinal schemes of the 
unconscious while at the same time drawing on myth in that he holds on to the 
„conceptual personae‟ of Eros (libido, love), Mnemosyne (memory, reminiscence; past) 
and Thanatos (death).  
 
I deal with the libidinal machine of impulses elsewhere, so I follow here Deleuze‟s 
proposition of the libidinal, inseparable machines of Eros and Thanatos as the flux of 
time lost (Deleuze 2004b, pp. 131-48),
81
 in particular the third synthesis of the 
unconscious (Deleuze 2004b, pp. 136-140) which refutes Freud‟s opposition and 
conflict of Eros and Thanatos and in correlating them folds them into each other.  
 
Time empty and out of joint, with its rigorous formal and static order, its crushing unity and its 
irreversible series, is precisely the death instinct. The death instinct does not enter into a cycle 
with Eros, but testifies to a completely different synthesis. It is by no means the complement or 
antagonist of Eros, nor in any sense symmetrical with him. The correlation between Eros and 
Mnemosyne is replaced by that between a narcissistic ego without memory, a great amnesiac, 
and a death instinct desexualized and without love (Deleuze 2004b, p. 136). 
 
Deleuze‟s argument, refuting the complementary or antagonistic nature of Eros and 
Thanatos, aligns the death instinct with the third synthesis of time, making it correspond 
to the pure and empty form of time. This takes death out of any relation to materiality, 
to negation. 
 
Death is, rather, the last form of the problematic, the source of problems and questions, the sign 
of their persistence over and above every response, the „Where?‟ and „When?‟ which designate 
this (non)-being where every affirmation is nourished (Deleuze 2004b, pp. 137-8). 
 
In Deleuze‟s differential frame of the equation of time and unconscious, the second 
synthesis of Eros and Mnemosyne (libido and memory) is followed by the third 
synthesis of Eros/Thanatos whereby the second part of the equation is the same, if 
„desexualized‟, energy (Deleuze 2004b, p. 139). Deleuze‟s Proust exegeses are 
anchored in this rewritten (non-Freudian) scheme of differential analysis. 
                                                 
81
 The internal connection between Deleuze‟s notion of temporality and his understanding of Proust‟s 
oeuvre (not as an example but an experimentation of the problematic on artistic level(s)) is demonstrated 
in his inserted notes. Cf. for instance, „Note on the Proustian experiences‟ (Deleuze 2004b, pp. 149-56). 
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This Combray in itself is defined by its own essential difference, that „qualititative difference‟ 
which, according to Proust, does not exist „on the surface of the earth‟, but only at a particular 
depth. […] And if the two series succeed one another, they nevertheless coexist in relation to 
Combray in itself as the object=x which causes them to resonate. Moreover, the resonance of the 
series may give rise to a death instinct which overruns them both: for example, the ankleboot and 
the memory of the grandmother. Eros is constituted by the resonance, but overcomes itself in the 
direction of the death instinct which is constituted by the amplitude of a forced movement (this 
death instinct finds its glorious issue in the work of art, over and above the erotic experiences of 
the involuntary memory). The Proustian formula „a little time in its pure state‟ refers first to the 
pure past, the in-itself of the past or the erotic synthesis of time, but more profoundly to the pure 
and empty form of time, the ultimate synthesis, that of the death instinct which leads to the 
eternity of the return in time (Deleuze 2004b, p. 149). 
 
I propose that in this sense the libidinal machine of equated Eros/Thanatos overrides the 
referential frames of involuntary memory and of the complex system of sign systems 
which Deleuze presents in the earlier version of his Proust exegesis. Thus several 
competing schemes of readings are on offer: pure past (second synthesis of time) as 
encompassing all lived presents ‒ contemporaneity, co-existence and pre-existence; and 
conical serialization ‒ which is also the libidinal (erotic), anoedipal, timeless 
(unconscious) past in contrast to, „more profoundly‟ (Deleuze 2004b, p. 149), the pure 
and empty form of time (the third synthesis of time) which is non-libidinal (Thanatos), 
projected future of eternal return.   
 
The spider-narrator-BwO: Madness and delirium    
 
Deleuze‟s third exegesis, „Presence and function of madness: the spider‟, completes his 
move toward a symptomatological reading of Proust‟s work.82 As I have explored the 
                                                 
82
 Since Deleuze‟s Proust exegeses [1964; 1972; 1973] span more than a decade of simultaneous 
philosophical engagement (1962 Nietzsche, 1963 Kant, 1965 Nietzsche, 1966 Bergson, 1968 Difference 
and repetition and Spinoza, 1969 The logic of sense: for instance, Husserl and Sartre [14th series], 
Husserl and Leibniz [15th series], Kierkegaard and Nietzsche [19th series], 1972 Anti-Oedipus) and 
literary engagement (1967 Masoch, 1969 The logic of sense: for instance, Carroll, Blanchot, Artaud, 
Klossowski, Zola), the „augmentations‟ reflect Deleuze‟s changing literary discourse. Deleuze‟s „Preface 
to the 1972 edition‟ (Deleuze 2000, p. xi) states: „This book considers Proust‟s entire work as 
commanded by an experience of signs that mobilizes the involuntary and the unconscious: whence the 
Search as interpretation. But interpretation is the converse of production of signs themselves. The work of 
art not only interprets and not only emits signs to be interpreted; it produces them, by determinable 
procedures. Proust himself conceives his work as an apparatus or a machine capable of functioning 
effectively, producing signs of different orders, which will have an effect on the reader. It is this 
viewpoint I have attempted to analyze in chapter eight, added to the original edition‟ [Deleuze is referring 
to Part II The literary machine, 8. „Antilogos‟, pp. 105-15]. Then a further step toward productive 
schizodicity is taken in the third exegesis. Deleuze‟s „Preface to the complete text‟ (Deleuze 2000, p. ix) 
reads: „The first part of this book concerns the emission and the interpretation of signs as presented in In 
search of lost time. The other part, added to the 1972 edition as a single chapter, deals with a different 
problem: the production and the multiplication of signs themselves, from the point of view of the 
composition of the Search. This second part is now divided into chapters, in a desire for greater clarity. It 
is completed by as text first published in 1973 and subsequently revised‟ [Deleuze is referring to 
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notion of the literary machine with its specific threefold and inter-related embodiments, 
machines of partial objects (libidinal impulses), machines of resonance (Eros, libido) 
and machines of forced movement (Thanatos, death) elsewhere, here I want to focus on 
Deleuze‟s rewriting of Proust‟s work as affective network in engaging with his notion 
of the Body without Organs. In this sense, then, signs, hieroglyphs and symptoms share 
their origin as libidinal surges of an anoedipal unconscious and are propelled by 
involuntary memory in that they point to states of „pure past‟, signifying in a 
crystallized form „a morsel of time in the pure state‟ (Deleuze 2000, p. 61).83 Instead of 
acknowledging a „time regained‟, as the title of volume VI claims, Deleuze emphasises 
the artistic achievement of the „narrator‟ where worldly, sexual, sensuous and artistic 
signs are now rewritten in their artistic expression and condensation, with the ultimate 
aim of a search for truth (Deleuze „The image of thought‟, 2000, p. 94). The four 
categories of signs (worldly, sexual, sensuous and artistic) are serialized according to 
the principle of difference and repetition and thus establish the explored multiple 
viewpoints (Deleuze „Pluralism in the system of signs‟, 2000, pp. 84-99). Contrasting 
the world of logos with the world of pathos, reasoning and representation with 
affectivity and a-representation, analytic expression and rational thought with 
expression in hieroglyphs and ideograms (Deleuze„Antilogos‟, 2000, pp. 105-15), 
Deleuze‟s exegesis explicates principles of a literary critique which I pursue in the 
frame of my project of differential desiring practice.  
 
Deleuze makes a bold move into symptomatological diagnostics in focusing on the 
presence of madness, its distribution and its function in Proust‟s work; in choosing to 
foreground Charlus and Albertine as two different modalities of such madness, and then 
attributing the dispersion of madness in the work to an all-knowing and manipulating 
                                                                                                                                               
Conclusion to Part II, „Presence and function of madness: The spider‟, pp. 170-82; E.G.]. Comparing the 
two conclusions throws a light on Deleuze‟s philosophical-literary trajectory and the changed premises of 
his literary discourse.  
83
 Deleuze draws here on specific passages of the last volume VI Time regained which illustrate his 
affective probing into the Proustian text: „[…] as I compared these diverse happy impressions, diverse yet 
with this in common, that I experienced them at the present and at the same time in the context of a 
distant moment, so that the past was made to encroach upon the present and I was made to doubt whether 
I was in the one or the other. The truth surely was that the being within me which had enjoyed these 
impressions had enjoyed them because they had in them something that was common to a day long past 
and to the present, because in some way they were extra-temporal, and this being made its appearance 
only […]: outside time. […]: a fragment of time in the pure state. […] A minute freed from the order of 
time has re-created in us, to feel it, the man freed from the order of time. And one can understand that this 
man should have confidence in his joy […] one can understand that the word „death‟ should have no 
meaning for him; situated outside time, why should he fear the future?‟ VI Time regained (Proust 2000, 
pp. 222-5; cf. p. 227). 
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centre of affectivity in the „narrator‟ (Marcel). This narrator, the Body without Organs, 
the spider spinning his web and trapping the characters, is both Charlus and Albertine: 
what makes him the ideal Body without Organs is his essential schizoid split, his 
hermaphroditism (understood in the Deleuzian sense). This is of course a very different 
perception and circumscription of the Body without Organs, understood here 
specifically as a literary and discursive device for the purposes of developing a critical 
apparatus of differential desiring practice. 
 
Deleuze does not view Charlus‟ perversion as immoral and blameworthy but rather as 
centered in his „physical mystery‟ (as does Proust). A strong, independent if narcissistic 
personality, a voice propounding virile content but carrying a feminine expression 
(shrill, high, exalted); flashing feverish eyes; instantaneous mood swings from manic 
rage to sweet indulgence; he is driven by an enormous libidinal outpouring of affectivity 
so that rage, insult, provocation and mellow surrender intricately and inseparably blend. 
His speeches are paradoxical discourse where rhythm and intensity demonstrate the 
delirium he lives. Deleuze symptomatologically detects in Charlus the vacillating 
between denial of interest and refutation of contact, infinite distance and isolation, and 
gestures of tenderness. He views him in the position of a prophet (in the desert) with a 
barely contained will to exert violence (he squeezes and pinches people‟s arms and 
cheeks). Albertine, on the other hand, is wrapped in a web of lies, deceptions and 
dissimulations, exhibiting a comparable „physical mystery‟, easily recognized in her 
„selective affinities‟,84 her sensual laughter and her barely contained voraciousness for 
encounters (cut short by a fatal riding accident after her escape). 
 
Deleuze relates their respective madness, their schizodicity, to an undefined sexuality, 
or more precisely to their rebuke of being identified with their respective corporeality. 
However he anchors their respective delirium (paranoiac for Charlus, eroto-maniacal for 
Albertine) in the schizoid status between embodiment and libidinal impulses. The 
narrator Marcel as spinner of the affective web, as embodied machine of an 
(unreachable) search for truth, shares Charlus‟ and Albertine‟s delirium, alternating 
between them, thus profiling his own madness, his own delirium: „the universal 
schizo(phrenic)‟ (Deleuze 2000, p. 182). 
                                                 
84
 A similar observation can be made in Charlus, cf. Charlus-Jupien encounter, IV Sodom and Gomorrah 
(Proust 2000, pp. 1-15, pp. 32-5). 
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Deleuze‟s Proust exegeses thus suggest some insights with regard to the compositional 
techniques, the stylistic and discursive criteria and the thematic preoccupations I pursue 
as my guiding parameters for a differential literary practice. Compositionally, Deleuze 
points to the „intervention of galactic structures‟ which can be understood in terms of 
assemblages of desire while the „indirect‟, „marginal‟ communication of „closed 
vessels‟, „cellular regions‟ circumscribes aspects of serialization, transversal 
connections, parallel but resonating series with the „dark presursor‟ as mobile 
connecting device. Stylistically and discursively, two notions are held in a paradoxical 
balance: dissociation and schizodicity, fragmentation and dispersal on the one hand, 
affective „galactal‟ reassembly on the other with contiguity turning into distance. 
Thematically, the gigantic desiring-machine does away with individual subjectivity and 
assumed norms of sexuality. Hence in the third version of his Proust exegesis, Deleuze 
re-locates the desiring-machine(s) as a Body without Organs (as one of its avatars) at 
the heart of Proust‟s work which allows speculating on an inter-dependence of mad 
delirium and sexual embodiment. 
 
In the „Proust Round Table‟ [1975] (Deleuze 2006g, pp. 29-60)85 Deleuze defends his 
proposition of Proust‟s work as an exploration of schizoid states of mind in madness 
and trans-sexuality. He maintains that his schizoid discourse on Proust‟s work is 
anchored in a „very skillfully distributed‟ (Deleuze 2006g, p. 30) madness and not in 
specific characters (such as Charlus). He presents the narrator as having already 
undergone the process of (positive, affirmative) schizodization; the madness as 
                                                 
85
 Cf. Deleuze „Proust round table„ [1975] (participants: Barthes, Genette, Doubrowsky, Richard, 
Ricardou, and audience; publ. in Cahiers Marcel Proust, new series, 7, pp. 87-116; 2006g, pp. 29-60). 
Barthes sets the tone with circumscribing Proust‟s work as „digressed discourse‟ (2006g, p. 29), 
„discourse perforated and deconstructed‟ (2006g, p. 29) and „excellent material for critical desire‟ (2006g, 
p. 30) and Genette (who also published on Proust) attempts to hold on to „structural‟ devices of 
composition (2006g, pp. 33-6; 2006g,  pp. 55-6), Deleuze detects in Proust‟s work „a very important, very 
troubling presence of madness‟ (2006g, p. 30),‟a very vivid, very widespread presence of madness‟ 
(2006g, p. 30). „A spider-madness, narrator-madness that understands nothing, […]. It [the process of 
blind „narration‟] is an even greater metamorphosis than in Kafka, since the narrator has already 
undergone a transformation before the story begins‟ (2006g, p. 31). Attempting to describe the prevalent 
madness, Deleuze refers to schizophrenia (2006g, p. 50) „this universe of closed boxes that I tried to 
describe, with its aberrant communications [the homosexual model of non-relations], is a fundamentally 
schizoid universe‟ (2006g, p. 50). The interlocutor in the audience have some trouble to accept the idea 
that Proust‟s Search is about homosexuality and madness (for instance, 2006g, pp. 56-7). Yet, Deleuze 
closes the debate with a provocative statement on the inherent („worrisome‟) violence of Proust‟s text 
(referring for instance to Charlus stroking the cheeks and pulling the ears of a family mother‟s boys 
(2006g, p. 50)). „The world of signals is not a reassuring one at all, nor is it asexual. On the contrary, it is 
the world of the hermaphrodite, of a hermaphrodite that does not communicate with itself: it is the world 
of violence„ (2006g, p. 60). Cf. also „Occupy without Counting: Boulez, Proust and Time‟ [n. d.] 
(Deleuze 2006g, pp. 292-9).   
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displayed and lived out in Charlus and Albertine is a deeply anchored emanation 
(Deleuze 2006g, p. 31) of the narrator‟s multiply dispersed, dissociated affectivity. The 
strands of serialization, proliferations and multiplications lead back to the „spiderlike‟ 
capacity of the narrator‟s responses to vibrations and intensities, and his utterly diffused 
sensibility. Deleuze relates the narrator‟s excessive sensibility to the delirium in 
Charlus-Albertine as the two faces of a paradoxical reading of sexuality, named by 
Deleuze in his (public) defense as „aberrant communication‟ (Deleuze 2006g, p. 39). 
 
A famous example of this type of communication: the bumblebee and the orchid. And that does 
not mean that Proust is mad, but this is a mad vision, since mad vision is much more plant-based 
than animal-based. What makes human sexuality an affair of flowers for Proust is that each 
person is bisexual. Everyone is a hermaphrodite but incapable of self-fertilization because the 
two sexes are separated. The amorous or sexual series will therefore be a particularly rich one. In 
speaking of a man, there are the male and the female parts of the man. And for this male part, 
two cases or rather four: it can enter into a relationship with the male part of a woman or the 
female part of a woman, but also with the female part of another man or the male part of another 
man. There is communication, but it is always between non-communicating vases. There are 
openings but they always take place between closed boxes (Deleuze 2006g, p. 39). 
 
In Deleuze‟s reading Proust comprehends „human sexuality‟ (Deleuze 2006g, p. 39) as 
general bisexuality and as hermaphroditism although the corporeal evidence of sexes 
brings about separation.  This allows for multiple unfoldings (of the male and the 
female in man and in woman) and combinatorial advantage (of at last eight 
possibilities). „The amorous or sexual series will […] be a particularly rich one‟ 
(Deleuze 2006g, p. 39), yet because of its (bisexual and hermaphroditic) self-sufficiency 
(read in the Deleuzian sense) it does not allow for communication: sexuality is seen 
related not to corporeality, nor to willing intentionality but to libidinal impulses which 
are beyond the characters‟ power of decision as demonstrated in Charlus-Albertine. The 
libidinal impulses ‒ read anoedipally ‒ are de-sexualized and in a strict sense do not 
adhere to characters at all. „This universe of closed boxes that I tried to describe, with its 
aberrant communication, is a fundamentally schizoid universe‟ (Deleuze 2006g, p. 50). 
Deleuze detects the full functioning of the Body without Organs in the concluding part 
of Proust‟s work, titled Time regained, where all the threads are pulled together and 
humour (as the saving grace of some writers) takes over.
86
 Overall, then, several threads 
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 „[…] as soon as Proust manipulates the laws [for instance the laws of lies and the laws of jealousy, as 
corresponding to the sign systems], a dimension of humor intervenes that I see as essential and that raises 
a problem of interpretation, a real problem. Interpreting a text, I think, always comes back to evaluating 
its humor. A great author is someone who laughs a lot. […] I think that all the methods that have been 
invoked so far find themselves faced with this need to take into account not only a rhetoric, but a 
humoristics‟ (Deleuze 2006g, p. 41). 
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of Deleuze‟s literary discourse on Proust set his progressive exegeses apart from other 
existing readings of Proust (in the mundane sense of „searching‟ for lost time, for truth 
and „regaining‟ time): Deleuze‟s insistence on schizoid discourse as compositional 
principle of Proust‟s Search, in tandem with (and in support of) a thematics of an 
anoedipally understood libidinal theory which reaches beyond an enquiry into sexuality 
(as hetero-, homo-, bi- and trans-sexuality), and Deleuze‟s foregrounding of an 
affectively ruled symptomatology (by contrast to his early proposition of a semiological 
regime) as Proust‟s stylistic innovation. 
 
Libidinal symptomatology 
 
Finally I turn to Deleuze‟s (and Deleuze-Guattari‟s) engagement with literary practice 
in Beckett and Masoch. These I shall subsume under the umbrella of critical-clinical 
symptomatology, although in each case it has a different libidinal emphasis. Deleuze‟s 
exegesis of the libidinal machines of Eros and Thanatos sets symptomatology into the 
frame of his rewritten libido theory (which is completed in Difference and repetition). 
For both Beckett and Masoch, then, I profile and accentuate literary strategies of 
differential desiring practice anchored in the notion of the schizoid. Since there is no 
space within the frame of this exposition to draw on all three mutually supportive levels 
‒ compositional techniques, stylistic and discursive criteria, and thematic 
preoccupations ‒ I foreground for each writer one specific level of symptomatology. In 
alignment with Deleuze‟s (and Deleuze-Guattari‟s) emphasis this consists for Beckett in 
stylistic and discursive innovations such as stuttering and stammering, a frenetic 
pseudo-syntax and specific gestural procedures and for Masoch in the deployment of 
the libidinal machines of Eros and Thanatos. Libidinal symptomatology then is traced 
as either stylistic-discursive or as thematic strategy to textually enact the as-yet-unsaid. 
 
Focusing first on Beckett, Deleuze (and Deleuze-Guattari) consider the phenomenon of 
stuttering as demonstrating a direct access to the unconscious, to the working of 
desiring-machines. Transferred to literary texts, for instance here to those of Beckett, 
stuttering can be considered one of the stylistic descriptors of a differential desiring 
practice. Gestural observations dominate in Beckett‟s dramatic work; although they 
have also been fruitful in the analysis of his prose works. Literary strategies already 
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explored earlier in the work of Kafka and Proust – such as the proliferation of series, 
connectors, blocks and intensities as part of assemblages of desire – can also be 
observed in Beckett‟s novels. Liminal expression in stuttering, or liminality as I shall 
now term it – that is pushing to the limits of discursive potential – and ritualized, 
machinic movement and gesturing exemplify libidinal modes of the symptomatological 
in Beckett. These modes trace stages of de-subjectification at the limits of bodily 
existence or rather within the processes of becoming.  
 
In Beckett‟s prose as in his dramatic work, frenetic pseudo-syntax, stuttering, verbal 
exhaustion (as the three stages of stylistic excess on the textual level), progressive loss 
of memory and bodily dissolution (as the concomitant excess on the corporeal level) 
demonstrate inner libidinal forces at the textual surface and thus can be symptomatically 
read as interruptions of the flows and breaks of desiring-machines. Deleuze and 
Deleuze-Guattari evaluate these stylistic and discursive innovations in Beckett as 
libidinal symptomatology of a schizoid nature since the production of the text runs 
parallel to its own dismantling (as I demonstrated in Kafka‟s work on the compositional 
and stylistic levels and in Proust on the thematic and stylistic levels). For Deleuze (and 
Deleuze-Guattari) stuttering as a discursive dissolution in style also points to the 
creative process defined as delirium [délire] (Deleuze 2004a, p. 275)
87
 which can itself 
be read, I propose, in two ways: either as spontaneous, uninterrupted breaking forth of 
the chaotic, „chao-errant‟ (Deleuze 2004b, p. 69; p. 80) within the unconscious, or as a 
deliberate foregoing of rational control and manipulation. The immediacy of expression 
captures the flux within the process of becoming, leaves the orderliness of boundaries 
                                                 
87
 „Desire or delirium (which are in a deep sense the same thing), desire-delirium is by nature a libidinal 
investment of an entire historical milieu, of an entire social environment. What makes one delirious are 
classes, peoples, races, masses, mobs. Psychoanalysis, possessed of a pre-existing code, superintends a 
sort of destruction. This code consists of Oedipus, castration, the family romance; the most secret content 
of delirium, i.e. this divergence from the social and historical milieu, will be destroyed so that no delirious 
statement, corresponding to an overflow in the unconscious, will be able to get through the analytic 
machine. We say that the schizophrenic has to deal not with the family, nor with his parents, but with 
peoples, populations, and tribes. We say that the unconscious is not a matter of generations or family 
genealogy, but rather of world population, and that the psychoanalytic machine destroys all this. I will 
cite just two examples: the celebrated example of President Schreber whose delirium is entirely about 
races, history, and wars. Freud doesn‟t realize this and reduces the patient‟s delirium exclusively to his 
relationship with his father. Another example is the Wolfman: when the Wolfman dreams of six or seven 
wolves, which is by definition a pack, i.e. a certain kind of group, Freud immediately reduces this 
multiplicity by bringing everything back to a single wolf who is necessarily the father. The entire 
collective libidinal expression manifested in the delirium of the Wolfman will be unable to make, let 
alone conceive of the statements that are for him the most meaningful‟, „Five propositions on 
psychoanalysis‟ [1973], presentation and discussion (Deleuze 2004a, pp. 274-80; p. 275). 
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behind or has not yet settled for new terms. The not-yet-articulated, breaking forth as 
stutter, circumvents linguistic and syntactical constrictions, a symptomatological 
technique I circumscribe as liminality.  
 
Such a symptomatological technique also needs to be read in the frame of Deleuze‟s 
project of the critical-clinical which I have explored earlier (chapter three) while 
situating the notion of a literary machine of symptomatology as an expansion of the 
triangulated schizoanalytic machine. More specifically I propose that the critical-clinical 
presents itself as a method of corporeal reading: it takes language to its limits since it 
attends to the corporeal responses (as symptoms) of the (anoedipal, freed) unconscious 
in deploying pre-linguistic visions and auditions (Deleuze 1997b, pp. 152-173).
88
 These 
liminal processes of becoming, then, can be appropriately circumscribed as libidinal 
symptomatology in the sense that desirous symptoms (enigmatic and elusive, 
undecipherable complex signs or hieroglyphs as read by Deleuze in his Proust exegeses) 
find textual expression. The critical aspect of the Janus-faced method concerns the 
creative (and literary) side of the reading and writing process while the clinical 
embraces the delirious, intensive, corporeal (and thus symptomatological and schizoid) 
side of the process shared by writer and reader. 
 
In contrast to his consideration of Beckett, Deleuze‟s exegesis on Masoch is directed 
toward the libidinal machines of Eros and Thanatos. While the stylistic-discursive 
moves are also observed, the emphasis is on the exploration of thematic strategies 
(specifically to dis-engage affective masochism from sadism). This opens the way into 
drawing parallels to Deleuze-Guattari‟s handling of libidinal machines in Kafka 
(explored earlier as polyvocality of desire) and Deleuze‟s exegeses of Proust (viewed 
earlier as libidinal machines of impulses, Eros and Thanatos). Thus I now re-visit my 
discussion of schizoid processes of discursive dissociation to consider how the 
observations gathered from Beckett and Masoch further dismantle representational 
schemes and replace them with strategies of differential desiring practice. 
                                                 
88 Cf. Deleuze „The exhausted‟ [1992] 1997b, pp. 152-173) [„L‟épuisé‟, originally postface to Beckett 
1992, „Quad‟ et autres pièces pour la télévision]; cf. also „He stuttered‟ [19..] 1997b, pp. 107-14; „The 
greatest Irish film (Beckett‟s Film)‟ [19..] 1997b, pp. 23-6; cf. also O‟Reilly „Demonter le roman: Anti-
récit, anti-prose, anti-mot‟ [1992] (Buning and Oppenheim (eds) 1993, pp. 165-74); Murphy „Only 
intensities subsist: Samuel Beckett‟s Nohow on‟ (Buchanan and Marks (eds) 2000, pp. 229-50); Bogue 
„Deleuze and the invention of images: From Beckett‟s television plays to Noh drama‟ [2002] (2004, pp. 
127-42). 
  
 
 
207 
Both the literary machine of symptomatology and the Deleuzian notion of the critical-
clinical focus on symptoms as bodily signs which display affectivity. Deleuze theorizes 
symptomatic bodily signs as rising out of the unconscious, parallelling his proposition 
that simulacra rise from the depth (of the unconscious) to the surface of the body and 
can be observed in their diverse linguistic-literary forms of expression. I infer that 
bodily displayed symptoms appear on the textual surface as simulacra (taking up here 
my explorations from chapter four). Being considered by Deleuze and Deleuze-Guattari 
as forms of desiring-machines, literary machines produce symptoms, complex corporeal 
signs and condensed, contracted simulacral images. If I take Deleuze‟s proposition from 
his Proust exegesis of (strategic) equivalence of signs, hieroglyphs and symptoms as a 
guideline (while setting aside their different functions), symptomatology concerns the 
process of deciphering the complexity of signs which prove ultimately undecipherable. 
Symptomatology of the critical-clinical is supported and complemented by the notion of 
an anoedipal unconscious which sustains Deleuze‟s rewritten libido theory that Eros 
and Thanatos are not complementary drives, nor contradictory or conflictual as 
proposed by Freud, but anchored in different sign systems. This is already indicated in 
Deleuze‟s Proust exegesis and I return to it in more detail in his treatise on Masoch. 
 
The leading principle of symptomatology, palpating, is the practice of detecting 
desirous moments, events of becoming, desiring-machines in action, in the textual 
fabric of the literary text. I compare this to knocking „surfaces‟ or listening for „sounds‟, 
using a „literary stethoscope‟ to detect what Deleuze terms „auditions‟ and „visions‟89 in 
literary texts. Deleuze‟s vision of the diagnostic and symptomatological function of 
literary works supports the drawing together of the literary machine of symptomatology 
and the Deleuzian notion of the critical-clinical, both focusing on symptoms as bodily 
signs of affectivity. 
 
Masoch‟s a great symptomatologist. In Proust it‟s not memory he is exploring, it‟s all the 
different kinds of signs, whose natures have to be discovered by looking at their setting, the way 
they‟re emitted, their matter, their system. The Recherche is a general semiology, a 
symptomatology of different worlds. Kafka‟s work is a diagnosis of all the diabolical powers 
around us. As Nietzsche said, artists and philosophers are civilization‟s doctors. […] It‟s not just 
a matter of diagnosis. Signs imply ways of living, possibilities of existence, they‟re the 
                                                 
89
 Cf. also Freud‟s proposition of an „acoustic cap‟ situated sideways on the layer of the Ego (with 
apparent access to both, the Ego and the Id); on one side of the surface layers of the psychic apparatus 
only, in line with the evidence of cerebral anatomy. „It sits at a crooked angle, so to speak‟ (Freud „The 
ego and the id‟ [1923] 2003, pp. 115-6).  
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symptoms of life gushing forth or draining away. […] Creating isn‟t communicating but 
resisting. There‟s a profound link between signs, events, life, and vitalism […] Everything I‟ve 
written is vitalistic, at least I hope it is, and amounts to a theory of signs and events (Deleuze 
1995, pp. 142-3).
90
 
 
Symptomatology as a revealing literary art is diagnostic, analytic, yet resisting, 
provocative and critical, semiologically anchored but outgrowing the linguistic level in 
that it draws on life‟s energies and vitalism. The great writers‟ art consists in the power 
to penetrate the complexity of signs and to appropriate them compositionally, 
stylistically and thematically in their works.
91
 Deleuze draws a distinction between 
writers on the grounds of their sensibility to capture, in their diagnosis of life, the 
revelatory symptoms and to make them the body of their literary phantasm, „making the 
phantasm itself the object of their work, whereas usually it is only the origin of the 
work‟ (Deleuze 2004a, pp. 132-3). This creative decision ‒ and visionary power ‒ 
distinguishes (in Deleuze‟s and Deleuze-Guattari‟s evaluation) Kafka, Proust, Beckett 
and Masoch (and other writers).
92
  
 
The libidinal machines: Eros and Thanatos 
 
With regard to experimental, innovative style and transgressive expression Masoch 
holds a special position in Deleuze‟s engagement with literary practice93 since he 
exemplifies in Deleuze‟s view a complex and admirable, if daring and controversial, 
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 Deleuze 1995 „On philosophy‟ [1988], pp. 135-55 [conversation with Bellour and Ewald, Magazine 
Littéraire 257 (Sep 1988)]. 
91
 „G.D. […] there are of course other[s] (writers) whose work hasn‟t yet been recognized as a creative 
symptomology [sic], as is the case of Masoch. Samuel Beckett‟s work is an extraordinary portrait of 
symptoms: it‟s not just about identifying an illness, but about the world as symptom, and the artist as 
symptomologist. 
M.Ch. […] we might say the same thing about Kafka‟s work or the work of Marguerite Duras […]. 
G.D. Absolutely. 
M.Ch. […] Jacques Lacan expressed his appreciation of The ravishing of Lol Stein and told Marguerite 
Duras that he saw in it the exact troubling description of particular manias found in the clinic […] But 
certainly that is not the case with the work of every writer. 
G.D. No, of course not. What properly belongs to Sade, Masoch and a few others (for example Robbe-
Grillet or Klossowski) is making the phantasm itself the object of their work, whereas usually it is only 
the origin of the work‟, „Mysticism and masochism‟ [1967], interview with Madeleine Chapsal after the 
publication of Masoch (Deleuze 2004a, pp. 132-3).    
92
 Cf. Bogue „Re-viewing Deleuze‟s Sacher-Masoch‟ (2007, pp. 107-12); Geyskens „Literature as 
symptomatology: Gilles Deleuze on Sacher-Masoch‟ (de Bolle (ed.) 2010, pp. 103-15); Alliez „Deleuze 
with Masoch‟ (de Bolle (ed.) 2010, pp. 117-30). 
93
 Deleuze has written several essays and given interviews on Masoch: „De Sacher-Masoch au 
masochisme‟ [1961] (untranslated); Masochism: Coldness and cruelty [1967], with Sacher-Masoch Venus 
in furs (Deleuze 2006d); „Mysticism and masochism‟ [1967] (Deleuze 2004a, pp. 131-4) [after the 
publication of Masoch]; „Re-presentation of Masoch‟ [1989] (1997b, pp. 53-5). 
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stylistic and discursive display of supposedly „masochistic‟ desire patterns. Raising an 
argument against the psychoanalytic construction of sadism and masochism as 
oppositional yet related perversions and refuting the unacceptable nature of combined 
„sadomasochism‟,94 Deleuze argues in an original reading of Masoch‟s literary texts for 
a revised notion of a contractual, ritualistic and literary masochism. In such a reading 
Masoch‟s writing process marks a form of innovative desiring practice, a literary 
experimentation based on complex ritualistic structures – supported by the composition 
and style of Masoch‟s many novels (Venus in furs [1870], 1st volume of The heritage of 
Cain)
95
 – as well as determining the libidinal mode of imagery and the forming of 
intensities rather than narrative patterns. Compositional rules such as suspense, 
postponement, diversion and repetition of rituals are also comparable to those observed 
in the Kafka exegesis. That is, they encompass a-representational devices although there 
are differences in desire patterns between Kafka and Masoch, for instance with regard to 
Eros and Thanatos dependency.
96
 
 
Symptoms within the context of masochism are therefore defined by Deleuze as 
contractual and ritualistic and point to libidinal corporeal expressions which cannot be 
easily deciphered in the literary text. However, in Deleuze‟s understanding, these 
libidinal corporeal expressions have nothing to do with the link between pain and 
pleasure as constructed by Krafft-Ebing; rather, pointing to „something more 
fundamental connected with bondage and humiliation‟ (Deleuze 2006c, p. 16).97 The 
symptomatology of masochism is thus not situated in the domain of sexuality but in the 
experiential domain of nervous sensibility where pain is „perverted‟ to pleasure. This, 
Deleuze claims, however, is not for the gaining of pleasure (out of pain), but for 
abnegating, postponing and interrupting pleasure to secure the prolongation of desire.
98
 
The submission to bondage and humiliation thus becomes an attempt at spiritual 
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 Deleuze considers the combination of sadomasochism a „semiological howler‟ (Deleuze 2006d, p. 
134). 
95
 The heritage of Cain: 2nd
 
volume, The mother of god 1883, 3rd volume, The fountain of youth 1886, 
4th volume, The hyena of the Pussta; other novels: The aesthetics of ugliness 1880, The fisher of souls 
1886. Deleuze appreciates especially Venus in furs 1870 which he used as exemplum for his new theory 
of masochism), also The mother of god and The fisher of souls (both of which were republished in French 
translation in 1991). 
96
 Cf. Deleuze „The death instinct‟ (2006d, pp. 111-21); cf. Freud Beyond the pleasure principle [1920] 
(2003, pp. 43-102). 
97
 Cf. Deleuze „The language of Sade and Masoch‟ (2006d, pp. 15-23). 
98
 Deleuze „Desire and pleasure‟ [1977] (2006g, pp. 122-34) [originally a letter to M Foucault after the 
publication  of La volonté de savoir/The history of sexuality, vol. 1, 1976]; cf. also Deleuze Vincennes 
lecture 1973 on Chinese martial arts, war and love manuals; medieval courtship rituals. 
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mastery. The „something more fundamental‟, then, is manipulation of the body and 
holding the death drive in suspension; a network of manipulation, alliances, contracts 
and pacts is drawn up to overcome the sensuality of the flesh. In Deleuze‟s reading this 
explains the tendency to align the masochistic rituals with mysticism and its initiation 
rites (Deleuze 2006c, p. 21). The only commonality between sadism and masochism, as 
Deleuze views it, lies in their intent to overcome the limitations of corporeality; their 
techniques are worlds apart. 
 
In Sade the imperative and descriptive function of language transcends itself toward a pure 
demonstrative, instituting function, and in Masoch toward a dialectical, mystical and persuasive 
function. These two transcendent functions essentially characterize the two perversions, they are 
twin ways in which the monstrous exhibits itself in reflection (Deleuze 2006c, p. 23).   
 
The masochist is cold and fetishistic (object-bound), not sensual, and has nothing in 
common with the sadist. The masochist‟s rituals of waiting and suspense are 
experienced as bodily, physical and spiritual plenitude. 
 
This suspense becomes the motivating force for Masoch‟s literary text and thus the style 
symptomatically delivers the pure and almost unbearable state of halting and icy 
coldness, a point of near-death and liminality which is one of the characteristics of the 
symptomatology of the critical-clinical. The world of suspense is traversed by waves of 
intensities and these waves can be stylistically palpated in the literary text. Deleuze 
describes this as „linguistic trembling‟ (Deleuze 1997, p. 109),99 as suspenseful 
„stammering‟(Deleuze 1997, p. 107)100 which marks halts in the desirous patterns;  
stops in the audible and visible, in contrast to stuttering which is an expression of 
repetition, proliferation, bifurcation and deviation under the sway of affects (and thus 
rather a linguistic-discursive effect). Deleuze finds a similar process in Kafka‟s 
language;
101
 in both cases it is the suspension of the bodies linked with the stammering 
                                                 
99
 Deleuze differentiates between stuttering and stammering as two separate levels of expression. On the 
one hand, on the textual level, words and syntax can fall under the regime of dissociation, on the other 
hand, the language, or rather the discourse (held above the textual level) can respond to the „milieu‟ in a 
symptomatological manner and thus make the language tremble. The „characters‟ may stammer and 
stutter, but sub-textually („simulacrally‟), beyond their expression, the stammer and stutter is intensified. 
Deleuze states that „Language trembles from head to toe‟ and that affect penetrates language in „zones of 
variations‟, thus „introduc[ing] desire into the corresponding field‟ (1997, p. 109).  
100
 „It is no longer the character who stutters in speech; it is the writer who becomes a stutterer in 
language‟ (Deleuze 1997, p. 107; original emphasis). The writer‟s style as a discursive field becomes 
intensive, affective and makes the fabric of language stutter under the (simulacral) pressure. 
101
 In Deleuze-Guattari‟s Kafka treatise these processes take the form of sonorous intrusions of voice and 
sound, and of music (for instance, 2006, pp. 5-7). 
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of the language which becomes the body-language, thus establishing the Kafka and 
Masoch literary machines.  
 
I turn now to a more detailed exploration of aspects of Deleuze‟s rewriting of (Freudian 
and Lacanian) libido theory as presented in his Masoch essay. This impacts on 
differential desiring practice with regard to Deleuze‟s understanding of anoedipal 
unconscious and temporality within the scheme of difference and repetition. In my 
comments on Deleuze‟s exegesis of the libidinal machines of Eros and Thanatos in his 
threefold Proust treatise I pointed to the fact that Deleuze integrates his take on libidinal 
aspects and his understanding of unconscious processes into his adapted Humean-
Bergsonian threefold process of temporality. First synthesis of time as living present, 
habitus, second synthesis of time as pure past, and third synthesis of time as projected 
future are played through in parallel and finally equated with the three syntheses of the 
unconscious: the first passive repetition as habit laying down the first layer of the 
unconscious (comparable to Freud‟s first repression), second repetition anchoring libido 
and memory (comparable to Freud‟s second repression, Nachdruck), evoked as Eros 
and Mnemosyne, and also obeying the death drive, evoked as Thanatos. 
 
In his Masoch essay Deleuze revisits some of those deliberations and more explicitly 
engages with the processes of unconscious impulses (drives) and temporality within 
(Freudian) libido theory, with the aim of debunking the assumed symptomatology of 
sadomasochism.
102
 While Deleuze‟s Masoch treatise is both philosophical and 
psychoanalytically engaged, I view it in equal measure as a literary treatise since it is 
based on, and supported by the accompanying text of Masoch‟s Venus in furs [1870].103 
It is this that warrants evaluating it as laying the foundation of a libidinal 
                                                 
102
 Deleuze‟s sources for the Masoch treatise are manifold: Krafft-Ebing Psychopathia sexualis 1886 
which (in Deleuze‟s understanding unwittingly) set up the syndrome of „masochism‟. Freud Beyond the 
pleasure principle [1920], „The ego and the id [1923], „Inhibition, symptom and fear‟ [1926], „The 
unconscious‟ [1914], ‟Remembering, repeating, and working through‟ [1914], „On the introduction of 
narcissism‟ [1914], „The libido theory and narcissism‟ [1916], Three essays on the theory of sexuality 
[1905], „Instincts and their vicissitudes‟ [1914], „The dissolution of the Oedipus complex‟ [1924], „The 
economic problem of masochism‟ [1924], Civilization and its discontents [1927]. Deleuze‟s endnotes 
read like a commentary on 20 years of Freud studies and cannot be appreciated without the re-engaging 
with the original texts. As further studies are mentioned: Reik Masochism in Sex and Society [trans. into 
English 1962] according to the endnotes of the translator; this refers most likely to Reik Masochism in 
Modern Man [1941]; Bataille Eroticism: Death and sensuality [1957] and Blanchot Lautréamont et Sade 
[1963]. Cf. also Bataille 1986a and „Sade‟ [1957] (1986b, pp. 103-29). 
103
 Further (selected) appendices to Venus in furs provide models of contracts and excerpts from other 
contemporary sources. 
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symptomatology in literary texts but as anchored in a (thematic-discursive) rewriting of 
masochism. 
 
Because the judgment of the clinician is prejudiced [on sadomasochism as a syndrome], we must 
take an entirely different approach, the literary approach, since it is from literature that stem the 
original definitions of sadism and masochism. It is no accident that the names of two writers 
were used as labels for these two perversions. The critical (in the literary sense) and the clinical 
(in the medical sense) may be destined to enter a new relationship of mutual learning. 
Symptomatology is always a question of art; the clinical specificities of sadism and masochism 
are not separable from the literary values peculiar to Sade and Masoch. In place of a dialectic 
which all too readily perceives the link between opposites, we should aim for a critical and 
clinical appraisal able to reveal the truly differential mechanisms as well as the artistic 
originalities (Deleuze „Foreword‟ 2006c, p. 14). 
 
Deleuze‟s enquiry into the language of Sade and Masoch, the role of descriptions, their 
utterly different textual attitudes and modes of subversion – as humour in Masoch and 
irony in Sade – leads to the fusion of the critical (in the literary sense) and the clinical 
(in the medical sense) in libidinal symptomatology. This achieves, I propose, a clear 
separation of the functions of the language strategies, leaving the „semiological howler‟ 
(Deleuze 2006c, p. 134), sadomasochism, behind. 
 
However, beyond those linguistic and discursive discrepancies which divide sadism and 
masochism and forbid a combination as well as a reversal (as proposed by Freud), there 
lies their deeply diverse libidinal anchoring which Deleuze evolves out of detailed 
discussion of Freud‟s essay Beyond the pleasure principle.104 For Deleuze the 
fundamental difference between sadism and masochism lies in their respective handling 
of the death instinct as the ultimate unknown, silent power, the void: sadism treats it 
speculatively, analytically and deals with scenarios of „reality‟ while masochism deals 
with it mystically, dialectically, imaginatively and in a phantasmagoric mode. I propose 
that it is this last criterion, the complex double-faced handling of the death instinct,
105
 
                                                 
104
 Cf. „The role of descriptions‟ (Deleuze 2006c, pp. 25-35; esp. pp. 30-5); „Psychoanalysis and the 
problem of masochism‟ (Deleuze 2006c, pp. 103-10); „The death instinct‟ (Deleuze 2006c, pp. 111-21); 
„Sadistic superego and masochistic ego‟ (Deleuze 2006c, pp. 123-34). 
105
 „Destructive instinct‟ is a „[T]erm used by Freud to designate the death instincts when he is tending to 
view them in the light of biological and psychological experience. Sometimes it has the same extension as 
„death instinct‟, but for the most part it refers to the death instinct in so far as it is directed towards the 
outside world. For this more specific sense Freud also uses the term „aggressive instinct‟ 
(Aggressionstrieb) […] When the notion of the death instinct is introduced in Beyond the pleasure 
principle [1920], the context is a frankly speculative one. Freud is concerned from the start, however, to 
identify the empirical effects. Consequently he often speaks in subsequent writings of a destructive 
instinct, since this allows him to indicate the aim of the death instinct more precisely. […] Considering 
that these instincts operate, as Freud puts it, „essentially in silence‟, and can therefore hardly be 
recognised save when their action is directed outwards, it is understandable that the term „destructive 
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which decides the symptomatological value of Deleuze‟s Masoch treatise, its literary 
anchoring in the imagination, the phantasm. The libidinal characteristics of the impulses 
cannot be separated from their literary actualizations and thus a new literary 
characteristic, the symptomatological or critical-clinical is needed to grasp the literary 
enactment. Both perversions ‒ masochism and sadism read here as creative libidinal 
bifurcations ‒ establish coldness and cruelty (determining the sub-title of the Masoch 
treatise) but in different measures: the cold purity of thought in sadism against the 
iciness of imagination in masochism (Deleuze 2006d, p. 128). 
 
As perversions, both deal with digressions from the oedipal conflict: sadism exalting the 
father and negating the mother, masochism humiliating the father and affirming the 
mother. Yet their libidinal economy is worlds apart and demonstrates an „irreducible 
dissymmetry‟ (Deleuze 2006c, p. 68). In Deleuze‟s reading, then, the oedipal content 
undergoes a „dual transformation‟ (Deleuze 2006c, p. 90): in Sade (as in Lacan and 
Kant)
106
 the Law of the Father reigns supreme while Masoch reverts to the (primal) Law 
of the oral (good) Mother. These conclusions interfere with the resolution of the oedipal 
complex and overthrow both Freudian hypotheses of the duality of instincts; the duality 
of sexual instincts and ego instincts (procreation and self-preservation), and the duality 
of life instincts and death instincts (Eros and Thanatos). Deleuze instead argues for a 
system of de-sexualization, a neutralization of libidinal energy put into the service of 
Thanatos which results in „coldness‟ and a re-sexualization which separates the libidinal 
impulses of pleasure and pain assumed to govern both sadism and masochism. The 
pleasure principle does not have the final authority; the „beyond‟, the „residue‟, the 
„irreducible something‟ (Deleuze 2006c, p. 112) is the binding power, which Deleuze 
instantiates as the higher authority of repetition in and of itself as synthesis of time, 
repetition as simultaneity of present, past and future (Deleuze 2006c, pp. 113-5). 
Deleuze‟s formula is thus that „Eros is desexualized and humiliated for the sake of a 
                                                                                                                                               
instinct‟ should apply to their more accessible, more manifest effects. The death instinct turns away from 
the subject‟s own self because this has been cathected by narcissistic libido, and is directed, with the 
musculature serving as mediation, towards the external world; it „would thus seem to express itself – 
though probably only in part – as an instinct of destruction directed against the external world and other 
organisms (Source:  Freud The ego and the id [1923] (SE, vol. XIX, pp. 12-68)). […] In other texts this 
restricted sense of the destructive instinct relative to the death instinct does not emerge so clearly, for 
Freud also attributes self-destruction (Selbstdestruktion) to it (Source: Freud New introductory lectures on 
psycho-analysis [1933] (SE, vol. XXIII)). […] As for the term „aggressive instinct‟, it is definitely 
reserved for destructive tendencies directed outwards‟ (Laplanche and Pontalis 2006, pp. 116-7). 
106
 Cf. Lacan „Kant with Sade‟ [1962/3] which proposes the „moral equivalence‟ of their schemes (Ecrits, 
trans. Fink, 2006, pp. 645-68).  
  
 
 
214 
resexualized Thanatos‟ (Deleuze 2006c, p. 120; original capitalization); in both 
perversions the Death Instinct „seems about to speak‟ (Deleuze 2006c, p. 120), being 
the silent one. The foundations for a differential desiring practice can finally be made 
clear. Libidinal symptomatology in masochism operates on several levels. The 
corporeal, physical body, as well as the textual body as its outreach and complement, 
become readable on their surface, palpable for symptoms of suspense, suffocation, 
waiting and halting of pleasure for the sake of prolonged and perpetuated desire. The 
corporeal and textual strategies of postponement, lingering and incompletion, gesturing 
rather than action, frozen tableaus, sculptural displays and theatrical simulated 
„suffering‟ embody the negated temporality of phantasm in masochism. These, then, 
become criteria for my differential textual practice. 
 
In this chapter I re-visited my earlier take on Deleuze-Guattari‟s treatise on Kafka 
(chapter three) ‒ now within the reset hermeneutic frame of the differential and the 
libidinal ‒ and explored Deleuze‟s treatise on Proust in its several evolving 
instantiations, reaching from the semiological to the symptomatological. I engaged in 
the frame of the symptomatology of the critical-clinical with Deleuze‟s commentaries 
on Beckett and his treatise on masochism. In the section on Kafka I also took up and 
rethought points of my earlier Freudian critique (chapter two) with regard to the process 
of oedipalization and in the section on Proust and on Masoch with regard to Deleuze‟s 
notion of the three libidinal machines (of impulses, Eros and Thanatos in Difference 
and repetition). The outcome of the chapter then is an apparatus of literary critique 
drawn from testing Deleuze-Guattari‟s and Deleuze‟s premises as practised in their 
literary treatises and thereby mounting further specific schizoid processes such as the 
libidinal and the symptomatological. 
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Chapter six: A differential desiring practice        
   
Developing a literary practice for engaging with resistant and perplexing literary texts in 
productive ways within the Deleuzian frame of thought asks for alternatives to be found 
to representational interpretative practices. A literary practice following the rules of 
representation and its modes of meaning-making promises coherent meaningful 
rendering of themes and their embodiment in subjects and characters in the literary text. 
If a literary text does not follow the rules of a mimetic rendering of the world but 
undermines the modes of meaning-making, then themes and characters cannot deliver 
their messages to the expectant reader. The literary text withdraws from immediate 
comprehension in not offering means of identification in subjects and recognition of 
themes and thus becomes confusing, alarming and threatening. A void of 
meaninglessness opens between the world of the literary texts and the reader; yet 
Deleuze and Deleuze-Guattari maintain that this is a productive void in terms of 
schizoanalytic critique and schizoid modes of affectivity. My project of developing a 
differential desiring practice shares and supports this aesthetic decision. 
 
I have followed a range of different threads in the preceding chapters in laying the 
foundation for my project of outlining a differential desiring practice and sounding out 
its potential: my psychoanalytic weave in chapter one revolving around rewriting 
libidinal processes; my contrasting schizoid weave in chapter two revolving around the 
radical notion of the creative schizo and a productive, anoedipal, molecular 
unconscious. This was enlarged in chapter three through my proposition of a schizoid 
constellation in Deleuze-Guattari that led from assumed oedipal subjectivitiy to 
projected anoedipal schizodicity, and my discussion of stages of becoming as 
supporting such a postulated move. My proposition of a schizoid constellation 
developed pivotal aspects of desiring practice such as the Body without Organs (within 
the theorization of desiring-production and desiring-machines), and outlined my initial 
thoughts on symptomatology and a differentiated theory of becoming as providing the 
cornerstone of a literary differential desiring practice. The actualization of the event as 
initiating becoming was equated with the actualization of the writing process whereby I 
drew together the notion of creative delirium (on the productive side) and the detection 
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of libidinal structures in the literary text (on the „consummating‟ side).1 With these 
strategic moves I have prepared the ground for anchoring the writing process within 
Deleuzian literary discourse.
2
 At the end of this chapter, and more extensively in 
chapters seven and eight, I shall demonstrate the usefulness of this move; but before 
such a demonstration, I need to argue for the productive engagement of schizoid and 
differential strands of discursive dissociation in differential desiring practice. 
         
The aims of the chapter 
 
In this chapter I lay out my theorization of differential desiring practice in focusing on 
some aspects of a literary mode of desiring practice, in body surfaces and intensities and 
elements of composition in differential desiring practice such as machine(s) of 
resonance or desire, transversality and serialization. I propose that desiring-machine(s) 
and assemblage(s) of desire eventuate in a simulacral manner in the shape of phantasm. 
More specifically, I propose to subsume these different strands of Deleuze-Guattari‟s 
and Deleuze‟s literary practice ‒ their exegesis of minoritarian literature in Kafka, 
Deleuze‟s theories of semiotic-symptomatological systems in Proust3 and libidinal and 
                                                 
1
 In Deleuze-Guattari‟s sense the threefold process of desiring-production as proposed in Anti-Oedipus 
moves through the stages of producing – recording – consuming / consummating.  
2
 With these strategic moves I have prepared the ground for anchoring the writing and reading process 
within Deleuzian literary discourse. For guidance in the close reading of Deleuze‟s work I am indebted to 
the work by J Williams on Difference and repetition (2003) and on The logic of sense (2008) as well as 
his comparative work across Derrida, Lyotard, Foucault, Kristeva with regard to poststructuralist stances 
(2005c) and his work on the impact of Deleuze‟s earlier studies (2005b), on Hume (1991/1953), Bergson 
(2006a/1966), Nietzsche (2006e/1962), Spinoza (2005b/1968 and 1988b/1970) and Leibniz 
(2006f/1988a). To support my new paths into differential desiring practice I also draw on the work by 
Sauvagnargues (2005a) and (2005b) with regard to new approaches to art. Zepke (2005) on art as abstract 
machine opened a way into Deleuze‟s ontology and aesthetics. Buydens (1990) led the way into a form of 
„Sahara aesthetics‟ or „desertification‟. Colebrook (2002, 2003, 2006) opened access to questions of style 
and expression. Bergen (2008/2001) made Deleuzian ontology accessible und Laporte (2005) provided 
insight into the triple form of Deleuzian temporality. 
3
 I explored the different modalities of the schizoid in Anti-Oedipus earlier on: (1) to support a new 
libidinal theory of intensive quantities of the celibate machine; (2) as a literary stylistic notion to 
circumscribe Proust‟s Search; (3) in the sense of a dissolution of fixed sexuality; and (4) the notion of the 
schizoid is contextualized as a specific practice of reading and writing: „Delirium has something like two 
poles, racist and racial, paranoiac-segregative and schizonomadic. […] Whence the ambiguity in the text 
of the great authors, when they develop the theme of races, as rich in ambiguity as destiny itself. Here 
schizoanalysis must unravel the thread. For reading a text is never a scholarly exercise in search of what 
is signified, still less a highly textual exercise in search of a signifier. Rather it is a productive use of the 
literary machine, a montage of desiring-machines, a schizoid exercise that extracts from the text its 
revolutionary force‟ (Deleuze and Guattari 2004a, p. 116). The libidinal-intensive, the literary-stylistic, 
the sexual-hermaphroditic and the delirious-simulacral come together to circumscribe the force of 
schizodicity. In Proust‟s Search all four modalities can be traced. „In the literary machine that Proust‟s In 
search of lost time constitutes, we are struck by the fact that all the parts are produced as asymmetrical 
sections, paths that suddenly come to an end, hermetically sealed boxes, noncommunicating vessels, 
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gestural aspects of a critical-clinical practice as symptomatology in Masoch and Beckett 
‒ under the umbrella of the critical-clinical (understood as symptomatological critique). 
This is because they share, in different measures, a concern with signs and symptoms. 
They read social and political as well as linguistic-discursive processes in terms of the 
body and corporeal symptoms but at the same time constitute literary texts as literary 
machines (the Kafka machine, the Proust machine, the Masoch machine, the Beckett 
machine). Differential desiring practice thus comprises the detection of literary 
machine(s) and their compositional, stylistic, discursive and thematic characteristics. 
Finally I read the machinic aspect of the literary practice as discursive descriptor of the 
postulated anoedipal unconscious in its spontaneous, delirious desiring-production in 
the activities of desiring-machines. 
 
These aims play out over this chapter as follows. First, I engage again with the process 
of becoming in its different instantiations as literary machine, drawing here on my 
earlier observations on the working of desiring-machines and assemblages of desire, 
and on the processes of symptomatology in the critical-clinical. Second, I consolidate an 
array of aspects of the literary modes of desiring practice, specifically with a view to 
their impact on perplexing and resistant texts. Third, and to conclude this chapter, I 
present a brief and preliminary engagement with Duras and Carter so as to demonstrate 
just how a differential desiting practice might be enacted. This will be extended in the 
following chapters.  
   
Mapping differential desiring practice: Aspects and modes  
 
At this stage, then, I need to map to what extent the various aspects and modes of 
differential desiring practice have come into view. As has been outlined previously, my 
projected practice relies on several foundational premises drawn from Deleuze‟s 
differential and Deleuze-Guattari‟s schizoanalytic image of thought. One such 
                                                                                                                                               
watertight compartments, in which there are gaps even between things that are contiguous, gaps that are 
affirmations, pieces of a puzzle belonging not to any puzzle but to many, pieces assembled by forcing 
them into a certain place where they may or may not belong, their unmatched edges violently bent out of 
shape, forcibly made to fit together, to interlock, with a number of pieces always left over. It is a schizoid 
work par excellence: it is almost as though the author‟s guilt, his confessions of guilt are merely a sort of 
joke. (In Kleinian terms, it might be said that the depressive position is only a cover-up for a more deeply 
rooted schizoid attitude.)‟ (Deleuze and Guattari 2004a, p. 46; 1, 6: „The whole and the parts‟; total on 
Proust (pp. 46-7). Cf. also Deleuze (2004a, pp. 76-8) for further comments on Charlus and Albertine in 
Proust‟s Search. 
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foundational premise is the postulate of desirable and projected schizoanalytic modes of 
discourse which are directed at social and political provocation and encompass a social 
critique. Another foundational premise is the need for critical-clinical observation and 
evaluation in literary texts. This I integrated into my proposition of schizoid processes 
of discursive dissociation whereby these processes encompassed a range of creative and 
literary perspectives. The third foundational premise comprises a notion of an anoedipal 
unconscious as the source of libidinal impulses and manifesting in the symptomatology 
of schizoid style. This premise binds the two anchors of differential desiring practice, 
the differential and the libidinal; together with the guiding principle of critical-clinical 
symptomatology. It also foreshadows the simulacral and establishes my discursive 
stance in the thesis.  
 
Deleuze-Guattari‟s proposition of desiring-production and the functioning and working 
of desiring-machines embrace the demand for a freed, de-oedipalized unconscious.  
Indeed schizoanalysis as a process and a practice is directed at subjective de-
oedipalization, thus severing the process of creation from being understood in terms of 
the Freudian libido theory. These strategic moves are an integral part of my 
development of differential desiring practice, and establish the link between the flux of 
desire within desiring-machines (as the processual side of desiring-production) and the 
outcome and result of this process, free-flowing desire as creative delirium in the 
literary text. More specifically, in the discursive frame of my argument, the link lies in 
the actualization of the event and the notion of becoming. After all, to follow Deleuze-
Guattari‟s line of thought, it is the event which allows the ephemeral subject to 
eventuate as haecceity and the process of becoming to be initiated. I pursue this reading 
of the mutuality and inter-dependence of event and haecceity (as ephemeral subject) 
below, making it the condition for reading the practice‟s libidinal mode. 
 
The schizoanalytic image of thought as set out in Anti-Oedipus and A thousand plateaus 
has as its core the postulate of anoedipal unconscious. I earlier raised the question of its 
function and role in the writing process, and in particular how the concept of desiring-
production ties in with the process of literary production. I also discussed the radicality 
of the idea of the creative schizo and his/her productive, anoedipal, molecular 
unconscious, and the assumption of his/her likely escape and freedom from 
oedipalization. This assumption of escape carries a potential answer to the function and 
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role of an anoedipal unconscious in the writing process. In the discursive frame of my 
project, I draw together those strategic moves in Deleuze‟s and Deleuze-Guattari‟s work 
which have a bearing on the writing process, namely the relation of the productive 
schizo and the anoedipal unconscious as his/her source of creativity to the experimental 
process of literary creation. 
 
Both psychoanalytic hypotheses and philosophical stances impact on the literary 
discourse. Upsetting the process of meaning-making in the literary text interferes with 
the process of repression and disturbs the affirmation of subjectivity since the 
psychoanalytic notion of the oedipal unconscious is linked to subjectivity and the 
system of ego-id-superego where the process of repression maintains the orderliness of 
meaning-making. Questioning the scheme of representation and rewriting the libidinal 
processes are interlinked.
4
 Setting aside critical practices based on representational 
premises opens a path into differential desiring practice as a path into a Deleuze inspired 
literary discourse. 
 
In the frame of my mapping of the aspects and modes of differential desiring practice 
this brings up two questions:  How can a schizoanalytic oriented desiring practice aware 
of its social-political agenda, a differential desiring practice or libidinal practice aware 
of its differential and libidinal anchoring ‒ and thus open to schizoid modes of analysis 
‒ set down reading practices which deal with the creative delirium? How can the 
libidinal structures in the literary text be detected and palpated, illuminated and 
                                                 
4
 It is worth recalling a statement by Deleuze-Guattari from Anti-Oedipus which I can now draw into my 
perspective. The schizoid aspects of Anglo-American literature are: „desertification‟ (that is the 
„scrambling of codes‟; thus doing away with representation), tracing and circulating libidinal flows, thus 
giving way to affectivity („traversing the BwO‟), both resulting in „absence of style‟ (the use of 
asyntactic, agrammatical language). „Strange Anglo-American literature: from Thomas Hardy, from D. H. 
Lawrence to Malcolm Lowry, from Henry Miller to Allen Ginsberg and Jack Kerouac, men who know 
how to leave, to scramble the codes, to cause the flows to circulate, to traverse the desert of the body 
without organs. They overcome a limit, they shatter a wall, the capitalist barrier. And of course they fail 
to complete the process, they never cease failing to do so. The neurotic impasse again closes – the daddy-
mommy of oedipalization, America, the return of the native land – or else the perversion of the exotic 
territorialities, then drugs, alcohol – or worse still, an old fascist dream. Never has delirium oscillated 
more between its two poles.  […] Yet is has been a long time since Engels demonstrated, already apropos 
of Balzac, how an author is great because he cannot prevent himself from tracing flows and causing them 
to circulate, flows that split asunder the catholic and despotic signifier of his work, and that necessarily 
nourish a revolutionary machine on the horizon. That is what style is, or rather absence of style – 
asyntactic, agrammatical: the moment when language is no longer defined by what it says, even less by 
what makes it a signifying thing, but by what causes it to move, to flow, and to explode – desire. For 
literature is like schizophrenia: a process and not a goal, a production and not an expression‟ (Deleuze-
Guattari 2004a, pp. 144-5).  
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explicated? The following sections respond to these questions and sum up my proposed 
responses in focusing on the equivalence of body and text and the role symptomatology 
plays in reading body surfaces and intensities. 
 
The process of becoming as literary machine 
 
The process of becoming instantiates in (always) different literary machines. The notion 
of desiring-machines focuses on libidinal activities, as they eventuate within the process 
of desiring-production (in Anti-Oedipus), while the notion of assemblages of desire 
focuses on the malleable and fluid connectivity of desiring-machines (in A thousand 
plateaus) with some divergences.
5
 With regard to literary texts desiring-machines are 
traceable on the stylistic and discursive levels while assemblages of desire manifest on 
the compositional and the thematic levels.
6
 The process of becoming in terms of the 
activities of desiring-machines takes the form of desire in action; thus I propose that a 
differential desiring practice is apt to follow stylistically and discursively the libidinal 
intensities in a literary text. Here, then, I read Deleuze‟s and Deleuze-Guattari‟s 
theorization of the process of becoming as equated with the working of literary 
machine(s). This is highlighted of course in Deleuze‟s literary engagement with Masoch 
and Beckett within the literary critique of the clinical-critical where the literary writing 
and reading processes are subsumed as symptomatology, a reading of signs or 
symptoms firstly in the corporeal sense, secondly in parallel in the textual sense. I read 
this as a symptomatological equation of body and text.    
 
Symptomatology: Body surfaces and intensities 
 
Symptomatology in its turn deals with a specific case of desiring-machines in reading 
body surfaces and parallel textual surfaces with their spectrum of intensities. This is the 
reason why Deleuze and Deleuze-Guattari propose that a specific literary machine, for 
instance the Kafka machine, is a specific instantiation of Kafka‟s desiring-machine(s).7 
                                                 
5
 I explore in detail the divergences in chapters two and three. 
6
 I observe and discuss these writing and reading processes ensuing from my deduction in chapter five 
within the frame of Deleuze-Guattari‟s literary engagement with Kafka and Deleuze‟s with Proust, 
Masoch and Beckett.  
7
 It takes the form of private letters (to Felice, Milena or Max Brod), of short stories („Metamorphosis‟ or 
„The Hunger Artist‟), or the form of novels (The Trial or The Castle). I explicate and test the threads of 
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Literary machine(s) are always specific and different instantiations and become 
equivalent to a literary signature. However, to appreciate comprehensively the equation 
of processes of becoming with the working of literary machine(s), earlier results of my 
project need now be drawn together. These include some key characteristics of the 
schizo; the regime of desiring-machines in contrast to coding (which works in 
representational schemes); becoming as desire in action and the differential theorization 
Deleuze proposes in his rewriting of the Freudian libido theory (to support his 
superseding of the three syntheses of time with the three syntheses of the unconscious). 
Progressively, I established these aspects of desiring-machines and assemblages of 
desire in literary texts, drawing them together to give shape to differential desiring 
practice. 
 
To begin with, I understand the schizos embodied in Artaud (writer and artist), 
Büchner‟s Lenz (playwright), Judge Schreber, Beckett‟s novelistic characters (Molloy, 
Malone and the Unnamable) and Masoch‟s multiple protagonist (Severin/Gregor) to 
instantiate and demonstrate potential configurations of desiring-machines in action. 
Deleuze-Guattari‟s postulate that the schizos‟ always different manifestations and „mad 
ravings‟ (in the sense of running up against representational codes) as world-historical, 
racial and cosmogenic, familial and transgenerational delirium intimate the anoedipal 
unconscious and its disparate pronouncements as simulacra „from the depth‟. The 
becoming(s) undergone by the schizo(s) ‒ becoming-animal, becoming-child, 
becoming-woman, becoming-imperceptible ‒ eventuate as shifting desiring-machines in 
action. I also read the changing connections of assemblages of desire in the becoming(s) 
of the schizo(s) as aspiring to (but never reaching or achieving) the ultimate limit, the 
production of the Body without Organs. The desiring-machines producing the Body 
without Organs follow a regime which reigns over their intensities spreading in waves, 
crossing thresholds, establishing ephemeral bands. Such a regime is processual and 
relational, it measures power and impact within a force field which I read in an a-
representational mode. A code, in contrast, describes and evaluates representationally.  
 
                                                                                                                                               
their argument in detail in chapter five in examining some of Kafka‟s texts, thus probing a path into 
differential desiring practice. 
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Desiring-machines in their turn follow machinic and dynamic principles which can now 
be aligned with the regime of simulacra as being divergent, serial, circular, decentred 
and disparate. The enactment and actualization of the initial moment of becoming in the 
event brings about ephemeral „subjectivity‟, haecceities, as free nomadic, impersonal, 
pre-individual singularities (Deleuze 2004c, p. 159). This is the moment where desiring-
machines demonstrate their (libidinal as well as literary) activity, and thus eventuate 
creative delirium. The completion of my modeling of differential desiring practice in 
appreciating the equation of processes of becoming with the working of literary 
machines(s), becomes accessible with Deleuze‟s differential theorization of the two 
strands of threefold syntheses, atemporality and anoedipal unconscious. 
     
Finally the promise of the literary critique of the critical-clinical and its supporting 
literary mode of symptomatology resided in its potential to demonstrate literary 
masochism on the corporeal and the textual levels.
8
 I drew together phantasm and 
simulacrum and fabulation which had the writing process eventuate as a form of 
experimentation. Two diverse instantiations in Masoch and Beckett
9
 demonstrated 
practical principles of symptomatology in exploring body surfaces and intensities which 
here can be employed for the equation of processes of becoming with the working of 
literary machines. The process of becoming as literary machine is held together by the 
notion of delirium [délire] (Deleuze and Guattari 2004a, p. 275),
10
 here read in the sense 
of desire. Tracing the notion of libidinal intensities and different shades of 
                                                 
8
 I examined the details in chapter three. 
9
 Cf. chapter five. 
10
 Although the following extract is an early statement, Deleuze‟s later work (Essays critical and clinical 
[1993] (1997) and Pure immanence: Essays on a life [1995] (posth. 2001) insist on the equation of desire 
and delirium. „Desire or delirium (which are in a deep sense the same thing), desire-delirium is by nature 
a libidinal investment of an entire historical milieu, of an entire social environment. What makes one 
delirious are classes, peoples, races, masses, mobs. Psychoanalysis, possessed of a pre-existing code, 
superintends a sort of destruction. This code consists of Oedipus, castration, the family romance; the most 
secret content of delirium, i.e. this divergence from the social and historical milieu, will be destroyed so 
that no delirious statement, corresponding to an overflow in the unconscious, will be able to get through 
the analytic machine. We say that the schizophrenic has to deal not with the family, nor with his parents, 
but with peoples, populations, and tribes. We say that the unconscious is not a matter of generations or 
family genealogy, but rather of world population, and that the psychoanalytic machine destroys all this. I 
will cite just two examples: the celebrated example of President Schreber whose delirium is entirely about 
races, history, and wars. Freud doesn‟t realize this and reduces the patient‟s delirium exclusively to his 
relationship with his father. Another example is the Wolfman: when the Wolfman dreams of six or seven 
wolves, which is by definition a pack, i.e. a certain kind of group, Freud immediately reduces this 
multiplicity by bringing everything back to a single wolf who is necessarily the father. The entire 
collective libidinal expression manifested in the delirium of the Wolfman will be unable to make, let 
alone conceive of the statements that are for him the most meaningful‟, „Five propositions on 
psychoanalysis‟ [1973], presentation and discussion (Deleuze 2004a, pp. 274-80; p. 275). 
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understanding the „body‟ or corporeality as Body without Organs, the problem of 
surface and depth, and the relations of libidinality to becoming supports such a 
retheorization. A literary practice which draws on the differential, libidinal and the 
simulacral can be theoretically and practically sustained by Deleuze‟s and Deleuze-
Guattari‟s a-representational image of thought. 
 
Aspects of a literary mode of desiring practice 
 
Having consolidated aspects of a literary mode of desiring practice as they emerged in 
the preceding chapters, I now use these to argue for a differential desiring practice as a 
pathway into literary texts, specifically with a view to their impact on perplexing and 
resistant texts. Differential desiring practice can be theorized within the triangular 
relations of the Deleuzian notions of event, haecceity and becoming.
11
 I infer that the 
enactment of the event, and its actualization, runs counter to the modes of established 
representation and questions narrative subjectivity and narrative time concepts. In 
proposing differential desiring practice I open a threefold questioning of established 
literary categories. I introduce simulacral techniques in anchoring my practice in 
differential processes. In defining the practice as desiring I point to its reliance on 
libidinal theory.
12
 In grounding my literary practice in Deleuze‟s differential and 
Deleuze-Guattari‟s libidinal image of thought (with its three projected postulates of 
schizoanalytic discourse, of schizoid processes of discursive dissociation and of 
anoedipal unconscious), I set out a literary practice of a-representation.  
 
I turn my attention now to three questions concerning simulacral techniques, libidinal 
theory and a-representation, so as to clarify and consolidate a range of aspects of a 
literary mode of desiring practice with a view to how this impacts on opening pathways 
into resistant texts. My three inquiries draw together the various aims which I pursue in 
the thesis. Exploring the process of enacting desiring practice led me to deduce 
principles of desiring practice such as the enactment of the event as originary instance 
of becoming. This directed my focus to the processes of actualization and temporality as 
set out by Deleuze in Difference and repetition. The consideration of temporality in turn 
                                                 
11
 I explored these notions in chapter four. 
12
 I examined the Freudian model of Eros and Thanatos and in its revised Deleuzian understanding in 
chapters one, two and three. 
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enabled my move from established literary categories such as subjectivity and 
individuation to Deleuze-Guattari‟s notion of haecceities and multiplicities (in Anti-
Oedipus and A thousand plateaus). In the context of Deleuze‟s innovative image of 
thought of difference and repetition I explored the potential of differential aspects of 
desiring practice as well as the impact of the differential on writing and reading 
strategies in literary practice. I anchored both the processes of enactment of desiring 
practice and the actualization of event in Deleuze‟s and Deleuze-Guattari‟s shifted time 
concepts which constitutes the link to Deleuze-Guattari‟s understanding of becoming 
(which, I argue, cannot be adequately understood and appreciated outside these 
considerations). The inter-related Deleuzian notions of event, haecceities and becoming 
as principles of enacting desiring practice finally drew out and supported the differential 
aspects.
13
 I define now the impact of simulacral techniques on composition, expression 
and style in literary texts.              
 
Simulacral techniques 
 
Anchoring my practice in differential processes involves the introduction of simulacral 
techniques. Deleuze presents the regime of the simulacra as a consequence of the eternal 
return in the system of difference and repetition. More importantly, he claims that the 
simulacral supports the double-play of the virtual and the actual/potential and thus the 
actualization of the event where the origin is localized.
14
 The simulacral parallels the 
aïonic register of the event as an instantiation of becoming, and this allows setting new 
parameters for atemporality in literary texts. If the event is conceived of as a moment of 
pure duration (in the Deleuzian sense), temporal categories such as progression and 
narration become dysfunctional. I observe as a further outcome of this shift toward 
atemporality that the parodic quality of the simulacral shapes the literary work‟s style 
and expression as well as its composition if the work is viewed as a totality in the sense 
of the literary machine where the machinic is traced to the originating event. Style and 
expression, I conclude, fall under the sway of the simulacral milieu expressed in affects, 
movements, speeds and delays. The sign systems of intensities and blocks of sensations, 
                                                 
13
 This can be further supported by drawing on Deleuze‟s and Deleuze-Guattari‟s notions of temporality 
such as the doubling and folding of actuality and virtuality / potentiality; the pairing of multiplicities and 
intensities and integrating the new array of concepts in a plane of consistency, or immanence which goes 
beyond the frame of my thesis.  
14
 I explored these connections in chapter four. 
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a-subjectivity and larval subjects, and transversality and dark precursor(s)
15
 capture 
these expressive moments of affectivity. (I return to these sign systems again when I 
focus on the impact of libidinal theory.)  Composition turns in the process of simulacral 
serialization into a super-position of events and their effects.
16
 I observe that the 
simulacrum, despite its vanishing and re-appearance, has an insisting power. An 
element of escape or excess adheres to, or rather inheres in, the simulacrum. 
 
Simulacral techniques impact in multiple ways on differential desiring practice. While 
the simulacrum has stylistic and expressive power, it re-configures the composition of 
literary texts in an array of techniques (not all of which can be pursued in the frame of 
this thesis) which become useful and decisive in the creative reading of perplexing and 
recalcitrant text. First, I propose filtering the composition of resisting literary texts in 
employing serialization and establishing the divergence of series. Second, I advance to 
observe, in consequence of the parallelity of series, the absence of a consolidating 
centre which decentres resisting literary texts, thus making circularity a defining 
characteristic of their composition. Finally and most importantly, I maintain that the 
simulacral impact on composition shows up as insistent disparity in compositional as 
well as in stylistic-discursive and thematic elements. I read this disparity which colours 
simulacral techniques as schizoanalytic, if understood as social-political critique, or 
schizoid, if understood in terms of discourse and style. Another demonstrative 
characteristic in literary texts can be observed when read by means of simulacral 
techniques. This is their tendency to display monstrosity – understood in the sense of 
coming to the surface, being on stage, „ob-scene‟ – for excessive and provocative 
display. The literary mode of desiring practice if theorized in differential terms is 
therefore compositionally, stylistically, discursively and thematically governed by 
simulacral aspects which make of the literary text a phantasm in the sense that the text 
undertakes its progression while concurrently unraveling itself in a schizoid manner in 
this very process.  
 
 
                                                 
15
 I examined these sign systems in chapter five.  
16
 Deleuze equates this with the Hölderlin model of „Untersinn‟ [„underneath-sense‟], that is resonating 
layers of sense-making (Deleuze 2004b, pp. 114-5). In a related sense I commented on Hölderlin‟s 
Unförmliche (untranslatable) which can be circumscribed as a notion of the formless viewed in terms not 
of form or un-form but of affect. The emphasis is on relational modes („movements, speeds, delays, and 
affects‟), not on (ephemeral) individuation and (preliminarily perceived) „forms‟. 
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Libidinal theory 
 
I now turn to the second question of libidinal theory, to consolidate aspects of a literary 
mode of desiring practice. As shown, my proposed desiring practice relies on, and is 
inspired by Deleuze‟s revised libidinal theory in that I drew together the postulates of 
the schizoanalytic discourse, the schizodicity of the processes of discursive dissociation 
and the postulated anoedipal unconscious. Deleuze‟s and Deleuze-Guattari‟s libido 
theory expands their theory of becoming and takes in several processes (not all of which 
can be followed within the frame of my thesis) and several regimes of literary signs 
(enigmatic illegible hieroglyphs and corporeal and textual symptoms). I comment on 
my understanding of sign systems first and then only briefly consider processes as a 
detailed consideration of them is beyond the frame of the thesis. 
 
            Libidinal sign systems 
 
The function of these sign systems lies in their capture and expression of affectivity and 
their connection to the simulacral. Viewed in this context, a rewritten and expanded 
libido theory grows out of the central notion of intensities as the core of the process of 
becoming as literary machine(s). The regimes of literary signs are useful indicators and 
descriptors in differential desiring practice. Strategically, I focus on intensities (as first 
sign system) pointing to libidinal impulses which can be corporeally experienced and 
textually traced. (Note that I examined these libidinal impulses being conceived as signs 
or sign systems with regards to Deleuze‟s exegeses of Proust and his elaboration of 
clinical-critical symptoms in the context of Masoch‟s writing.) Larval subjects (as 
second sign system) eventuate in the process of becoming as a different category of 
libidinal signs of intensities since they undergo affective shifts in desiring-machines and 
their changing alliances in assemblages of desire. (I explicated and demonstrated these 
latent subjectifications in the context of Deleuze-Guattari‟s exegesis of Kafka.) 
 
Taking Deleuze‟s and Deleuze-Guattari‟s rewritten and expanded libidinal theory as a 
frame of reference, the interlinking of several processes can consequently be theorized. 
Repetition as primary process (repetition compulsion in the psychoanalytic sense) leads 
into the (secondary) process of serialization which is the process I demonstrate in my 
engagement with Duras and Carter in the next chapters. I commented on the processes 
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of resonance and transversality in the context of Deleuze‟s Proust exegesis. I read 
resonance here as responses to „temporal‟ series ‒ theorized in grades of primary, 
secondary and tertiary nature ‒ and transversality as proposed by Deleuze in the Proust 
essay (that is transversality as a system of „non-communicating vessels‟, with specific 
reference to his changed modelling of sexuality, across several series; my chapter five). 
I practise two further processes, double differentiation and persistence of the simulacra, 
as eternal return of the different, in the following demonstration of Duras and Carter 
since they tie in with the simulacral techniques impacting in multiple ways on 
differential desiring practice. Although the composition of literary works is defined by 
these multiple processes in my practice, I cannot of course pursue all of them in the 
demonstrations in chapters seven and eight. Literary machine(s) are idiosyncratic 
signature(s) and ideally encompass the totality of a writer‟s work. As this cannot be 
achieved within the frame of my thesis, my choice of processes and sign systems, or 
type of symptomatology, will be decided by the rule of persistence of simulacra and 
phantasm in the selected literary texts. Deleuze and Deleuze-Guattari give preference to 
intensities (which I termed here first sign system), larval subjects or haecceities (which I 
termed here second sign system) and the dark precursor (sign system three) as the 
communicating device in the process of transversality of series. In terms of my 
consideration of a Deleuze inspired literary discourse, however, I conclude that the three 
sign systems as types of a symptomatology of literary texts, supported by the process of 
serialization, can be a useful (while limited) tool for handling Deleuze and Deleuze-
Guattari‟s libidinal theory. 
 
A-representation 
 
Given that simulacral techniques, reliance on libidinal theory and a literary practice of 
a-representation together encompass my questioning of established literary categories, I 
turn now to the third question of a-representation to clarify aspects of a literary mode of 
desiring practice with respect to how this might opens pathways into resistant literary 
texts. Here I follow Deleuze‟s and Deleuze-Guattari‟s insistence on constructing a new 
image of thought to escape the stranglehold of representation. Theoretically and 
practically Deleuze outlined four types of strangling reductions, all of which have to be 
overcome in order to work productively with resistant literary texts. This is because 
first, the reduction of leading back to identity excludes processes of becoming; second, 
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the channelling and reduction of analogy excludes all differentiation; third, the 
superficiality and reduction of resemblance closes out anything odd and different; and 
fourth, succumbing to the final noose of logical, rational, sense-making recognition, as 
the ultimate reduction in the reading process of literary texts, denies the states of 
schizodicity and their exemplification in schizoid processes of discursive dissociation 
which I proposed for differential desiring practice.
17
 The characteristics of the simulacra 
(divergence, circularity, disparity and parodic style) identified in this frame are 
therefore my counter-moves to the reductions of the representational scheme. I propose 
that the simulacral mode enacts an a-representational intent. 
 
Deleuze proposes to shift from a static, organic representation which only ever repeats 
the existing modelling of the world, to an orgiastic representation which does not 
mimetically reflect the world and does not halt any change, instead allowing for an 
experiential access to the world. My differential desiring practice thus embraces such an 
orgiastic, experiential representation which is theorized as open to the sensible, to 
sensation, to affectivity and the creative delirium [délire] equated with desire. I project 
this demanded orgiastic representation as eventuating in parodic simulacra which, 
vortex-like, reverses the originary intent of representation. Orgiastic representation thus 
becomes a-representational. Deleuze‟s experiential, orgiastic aesthetics of the sensible 
as a superior empiricism (Deleuze 2004b, p. 69)
18
 is grounded in his image of thought 
                                                 
17
 Deleuze summarises these reductive exclusions in his statement: Learning (opening), not knowledge 
(closing) is the goal of learning (see for instance, Deleuze 2004b, pp. 25-6, pp.204-7, 241-3; passim). 
18
 While setting out representation‟s failure (Deleuze 2004b, pp. 67-8), as „organic representation‟ 
adhering to the principles of identity, analogy, resemblance and recognition against „difference in itself‟ 
as „orgiastic representation‟ (Deleuze 2004b, pp. 52-9) focused on the „disparate‟ (Deleuze 2004b, p. 69), 
Deleuze proposes to consider his reviewed empiricism as „superior empiricism‟: „Empiricism truly 
becomes transcendental, and aesthetics an apodictic discipline, only when we apprehend directly in the 
sensible that which can only be sensed, the very being of the sensible: difference, potential difference and 
difference in intensity as the reason behind qualitative diversity. It is in difference that movement is 
produced as an “effect”, that phenomena flash their meaning like signs. The intense world of differences, 
in which we find the reason behind qualities and the being of the sensible, is precisely the object of a 
superior empiricism. This empiricism teaches us a strange “reason”, that of the multiple, chaos and 
difference (nomadic distributions, crowned anarchies)‟ (Deleuze 2004b, pp. 68-9). Superior empiricism  
(or transcendental empiricism) relies on (1) direct apprehension, and is thus empiricism, yet, (2) expands 
such an apprehension to the full range of difference, in particular difference in intensity, and thus (3) 
exceeds empiricism as such, is transcendental since it directs itself at the intense world of difference, at 
chaos (which is equated with the eternal return (Deleuze 2004b, pp. 81-3) and understood as positive 
(Deleuze 2004b, pp. 150-1) chaosmos  (Deleuze 2004b, p. 351, pp. 371-2). I concentrate here on a close 
reading of Deleuze‟s statements in Difference and repetition to support my line of presentation. Deleuze‟s 
original position is stated in his work on Hume Empiricism and subjectivity: An essay on Hume‟s theory 
of human nature [1953] (1991).The discussion on immanence and transcendence in Deleuze‟s thought 
cannot here be followed. However, DW Smith situates the potential of a Deleuzian ethics in the 
problematic of immanence and transcendence. See for instance, DW Smith „The place of ethics in 
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of difference and repetition and follows its categories and principles which my 
differential desiring practice enacts. Different/citation produces an a-representational 
mode which deals with completed yet unlimited, chao-errant, non-coherent and 
disparate compositional, stylistic, discursive and thematic elements which my 
differential desiring practice demonstrates in the reading of resistant literary texts. Such 
an aesthetics of excess and dissolution is nevertheless in the service of the libidinal 
forces of a postulated anoedipal unconscious and thus allows the capture of the impulses 
of desire and its spectrum of intensities which my differential desiring practice detects 
and palpates, traces and explicates.  
 
The impact of the Deleuzian aesthetic shift reaches beyond the fourfold stranglehold of 
representation through adherence to identity, analogy, resemblance and recognition. In 
particular, chronological time concepts in literary texts, which a representational reading 
of literary texts assumes, are unhinged by the Deleuzian image of thought of difference 
and repetition in the actualization of the event as the originating moment of becoming 
and of the creative writing process. In this sense, the three orders of chronological time 
– present, past and future19 – conceived in representational literary practice as taken-for-
                                                                                                                                               
Deleuze‟s philosophy: Three questions of immanence‟ (Kaufman and Heller (eds), 1998, pp. 251-69); 
„Deleuze and Derrida, immanence and transcendence: Two directions in recent French thought‟ (Patton 
and Protevi (eds), 2003, pp. 46-66); „Deleuze and the question of desire: Toward an immanent theory of 
ethics‟ (2007, pp. 66-78). May (2005) proposes as a guiding question through Deleuze‟s work an ethical 
query: „How might one live?‟Beside proposing transcendental empiricism, or superior empiricism (both 
of which Deleuze himself states) the notion of a pluralist (or multiple) empiricism has been raised, Cf. for 
instance Mengue (1994) and Hayden (1998) who anchors his position of pluralism in Deleuze‟s (and 
Deleuze-Guattari‟s) notion of multiplicities and becoming.Taking into account the shifts from The logic 
of sense to The Logic of sensation (Deleuze‟s work on the artistic work of Francis Bacon), Imbert argues 
for a questioned („unhinged‟) empiricism (Khalfa (ed.), n.d. [2000], pp. 133-48). Cf. also the work by 
Rölli (2003) and (ed.) 2004) working in the line of transcendental empiricism and on the modality of the 
event in Deleuze. J Williams proposes immanence and transcendence as inseparable processes in aligning 
Deleuze with Whitehead‟s work on process (2010, pp. 94-106). See also Robinson / J Williams / Shaviro 
on Forum on Deleuze, Whitehead and process (2010, pp. 92-133). Deleuze reserves a special place for 
Whitehead in his conclusion to Difference and repetition praising his work on Process and reality as one 
of the greatest books of modern philosophy. „For categories belong to the world of representation, where 
they constitute forms of distribution according to which Being is repartitioned among beings following 
the rules of sedentary proportionality. That is why philosophy has often been tempted to oppose notions 
of a quite different kind to categories, notions which are really open and which betray an empirical and 
pluralist sense of Ideas: “existential” as against essential, percepts as against concepts, or indeed the list 
of empirico-ideal notions that we find in Whitehead, which makes Process and reality one of the greatest 
books of modern philosophy. Such notions, which must be called “phantastical” in so far as they apply to 
phantasms and simulacra, are distinguished from the categories of representation in several respects‟ 
(Deleuze 2004b, pp. 355-6). Deleuze‟s final statement can be found in his ‟testament‟: „There is 
something wild and powerful in this transcendental empiricism that is of course not the element of 
sensation (simple empiricism), for sensation is only a break within the flow of absolute consciousness‟ 
(Deleuze 2001/1995, p. 25). See also Whitehead (1967/1933, 1968/1938, 1978/1929). 
19
 I explore the details in chapter four. 
  
 
 
230 
granted categories, give way to the infinitesimal subdivision of the Deleuzian event.
20
 In 
this manner I remove enacting desiring practice from any representational 
understanding of temporality. 
 
Enacting desiring practice in Duras and Carter: A preliminary version   
   
 
Concluding this chapter is a very brief and preliminary version of my working with 
Duras and Carter (to be extended in the following chapters). Here the focus is on three 
aspects: the function of desire and the related processes of event and becoming; the 
schizoanalytic intent in the sense of social-political critique and the schizoid mode in a 
creative and productive textual sense; and the styles of Duras and Carter eventuating 
from the thematic, compositional and discursive forces operating within their texts. 
 
Firstly, in Duras, desire is of a delirious mode which turns into liberating the delirium of 
madness (The ravishing of Lol V. Stein [1964]), in the sense in which I have explored 
madness in Deleuze‟s Proust essay. In Carter, desire eventuates in a transgressive mode 
veering into the utopian genre and is topically centered on the experimental exploration 
of sexuality in terms of transgender and hermaphroditism (The infernal desire machines 
of Doctor Hoffman [1972], The passion of the new Eve [1977]). 
 
Secondly, the schizoanalytic intent in Duras is all-encompassing and finds its 
expression in the Duras machine (to use a Deleuzian term) the Duras oeuvre being 
linked and knotted by the thematic of madness, an obsession with the exploration of 
                                                 
20
 Cf. Deleuze early treatise on Bergson, Bergsonism [1966]; esp. chapter III „Memory as virtual 
coexistence‟ (Deleuze 2006a, pp. 51-72) and chapter IV „One or many durations?‟ (pp. 73-89) explicate 
Matter and Memory [1896] and Duration and Simultaneity [1922]. The Bergsonian cone is first 
introduced in Matter and Memory; cf. Deleuze‟s comments, (pp. 59-67). Deleuze draws across all of 
Bergson‟s work in his treatise, for instance, Bergson 2011 [1907]; 2010 [1941]; 2005 [1896]; 2001 
[1888/89]. Of interest are here also Deleuze‟s shorter statements on Bergson: Deleuze 2004a [1956], pp. 
22-31 [published in M Merleau-Ponty (ed.) Les philosophes célèbres, Editions d‟Art Lucien Mazenod, 
Paris, pp. 292-9]; Deleuze „Bergson‟s conception of difference‟ [1956] 2004a, pp. 32-51 [„La conception 
de la difference chez Bergson‟, Etudes bergsoniennes, no. 4, 1956, pp. 77-112; published earlier in a 
different translation, J Mullarkey (ed.), 1999, The new Bergson. Deleuze draws across all of Bergson‟s 
work in his treatise. I have consulted the following works: Bergson 2011 [1907]; 2010 [1941]; 2005 
[1896]; 2001 [1888/89]. Moving beyond, and testing, Deleuze‟s assimilation of Bergson‟s time concepts, 
Laporte analyzes Deleuze‟s multiple time concepts in the first part of his essay (2005, pp. 15-56) drawing 
on Difference and Repetition and The Logic of Sense. Laporte draws for his proposition of a threefold 
structure of temporality in Deleuze on earlier works by Zourabichvili (1994/1996) on the Deleuzian 
event; Alliez (1996), Badiou (1997), Gualandi (1998) and especially by Bergen (2008/2001) who situates 
her argument in the frame of a renewed ontology for Deleuze‟s thought. 
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extreme emotional and bodily states. Consequently, the schizoid mode as the stylistic 
and discursive reflection of schizoanalytic intent demonstrates machines of resonance 
throughout her oeuvre: re-appearance of subjective ciphers (Anne-Marie Stretter in The 
ravishing of Lol V. Stein [1964], The lover [1984], The North China lover [1992]); of 
haunting waterscapes (Mekong river, the seaside); and of the enigma of passion. In 
Carter‟s case, the schizoanalytic intent is provocative, playful and extreme (Nights at 
the circus [1985]); the corresponding schizoid mode plays through all experimental 
states of becoming and event. Finally, I characterize Duras‟ style as libidinal, 
experimental and liminal and ultimate urge of her writing, while I evaluate Carter‟s 
style as parodic and experimental, on a par with Duras, yet libidinal in its final 
tendency. 
 
In terms of differential desiring practice, both writers have been categorized as 
obsessional, in Duras‟ case as passion-obsessed, in Carter‟s case as gothic-entranced. 
Within their chosen limits of representational aesthetics, such readings are meaningful 
even if missing some complexity in dealing with the ultimate enigma of their texts. I 
propose however that differential desiring practice brings a shifted level of stylistic, 
compositional and thematic enquiry to these texts, opening them to reveal their genuine 
perplexingness and resistance to interpretation. It is this I explore in the following 
chapters. 
 
Summing up the characteristics of my differential desiring practice, then, I emphasize 
three leading aspects: the differential, the libidinal and the symptomatological (an 
encompassing term for the critical-clinical critique whereby the three aspects support 
each other in the writing and the reading process). I infer the literary modes as a-
representational, orgiastic, experiential and simulacral and overriding aesthetic criteria. I 
distinguish the monstrous, excessive and provocative as expressive values in the 
simulacral. The general criterion for the discourse of differential desiring practice 
finally lies in its disparity which matches the compositional and thematic dispersion and 
schizodicity in resistant literary texts. Open to the sensible and shifting alliances of 
affectivity, my differential desiring practice can palpate resistant literary texts which 
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demonstrate a vortex-like, fractal self-engendering and self-destructing tendency which 
could be named mandelbrodian.
21
   
 
 
                                                 
21
 In the Deleuzian disjunctive sense, these texts display an „unlimited completion‟ since the originating 
core event determines all following series (Deleuze 2004b, pp. 347-8): „In short, systems of simulacra 
must be described with the help of notions which, from the outset, appear very different from the 
categories of representation: (1) the depth or spatium in which intensities are organised; (2) the disparate 
series these form, and the fields of individuation that they outline (individuating factors); (3) the “dark 
precursor” which causes them to communicate; (4) the linkages, internal resonances and forced 
movements which result; (5) the constitution of passive selves and larval subjects in the system, and the 
formation of pure spatio-temporal dynamisms; (6) the qualities and extensions, species and parts which 
form the double differenciation of the system and cover over the preceding factors; (7) the centres of 
envelopment which nevertheless testify to the persistence of these factors in the developed world of 
qualities and extensities. Systems of simulacra affirm divergence and decentring: the only unity, the only 
convergence of all the series, is an informal chaos in which they are all included. No series enjoys a 
privilege over others, none possesses the identity of a model, none the resemblance of a copy. None is 
either opposed or analogous to another. Each is constituted by differences, and communicates with the 
others through differences of differences. Crowned anarchies are substituted for the hierarchies of 
representation; nomadic distributions for the sedentary distributions of representation‟ (2004b, pp. 347-8).  
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Chapter seven: Desiring practice in Duras 
 
My theoretical trajectory for opening pathways into perplexing modern literary texts 
which resist representational literary practices has led me through several stages of 
theorization of desiring practice woven around the core notion of becoming. I now turn 
to demonstrating the usefulness and power of such a practice through an engagement 
with two authors whose works, in different ways, would benefit from a reading practice
1
 
marked by thematic and stylistic schizodicity and discursive dissociation. My 
differential libidinal practice for reading literary texts will thus now be further tested in 
turning to two challenging writers of the second half of the twentieth century, 
Marguerite Duras (1914-1996) and Angela Carter (1940-1992), both of whom defy and 
exceed representational aesthetics. While the preceding chapter aimed at consolidating 
the principles of desiring practice along with its characteristics, aspects and modes, I 
now practise these theorized and partially tested principles, aspects and modes with the 
intent of demonstrating the critical potential, productivity and creativity of a differential 
desiring practice pursued in the Deleuzian vein. 
 
The aims of the chapter 
 
Duras‟ manifold artistic oeuvre cannot be approached within the frame of the thesis; it 
encompasses, to use a preliminary generic definition, novels, stories, journalistic and 
autobiographical work, theatre plays, film scripting and film direction.
2
 To demonstrate 
                                                 
1
 In a published conversation (Deleuze „Mediators‟ [1985] (1995, pp. 121-34) Deleuze expressed the view 
that the crisis in contemporary literature stems from imitators having taken over true mediators such as 
Beckett and Kafka (p. 128, p. 133), Balzac, Stendhal, Céline and Duras (p. 128). Deleuze singles out 
Woolf and H James (p. 133), Proust and Pessoa in the literary domain; Renoir and Duras for cinema (as 
well as Bresson (p. 124), the Straubs, Syberberg, Resnais (p. 124-5), and Godard (p. 124). (This 
conversation ‒ in blending literary and cinematic references ‒ reflects on the fact that Deleuze published 
the first volume of his cinema studies in 1985. Reading and writings practices go hand in hand. Deleuze 
circumscribes the writers/filmmaker‟s tasks in the following way: „We have to see creation as tracing a 
path between impossibilities‟ […] A creator who isn‟t grabbed around the throat by a set of 
impossibilities is no creator. […] Your writing has to be liquid or gaseous simply because normal 
perception and opinion are solid, geometric. […] So style requires a lot of silence and work. […] You 
have to open up words, break things open, to free the earth‟s vectors. […] Truth is producing existence‟ 
(pp. 133-4). Correspondingly, an adequate reading practice has to be able to follow the paths traced 
„between impossibilities‟.  
2
 A generic approach to Duras works does not take into account the multiple cross-connections between 
her themes and preoccupations. However, for the purpose of an overview I adhere here to generic 
categories. Since Duras‟ novelistic creations („novels‟ and „stories‟) span more than three decades, I focus 
on some early and some late works. Novels: Moderato cantabile [1958], The ravishing/rapture of Lol V. 
Stein [1964], The vice-consul [1965], Destroy, she said [1968], The malady of death [1965; 1982], The 
  
 
 
234 
in Duras the critical and creative potential of a differential desiring practice, I focus on 
her novelistic work which, whilst it spans a wide frame of her creativity and several 
modes of style, pursues an insistent thematic of desire, memory, trauma and death. 
In the first section of this chapter I read several shorter texts by Duras in the frame of 
desire, memory, trauma and death and deploy some discursive principles of differential 
desiring practice. In the second section I consider two longer texts in the thematic and 
stylistic frame of dissolution and madness and as a demonstration of paradoxes of pure 
becoming. First I draw together several texts which share Duras‟ libidinal 
preoccupation: a difficult, minimalist, literary meditation, The malady of death in its 
later version (Duras, trans. Bray, 1986); a Goncourt prize novel, The lover (Duras, trans. 
Bray, 1985) and its later trans-generic re-writing as film script, The North China lover 
(Duras, trans. Hafrey, 1992). These integrate many of Duras‟ major themes from across 
fifty years of writing: French colonialism in Indochina, love in a racial setting, family 
tensions, and madness. These experimental and explorative texts considered in the first 
section cut a path through Duras‟ oeuvre so as to lay bare the inadequacy of 
representational literary modes and to open avenues into differential desiring practice.
3
 
                                                                                                                                               
lover [1984], Summer rain [1990], The North China lover [1990]. Stories: The square [1955], The 
afternoon of Mr Andesmas [1962]. I shall limit my practice to two early texts and two later texts and leave 
the stories. Among Duras‟ journalistic and autobiographical work stand out: The war: A memoir [La 
douleur] [1985], Writing [1993], Wartime writings: 1943-1949 [posth. 2006]. Duras‟ extensive theatre 
plays overlap with her novelistic and her film work. Film scripting: Hiroshima, mon amour [1959/60] 
(film by Resnais); film direction: Destroy, she said [1969], India song [1975], Her name‟s Venise in 
deserted Calcutta, [1976]. Since I focus on Deleuze‟s and Deleuze-Guattari‟s literary theories and 
practices and not on Deleuze‟s cinematic theories (Cinema 1: The movement-image [1983] and Cinema 2: 
The time-image [1985]) I limit myself to brief comments. Duras‟ cinematic work is mainly situated in the 
70s, thus separating the early novelistic work (1960s) and the later novelistic work (1990s). Deleuze 
devotes a whole section to Duras in his cinematic theory; he considers Duras‟ films in Cinema 2: The 
time-image, chapters two and four. Cf. „The Components of the Image‟ (1989, pp. 250-61, pp. 267-8, pp. 
278-9). The analysis (mostly) concerns Duras‟ films of her novels: India song [1975], La femme du 
Gange, Nathalie Granger, Destroy, she said, Vera Baxter, Son nom de Venise dans Calcutta désert and 
Agatha [1981]. It needs to be remembered that Duras‟ cinema is often based on her own novels, a fact 
well integrated into the critical appraisal of her literary work. Cf. Anderson „La rhétorique de la 
différence‟ (1995, pp. 25-39) where she comments on Duras‟ vision and style/signature. A range of 
Duras‟ novels have been transposed by herself into innovative cinematic works, for instance: the novel 
Moderato cantabile [1958] into a film with the same title; the novel The vice-consul [1966] into the 
trilogy India song [1975]; the novel Agatha [1981] into a film with the same title.                                                                                            
3
 The characteristics of Duras‟ thematics and style are vacillating while she commands a position as 
novelist (of the 1960s and 1980s), as filmmaker (of the 1970s) and as a dramatist and playwright. Some 
critics focus on emotional experiences, silence, sadness and loss; others emphasize her exploration of 
traumatic states and problematic identity, even her denial of representation. However, certain 
preoccupations emerge in Duras‟ work which cannot be encased in thematic and stylistic terms but are 
more appropriately described in terms of the libidinal practice I pursue in this thesis. Without wishing to 
generalize, some main concerns arise. (1) The notion of metamorphosis and disintegration which is 
expressed in terms of a desire for self-immolation and death, for instance, in Moderato Cantabile (Duras, 
Strachan (ed.),1968) (and in Hiroshima, mon amour (film script by Duras, film by Resnais,1960) which I 
cannot include). (2) The expression of the body‟s sensuality and intelligence, for instance, in The 
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Secondly I engage in more detail with two further texts: an early novella, Moderato 
cantabile (Duras, Strachan (ed.), 1968) and a later, difficult work, The ravishing of Lol 
V. Stein (Duras, trans. Seaver, 1966). Again while it is not feasible within the frame of 
the thesis to fully maintain Deleuze‟s aesthetic postulate of the literary machine as set 
out in his Proust treatises or to follow Deleuze-Guattari‟s univocal literary postulate 
maintained in their Kafka treatise, I take up with my selection the literary discussion of 
Duras‟ work where the liminality of the representational mode left it. The inadequacy of 
representational criticism to deal with Duras‟ works comes across in evaluative 
statements which point to their incompletion (in the sense of fragmentation), their 
incohesion (pointing to a disintegrated structure), their indistinction (as diffused 
characterization) and their obsessional thematic (in returning to the core thematic). The 
growing list of „lacking qualities‟, if not of literary deficiencies, points the way to the 
potential of a differential desiring practice to access fragmentation, disintegration, 
diffusion and repetition in a more productive and creative way. The discourse of 
differential desiring practice is defined by its disparity which matches the compositional 
and thematic dispersion of such literary texts and, as I term it, their schizodicity. The 
schizoid processes of discursive dissociation point to the three strands of the libidinal, 
the differential and the symptomatological within differential desiring practice, which I 
                                                                                                                                               
Ravishing of Lol V. Stein (Duras, trans. Seaver, 1966). This is reflected in the critical tendencies of 1970s 
and 1980s, for instance in Marini (1977) who reads Duras‟ works as representing the „feminine territory‟ 
which implies content and style. (3) The mystery of maternity to which Kristeva draws attention as noted 
before (Kristeva , trans. Roudiez, 1989, pp. 219-59), the struggle between attachment to and separation 
from the mother, and the indecisiveness and ambivalence of attitude played through in many texts by 
Duras. Anderson (1995, pp. 165-9) draws attention to the near-impossibility (as foreshadowed by Freud, 
and confirmed by Lacan) of a resolution of the female Oedipus in Duras‟s work. Hirsch (Twentieth 
Century Literature, 1982, pp. 69-85) reads Duras in terms of gender and desire and thus sets restraining 
parameters for a text (Moderato cantabile) which does not comply. Hirsch (1989) explores the 
mother/daughter plot and how it can be used to provide a feminist psychoanalytic reading of texts.  
Cohen (1993) adheres to the fictional (and feminist) positioning of Duras‟ work which precludes 
exploring the inner tensions in texts. (4) The prevalence of night and the nocturne, for instance, in 
Moderato Cantabile (Duras, Strachan (ed.), 1968), The lover (Duras, trans. Bray, 1985), The malady of 
death (Duras, trans. Bray, 1986). (5) The libidinal fusion of the sea, the illicit and the taboo, and of incest, 
for instance, in The North China lover (Duras, trans. Hafrey, 1992) (as well as in Agatha [1981] which I 
do not present). Here a change in critical attitude toward Duras‟ work can be noticed, for instance, 
Borgomano (1985) and Tison-Braun (1985) focus on Duras‟ fantasmatic, that is purely imaginative style. 
Hill (1993) (in English) offers a challenging and inspiring exegesis under the sign of „apocalyptic 
desires‟, thus pointing to the excessive trends in Duras‟s works. Similarly, Anderson (1995) opens a new 
path in emphasizing the deliberate discursive nature of Duras‟ works and the libidinal currents while 
Carrugi (1995) exposes the inner regime of Duras‟ writing which overwrites sense-making (and the intent 
of representation). These later studies are more in tune with my pursuit in this thesis. (6) The dissolution  
of identity and madness, for instance, in Moderato Cantabile (Duras, Strachan (ed.), 1968) and in The 
Ravishing of Lol V. Stein (Duras, trans. Seaver, 1966) (as well as in The vice-consul [1965] which I do not 
present). 
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contend are the missing links in accessing the potential of Duras‟ works more 
productively and creatively.    
 
Taking into account this positioning, I have two aims for the chapter. The first, as noted, 
is to propose a series of textual readings, less extensively in the first section, more 
closely in the second section, which enact the principles, aspects and modes of 
differential desiring practice. Secondly, I aim to engage with theoretical discussions 
matching, and ensuing from my practical observations along three lines of inquiries 
focusing on the processes of event and becoming, the Deleuzian notion of phantasm as 
sustaining these processes, and their effects as Duras‟ libidinal and liminal style. Within 
this framework I pay particular attention to how the processes of event and becoming, 
as they present themselves in Duras, are engendered by the differential mode of 
phantasm. This will be the guiding principle in both sections, in particular for the more 
closely examined texts in the second section. 
 
Section one: Desire, memory, trauma, death 
 
For each of the following texts, to demonstrate the practice of differential desiring 
practice, I focus on the three sign systems as types of a symptomatology of literary texts 
explicated earlier on (chapter five), with the proviso that these comprise a useful (while 
limited) tool for handling Deleuze‟s and Deleuze-Guattari‟s libidinal theory. These 
three sign systems are intensities and blocks of sensations; a-subjectivity and larval 
subjects; and (with less emphasis since I shall concentrate on this in the next chapter 
with regard to differential composition) the dark precursor as communicating device in 
the process of transversality of series. All libidinal regimes of literary signs deal with 
enigmatic, illegible hieroglyphs, complex signs and with corporeal and textual 
symptoms as explicated in previous chapters whereby text and body are considered in 
parallel. Thus the modes of intensities which spread in waves, cross thresholds, and 
(corporeally) establish ephemeral double-sided bands, will become the (textual) 
indicators in my practice to evoke the power and impact of intensities within emerging 
(corporeal and textual) force fields. I integrate the different shades of understanding of 
the body and corporeality, as Body without Organs (pure affectivity), as problem of 
surface and depth (simulacra rising), and their relations to the process of becoming. 
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Eros and Thanatos 
 
Focusing here on the later version of Duras‟ The malady of death [1982], I propose 
several latent, accumulative readings
4
 to demonstrate the ambivalent nature of Duras‟ 
literary technique. Version one: two anonymous personae, a hired woman (she, split 
into an observing I) and a paying man (an addressed you) play through repetitive 
libidinal encounters in a secluded space at a seaside location. Version two: a man 
attempts to overcome his inability to love beyond the sex routine by challenging a 
woman to cure his lovelessness. Version three: a woman offers her immemorial wisdom 
on life-sustaining love and lovelessness, man‟s malady of death, while withdrawing into 
sleep. Version four: articulated in ten sections of alternating intensity, a force field of 
intensities between two strangers and the white-black sea builds and destructs. Version 
five: a power game of attraction and repulsion, of man‟s anger and violence, of 
woman‟s peace and weariness, of male tears and female smiles, opens a chasm of 
unresolve. Version six: a homosexual man unsuccessfully seeks to break his emotional 
and corporeal barriers in the presence of a woman in a secured enclosure (for instance, 
(Duras, trans. Bray, 1986, pp. 30-1). To sum up, in unfolding and layering these 
latencies, Duras plays through the core event, a man‟s attempt to overcome his inability 
to love, a woman‟s offer to cure him of his lovelessness, his malady of death, as a 
challenging and risky game of total affective exposure.
5
  
 
A differential reading focusing on the three sign systems as types of a symptomatology 
of literary texts brings into focus how intensities sway, spread and thus establish the 
corporeal and textual force field. In contrast, a reading attempting to detect narrative 
patterns will be frustrated by the repetitive libidinal routines. There are several breaking 
points in the shifting waves of affectivity, functioning as simulacral thresholds or cross-
                                                 
4
 I follow here Deleuze-Guattari‟s axiom as for instance set out at the beginning of the Kafka treatise: 
„Only the principle of multiple entrances prevents the introduction of the enemy, the Signifier and those 
attempts to interpret a work that is actually open to experimentation‟ (Deleuze and Guattari 2006, p. 3; 
original capitalization). 
5
 With regard to her early work Duras can be considered one of the boldest French women writers with an 
unusual choice of themes and innovative techniques often subsumed as écriture féminine. Duras explains 
her approach in the following words: „I think „feminine literature‟ is an organic, translated writing […] 
translated from blackness, from darkness. Women have been in darkness for centuries. They don‟t know 
themselves. Or only poorly. And when women write, they translate this darkness‟ (Husserl-Kapit „An 
Interview with Marguerite Duras‟, Signs, 1975, pp. 423-34, p. 424, qtd. in Anderson, 1995, p. 10; my 
translation). Other representatives of this specific style of writing are Luce Irigaray, Annie Leclerc and 
Hélène Cixous. 
  
 
 
238 
roads and textual reversals indicated by Duras‟ references to the sound and sight of the 
(black) sea.
6
 The rhythm of the sea functions as the third affective persona in the 
assemblage of desire, thus presenting the deeper level of affectivity rising from the 
anoedipal unconscious. The man‟s imaginary, hallucinatory descent into violence and 
his repeated phantasm of killing the „stranger‟ (Duras, trans. Bray, 1986, p. 26, p. 39), 
„alien‟ body (Duras, trans. Bray, 1986, p. 30, p. 33), „fleshly machine‟ (Duras, trans. 
Bray, 1986, p. 35) of the woman is accentuated by his wish to throw her into the black 
water (Duras, trans. Bray, 1986, p. 28). Three levels of affective responses ‒ desire, 
repulsion and unresolve (the malady of death) ‒ fuse here; each indicated by signs or 
symptoms: the sign of the rising „black sea‟ as revealing sign of their separation (Duras, 
trans. Bray, 1986, pp. 22-3); the unleashing and outpouring of anger and then of hatred 
(Duras, trans. Bray, 1986, p. 28) which are underwritten by the turnaround on the 
olfactory level, the woman‟s smell (Duras, trans. Bray, 1986, p. 8) of heliotrope and 
citron becoming an unbearable stench (Duras, trans. Bray, 1986, p. 28) for the man 
affected by the „malady of death‟.  
 
Duras‟ affective and textual layering moves upwards and downwards from the surface 
materiality of (attempted) love making and sexual acts to the audible sea (for the 
woman) and visible sea (for the man), to the immemorial levels of sleep (for the 
woman) and sleeplessness (for the man), to the timelessness of ages. The text‟s 
corporeal and textual layering works in parallel with the symptomatological hieroglyph 
of the sea situated at the turning point of, or interstice between, the libidinal and the 
differential regimes as understood in my Deleuzian reading. The (male) black ‒ 
(female) white sea functions as the widening gap between the affective fields of their 
responses. The characteristic reduction of the text which enforces a de-individualization 
reveals differential and libidinal traits. We are not encountering sexual personae but pre-
individual affective states which barely take human form. 
 
                                                 
6
 The shifting waves of affectivity can be palpated (textually „touched upon‟) in attending to the sound 
(and sight) of the „(black) sea‟. Some examples are: „the sound behind the wall‟ (Duras 1986, pp. 7/8); 
„walls by the sea‟ (p. 11); the (unnamed) man listening to and looking at the „black sea‟ (pp. 22-3, pp. 27-
8, pp. 38-9, p. 43, p. 52). There is no separation between the „inner realm‟ of „malady of death‟ (as 
sadness and lifelessness) and the „outer realm‟ of an existing (or imagined) seascape. The (also 
unnnamed) woman listens (and does not need to look). 
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The emotional chasm between the two bodies, independent of their genitality, seems 
unbridgeable: her alien, mysterious corporeality incites provocation, anger and envy. 
 
The body‟s completely defenseless, smooth from face to feet. It invites strangulation, rape, ill 
usage, insult, shouts of hatred, the unleashing of deadly und unmitigated passions. [...] You look 
at this shape, and as you do so you realize its infernal power, its abominable frailty, its weakness, 
the unconquerable strength of its incomparable weakness  (Duras, trans. Bray, 1986, p. 16, p. 
27). 
 
The woman knows about the man being „a carrier, of death‟ (Duras, trans. Bray, 1986, 
p. 19; original punctuation ), of the „malady of death‟ (Duras, trans. Bray, 1986, p. 13, 
p. 14, p. 18, p. 34, p. 45, p. 55) and dismisses his way of life, leaving him to the black 
sea churning away outside. 
 
You herald the reign of death. Death can‟t be loved if it‟s imposed from outside. [...] I don‟t 
want to know anything the way you do, with that death-derived certainty, that hopeless 
monotony, the same every day of your life, every night, and that deadly routine of lovelessness 
(Duras, trans. Bray, 1986, p. 45, p. 48). 
 
The event progressively actualized is comparable to an opening chasm, a voiding which 
draws into its maelstrom any potential surface readings such as an exploration of 
perversion, sado-masochistic phantasy or melancholy and despair.
7
 Thus, once the focus 
shifts to the affective transparency achieved through the reduction of the text ‒ 
blankness ‒ barriers to, and limitations of, an interpretational and representational 
approach become apparent. 
 
The central symptom named „the malady of death‟ may be conceived of as closure, 
emotional death and final affective entropy. Individual subjectivity is replaced by a 
demonstration of impulses which take the textual form of voices, intonations of desires 
                                                 
7
 Kristeva‟s reading of Duras‟ work in Dark sun: Depression and melancholia (1998a, pp. 219-59) under 
the title „The malady of grief: Duras‟ [1987] finds fault with Duras‟ style in The malady of death: 
„Stylistic awkwardness would be the discourse of dulled pain‟ (p. 226). She admits feeling herself thrown 
into two opposing direction, compelled by a „difficult seduction‟ (p. 226). Kristeva offers a close reading 
(p. 245) which demonstrates her insisting unease with Duras‟ resisting text and its incomprehensible 
characters (or rather voices). She does not gain access to the text as such but chooses to define it in terms 
of expression, or rather of compositional technique which she calls „reduplication‟ (couples and doubles) 
(p. 246). She reads the act of love in The malady of death in terms of a doubling and dismisses the third 
component, the black sea (pp. 249-50). Summing up her dissatisfaction with Duras‟ texts, she only finds 
„stylistic awkwardness‟, lack of catharsis, blank apocalyptic rhetoric: „The reverberation among 
characters as well as the silence inscribed as such, the emphasis on the „nothing‟ to be spoken as ultimate 
expression of suffering, leads Duras to a blankness of meaning. Coupled with rhetorical awkwardness, 
they make up a world of unsettling, infectious ill-being‟ (p. 258). 
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rather than individual characters. Since the text uncovers the inner spaces of the 
subjective larvae, both the workings of the desiring-machines and the field of shifting 
affectivity are revealed. Duras‟ The malady of death demonstrates a process of 
experimentation with intensities and exposes a confronting harshness of affects and 
sensations. The restricted space as enclosure in interplay with the immensity of the (at 
times invisible, at times audible) sea gives an air of theatricality and ob-scene staging to 
this libidinal phantasm.
8
 The third player in the affective game is „the white (bed sheets, 
surf)-black sea‟ as dark precursor and communicating device, and sign system, in the 
process of transversality of serial repeats. Modes of intensities thus function as the 
indicators for differential desiring practice. The emerging corporeal and textual force 
fields invite a reading in terms of a Deleuzian Body without Organs, as establishing an 
affective network, with the sea in sound (for the woman) and sight (for the man) 
functioning as a simulacrum rising from the depth of the anoedipal unconscious to the 
surface of awareness; in Deleuzian terms auditions and visions as affective indicators. 
The rising simulacrum promises to initiate a process of becoming which is ultimately 
aborted since the woman disappears and leaves the man attempting another repetitive 
round. 
 
Circular composition             
 
In the representational mode Duras‟ text The lover [1984] ‒ which is also a debated film 
‒ can be read at surface level as yet another love story with a Lolita twist, having an 
adolescent girl of fifteen and half in French colonial Indochina at the start of the 20th 
century fall for a racially incompatible older Chinese suitor in his late twenties. 
Significantly, the Chinese lover stays anonymous (in one instance the girl dares to 
pronounce his name without the reader being privy to it) which makes him a libidinal 
cipher. Such a focus on a heterosexual love couple, despite jarring age and racial 
differences, offers a restricting and counter-productive reading. 
 
                                                 
8
 This type of staging occurs at many instances in Duras‟ work and can be read in several ways: (1) as a 
mode of writing adapted from her large theatrical productions and stage plays; (2) as a method of literary 
distancing; and (3) as the appropriate literary mode for a libidinal phantasm in either the psychoanalytic 
sense (explored in chapter one) or in the schizoanalytic and differential sense of my differential desiring 
practice. 
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More important for desiring practice is the libidinal subtext which introduces a second 
child-woman, Hélène Lagonelle, as third part of the triangular assemblage of desire. A 
symptomatological reading accesses the triangular field of desire between two women 
and a man, or rather between two women by means of a man. Duras invokes further 
positions in the assemblage of desire through the enlarged family: the mother tolerating, 
even wanting, the prostitution of her daughter, for multiple reasons, financial and 
emotional; the elder brother supporting her being pimped because of gambling and 
opium addiction debts. Power positions change according to the desiring-positions 
within the wider assemblages of desire, in both libidinal and familial terms, and are 
more adequately accessed in the modes of desiring practice. 
 
Beneath the love story and the family history an inner realm of desire directed towards 
becoming a writer is rediscovered or re-evoked, projected into the natural and the 
imaginary landscape evoked in memory: the Mekong delta with its swamp lands and 
rice fields, its tropical heat and monsoon season; the soundscape of Saigon‟s 
Chinatown, Cholon, where the bachelor‟s quarters of the Chinese lover are located. 
Crossing the Mekong river becomes the central image in several senses: traversing the 
border between girl childhood and adolescent woman, bridging the racial divide, but 
most importantly, coming to terms with the mother-daughter relationship and separation 
which is part of the libidinal subtext. 
 
The story of my life doesn‟t exist. Does not exist. There‟s never any centre to it. No path, no line 
(Duras, trans. Bray, 1985, p. 11). 
 
Despite a continuous circling and spiralling across, and downwards, several layers of 
memory, abrupt reversals and forward leaps (which defy representational readings), 
desiring practice allows the detection of a progression of emotional and affective 
compositional cycles: the first cycle (Duras, trans. Bray, 1985, pp. 1-30) centering on 
the mother-daughter and sibling relations within the family; then, descending into the 
second cycle (Duras, trans. Bray, 1985, pp. 30-60) reviving the girl‟s fated love story 
with the Chinese lover; further downwards into the third cycle (Duras, trans. Bray, 
1985, pp. 60-90) unearthing her broken, un-admitted libidinal commitments to women 
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in her life.
9
 Finally, fusing all events which have re-emerged, and having reached the 
simulacral ground of her anoedipal, molecular unconscious, the fourth cycle (Duras, 
trans. Bray, 1985, pp. 90-120) draws up a vision of all moments of pure past in a 
hallucinatory mode. The process of circular deepening of memories defies an 
understanding in terms of temporal advance; quite to the contrary, although the cycles 
are transversally connected, they condense and fuse, and consequently re-align the 
kernels of events (in childhood, in adolescence, in adulthood, in age).
10
 In the following, 
I am taking up libidinal and differential moments of pure past for each cycle to 
demonstrate Duras‟ masterly evocation of a process of becoming, in Deleuzian terms 
actualized as literary machine.
11
 
 
Photographs, frozen simulacra of past events, re-invoke the French-Vietnamese past of 
Hanoi, Vinh Long, Sadec, Cholon and Saigon of the 1930s, colonial lethargy, the 
stagnant waters of the rice-fields, the father‟s death, the family‟s grinding poverty, the 
mother‟s despair and madness.12 Although fragments of the love story flicker up, the 
family story imposes itself, and the as yet hidden intermingling of both.
13
 The first cycle 
immerses the family in death. 
 
They are dead now, my mother and my two brothers. […] She died between Dô and him she 
called her child, in her big bedroom on the first floor, where during heavy frosts she used to put 
                                                 
9
 Duras often uses just initials of her female (and more rarely male) characters, for instance: H.G. (Hélène 
Lagonelle), Marie-Claude C. (Carpenter), Betty F. (Fernandez).  
10
 Duras‟ aim of „writing in reverse‟ is one of several connection points to my proposal of a desiring 
practice. Anderson (1995, p. 31) proposes that Duras‟ authorial strategy follows  Barthes‟ idea of stylistic 
and structural inversion, compared to sorcery which is defined as working backwards: “La sorcellerie est 
un à-rebours” (Michelet). In Duras‟ own words the process involves a deliberate decision: „Reverse 
everything. Make women the point of departure in judging, make darkness the point of departure in 
judging what men call light, make obscurity the point of departure in judging what men call clarity.‟ 
(interview with Husserl-Kapit, 1975, p. 426, qtd. in Anderson (1995,  p. 31; my translation)). One of the 
effects of structural reversion is the literary text‟s deliberate opacity so that the process of signification 
will be hindered. Texts written in such an opaque style become undecidable in their intentional 
ambivalence and driven further, lead to a transgression on the topical level. This evokes Deleuze and 
Guattari‟s comments in their treatise on Kafka regarding the operation of the machine of expression, or 
dismantling literary machine. Further points of comparison are that Duras‟writing has been described as 
doubly marginal, transgressive and marginalised through its innovation.  
11
 Much has been made of Duras‟ autobiographical sources for her writing, for instance that with regard 
to The lover a writer of seventy revisits her adolescent life. Recently there has been a critical turn away 
from focusing on the biographical background of her work and returning to the creative literary and 
cinematic texts. 
12
 „[A] misfortune my mother‟s always predicted for me when she shrieks in the desert of her life‟ (Duras 
1985, p. 49). „A woman‟s shrieking in the desert of her life‟ is one of Duras‟ signature expressive turns 
for a disconsolate liminal corporeal state short of madness; a turn re-emerging in several texts (and films). 
13
 For instance in the miracle of being relieved from the elder brother‟s gambling debts as the Indian 
money lenders stopped coming (Duras 1985, p. 32). 
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the sheep to sleep, five or six sheep all around her bed, for several winters, her last (Duras, trans. 
Bray, 1985, p. 32, p. 34). 
 
In terms of desiring practice the love story is just one knot, one of the quilting points 
and not the libidinal core of the cycle; it is the coming to writing despite pervasive 
obstacles which becomes an ascending counter-current through the four cycles and 
functions as a dismantling device. 
 
[…] in that common family history of ruin and death which was ours whatever happened, in love 
and in hate, and which I still can‟t understand however hard I try, which is still beyond my reach, 
hidden in the very depths of my flesh, blind as a new-born child, it‟s the area on whose brink 
silence begins. What happens there is silence, the slow travail of my life. […] I‟ve never written, 
though I thought I wrote, never loved, though I thought I loved, never done anything but wait 
outside the closed door (Duras, trans. Bray, 1985, p. 29).
14
 
    
The effort needed to break the barriers of ignorance and mystery determines the 
fragmentary and questioning character of the first cycle. 
 
The second cycle, far from focusing on the innocent pleasures of a love story, shatters 
it; the cycle descends from the memory cycle of a doomed family, in three strands: the 
girl knowing now in hindsight that she prostitutes herself;
15
 the inextricable blend of 
love and violence she experiences (Duras, trans. Bray, 1985, pp. 46-7); and her family‟s 
despicable racist treatment of her Chinese lover.
16
 There is thus a continuous transversal 
connection and exchange between the two cycles. Duras not only frees herself from 
temporal restrictions but explores the events of one cycle within the other, or rather as 
the other side in the sense of folding. 
 
It‟s a family of stone, petrified so deeply it‟s impenetrable. Everyday we try to kill one another, 
to kill (Duras, trans. Bray, 1985, p. 58). 
 
The shifting movements of the memory layers (foregrounding the familial; back-
grounding the erotic; allowing interferences of the societal, the colonial and the racial; 
then distancing herself and neutralizing the fractal scenery by shifting into a 
                                                 
14
 Duras‟ doors (open, closed, passing through doors, real and imaginary doors) can be traced in many 
texts (for instance in The ravishing of Lol V. Stein, as will be seen). 
15
 „[T]hat he [her lover] lacks the power to understand such perverseness. And he can never move fast 
enough to catch her‟ (Duras 1985, p. 41). 
16
 „Like her elder son, she [the mother] looked down on the weak. Of my lover from Cholon she spoke in 
the same way as my elder brother. I shan‟t write the words down. They were words that had to do with 
carrion you find in the desert‟ (Duras 1985, p. 61).  
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phantasmagoric level of the natural-cosmic) sustains the simulacral mode of the third 
cycle which spells out further verdicts upon her life which have until then not surfaced. 
 
I see her [H.G.] as being of one flesh with the man from Cholon, but in a shining, solar, innocent 
present, in a continual self-flowering which springs out of each action, each tear, each of her 
faults, each of her ignorances. Hélène Lagonelle is the mate of the bondsman who gives me such 
abstract, such harsh pleasure, the obscure man from Cholon, from China. Hélène Lagonelle is 
from China (Duras, trans. Bray, 1985, p. 79). 
 
The third cycle is disruptive and veers more violently, according to the level of descent 
erupting in impulses, across several time levels: early childhood, adolescence (Duras, 
trans. Bray, 1985, pp. 62-6), the time of adulthood in war-torn France during World 
War II,
17
 and a final coming to writing which sanctions the suffering. It demonstrates 
the inextricable intermingling of the familial and erotic levels where the love story is 
now re-viewed as a story of death, violence, pain, despair and dishonour which breaks 
with an assumption of a blissful affair if perverse for age and racial reasons. 
 
I‟m still part of the family, it‟s there I live, to the exclusion of everywhere else. It‟s in its aridity, 
its terrible harshness, its malignance, that I‟m most deeply sure of myself, at the heart of my 
essential certainty, the certainty that later on I‟ll be a writer. […] That‟s the place where later on, 
once the present is left behind, I must stay, to the exclusion of everywhere else. The hours I 
spent in the apartment show it in a new light. It‟s a place that‟s intolerable, bordering on death, a 
place of violence, pain, despair, dishonour. And so is Cholon. On the other bank of the river. As 
soon as you‟ve crossed to the other side (Duras, trans. Bray, 1985, p. 80). 
 
Within the cycle, because of its descending movement, the lines of association often 
fade, as for instance between the individual women portraits
18
 which foreshadows the 
alignment of the girl‟s/adolescent‟s fate with her mother‟s, and other women‟s, which 
becomes the focus of the next cycle. The deeper levels of memory are drained of 
individual or personal attachments and become moments of pure past, actualized in a 
remote poetic, if not incantatory, mode. 
 
I had that good fortune – those nights, that mother. The light fell from the sky in cataracts of 
pure transparency, in torrents of silence and immobility. The air was blue, you could hold it in 
your hand. Blue. The sky was the continual throbbing of the brilliance of the light. The night lit 
up everything, all the country on either bank of the river as far as the eye could reach. Every 
night was different, each one had a name as long as it lasted. Their sound was that of the dogs, 
the country dogs baying at mystery. They answered one another from village to village, until the 
time and space of the night was utterly consumed (Duras, trans. Bray, 1985, pp. 86-7). 
                                                 
17
 „I see the war as I see my childhood‟ (Duras 1985, p. 67). 
18
 Women portraits are inter-connected and inter-related, for instance, those of Marie-Claude Carpenter 
(Duras 1985, pp. 68-70), Betty Fernandez (pp. 71-3) and Hélène Lagonelle (pp. 74-9) although they 
inhabit different times and places.  
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Having reached the level of absolute memory, the fourth cycle fuses all events and time 
layers and turns progressively to a hallucinatory mode of expression. 
 
While the love story re-emerges in splinters as fated from the beginning (Duras, trans. 
Bray, 1985, pp. 87-8; pp. 93-5; pp. 97-8), the girl becomes the Chinese lover‟s child19 
while, in parallel, originary, ancient visions invade the remnants of personal history. 
The mad beggar woman from Calcutta (Duras, trans. Bray, 1985, pp. 91-3), one of 
Duras‟ signature figures,20 awakens, crossing the forests of East-Asia, descending down 
to the sea, turning up in Calcutta, at the Ganges where at night the lepers laugh in the 
gardens: an imagery which re-surfaces in other texts (and films) by Duras. 
 
For me the whole town is inhabited by the beggar woman in the road. And all the beggar women 
of the towns, the rice fields, the tracks bordering Siam, the banks of the Mekong – for me the 
beggar woman who frightened me is inhabited by them. She comes from everywhere. […] And 
always my mother has been there beside her, tending her foot eaten up with maggots and 
covered with flies. […] Beside her, the little girl in the story. She‟s carried her two thousand 
kilometers. She‟s had enough of her, wants to give her away (Duras, trans. Bray, 1985, p. 91).  
 
The mother figure, as just one other inhabitation, and the girl-child are evoked as an 
eternal return of the story played out then and now. 
 
There is another incomplete layer I can intimate, the parallel between becoming the 
child of the Chinese lover and forever being the child given away by the mother. In both 
events the writing struggles with the admission: it is too painful to be written down (as 
was the debasing remark of a daughter serving a carrion-like Chinese lover) but 
nevertheless it must be said. The framing devices, photos to remember by at the start 
and at the end of the text, and a voice on the phone, close the chasm with a more than 
ironic twist.
21
 In particular the fourth and deepest cycle explodes any attempt to read the 
text in a representational mode on account of its simulacral and hallucinatory aspects 
while the discourse of differential desiring practice embracing disparity, compositional 
and thematic dispersion, offers pathways into Duras‟ text. The schizoid processes of 
discursive dissociation with its libidinal, differential and symptomatological strands as 
                                                 
19
 „I‟d become his child. It was with his own child he made love every evening‟ (Duras 1985, pp. 105-7; 
p. 105). 
20
 Another signature figure is Marie-Anne Stretter who appears across many texts (and films), for instance 
in The ravishing of Lol V. Stein and The North China lover as will be seen. 
21
 „And then he told her. Told her that it was as before, that he still loved her, he could never stop loving 
her, that he‟d love her until death‟ (Duras 1985, p. 123). 
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the reading strategies of a differential desiring practice provide the missing links in 
accessing the potential of Duras‟ works more productively and creatively.    
        
Dialogical memory structure      
 
As a grand gesture of memory, a few years before her death, Duras re-visits in The 
North China lover [1991] the enduring themes of her artistic career: French colonialism 
in Indochina, love in a racial setting, family tensions, desire, death and madness. Since 
the text works trans-generically and expands episodically the core events of The lover 
and other texts,
22
 to follow its full compositional trajectory is beyond the scope of the 
thesis. My focus is rather on identifying the cross-roads between The lover and The 
North China lover and positioning the points of congruence within differential desiring 
practice. My positioning follows the three sign systems set out as types of a 
symptomatology of literary texts: intensities and blocks of sensations, a-subjectivity and 
larval subjects, and to a limited degree transversal techniques to which I have given 
more space in my consideration of The lover. 
 
Shifting modes of intensities as indicators of desiring practice take the form of a further 
layer of memory which re-assembles and differentiates the desiring-machines and 
assemblages of desire: familial, erotic, societal, colonial and atmospheric-cosmic.  
 
When they were little, in the dry season their mother sometimes took them to see the night. […] 
Children really ought to be told the things people usually hid from them – work, wars, parting, 
injustice, solitude, death. Yes, the hellish but inescapable side of life, children needed to be told 
that, too – it was like looking at the sky, the beauty of the world‟s nights. […] Know above all 
else: that you knew nothing (Duras, trans. Hafrey, 1992, p. 23). 
 
This supplementary layer of memory supersedes the libidinal strand with an at times 
mildly mocking, at other times wise or serene commentary; it also lifts events of 
submersed cycles of past(s) previously either deliberately relegated or not realized. To 
access and observe these schizoid processes is outside and beyond a representational 
mode of reading while a differential desiring practice allows for the palpation of 
corporeal and textual symptoms, complex signs and hieroglyphs across the memory 
thresholds.  
                                                 
22
 Duras also undertakes setting the record straight with the director of The lover.   
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She remembers. She is the last to remember. She still hears the sound of the sea in the room. 
And she remembers having written about that. And she remembers the Chinese street. She even 
remembers writing that the sea was present that day in the lovers‟ room. She wrote the words: 
the sea, and three other words – the words simply and beyond compare (Duras, trans. Hafrey, 
1992, p. 69). 
 
The libidinal parallel of corporeal and textual event in The lover reveals how the 
connections between memory and desire in the textual fabric have shifted and how the 
writing process condenses the textual and corporeal symptoms, making the sea the 
expressive sign of corporeal, and textual, orgiastic bliss.
23
  
 
And, weeping, he makes love. At first, pain. And then the pain is possessed in its turn, changed, 
slowly drawn away, borne towards pleasure, clasped to it. […] The sea, formless, simply beyond 
compare. […] The sea, the immensity, gathering, receding, returning. […] I asked him to do it 
again and again. Do it to me. And he did, did it in the unctuousness of blood. And it really was 
unto death. It has been unto death (Duras, trans. Bray, 1985, p. 42; p. 47). 
 
The supplementary memory also sets the earlier unrealized power positions in a 
different light in shifting the familial-erotic balance within the assemblages of desire. 
 
She becomes his object, secretly prostituted to him alone. Nameless now. Offered up like a thing 
he alone has stolen. Taken, used, penetrated by him alone. Something suddenly unknown, a girl 
child without identity except that she belongs to him, is his sole estate – there is no word for that 
– melded into him, absorbed in a totality that is itself just being born, called since the dawn of 
time by another, an unjust name: indignity (Duras, trans. Hafrey, 1992, p. 87). 
 
In contrast to the submerged response to the love affair between the girl-child and the 
Chinese lover in The lover where rumours of the scandal circulate (Duras 1985, pp. 93-
8; in the fourth cycle), in The North China lover child prostitution and sibling-incest are 
foregrounded (Duras, trans. Hafrey, 1992, pp. 44-9; pp. 45-6; pp. 101-3; p. 166) and 
become a separate, independently explored strand within the familial assemblage of 
desire.
24
 Whenever there is a gliding shift in the libidinal coordinates within the 
assemblage of desire, the hieroglyphic figure of A.M.S., Anne-Marie Stretter emerges 
in a red dress, variegated with the Ganges beggar woman (Duras, trans. Hafrey, 1992, p. 
8, p. 12, p. 30, pp. 40-1, pp. 98-9). The libidinal portraits of the cast
25
 (which has now 
become quite vast) disperse the affective force field as impulses erupt in long, film 
                                                 
23
 This parallels the use of the (white-black) sea in The malady of death as third persona of the 
assemblage of desire. 
24
 For instance in the relationship between the younger brother Paulo and the sister/girl-child and their 
relations to the native servant-boy Thanh, to whom the text is dedicated.  
25
 This includes the native houseboys and personnel, and the college girls and the teachers.   
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script-like dialogues.
26
 Corresponding to The lover, as a point of congruence within 
differential desiring practice, the diverse layers of memory in The North China lover 
respond to each other, and are held together, by the never lost desire for becoming a 
writer which at the deeper level of the processes of becoming re-surfaces at rhythmic 
intervals. 
 
For a long time, the child never understood why she was fascinated, much as the Chinese hadn‟t 
understood. And then one day she remembered: she recovered the image of those couples 
bloodlessly, wordlessly dancing on deck, recovered it intact, and as though it were already 
integrated into a book she hadn‟t taken on yet but must have been on the verge of tackling every 
morning, every day of her life for years and years, and which demanded to be written – until she 
reached that moment of clear memory in the forest of writing still to come (Duras, trans. Hafrey, 
1992, p. 141).  
 
While both The lover and The North China lover re-invoke the memory of a lived past 
on several affective levels, the extension of the libidinal cast and the dialogic structure 
in the later text contain the libidinal impulses. The unsaid in the gaps and interstices 
between morsels of dialogues points to a different affective regime from the 
hallucinatory mode of expression in the last cycle of The lover. As is Duras‟ habit in 
most of her literary texts, The North China lover concludes with the evocation of 
cinematic insert shots, condensed kernels of memory, visionary seeds of events which 
are – despite their sparse and minimalist expression – of a somnambulistic nature. 
 
– Another river in all its breadth, its vastness. Only the green line of its banks is unmoving. 
Between its banks it advances toward the sea. Complete, IMMENSE (Duras, trans. Hafrey, 
1992, p. 228).  
 
Section two         
 
In this second section of practising differential desiring practice I now engage with two 
texts by Duras which are perplexing in different respects: Moderato cantabile poses 
compositional and thematic challenges while The ravishing of Lol V. Stein departs even 
further from representational literary modes. Duras‟ texts challenge the reader to not 
withdraw from unpredictable shifts in their fictional modalities.
27
 Libidinal reading 
                                                 
26
 Extended dialogues between the girl-child and the Chinese lover (Duras 1992, pp. 27-31; pp. 34-7), 
between H.G. and the girl-child (pp. 42-9, passim) and between the mother, the brothers and the Chinese 
lover (pp. 115-23, passim) establish a very different forcefield of affectivity as compared to that in The 
lover. 
27
 The disconcerting handling of the time structure contributes to the complexity of the text. The 
„narration‟ may jump from present tense to past, into the conditional which is often given the value of 
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strategies in the frame of differential desiring practice affirm rather than decry 
unsettling notions and situations, unfamiliar and disruptive responses, inexplicable 
reversals and unruly breaks with routines, enigmatic and paradoxical moves, absurd 
decisions, improper and transgressive displays, and last but not least, parodic 
disturbances.  
 
Dissolution and madness 
 
Duras‟ Moderato cantabile [1958] ritualises an absent event, a passionate crime which 
is only manifested in a disembodied cry. This initial void invites a non-narrative, non-
representational reading. Through its absence the inaccessible, outside occurrence 
instigates the two protagonists‟ obsession with the inexplicable. In naming the outside 
occurrence of the auditory signal (the cry) an absent event, I draw on the Deleuzian 
understanding of event in the sense of its actualization as eventuating out of the a-
temporal virtual. This sets the frame for distancing myself from reading the instigating 
cry as a narrative instance or action. Instead I read it non-narratively as the initiating 
moment of the process of becoming. The instigation of action within a differential 
reading is viewed as a symptomatological libidinal impulse and protagonists as subjects 
in the initial, larval states of becoming.
28
 
 
                                                                                                                                               
expressing the unconscious or the imaginary. Since the levels of „narration‟ are not observed or adhered 
to, time shifts can afford access to inexpressible moves and fluxes within one character or between 
characters. Duras‟s innovations in „narrative‟ style and the handling of time structures are mutually 
supportive. (Considerations of cinematic techniques may afford more appropriate readings, however this 
goes beyond the frame of the thesis.) Duras‟s writing is directed at grasping ambiguous and inextricable 
situations and evoking them without delivering the satisfaction of a solution for the reader (which would 
make it „literature‟). The rudimentary „plot‟ does not move forward or horizontally but in stages, 
vertically and regressively.Deleuze and Guattari speak of transversality and dismantling. This allows for a 
literary adaptation of Deleuze and Guattari‟s stylistic, structural and topical claims of rhizomatics and 
plateaus, and in particular, the disorientation effected by the schizoanalytic process as discussed in the 
Kafka treatise.  
28
 In this reading of Duras‟ Moderato cantabile I draw on some ideas presented in my paper, „Actualising 
Deleuze‟s “empty square” in Duras‟ Moderato Cantabile‟, to the First International Deleuze Conference 
at Cardiff University, UK, 3-5 August 2008, convened by I Buchanan. My thanks go to the panel chaired 
by K Wolfe (SUNY, Buffalo) and to the participants in the discussion, in particular, P Hertz-Ohmes 
(SUNY, Oswego), J Skeet (Amsterdam) and R van de Wiel (Amsterdam). Acknowledgement is also due 
to the key address by R Bogue on „Esperanza, the wandering island‟ and the plenum discussion; to the 
delegate L Mozère (Emerita, Lille) as well as to the Second Deleuze Camp / Summerschool in Cardiff, 
UK in June 2008: their leaders, especially, J Williams (Dundee), EW Holland (Ohio) and H Berressem 
(Cologne) and their participants, in particular, K Wolfe (SUNY), M Radomski (Warsaw/Utrecht), E Urrio 
(Finland), L Collins (Cambridge), M Celletti (Westaustralia), M Causey (Emory), E Sapp (Stanford), A 
Nocek (Chicago) and A Tynan (Cardiff). 
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Within the Deleuzian frame of differential desiring practice, occurrence as event and 
protagonists as larval subjects are not separate instances since ephemeral subjects as 
discursive ciphers are instantiated while the process of the event runs through them. The 
protagonists‟ fascination in Moderato cantabile with an unfathomable self-sacrifice 
triggers their return to the crime scene and they progressively embody the event on 
imaginary and discursive levels. The differential mode of phantasm thus engenders 
processes of becoming. While the Deleuzian notion of phantasm sustains these 
processes of becoming, the specific modes of this engendering need to be further 
explored.  
 
Rather than assuming a temporal sequencing and thus constructing a level of meaning-
making narration, shifting into the Deleuzian literary mode of desiring practice, which 
works a-temporally and a-causally, allows a reading of the return and renewed 
embodiment of the (past, dead and mad) love-couple in the sense of differential 
serialization. If I take as my frame for reading Duras‟ text the Deleuzian process of 
becoming as literary machine (rather than a reading in terms of a narration of a novella), 
moments of temporally, spatially and causally anchored action are replaced by a-
temporal, a-topical and a-causal actualizations of events and protagonists as subjects 
and novelistic characters undergo a de-subjectification and become transitory aspects of 
the event. 
 
In this frame, I read the impersonations within the textual fabric as unstable, shifting 
assemblages of desire held together, and apart, by inter-relational affectivity, not as 
holding independent positions or undergoing a progressive characterization. The 
protagonists substitute themselves for the original love couple and enact, discursively, 
the unknown event in a seemingly „masochistic‟ ritual.29 As such I read the act of 
substitution as entering the compositional scheme of serialization grounded in 
connections and relations, thus performing an aesthetic shift toward the a-presentational 
mode of differential desiring practice. I understand here the process of serialization in 
transversal, relational terms of repeated series playing through the simulacral re-
                                                 
29
 The stylistic decisions made by Duras and the existential stance of her vision, both make up her specific 
signature. Anderson (1995), drawing on earlier works by Vircondelet (1991), Borgomano (1985), Tison-
Braun (1985) and Marini (1977) proposes that this involves a formalization (and ritualization) of 
language, which in turn  involves strategies of repetition and leads to serialization (in the Deleuzian 
sense). Correspondingly, Zepp (Symposium, 1976, pp. 236-59) approaches Moderato cantabile in terms 
of ritualized language. 
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appearance of events. I argue that the psychoanalytic modes of libidinal responses, here 
of masochism and narcissism,
30
 become dysfunctional descriptors
31
 since the libidinal 
responses cannot be attached to individualized subjects or characters. Fascination and 
obsession with the absent event actualizes another event, its different repetition of an 
infinite series. 
 
A textual (even narrative) progression could be argued since there are clearly designated 
halting points.
32
 Similarly, four textual levels (at least) could be proposed.
33
 Yet arguing 
for textual progression and proposing textual levels assumes a meaning-making process 
grounded in the representational modes of equivalence rather than in schizoid 
differential disparity; focused on analogy and resemblance rather than on differentiation 
and dissociation; and aiming at the recognition of a mimetically rendered world which 
offers, and guarantees, identification. While leading to a moderately comfortable 
closure of the text, such a reading ignores the briefly emerging libidinal movements and 
shifting intensities in the text. How then can an eventual-simulacral and libidinal 
reading of Duras‟ Moderato cantabile overcome the hurdles of a dysfunctional 
representational reading? 
 
I view the libidinal impulses manifesting as signs and symptoms which instantiate the 
play of simulacra in the sense of fleeting affective images. In the frame of a Deleuzian 
differential desiring practice, impulses
34
 conceptualized as desiring-machines find 
expression as libidinal activities on stylistic and discursive levels, as aberrations in the 
syntax, as textual quavers which indicate shifts in intensities. Assemblages of desire 
show as connectivity on the compositional and thematic levels in the textual fabric, in 
                                                 
30
 The psychoanalytic notions need to be re-written in the affective spectrum of Deleuzian libidinal 
theory. 
31
 Deleuze‟s reading of masochism departs from the psychoanalytic understanding and warrants further 
investigation which cannot be followed in the frame of the thesis. Cf. chapter five and Deleuze (2006c). 
32
 Section I (Duras 1968, pp. 75-82), II (pp. 83-91), III (pp. 92-100), IV (pp. 101-9), V (pp. 110-7), VI 
(pp. 118-25), VII (pp. 126-33), VIII (pp. 134-40). These halting points appear at times not in agreement 
with an assumed (thematic) progression. 
33
 These four textual levels are inter-related and not easily separated: 1 the auditory foreground level (for 
instance, the young boy‟s piano lessons, the cries of birds and winds); 2 the ritualised dialogues between 
the protagonists in the café-bar (which are serialized); 3 the indistinctly recalled memory level (shared 
and individually, imagined and discursively provoked); and 4 the partly hidden, reactive and affective 
level (for instance, Anne‟s crying in response to the initial disembodied cry of the dying woman, her 
vomiting of the sumptuous supper as well as Chauvin‟s nightly (silent but intrusive) loitering around the 
house). 
34
 The three differentiated desiring-machines are impulses, Eros and Thanatos; cf. chapters three, four and 
six. 
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the form of connections and relations, as serialization, yet also as disruptions in the 
textual fabric. Becoming is noticed in shifts in intensities and affectivity, read 
corporeally and textually in its signs and symptoms. Unsettling situations, unfamiliar 
responses, unexpected breaks of routines, paradoxical moves, transgressive and parodic 
displays become the instruments of detecting, palpating and locating libidinal structures 
in the regime of desiring-machines which share with the regime of the simulacra the 
characteristics of being processual, relational, differential and libidinal. Examples of 
these alarming diagnostic symptoms, or libidinal hieroglyphs, abound in Moderato 
cantabile, but are in most readings discarded as unfortunate, awkward or misguided 
literary mistakes.  
 
The evolution of Duras‟ phantasm can be detected in the symptomatological, speaking 
irregularities of the textual fabric which can be subsumed as literary dissolution, dis-
assemblage, as a process of pro- and re-gressive different/ciation.  In this sense the 
literary text arises from a core event and its successive infinite unfolding, from the 
inside out, yet simultaneously withdraws from the outside in, in a movement of 
enfolding. This process of schizodicity as doubled-up dispersion and defining 
characteristic of differential desiring practice enacts the simulacral mode of the process 
and serves its a-representational intent.  
 
Here, then, I demonstrate the evolution of phantasm in Duras‟ Moderato cantabile in 
following several (although not all potential) simulacral strands in keeping with the 
techniques explored earlier.
35
 The regime of simulacra, as a consequence of the 
postulate of the eternal return in the system of difference and repetition, is eventual, thus 
a-temporal, and focuses on a moment of pure duration. Compositionally these processes 
take in differential desiring practice and milieu-based composition the form of machines 
of resonance or desire, serialized and transversally connected by inter-relating and 
communicating dark precursors. Machines of resonance or desire need to be viewed not 
as a structural but as a relational device. The inter-connecting series lead to a 
progressive rising of the simulacra, the un-layering of the core event and an access to 
the deeper enigma, aporia covered by moments of aphasia (memory and forgetting), an 
unexplained and inexplicable trauma (wound).  
                                                 
35
 The simulacral techniques are: serial and divergent-serial, decentering and circular, disparate and 
schizoid, and excessive; cf. chapter six.  
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I thus follow Moderato cantabile‟s textual progression to lay open the double-strand of 
pro- and regression in the ritual of substitution which the protagonists undertake. 
Section I sets out the initiating event, introducing unsettling notions and situations with 
a first precursor, the woman‟s cry (and the sound of the sea) and its off-spring (as 
resonance), the boy‟s sonatina. 
 
In the street downstairs a woman screamed, a long, drawn-out scream so shrill it overwhelmed 
the sound of the sea. Then it stopped abruptly (Duras, Strachan (ed.), p. 78 [section I]). 
 
Section II introduces unmotivated emotional outbursts and „irrational‟ reasoning for 
returning to the crime scene while soft and sharp voices establish the second precursor. 
 
„From the way he acted with her,‟ she said softly, „as if it didn‟t matter to him any more whether 
she was alive or dead, do you think that it‟s possible for anyone to reach such a … state … 
except … through despair?‟ The man hesitated, looked directly at her, and said sharply: „I don‟t 
know‟ (Duras, Strachan (ed.), pp. 86-7 [section II]; original ellipses). 
 
Section III introduces unexpected ruptures of routines and sets up the third precursor, 
the magnolia.
36
 
 
„It was a long, high-pitched scream …‟ she said. „She was dying,‟ the man said. […] „The  
magnolia tree in the left-hand corner of the garden is in bloom.‟ „Yes, there are so many flowers 
at this time of year […] You shut your window, it‟s unbearable.‟ […] „I suspect there was indeed 
something else, something we don‟t know about yet‟ (Duras, Strachan (ed.), pp. 95-9 [section 
III]; original ellipsis).  
 
Section IV presents enigmatic and paradoxical moves, vacillating between several 
discursive layers of remembered past, imagined present and projected future, 
embodying a moment of pure duration. It fuses several auditory and olfactory dark 
precursors (the cry – the siren – screaming trees and birds, the magnolia – the trees). 
The loosening of the syntax demonstrates Anne Desbaresdes‟s despair which exposes 
another affective layer in the text.
37
    
                                                 
36
 The precursor and its multiple descendants (here the third resonance) evolve into an affective, 
symptomatological network which spreads through the textual fabric as an olfactory element tracing 
Anne‟s moods and affective shifts: the magnolia tree, the crushed magnolia at Anne‟s dress at the supper, 
the magnolia hedges and the moaning trees, thus combining the affective layers.  
37
 „“People ought to live in a town where there are no trees trees scream when there‟s a wind here there‟s 
always a wind always except for two days a year in your place don‟t you see I‟d leave this place I 
wouldn‟t stay all the birds or almost all are seagulls you find them dead after a storm and when the storm 
is over the trees stop screaming you hear them screaming on the beach like someone murdered it keeps 
the children from sleeping no I‟ll leave.” […] “Dead,” she said, “even after she was dead she was still 
smiling happily”‟ (Duras 1968, p. 106 [section IV]).The female character Anne in Moderato cantabile 
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While sections I to IV unfold from the inside out until Anne‟s emotional outburst, 
sections V to VIII enfold from the outside in. This compositional technique occurs 
repeatedly in Duras‟ texts and functions as part of her signature. Section V revisits the 
first precursor and the ambiance of the fatal night of the cry. 
 
The sonatina still resounded, borne like a feather by this young barbarian, whether he liked it or 
not, and showered again on his mother, sentencing her anew to the damnation of her love. The 
gates of hell banged shut. […] And as the music built, the light visibly declined. […] In ten 
minutes all the color of day would have vanished (Duras, Strachan (ed.), pp. 115-6 [section V]). 
 
Sections VI and VIII lead to the completion of the phantasm of despair, the equation of 
the dead couple with the living couple in a ritualized serialization. The jarring section 
VII establishes another textual level, parodies the text‟s intent and sets a finishing 
flourish, another stylistic turn of Duras‟ signature. Anne‟s supper with her guests turns 
into a funereal celebration and dis-gorging of salmon and duck.
38
 A whole range of 
precursors
39
 re-appear and invade the text. The phantasm is sealed with an improper and 
transgressive display of another „mortuary ritual‟, kissing a stranger in a public bar.  
 
Then she did what he had been unable to do. She moved close enough to him for their lips to 
meet. They lingered in a long embrace, their lips cold and trembling, so that it should be 
accomplished, performing the same mortuary ritual as their hands had performed a moment 
before. It was accomplished. […] „I wish you were dead,‟ Chauvin said. „I am,‟ Anne 
Desbaresdes said. […] She passed the cluster of men at the bar and found herself again moving 
forward into the fiery red rays of the dying day (Duras, Strachan (ed.), pp. 139-40 [section 
VIII]). 
 
                                                                                                                                               
moves through stages of bodily and facially visible disintegration. The voice changes so that the status 
may be called becoming-animal in the sense of a line of escape. The novel in its narrative trajectory can 
be read as depicting a metamorphosis ending in the wished-for death. The work has, like some other 
works by Duras, the mark of unfathomable grief. See Anderson (1995, p. 143) who refers to Marini 
(1977). The style of narration shifts and is indeterminate, at times moving into interior monologue with a 
dissolved syntax, thus producing a stammering style; this can be viewed as an instance of free indirect 
style or even an impersonal „stammering‟. An alternative translation (demonstrating the liberated syntax 
and vacillations in Duras‟ style) reads: „What is needed is to live in a city without trees the trees cry when 
it is windy here it is always windy here always except for two days in the year in your place you see I am 
going away from here I am not staying here all the birds or nearly are sea birds which one finds battered 
after the storms and when the storm stops isn‟t it that the trees cry harder one hears them crying them on 
the beach as if they were murdered that prevents the children from sleeping not me I will be going away‟ 
(Duras 1958, p. 44; my translation). 
38
 „Outside, in the garden, the magnolias‟ funereal flowering continues in the dark night of early spring. 
[…] Anne Desbaresdes will go upstairs. From the big bay window of the long corridor of her life she will 
look at the boulevard below. […] She will go into the child‟s room, and lie down on the floor at the foot 
of the bed, paying no attention to the magnolia crushed to pieces between her breasts. And to the 
inviolable rhythm of her child‟s breathing she will vomit forth the strange nourishment that had been 
forced upon her‟ (Duras 1968, pp. 126-33 [section VII]). 
39
 For instance: Chauvin‟s rejection, the first auditory precursor, the magnolia, precursors which are 
affectively inter-related. 
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Although Moderato cantabile is an early text by Duras, her stylistic and thematic 
preoccupations are noticeably present: the voiding of content, the presence of absence, 
the abstraction of the text toward eventuality and atemporality, and the self-parody of 
phantastic intent. This is thus a text that evolves, partly discursively, partly 
imaginatively, but at the same time unravels since it follows the state of becoming. 
Fascination and obsession can be read as signs or symptoms of inner forces which drive 
the process of actualization from the virtual into the actual in the Deleuzian sense. Event 
is here the propulsion forward rather than occurrence as such; there is neither action nor 
occurrence but only intermediate or transitional moving forward, not temporally nor 
spatially but experientially. I suggest that these transitional stages of becoming are the 
real fabric of the text. 
 
Overall, then, if set into the Deleuzian frame of literary discourse, reading and 
theorizing literary texts such as Duras‟ Moderato cantabile happens as a pursuit of open 
or even absent spaces, of speaking voids or silences which reveal through their absence 
of offer or their pregnant nothingness that something has either been falling away or has 
not yet come to pass. The initiating event‟s different repetition of an infinite series is a 
repetition which draws on semblance but has not absorbed it. The infinite series points 
to the atemporality of the non-existing action and its non-location. The text is totally 
perforated and thus open in terms of a-representational aesthetics. Deleuzian 
serialization demonstrates the process of becoming, does not focus on characters and 
subjectivity but on the processual exploration of affectivity. My further perspective is 
directed toward unplaceable texts, to explore their characteristics as not fitting the 
categories of sequential reading but rather drawing the reader into speculative 
circularity. 
 
The paradoxes of pure becoming 
 
In contrast, reading Duras‟ The ravishing of Lol V. Stein [1964] in the light of 
differential desiring practice focuses on detecting and theorising the multiple layers of 
symptomatological affectivity between two inter-related triangular assemblages of 
desire.
40
 Since this perplexing text also resists a reading via representational practices, I 
                                                 
40
 These two triadic assemblages are; Lol Stein ‒ Michael Richardson ‒ Marie-Anne Stretter; Lol Stein ‒ 
Jack Hold ‒ Tatiana Karl. Further accessory figures are attached to the triads; to the first triad: Lol‟s 
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here deploy the modes of differential desiring practice, the differential, libidinal, 
symptomatological and simulacral. I have previously subsumed these modes as schizoid 
modes of discursive dissociation whereby schizodicity points to the affective 
perforation of the texts as part of the libidinal mechanism of desire breaking through, 
and discursivity to the differential mechanism of phantasm. Schizodicity operates under 
the double-regime of libidinality and of different/ciation. The processes of becoming 
and its successive stages as I observe them in The ravishing of Lol V. Stein (Duras, 
trans. Seaver, 1966) are situated at the turning points or interstices between the two 
Deleuzian regimes where desire in the doubled triad plays itself out in repeated 
scenarios of phantasm(s). I focus on the processes of becoming, as displayed in the 
shifting multiple play of affectivity, attraction and distanciation, and how these are 
anchored in a core event, the ballroom dance event at the Town Beach casino; I also 
position event and becoming in the larger frame of the a-representational modes of 
phantasm and simulacra as theorized in previous chapters.
41
  
 
Here, then, I locate the core event as intimated in the ambivalent title, the ravishing as 
rape or rapture (jouissance),
42
 and follow its serialization in the form of phantasms (as 
imagined and recreated events) deeply descending into the forgotten layers of Lol‟s 
memory as well as those of other personae.
43
 In this way I read the process of becoming 
in the frame of the scenarios as they eventuate in the serialized phantasm(s) which 
sound out the affective network of the doubled triad. If one were to follow the reading 
process which takes the reader through various marked sections of varying length,
44
 a 
                                                                                                                                               
husband John Bedford; to the second triad: Tatiana‟s husband Peter Beugner. The naming of the 
„members‟ of the assemblages is progressively fading and does not contribute to establishing subjectivity.  
41
 In this reading of Duras‟ The ravishing of Lol V. Stein I draw on some ideas presented in my paper, 
„The paradoxes of pure becoming in Duras‟ The ravishing of Lol V. Stein [1964] – A Deleuzian take‟, to 
the Second International Deleuze Conference at the University of Cologne, Germany, 10-13 August 
2009, convened by H Berressem and L Haferkamp. My thanks go to the panel chaired by R Schelkle 
(Tübingen) and to participants in the discussion afterwards. Acknowledgement is also due to the delegates 
L Mozère and A Sauvagnargues; to the camp leaders I Buchanan, P Harris, P Pisters, B Reynolds, J 
Watson and J Williams of the Third Deleuze Camp / Summerschool, at Schloss Wahn, University of 
Cologne, Germany.   
42
 Duras‟ phantasm can be detected in the symptomatological, speaking irregularities of the textual fabric 
which can be subsumed as literary dissolution, dis-assemblage, as a process of pro-regressive 
different/citation. 
43
 The named personae, Tatiana, Jack Hold, John Bedford, Peter Beugner are affective instantiations, or 
rather affective ciphers, which do not hold the status of characters as will become clear. 
44
 These marked sections (eighteen altogether) do not agree with the pro- and re-gress of Lol Stein nor 
with that of any other personae or ciphers, but I shall keep them as a guide through the text (for 
orientation purposes): S1 (Duras 1966, pp. 1-12); S2 (pp. 13-21); S3 (pp. 22-6); S4 (pp. 27-41); S5 (pp. 
42-8) ; S6 (pp. 49-57); S7 ( pp. 58-65); S8 (pp. 66-78); S9 (pp. 79-100); S10 (pp. 101-8); S11 (pp. 109-
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textual progression could be constructed. Such an enforced pursuit, however, soon turns 
out to be counter-productive through the repetitive overlapping of speculative 
observations and contradictorily reported incidents which make up the multiple layers 
of symptomatological affectivity. To approach the text by following the core event and 
its serialization, I extract one decisive layer with which to demonstrate that the first 
desirous triad
45
 is unravelled while simultaneously being replaced by the second.
46
  
  
At first sight the reader may assume that the outer shell of the textual fabric discursively 
presents a narrative instance in the Deleuzian understanding of Proust. However, the 
assumption of a male narrator
47
 or, as I prefer, affective centre
48
 with a motivating love 
interest in Lol Stein,
49
 does not facilitate access to the text. Instead, it deliberately 
distracts the reader, often disguising and at times even distorting the discursive moves 
in super-imposing another affective layer onto the triadic assemblage of desire. I 
therefore prefer to consider this narrative instance as part of a discursively framed 
schizodicity operating both libidinally and differentially.
50
 This entanglement of the 
libidinal and the differential modes marks the first section (Duras, trans. Seaver, 1966, 
pp. 1-12) which attempts to trace Lol‟s personal history which in a schizoid manner is 
dispersed in two interfering layers, the (vacillating) male narrator‟s recollections and 
doubts about Lol‟s childhood friend Tatiana‟s remembrances of their shared time. 
 
On Thursdays, which was a school holiday, they used to go out and dance in the empty 
playground. … Shall we dance, Tatiana? … Come, Tatiana, come, let‟s dance, Tatiana, come on. 
That much I know (Duras, trans. Seaver, 1966, p. 2; S1; original ellipses). 
 
                                                                                                                                               
10); S12 (pp. 111-5); S13 ( pp. 116-29); S14 (pp. 130-50); S15 (pp. 151-4); S16 (pp. 155-72); S17 (pp. 
173-6); S18 (pp. 177-81). I have explored the schizoid process of dismantling with regard to Kafka and 
Proust while theorizing the schizoid processes of discursive dissociation and their function in differential 
desiring practice.  
45
 The first triad consist of Lol Stein ‒ Michael Richardson ‒ Marie-Anne Stretter.  
46
 The second triad replacing the first embraces Lol Stein ‒ Jack Hold ‒ Tatiana Karl but plays on the first 
triad in terms of Lol‟s memory. The assemblages cannot fully be separated. 
47
 For the first larger part of the text the narrator (if that what it is) hides in anonymity; S1 ‒ S7 (pp. 1-65). 
48
 In the sense Deleuze conceptualises the omni-perceptive narrator in Proust‟s work as a spider in its 
affective network and as BwO.  
49
 The (libidinal) assertions become paradoxically, both less and less certain and insisting: „the 
overwhelming actuality of this woman in my life‟ (S1 (p. 4)); „knowing this woman‟ (S4 (p. 27)); „I know 
Lol Stein in the only way I can: through love‟ (S4 (p. 37)); „I like to believe – since I love her – ‟ (S4 (p. 
38)); „She told me, at the same time as I became aware of my love, of her inviolable self-sufficiency, a 
giantess with the hands of a child‟ (S12 (p. 115)). 
50
 The affective layering within the assemblage of desire could be libidinally read as: I love Lol who 
loved Michael Richardson/and-or/Tatiana and differentially read as: I did love then Tatiana/and-or/now 
love Lol and Tatiana, both of them. 
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The foregrounded I-narrator shapes Tatiana‟s impressions in three inter-relational 
affective layers: what the narrator heard and understood or misunderstood of Tatiana‟s 
account, including what she/he libidinally wanted to hear; what Tatiana understood (on 
the level of memory structure) and what she (selectively and differentially) said to the I-
narrator; and how Lol was behaving (if that were ever possible to be defined and 
described). The libidinal and differential modes are at cross-purposes with each other; 
the reader is left with textual indicators in the sense of symptoms to be palpated (in the 
sense of „touching‟ the text). The text recedes further and further from the possibility of 
defining Lol‟s affective status in that it disperses the event of her ravishing as 
rape/rapture (jouissance) into a simulacral series of phantasms intent on explicating the 
riddle. An inner system of mirroring eventuates which circles around libidinally ruled 
impressions and thus cannot be taken as a portrait of Lol but is better understood as a 
differentially ruled, time-dispersed series of simulacra of so many potential 
embodiments of Lol in her becoming. The attempt to gain insight into Lol‟s ravishing, 
rape/rapture, leads further and further away into libidinal and differential ignorance and 
dissociation, eluding rational comprehension and shifting toward the paradoxical 
process of becoming characterized by stylistic and thematic schizodicity. 
 
Duras‟ self-conscious stylization effectively creates another layer of mocking, and at 
times sardonic, commentary which breaks the narrative instance. 
 
I asked her if Lol‟s subsequent illness was not proof positive that she was wrong. She repeated 
that it was not, that she, personally, believed that this crisis and Lol were one and the same, and 
always had been. […] I no longer believe a word Tatiana says. I‟m convinced of absolutely 
nothing (Duras, trans. Seaver, 1966, p. 4; S1). 
 
Since the focus is on relational affectivity, any insight into Lol‟s personal history and 
the enigma of her ravishing, or the determination of subjective traits, becomes 
admittedly futile. 
 
Now, I alone of all these perverters of the truth know this: that I know nothing. That was my 
initial discovery about her: to know nothing about Lol Stein was already to know her. One could, 
it seemed to me, know even less about her, less and less about Lol Stein (Duras, trans. Seaver, 
1966, p. 72; S8). 
 
Duras‟ stylistic layering has a vortex-like strength which splinters the already 
differentially dispersed factuality of different time layers into libidinal potentiality. 
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For Duras‟ style, I propose that schizodicity operates simultaneously in both modes, 
libidinally and differentially, and that the line of elision intimating either ignorance or 
unknowability, demonstrates the processes of becoming. While the textual sur-face is in 
large parts inhabited by the male, libidinally biased narrator‟s perspective, it struggles 
with the sub-textual, un-acknowledged, sub-liminal female voice of Tatiana and Lol 
with their separate libidinal agenda. This latter comes at times to the fore, yet is often 
reversed and dismissed. This leads to the reader‟s immersion into the unfathomable 
fluctuations of desire with an ever increasing differentiation. Personae do not eventuate 
any longer, despite their naming, but an intense reverberating field of affectivity is 
established where interactions momentarily conglomerate to create ephemeral and non-
insisting larval selves. Here, then, I read the libidinal dispersion of the textual fabric as 
the working of desiring-machines and the forming of shifting assemblages of desire. 
The backward movement of remembrance unearths from different angles, layer by 
layer, the originary event which overwhelms the textual forward movement, comprising 
the replacement of the triad. The result is a compositional and thematic dispersal of the 
text which I have theorized as schizoid dispersion of discursive dissociation and which 
functions as the general criterion for the discourse of differential desiring practice. 
 
The (vacillating, trembling)
51
 narrator as affective centre of the assemblage of desire 
takes it upon himself to lay out an initial phantasmatic version of „that night of Lol‟s 
ravishing‟ which is most satisfying to his desire. 
 
Here, then, in full, and all mixed together, both this false impression which Tatiana Karl tells 
about and what I have been able to imagine about that night at the Town Beach casino. 
Following which I shall relate my own story of Lol Stein (Duras, trans. Seaver, 1966, p. 4; S1). 
 
The simulacral re-enactment of the ball night at the Town Beach casino takes as its 
trigger the narrator‟s (illogical and paradoxical) desire for Lol.52 Despite both his denial 
and insistence, it is Tatiana‟s story of the night that he refashions53 and he subsumes in 
her words its fatal outcome: Lol‟s despair transformed into a process of instantaneous 
                                                 
51
 Deleuze often refers to trembling discursive instances in symptomatological readings of texts.  
52
 „I am therefore going to look for her, I shall pick her up at that moment in time which seems most 
appropriate, at that moment when it seems to me she first began to stir, to come toward me, at the precise 
moment when the last arrivals, two women, came through the door into the ballroom of the Town Beach 
casino‟ (Duras 1966, pp. 4-5; S1). 
53
 Tatiana maintains (p. 5; S1); Tatiana clearly recalls, Tatiana thought (p. 6); Tatiana had realized (p. 9) 
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ageing, as ultimate form of becoming which includes all of the participants in the event 
in a phantasmatic assemblage of desire. 
 
They had walked out onto the dance floor. Lol had watched them, the way a woman whose heart 
is wholly unattached, a very old woman, watches her children leave her: she seemed to love 
them. […] In the first light of dawn, when night was gone, Tatiana had seen how all of them had 
aged. Although Michael Richardson was younger than this woman, he had overtaken her, and 
together – with Lol – all three of them had aged years and years, grown centuries older, that kind 
of age which lies lurking, within the insane (Duras, trans. Seaver, 1966, pp. 8-10; S1). 
  
The scene of the ball night at Town Beach casino is multiply dispersed through several 
over-lapping points of view: the narrator‟s imaginings, Tatiana‟s remembrances, Lol‟s 
appearance to Tatiana as reflected upon by the narrator‟s splintering of Tatiana‟s 
remembrance. At the same time it is a frozen tableau which is libidinally and 
differentially re-enacted throughout the text, as an aïonic event in the Deleuzian sense, 
and a core phantasm, since the night endures forever. The splitting of the account 
through several perceptions
54
 can be read as functioning in the sense of an assemblage 
of desire in which all are mutually and eternally engaged and which captures their 
shared affectivity. That this fusion into a libidinal assemblage has taken place can be 
symptomatically read when Anne-Marie and Michael in the half-light of dawn intend to 
leave through „imaginary doors‟ (Duras, trans. Seaver, 1966, p. 11) and Lol attempts to 
follow them, only to fall –symptomatologically – unconscious. The affective network of 
a Deleuzian Body without Organs turns into a staging ground for Lol‟s intensifying 
process of becoming: fascination, ageing, temporal standstill, catatonia, and loss of 
consciousness (as surrender and jouissance). 
 
Differential desiring practice is open to the shifting alliances of affectivity and their 
symptomatological reading. Rather than explicating actions of characters, temporal 
progression and causality, it palpates the shifts in intensities and recedes from factuality, 
individualized corporeality and actions which could be represented. Instead it confronts 
us with, and immerses us in, the processes of change in emotional and bodily states: in 
the event and the resulting becoming. Duras‟ libidinal experimentation pushes the limits 
of language, making liminality a defining characteristic of her literary work. 
 
                                                 
54
 This splitting (schizodization) includes the perceptions of Anne-Marie Stretter and Lol‟s mother whose 
anger dissolves the scene. 
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The discursive means of explicating the process of becoming in Lol Stein become 
accessible in following the core event of ambivalent ravishing as rape or rapture 
(jouissance) and its serialization within the text in the form of phantasms, and thus 
extracting from the text the decisive layer of the replacement of the libidinal triad. This 
pursuit involves a descent into the „layers‟ of the anoedipal, molecular unconscious and 
its libidinal activities, and demands re-visiting the three syntheses of the unconscious 
and the Deleuzian parallel structures of the three syntheses of temporality which I 
explored earlier. These theoretical procedures open avenues to circumscribe the process 
of ravishing, in its progressive and regressive stages, as they trace the fascination and 
affective stunning (one night), then the comatose halt (for months?), and finally the 
celebratory catatonia (10 years) of Lol Stein which make up the different instantiations 
in her process of becoming. The central or originary event, the ball dance at the casino, 
is in this sense a moment of pure duration which initiates the process of becoming. 
 
Lol most certainly noticed this change. She was, it seemed, transported in the presence of this 
change, without fearing it or ever having feared it, without being surprised, as though she were 
already familiar with the nature of this change. […] Lol was watching him, watching him 
change. […] Pain was etched upon it [his face], ancient, primordial pain. […] That it now had to 
be played out to the bitter end. Michael Richardson‟s new tale had already begun to take shape. 
In Lol, this vision and this conviction did not appear to be accompanied by any sign of suffering. 
[…] Tatiana herself found Lol changed. She watched and waited for what would come next, 
brooded over the enormity of it, its clockwise precision (Duras, trans. Seaver, 1966, pp. 7-8; S1). 
 
Multiply dispersed, with overlapping points of view, the staging of the originary 
scenario involves all personae present in a gigantic assemblage of desire which includes 
the musicians filing out at dawn, „their violins enclosed in funereal cases‟ (Duras, trans. 
Seaver, 1966, p. 11).
55
 Lol‟s change and becoming are projected onto Michael 
Richardson, yet as observed by Tatiana in empathy with Lol and filtered and mediated 
through the narrator‟s selective revival of the scene, finally lifted onto the durative 
level: „That it now had to be played out to the bitter end‟ (Duras, trans. Seaver, 1966, p. 
7). In this way the event is utterly dispersed through the fluctuating responses which 
reflect their mutual attachment to each other. The shifting emphasis from the characters 
to the event, acting out its „enormity‟ in „clockwise precision‟ (Duras, trans. Seaver, 
1966, p. 8), expresses the relentlessness of the change eventuated, in the Deleuzian 
                                                 
55
 Lol‟s husband, John Bedford, is a violinist, absenting himself and rehearsing during the second 
invitation at Lol‟s while the guests are still present. His rehearsal play (as he claims it is) punctuates the 
amorous conversation between Jack Hold and Lol in the adjacent room. 
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sense, by passion and choiceless fate: Marie-Anne Stretter‟s sudden appearance 
provoking Lol‟s jilting and Michael‟s „new tale‟. 
 
The actualization of the eternal event of passionate infatuation is stretched and thus 
becomes a timeless durative display. It can be laid out under the regime of the four 
Bergsonian paradoxes of the past as part of Deleuze‟s theory of different/ciation: 
contemporaneity of present and past: „as though she were already familiar with the 
nature of this change‟ (Duras, trans. Seaver, 1966, pp. 7-8); their co-existence; their pre-
existence: Michael‟s display of „ancient primordial pain‟ (Duras, trans. Seaver, 1966, 
pp. 7-8); and becoming a moment of pure duration. This facilitates a reading of Duras‟ 
text in that the focus is moved to the shifting alignments of affectivity rather than to 
outward action(s) which only function as scaffolding. The actualization of the event 
happens once in the initiation of the process of becoming; then the serialization plays 
through the effects of this actualization. Read in the Deleuzian sense, the actualization 
of the event takes place in the actual while the counter-actualization is theorized as 
taking place in the virtual. Yet both movements are coinciding, are folded and thus 
inseparably held together. 
 
The complication of the Deleuzian fold of actual and virtual can be aptly deployed for 
Duras‟ text so as to deal with the multiply dispersed positions which the narrating voice 
attempts to filter. It also aids in approaching the various knotting points in the 
assembling, dis-assembling and re-assembling of the double triad, the return to specific 
evocative places (the Town Beach casino, the Forest Hotel, the rye field). If differential 
desiring practice deals with locating intensities and blocks of sensations, then the 
meandering dialogical sections of the text (especially in sections 9 and 14) are 
particularly apt for pursuing the dissolution of these blocks in moving through several 
levels, from a revived past to a past present, to the present presence and a speculative 
fractured future. 
 
In this vein, I propose seven instantiations of the event as serialized phantasms taking 
various textual modes as actualized and counter-actualized; as imagined and re-created; 
as singularly imagined or in the affective assemblage; as singularly remembered or by 
way of shared remembrance; as foregrounded experienced or withdrawn observed 
instances. These textual modes of schizoid, dissociative discursivity point to the 
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differential mechanism of phantasm and capture the affective network within the 
double-triad as the libidinal mechanism of desire breaks through. Progressively, we are 
encountering deeper levels of an anoedipal unconscious. I read the timelessness of the 
(now) aïonic event(s) as pointing to the Deleuzian hypothesis of the three syntheses of 
the unconscious (repetition, memory, death) and, in parallel, of atemporality.
56
 
 
The first instantiation of the phantasm of the summer ball at Town Beach casino (Duras, 
trans. Seaver, 1966, pp. 5-12; S1) is imagined and recreated in several descending 
attempts by a disembodied „voice‟ (a still anonymous Jack Hold)57 mediated by Tatiana 
who was „present‟. Despite the modal choice (imagined), this instantiation functions on 
the level of actualization since it is the reference point for all subsequent phantasmatic 
evocations. The second instantiation (Duras, trans. Seaver, 1966, pp. 35-41; S4), 
although textually presented in the guise of an imagined and re-created imaginary 
account by „Jack Hold‟, functions on the level of counter-actualization as it is a timeless 
evocation of the ball event surging out of Lol‟s anoedipal, molecular unconscious 
(twice) while roaming the streets of South Tahla. The third instantiation (Duras, trans. 
Seaver, 1966, pp. 52-4; S6) has multiple discursive functions: first as an event of mixed 
imagination, it draws up the second triad and thus constitutes the turning point in the 
triadic reversal as an interstice in the text; second, it presents a libidinal interplay of 
doubled and shared love-making.
58
 The following three instantiations of the phantasm 
which complete the circular serialization demonstrate a double movement, regressively 
unraveling and dissolving the initial triad while progressively replacing and perfecting it 
by the second triad. The fourth instantiation (Duras, trans. Seaver, 1966, pp. 88-100; S9) 
of the phantasm, eventuating at the first invitation at Lol‟s place, unfolds in Tatiana‟s 
imagination although, while presented as singularly remembered, it induces a shared 
remembrance in Tatiana and Lol and follows the rules of the established affective 
assemblage in pursuing an unnamed, effortless exchange of incomplete memories. The 
fifth instantiation (Duras, trans. Seaver, 1966, pp. 123-4; S13) takes up the textual 
                                                 
56
 All three syntheses are evoked although I cannot fully follow here the details: the living present as 
passive synthesis of contraction and contemplation and habit; the active and passive synthesis of pure 
past, as memory and representing all presents; and the empty form of time, death, as third synthesis.  
57
 It needs to be kept in mind that for the first larger part of the text the narrator (if that what it is) hides in 
anonymity; S1 ‒ S7: pp. 1-65. If there is a wish to construct a „narrator‟, then he/she comes about through 
his/her libidinal creation that is the ever-changing becoming-Lol. 
58
 Tatiana and „Jack Hold‟ are „situated‟ in a room in the Forest Hotel and Lol in the rye field with a view 
onto the hotel room window. It is barely possible to assume „locations‟ in affective force fields if not for 
the purpose of anchoring a point of reference. 
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modes and libidinal aspects of the third with the difference that the modes of love-
making of Tatiana and Jack Hold, and Lol (formerly split, on one side experienced and 
the other side observed), are now textually fused and the phantasm is summed up in a 
provocative account by Jack Hold to Lol. This symptomatologically reflects the 
progressive shaping of the second assemblage of desire which is further established in 
the sixth instantiation (Duras, trans. Seaver, 1966, pp. 142-50; S14) at the second 
invitation at Lol‟s place: Lol dancing with Jack Hold, who has now replaced Michael 
Richardson, observed by Tatiana. The seventh instantiation (Duras, trans. Seaver, 1966, 
pp. 169-71; S16) concludes a circular movement in the return to Town Beach casino by 
Lol and Jack Hold, with a shared imagined summer ball in a symptomatologically 
closed and darkened venue. From the turnaround in the assemblage of desire in the third 
instantiation onward, the textual modes foreground the experiential level although no 
definite closure of the traumatic event takes place in that Lol claims independence. 
 
[…]: the tide is finally coming back in, it drowns the blue marshes one after the other until, 
progressively, slowly but surely, they lose their individuality and are made one with the sea, 
some are already gone, others still await their turn. The death of the marshes fills Lol with a 
frightful sadness, she waits, anticipates, sees it happen. She recognizes it (Duras, trans. Seaver, 
1966, pp. 175-6; S17). 
 
Having laid out the libidinal mechanism of desire and its discursive shaping in the 
differential mechanism of phantasm, I now explicate the sequences of event and 
becoming which take place within the scenarios of phantasm. The seven phantasmatic 
instantiations of the event enact potential libidinal and differential time layers in degrees 
of intensity and thus capture the setting free of Lol‟s anoedipal unconscious, in 
Deleuzian terms a schizoanalytic curettage: actualized, then counter-actualized 
(presence and a-temporal duration); imagined and re-created (revived past and a-
temporal past present/duration);59 remembered and told (simulacral); experienced and 
observed (present presence and fractured future);60 and at times an intricate and 
indissoluble blend of these potential affective takes which articulate Lol‟s progressive-
regressive becoming within the dis/assemblage of the double triad. 
 
                                                 
59
 Here I am drawing for my analysis on Deleuze‟s work on Bergson, Whitehead, Heidegger; Deleuze‟s 
ideas presented in The logic of sense and Difference and repetition; on chapters one and two (the texts by 
Freud and Lacan), especially Lacan‟s seminar on (Poe‟s) „Purloined Letter‟. 
60
 For the notion of prehension, see J. Williams, DLS 4.1 2010 with regard to the cut off between 
phenomenology (Husserl) and transcendental empiricism (Deleuze). Cf. also Bell 1998 and Beaulieu 
2004. 
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While the first ball at Town Beach casino is imagined and recreated by the (anonymous) 
voice,61 the second ball eventuates as two instances of desire (claimed as) experienced 
by the pseudo-narrator who follows Lol roaming the streets in the summer heat (Duras, 
trans. Seaver, 1966, pp. 35-41; S4). It is the sensual atmosphere of the summer heat 
which triggers off the evocation first in narrative cipher „Jack Hold,‟ then transposed 
into (one of the many ciphers of) Lol. The phantasm is preceded by a speculative 
evocation of Lol‟s awakening. 
 
[…] to open the tombs wherein Lol is feigning death. […] She waits. […] Lol stirred, she turned 
over in her sleep. […] No matter where she is, it is as though Lol is there for the first time. She 
no longer experiences the invariable distance that memory provides: she is there, in the present. 
Her presence renders the town pure, unrecognizable. She begins to walk in the sumptuous palace 
of South Tahla‟s oblivion (Duras, trans. Seaver, 1966, pp. 27-33; S3). 
 
The phantasm evokes the progressive opening, or awakening of Lol,62 in three affective 
movements: entering the timeless past, locating the absolute end, and being forever 
severed from the triangle until such time as it returns. I read this in terms of Deleuze‟s 
hypothesis of the third synthesis of time: Lol having missed the first round and not 
having had the strength for the second round, the third round asks her for doing, acting 
and the completion of her becoming.  
 
In the distance the ball trembles, ancient, the only wreck on a now peaceful ocean, in the rain at 
South Tahla. […] among the many aspects of the Town Beach ball, what fascinates Lol is the 
end. […] What she is reconstructing is the end of the world. […] She sees herself […] in the 
center of a triangular construction […] She smiles, she smiles at that remembered minute of her 
life. […] All that remains of that minute is time in all its purity, bone-white time. Enormous, 
endless, an empty gong […] the eternity of the ball in the cinema of Lol Stein (Duras, trans. 
Seaver, 1966, pp. 36-9; S4). 
 
As the simulacra of the phantasm are rising from the anoedipal unconscious to the 
affective-textual surface, the desire patterns in this evocation take on an a-temporal 
clothing: the scene is „ancient‟, a „wreck‟, lit by a „wondrous artificial light‟. Lol is 
reconstructing „the end of the world‟ (Duras, trans. Seaver, 1966, p. 36) and is „born to 
witness it (this minute)‟ (Duras, trans. Seaver, 1966, pp. 39-40).  The empty form of 
time or, as Deleuze names it, death (Thanatos) rises „in all its purity, bone-white time‟ 
                                                 
61
 Toward the completion of the first circle of serialization, with Lol‟s setting free, Duras manages to 
convey the impression that it is Lol who commands the instantiations of phantasm. 
62
 John Bedford‟s claim of his wife as „this upright sleeping beauty‟ points to this progressive opening or 
awakening of Lol. 
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(Duras, trans. Seaver, 1966, p. 37). The traumatic event thus both sustains and petrifies 
her, keeping her alive but libidinally and corporeally impotent.  
 
The text exemplifies a gliding attitude in switching effortlessly genders and personae as 
well as moving across several thresholds of past and present at the instigation of a 
libidinally powered affective center which is incorporeal, yet discursively palpable.
63
 In 
the sway of atmospheric changes and eclipses of day and night, dawn and dusk, a series 
of imaginary ties evolves between the serial phantasms which are governed by an utter 
enmeshment of desirous fluxes within the assemblage of desire. The third evocation of 
the ball (Duras, trans. Seaver, 1966, pp. 52-4; S6), instantiating the replacement of the 
desirous triad
64
 in a ritual of doubled and shared love-making in the Forest Hotel
65
 and 
the pre-harvest rye field where Lol has bedded herself and will fall asleep again, 
assembles and disassembles the affective ties. 
 
I think I can see what Lol Stein must have seen: […] Lol Stein watches these lovers, she devours 
them with her eyes, she invents them. […] Their union is constructed upon indifference. […] By 
opposite paths, they have arrived at the same result as Lol Stein, they by doing, saying, by trying 
and failing, by going away and coming back, by lying, losing, winning, advancing, by coming 
back again, and she, Lol, by doing nothing (Duras, trans. Seaver, 1966, p. 51; S6). 
   
The touchstone of the reversal in the triad, where Lol stays as a fixture and turnstile in 
her progressive becoming, is her un-acknowledged affective attachment to Tatiana 
expressed in the hair-rituals
66
 as well as in their later mutual effortless recall of times 
long past. The split staging of the phantasm of the second desirous triad eventuates in 
several stages (Duras, trans. Seaver, 1966, pp. 52-4; S6 and pp. 123-4; S13) where 
desire and love-making fall apart, are doubled and shared, yet removed from affective 
experience, in fact unreachable.   
 
                                                 
63
 „This is what I see: (p. 43) The heat of a summer […] I see this: […] Careful, calculating, she walks a 
good distance behind him. This I invent, I see: […] The only times she feels the suffocating heat of 
summer are […] I invent: […] At that distance, he can‟t even hear the sound of her footsteps on the 
sidewalk‟ (Duras 1966, pp. 43-6; S5). 
64
 The first triad of Lol Stein ‒ Michael Richardson ‒ Marie-Anne Stretter is replaced by the second triad 
of  Lol Stein ‒ Jack Hold ‒ Tatiana Karl. 
65
 The affective „location‟ of the Forest Hotel is the former venue of Lol and Michael‟s affair, now the 
meeting place of Tatiana and Jack Hold, another doubling which affirms the interlacing of the triads.  
66
 The hair ritual (shared between women, Tatiana and Lol) establishes another series of precursors 
running through the text and making multiple re-appearances which I cannot follow here: „that 
marvellous head of hair which, suddenly, Lol remembers and sees again, luminously juxtaposed to this 
one‟ (pp. 50-1). Jack Hold takes note of it without comprehending. 
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Duras‟ engagement with various fluctuating textual modes in this multiply layered 
phantasm is nearly impossible to untangle. I propose the need to shift from a singularly 
imagined perspective (male, cipher „Jack Hold‟) to a plurally imagined perspective 
(female, foregrounded and shared, cipher Tatiana-Lol) in the affective assemblage. 
Duras achieves to deeply unsettle our discursive reliance on, and trust in, 
representational schemes of characters, names, gender and individuation which turn out 
to be dysfunctional. Duras‟ libidinal phantasm pursues the interplay between 
foregrounded experienced love-making and withdrawn observed (or remembered) 
participation. The re-arrangement in the assemblage of desire, which leads to Lol being 
set free from the trauma of ravishing, and reaching her pure becoming, is played out in 
two chiastically co-ordinated series of phantasms.
67
 The affective-textual chiasmus of 
the third and the fifth phantasm enacts the reversal of the libidinal triad in imagined and 
simulacral terms. 
 
On the level of textual progression Lol emerges from her sleeping passivity and enters 
an active stage of becoming after the reconnaissance scene of Tatiana in the Forest 
Hotel. During her visit to Tatiana‟s place, Lol is now in libidinal control since she 
knows about the relationship between Jack Hold and Tatiana while they are (seemingly) 
not aware of her knowledge.
68
 Lol‟s visit to Tatiana prepares the affective and libidinal 
enmeshment of the second triad where Jack Hold recognizes, and desires to detect, the 
former relations between Tatiana and Lol which are the un-acknowledged level of Lol‟s 
becoming. 
 
I have a difficult time following what they are both reminiscing about now, in a bantering tone, 
something about her youth, about Tatiana‟s hair. […] I intend to find out why, no matter what I 
have to do, why me, why me? […] It seems to me that I already know a trifle more about what is 
going on inside Tatiana when, naked, she rearranges her hair in the room in the Forest Hotel. 
What was this unruffled ghost concealing about a love so deep, so strong, they said, that it had 
literally driven her mad? (Duras, trans. Seaver, 1966, pp. 70-1; S8). 
 
                                                 
67
 The third (pp. 52-4; S6) and fifth ball (pp. 123-4; S13) are placed at Forest Hotel and in the rye field 
and the fourth (pp. 88-100; S9) and the sixth ball (pp. 142-50; S14) are embedded in two gatherings at 
Lol‟s place. 
68
 „She had to succeed. For these people, the next few days are going to be […] whatever she cares to 
make of them, she, Lol Stein. She will invent the necessary circumstances, then she will open whatever 
doors have to be opened: they will pass through them. […] Lol the intruder, the little girl in the 
playground, Lol from Town Beach, that ball, that ball, mad Lol, did she still love her? Yes‟ (Duras 1966, 
pp. 62-4; S7). 
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The textual fabric effortlessly folds ascending and descending levels (of conscious and 
unconscious processes) to display the affective changes symptomatically within the 
assemblage of desire. „Inner‟ affective and emotional bonding subtends „outer‟ 
relationships where it is not clear whether there exist any boundaries between subjective 
instantiations and if so where the lines of separation may be drawn. An experimental 
doubling and tripling of relationships eventuates within the assemblage of desire.
69
 The 
affective network allows for minute fluctuations and positional shifts and is totally 
devoid of any moralising commentary which appears to be drained out of the text 
through the fusion of time layers. The instantaneous temporal shifts between 
remembered past, imagined and phantasized, evoked present, and desired, conditional 
and projected future absorb subjective boundaries and with them restrictive judgements. 
Since the focus is on Lol‟s becoming, and by necessity, the other members of the 
assemblage‟s becoming, the rising simulacra from the anoedipal unconscious appear 
uncensored, conventionally immoral, yet in Deleuzian terms desirably de-oedipalized. 
 
At the first invitation to Lol‟s place (Duras, trans. Seaver, 1966, pp. 88-100; S9) an 
intense exploration of observed, imagined and desired affects is staged between all 
present. This will be repeated in the staging of the second invitation with comparable 
intensity and Duras‟ irony (Duras, trans. Seaver, 1966, pp. 130-50; S14). Tatiana and 
Lol reconnect under Jack Hold‟s observing eyes, reviving different memorial strands of 
the ball scene, Lol admitting, or feigning forgetting and ignorance: they are lost in 
memory and then in silence. The phantasm of the ball returns a fourth time with further 
details emerging,
70
 yet Lol‟s continuing fascination (as dreamt up by „Jack Hold‟) with 
the event persists. The ensuing scene of love declarations between Lol and Jack Hold, 
triggered off by the evocation of the Town Beach ball, with Lol‟s husband practising 
violin in the adjacent room, treads a fine line between making mock of love rituals and a 
provocative transgression of acceptable mores whereby Lol declares her triumph over 
her own fate and those captured in the second triad. 
 
                                                 
69
 Tatiana Karl being married to Peter Beugner is in a (tolerated „adulterous‟) relationship with Jack Hold; 
Lol Stein being married to John Bedford is libidinally attached to Jack Hold (because of her differential 
yearning for Tatiana); Jack Hold is caught in a vacillating indecision between Tatiana Karl and Lol Stein, 
thus symptomatically repeating Michael Richardson‟s libidinal dispersion between Lol and Anne-Marie 
Stretter. 
70
 Duras throws in ironic twists such as the short affair of a few months between Marie-Anne Stretter and 
Michael Richardson wiping out Lol‟s story; and Lol‟s claim that they assumed the event will kill her 
(which is refuted by Tatiana). 
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Here she is, Tatiana Karl, suddenly naked beneath her hair, between Lol Stein and me. […] Lol 
is waiting for me to recognize something, not that I be attuned to her vision but I no longer be 
afraid of Tatiana. I am no longer afraid. There are two of us, now, beholding Tatiana naked 
beneath her dark hair. […] Blindly, I say: „An extraordinary lay, Tatiana.‟ […] There was a 
movement of her head. Lol‟s tone is one I have never heard from her before, shrill and plaintive. 
The wild animal removed from its forest home sleeps, dreams of the equator of its birth, 
trembles in its sleep, its dream of sunlight, weeps. […] „The best, the best one of them all, right?‟ 
[…] I say: […] „The best‟ (Duras, trans. Seaver, 1966, pp. 106-7; S10). 
 
As pointed out, the chiastically entangled series of phantasms of the third and fifth ball 
and the fourth and the sixth ball complete the reversal of the libidinal triad in simulacral 
terms. The final phantasm eventuates as the seventh ball (Duras, trans. Seaver, 1966, pp. 
169-71; S16) in a return visit to Town Beach casino and concludes the circular, ever 
tightening movement of the text. 
 
A Deleuzian reading can thus approach the text through a serialized differential regime 
rather than adhering to the textual progression even though a specific textual layer is 
prioritized. While in the first reading aspects and modes are explicated, such a reading 
highlights the full realization of the process of becoming as literary machine in the 
sense of differential desiring practice. Differential desiring practice can provide 
readings of resisting texts, paying attention to symptomatological affectivity in desiring-
machines as the working of singular fields of affectivity, and in assemblages of desire. 
With regard to the functionality of the modes of differential desiring practice, it can 
access the transversal connections between series, within single texts (and across several 
texts which I am not presenting here) in the sense of a simulacral reading as in the case 
of Moderato cantabile and The ravishing of Lol V. Stein. The process of becoming 
comes to the fore and thus reading Duras‟ specific type of textuality becomes 
performative since it enacts the process of becoming. For The malady of death the 
characteristic differential and libidinal traits is the reduction of the texts and its further 
de-individualization. Differential desiring practice invites the re-consideration of sexual 
positions and sexual personae and it facilitates as an emerging Deleuze-inspired textual 
practice the exploration of events as actualization.  
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Chapter eight: Desiring practice in Carter 
 
Throughout the thesis, while I theorized desiring practice woven around the core notion 
of becoming (chapter six) and focused on the principles, aspects and modes of the 
practice, multiple critical strands have come into view such as the libidinal, differential, 
symptomatological and the schizoanalytical. These strands, of course, were brought to 
the fore, in the course of my engagement with Deleuze‟s and Deleuze-Guattari‟s 
ontological and epistemological work and their ensuing literary practices which 
undergo, in accordance with their philosophical work and theoretical shifts, a continuing 
evolution. I explore this in earlier chapters (chapters three, four and five): from 
Deleuze‟s pseudo-semiotic early Proust critique [1964] (Deleuze 2000) to his 
intermediate symptomatological critique in Masoch [1967] (Deleuze 2006c) and Proust 
[1972] (Deleuze 2000) (chapter five); from Deleuze‟s differential practice [1968] 
(Deleuze 2004b) which focuses on the parallels of the processes of the unconscious and 
time (chapters four and six) to their extension in the simulacral modes of phantasm 
[1969] (Deleuze 2004c) (chapters four and six). In Deleuze-Guattari‟s collaborative 
works these practices move from a schizoanalytic critique which focuses on the Body 
without Organs and affectivity [1972] (Deleuze and Guattari 2004a) and [1973] 
(Deleuze 2000) (chapters one, two and three) to their minoritarian take of the 
schizoanalytic principles in Kafka [1975] (Deleuze and Guattari 2006) (chapter five) 
and then to their further theorization of schizoanalytic principles, beyond the Body 
without Organs and affectivity, in a more comprehensive theory of becoming [1980] 
(Deleuze and Guattari 2004b) (chapter two, three and four). In Deleuze‟s final work 
these schizoid processes take the form of an expanded and refined symptomatological 
critique in his critical-clinical hypothesis [1993] (Deleuze 1997) which draws on a range 
of literary figures (for instance, Masoch, Kafka, Beckett, Péguy, Roussel, Artaud, and 
Céline). Interlaced and read as schizoid processes of discursive dissociation (in several 
stages in chapter five), this and the previous chapter draw on these strands to 
demonstrate the critical potential, productivity and creativity of a differential desiring 
practice with regard to two challenging writers of the second half of the twentieth 
century. Such engagements also locate points of divergence between the desiring 
practice as deployed in Duras‟ work and that in Carter‟s work insofar as the formation 
of Carter-machine(s) is read as defying representation in other respects than Duras-
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machine(s). While Duras‟ critique eventuates out of the differential and paradoxical, 
Carter‟s is read as growing out of the symptomatological milieu which anchors parody.1 
 
The aims of the chapter 
 
The task at hand now is to locate the points of divergence between exercising a 
differential desiring practice in Carter and in Duras in view of the critical practices 
embodying schizoid processes. This presents itself as a twofold endeavour: to situate the 
critical practice(s) most suitable for Carter‟s work within the multiple critical strands of 
schizoid dissociation; and to explore, in contrast to Duras, the shifting balance between 
schizoid aspects ‒ the differential, libidinal and simulacral ‒ and how the effected 
difference impacts on each writer‟s style. My intent is to profile the schizoanalytic 
strand as growing out of the symptomatological while the schizoid strand (as pursued in 
Duras) extends from the differential to the simulacral. In my engagement with Duras I 
put critical emphasis on demonstrating the libidinal and the differential as well as the 
symptomatological and simulacral aspects of desiring practice; now I explore in three 
texts by Carter, in accordance with her preoccupations, the schizoanalytic strand as 
preliminarily developed in Deleuze-Guattari‟s notion of desiring-machines in Anti-
Oedipus and then further theorized in the notions of the Body without Organs, of 
affectivity, and the theory of becoming in A thousand plateaus. The defining 
characteristic of the schizoanalytic principle lies in its programmatic and polemic 
tendency and latent politicization
2
 which invites its deployment in Carter. 
 
While my subsuming of the critical strands of desiring practice as schizoid processes of 
discursive dissociation encompasses both the schizoid and the schizoanalytic, the 
favoured schizoid exemplification in Duras points to the schizoid mode (as stylistic and 
discursive reflection of schizoanalytic intent) and Duras‟ signature where the processes 
                                                 
1
 My approach then runs counter to the dominant Carter exegesis since most of the critical work is 
concerned with elaborating narrative structures (in the mode of the picaresque) and genre-bound topics 
(for instance, „the gothic‟ in its various brands), therefore the existing body of Carter criticism could only 
function as preparatory for my chapter, however the work by (the late) L Sage (academic colleague and 
friend of Carter) conveys critical insight in line with my pursuit. I return to some exemplary studies 
further on. See L Sage (1994) and L Sage ((ed.) (2007/1994)); the introduction to the new edition by A 
Smith (2007, pp. 1-19); Ward Jouve (2007, pp. 151-83) and Jordan (2007, pp. 201-26).  
2
 In setting Carter‟s symptomatological preoccupations (which lead to parody) into my schizoanalytic 
frame, I propose that Carter‟s polemic extracts itself from textual practices such as narrative pursuits and 
genre obligations. 
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of event and becoming take the form of deliberate disintegration and (productive) 
madness. In contrast, in Carter it is the schizoanalytic exemplification which marks her 
signature. The processes of event and becoming here focus on the libidinal body, 
however with an emphasis and bent toward the experimental and speculative 
exploration
3
 of a corporeal fluidity of gendering which is underscored by parodic 
excess. 
 
Carter‟s signature then lies in polemic, parody and schizoanalytic politicization. The 
shades of becoming then in Duras and Carter differ: in Duras‟ work they tend toward 
the differential and paradoxical while demonstrating a schizoid mode; in Carter‟s work 
they tend toward the symptomatological and parodic while exemplifying a 
schizoanalytic mode. Yet the overriding aesthetic criteria of desiring practice ‒ being a-
representational, orgiastic, experiential and simulacral ‒ apply to both writers as do 
expressive values within the simulacral and the phantasm such as a tendency to excess 
and monstrosity as well as to provocation.
4
         
 
                                                 
3
 Experimental and speculative writing can of course be garnered within the genre of the „fantastic‟. The 
decisive difference to my pursuit within the schizoanalytic frame lies in putting the emphasis on the 
processes of becoming (and the libidinal body) rather than on (structural) textual progression. I focus on 
the libidinal thread to detect how literary desiring-machines work, not on „subjects‟ (gendered or de-
gendered) in representation al understanding. Studies of the fantastic are contained within the structural 
paradigm. For a theorization of the fantastic as literary mode, see Jackson (1981) who analyzes fantasy as 
„the literature of subversion‟; Praz (1978/1933) who reconnects the fantastic to romanticism; Todorov 
(1973) who approaches the fantastic as literary genre in structuralist terms. For a revival of the 
carnivalesque in Carter (with regard to The passion of the new Eve), see for instance Armitt (1996b, pp. 
150-82, esp. 164-7) and Armitt (1996a). Armitt draws here on Bakhtin‟s idea of carnival excess. See also 
Chambers (1990) and L Sage (1994, p. 14). For a recent take on „fantastic metamorphoses‟, see Warner 
(2002). 
4
 Since the textual fabric of Carter‟s „novels‟ (and „stories‟) is indeterminate, ambiguous, self-consciously 
stylized, even artificially constructed, her texts invite a consideration in terms of playful postmodernism. 
However applying some schizoanalytic strategies of composition, style and expression to the reading of 
Carter‟s texts, within the larger frame of Deleuze-Guattari‟s theory of becoming, has the potential to 
access the levels of expression which desiring practice sets out to unearth, i.e. the nature, formation, and 
functioning of desiring-machines. The composition and structure of Carter‟s texts reveal multiplicities, 
becomings and serial proliferations which lead to a freeing of boundaries, in Deleuze-Guattari‟s sense of 
a schizoanalytic literary practice of becoming-reader and becoming-text. Critics have been baffled by 
Carter‟s hypnotic and somnambulistic style, her morbid characters and her warped sense of reality and on 
these grounds assigned her work to the genre of gothic and neo-gothic. See for instance Punter and Byron 
(2004, pp. 101-2) on Carter‟s „gothic‟ aspects; Punter and Byron (2004, pp. 263-7, p. 265) on Carter‟s 
„monstrous‟ elements; Punter and Byron (2004, pp. 268-72, esp. p. 271) on Carter‟s „vampiric‟ trends. 
This stylistic and thematic assignation has been adapted to a new hybrid genre of the „postmodern gothic‟ 
so as to do justice to the experimental and the speculative in Carter. Neumeier (V Sage and Lloyd Smith 
(eds), 1996, pp. 141-51) sets „desire and reality‟ into the frame of the postmodern gothic. 
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Parallelling my decision in the previous chapter, in this chapter I focus on three hybrid 
literary texts among Carter‟s novelistic work5 to demonstrate the critical and creative 
potential of differential desiring practice. At surface level, these texts share an episodic 
or picaresque discursive mode and stylistic strategies deemed to represent literary 
modes such as the fantastic, the gothic (neo-gothic, postmodern gothic), the grotesque, 
yet also (with more justification than the former) as surrealist (or magic realist).
6
 I 
consider these categorizations problematic as representational formulaic reductions. 
Rather than deploying these literary modes, I contend that Carter‟s hybrid texts demand 
a trans-generic evaluation which can be provided by the critical strands of a differential 
desiring practice with its a-representational modes of the orgiastic, the experimental and 
the simulacral. For the first text, The passion of the new Eve (Carter 1992b), a parodic 
work on trans-gendering and feminism, I focus on the extremes of the processes of 
becoming as viewed and speculated on by Carter.
7
 For the second text, The infernal 
desire machines of Doctor Hoffman (Carter 1982a), a sophisticated, multiply refracted 
dream and memoryscape on terror and sexuality, I follow the formation and function of 
                                                 
5
 Carter‟s work is widely dispersed across many „genres‟: novels, short stories, re-writings of fairy tales, 
dramatic scripts, radio work, essays, journalism, editing and translations (from the French) which makes 
it difficult to „categorize‟ her writing. Two recent critical works (Gamble (2006) and Peach (2009/1998)) 
demonstrate to which degree Carter‟s „hybridity‟ challenges, and outgrows as I propose, current 
modalities of criticism. Gamble (2006) frames her study in biographical terms (and taking note of the 
evolution of Carter criticism) while Peach (also following the chronology of Carter‟s work) attends to 
topical (or thematic) alignments between the works. I am here only concerned with the texts I have 
selected. The Infernal desire machines of Doctor Hoffman figure under „Symbolic order, myths and 
transgression‟ (chapter five), The passion of new Eve under „Sexual fictions‟ (chapter six) and Nights at 
the circus under „Spectacle, circus and the films of Federico Fellini‟ (chapter seven). This is problematic 
since either of the proposed themes (for instance, transgression or spectacle) can be applied to any of the 
selected texts. I argue that Carter‟s texts resist strangling categories and escape the interpretative mould. 
6
 With regard to the impact of surrealism on Carter‟s writing (which she herself confirms in some essays 
in acknowledging Breton) a case can be made. Carter has written on surrealism and appreciated the dada 
movement. See Carter „The Alchemy of the Word‟ [1978] (1992, pp. 67-73) and the comments by Roe (L 
Sage (ed.), 2007, pp. 78-114) and Suleiman (L Sage (ed.), 2007, pp. 115-32); cf. also Rosemount (ed.) 
1978. Suleiman also takes up the (long-ranging) discussion around Carter‟s stance on feminism (1988, 
YFS, pp. 148-72). For a corresponding examination of Carter‟s treatise The Sadeian woman (Carter 
1992/1979), weighing the pro and contra of Carter‟s (assumed) anti-feminism, see Keenan (Bristow and 
Broughton (eds), 1997, pp 137-48). More recently Carter has been re-cast within feminist postmodernism 
and equated with Kathy Acker (Pitchford (2002)) but also equated in narrative techniques with Jeanette 
Winterson (Lopez (2007)). For an interpretation of Carter‟s work in terms of magic realism, see for 
instance the discussion about magical realism, between Bayley and Stevenson vs Jordan and Sage in 
Jordan (L Sage (ed.), 2007, pp. 189-215; pp. 331-2, footnote 4; Sage (1994, p. 3). Apparently, critics find 
it difficult to categorise Carter‟s style of writing, to define her political bearings and her engagement with 
metamorphosis or states of becoming. 
7
 For (critical) narrative analyses and contrasting (textual and topical) interpretations of The passion of the 
new Eve, beside Peach‟s categorization of the work as „sexual fiction‟ (2009/1998, pp. 100-20), see 
Armitt (1996a, pp. 150-82) and (1996b) who reads the text in the mode of the fantastic. For an 
examination of „transgressive symbolism‟ and „the transsexual subject‟, see HL Johnson (Bristow and 
Broughton (eds), 1997, pp. 166-83). For an elaboration in terms of „the violence of gendering‟ and 
„castration images‟, see Wyatt (Easton (ed.), 2000, pp. 58-83) who aligns the text with Carter‟s fairy tales 
and „castration images‟.  
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desiring-machines and assemblages of desire and their interrelated modes of phantasm.
8
 
In the third text, Nights at the circus (Carter 1985) (which has previously been 
understood as another picaresque narrative of a magical heroine in the mode of the 
fantastic)
9
 I explore the extended range of metamorphoses, the complexities of 
assemblages and dis-assemblages of desire and how these processes eventuate on the 
compositional plane as literary serialization. 
 
Taking into account my schizoanalytic and a-representational positioning, I aim firstly 
to locate the points of divergence between Duras and Carter while developing a series of 
textual readings which enact the principles, aspects and modes of differential desiring 
practice. My second aim for the chapter is to enlarge my practical observations along 
three lines of enquiry: I observe processes of event and becoming, in particular Carter‟s 
speculation on trans-gendering; the Deleuzian notion of phantasm which replaces the 
formulaic definitions of gothic (neo-gothic, postmodern gothic); and Carter‟s parodic 
and experimental style. Within this frame I pay particular attention to how the processes 
of event and becoming, as they present themselves in Carter in the schizoanalytic mode 
(in contrast to the schizoid mode in Duras) are engendered by the differential mode of 
phantasm. This allows me to draw out the critical differences among schizoid processes 
of discursive dissociation. This also contributes to defining the critical potential of 
thsese processes with regard to practising differential desiring practice which I take up 
in later observations.     
 
De-gendering / trans-gendering  
 
The literary decisions Carter makes in the three hybrid texts selected are ruled by the 
libidinal body and the potential of its transgressive moves, which include abolishing any 
assumed sexual dichotomy and accepting the fluidity of gendering. This results in 
experimenting with excessive processes of event and becoming whereby the 
excessiveness of the process cannot be adequately theorized in terms of the grotesque, 
                                                 
8
 For a contrasting reading, see Peach (2009/1998, pp. 77-99, esp. pp. 88-99).   
9
 For contrasting analyses, see Armstrong (L Sage (ed.), 2007 [1994], pp. 266-86); Munford ((ed.) 
Paradoxa, 2002, pp. 235-56) in terms of representations of „gothic heroine‟, Munford ((ed.) 2006) and 
Munford (Gothic Studies, 2007, pp. 58-70) in terms of „(post)feminist gothic heroine‟.  
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the gothic or the carnivalesque
10
 but asks for critical practices which embrace the 
orgiastic and the simulacral and point to excess as not a destructive but as a creative 
force. 
 
Turning now to the first text by Carter, The passion of the new Eve [1977], its textual 
progression presents itself in twelve stations
11
 which follow the corporeal (if not 
emotional) transformation of (assumed male) Evelyn from London on the old continent 
into (assumed female) Eve on the new continent in New York and then across to 
Colorado and California. Yet such a reductive surface reading misses an essential aspect 
of the metamorphosis: Evelyn‟s initial vision(s) of the „perfected‟ female idol 
Tristessa
12
 and his/her desire to encounter her/him in the flesh which is the driving 
libidinal force for the processes of becoming which he/she undergoes as commented 
upon at the beginning of the text. 
 
Tristessa. Enigma. Illusion. Woman? Ah! […] And all you signified was false! Your existence 
was only notional; you were a piece of pure mystification, Tristessa (Carter 1992b, p. 6). 
 
In terms of enacting differential desiring practice my reading of the The passion of the 
new Eve shifts the focus from the textual (episodic, picaresque) progression to the 
function of the libidinal in the pursuit of a bi-directional process of re- and pro-
                                                 
10
 For the notion of the carnivalesque, see: Bakhtin (1981, trans. Emerson and Holquist, Holquist (ed.)) 
and Todorov (trans. Godzich, 1984). Todorov‟s structuralist work on the fantastic (Todorov, trans. 
Howard, 1973) set the precedent for a literary genre (see for instance Rabkin (1976), Jackson (1981)) 
which contracted to studies in the mode or genre of gothic (see for instance V Sage and Lloyd Smith (eds) 
(1996) and Punter and Byron (eds) (2004)) which in turn is at times adapted (or assimilated) to some of 
Carter‟s writing. See also for an extension of these notions, see Warner (2002). 
11
 I draw the idea of stations from Carter‟s (ironic) reference to Christ‟s Twelve (or fourteen) Stations of 
the Cross, via dolorosa (way of sorrows or passion), also rendering the ambiguous title of the text. The 
inserted meditations then take up the function of „prayers‟ with which the twelve stations are emulated as 
a spiritual pilgrimage. Carter takes up the ideas of (Christ‟s) meeting with the mother(s), stripping of 
garments and crucifixion, and other stations. Station 1: Evelyn in London (Carter 1992b, pp. 5-9); Station 
2: Evelyn in New York with Leilah (Carter 1992b, pp. 10-38); Station 3: On the road to the desert (Carter 
1992b, pp. 39-40); Station 4: Inner desert (Carter 1992b, p. 41); Station 5: Beulah, the women‟s 
community (Carter 1992b, pp. 42-8); Station 6: Evelyn‟s surgery in the underground (Carter 1992b, pp. 
49-82); Station 7: Eve‟s confusion about his/her bodily status (Carter 1992b, p. 83); Station 8: Zero, the 
patriarchal despot (Carter 1992b, pp. 84-109); Station 9: Tristessa, the male/female transvestite (Carter 
1992b, pp. 110-56); Station 10: The child colonel (Carter 1992b, pp. 157-63); Station 11: Leilah-Lilith 
and Mother; Eve‟s rebirth and death (Carter 1992b, pp. 164-90); Station 12: Apotheosis (Carter 1992b, p. 
191). 
12
 Cf. the Tristessa St Ange/Greta Garbo introduction of films: Wuthering heights (Tristessa as Catherine 
Earnshaw, Tyrone Power as Heathcliff), The fall of the house of Usher (Tristessa as Madeleine Usher) 
(Carter 1992b, pp. 5-9). 
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gression.
13
 Despite its imaginative force Carter‟s work is compositionally tightly 
controlled and contained through the choice of a (discursively subjective) memory 
structure. This allows for a textual unfolding with an inner completion given by the 
memory of a past ‒ thus formally completed ‒ event while simultaneously commenting 
on the process of becoming (as memory is revived). Episodic progression becomes 
purely enunciative and thus serves the exploration of the phantasm. The compositional 
decision on the enfolded memory structure
14
 permits a distancing transversality which 
cuts across the assumedly subsequent textual layers and thus emphasizes the completed 
circularity.
15
 In discursive terms this circularity of The passion of the new Eve decides 
the libidinal movements of the text as its final comment demonstrates.           
 
We start from our conclusions. […] I arrived on that continent by air and I left it by water; earth 
and fire I leave behind me. And all this strange experience, as I remember it, confounds itself as 
a fugue. At night, dreaming, I go back again to Tristessa‟s house […] He himself often comes to 
me in the night, serene in his marvelous plumage of white hair, with the fatal red hole in his 
breast; after many, many embraces, he vanishes when I open my eyes (Carter 1992b, p. 191). 
 
Reading The passion of the new Eve as a fictional, picaresque, episodic account (of a 
man‟s sexual transformation into his desired female opposite if by enforced castration, 
gender-surgery and hormonally supported brainwashing in a post-apocalyptic, 
disintegrating US engulfed in civil and racial war) only deals with textual effects of the 
libidinal phantasm. If I read The passion of the new Eve as an enquiry into the potential 
human states of embodiment and becoming, this allows me to speculate on the different 
human fates which are attached to a perceived (and subsequently assumed) sexual and 
corporeal status. Such a positioning opens a space for the programmatic and polemic 
aspects of schizoanalysis and symptomatological latent politicization. Carter envisions 
in The passion of new Eve the potential human (corporeal) states in a parodic 
multiplicity of forms.
16
 Sexuality understood in terms of genitality and procreative 
                                                 
13
 See my chapter five where I explore the process of dismantling in Kafka‟s work as bi-directional device 
within a libidinal construct. 
14
 Cf. chapter five where I engage with such an enfolded memory structure in my discussion of Deleuze‟s 
Proust treatises which allows for the affective display within assemblages. 
15
 In Leilah-Lilith‟s words, genitally „“he himself (male Tristessa) formed the uroborus, the perfect circle, 
the vicious circle, the dead end”‟ (Carter 1992b, p. 173). 
16
 These changing corporeal states serve as anchor points for Carter‟s satire of feminism (to be viewed in 
terms of the debate of the 1970s): (1) genital man presented in Evelyn at the beginning of the text and in 
patriarchal polygamous Zero; (2) genital woman presented in Leilah, in Eve in her gender-reversal and in 
the seven wives of Zero‟s harem; (3) infertile woman presented in Leilah in her second stage of 
transformation; (4) castrated/transgendered man presented in Evelyn in her remembered emotional and 
mental state; (5) one-breasted amazon presented in Sophia and her sisters, in Leilah transformed into 
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fertility is severed from desire; Carter sets out the phantasm of an un-gendered 
spectrum. Evelyn (as man) abuses the black whore Leilah (as full-breasted woman) in 
New York and abandons her after pregnancy, botched abortion and resulting infertility; 
after being turned into (female) Eve by surgery in Beulah, the amazon underground city, 
he/she experiences the abuses he dealt out, in repeated rape and denigration in her/his 
role as eighth wife of the despotic patriarch Zero. Yet to drive any assumptions of 
possible sexual dichotomy to the parodic extreme, Zero enforces the copulation of 
female Eve (as surgically transformed man into woman) and male Tristessa (revealed as 
disguised man and mere male/female transvestite). Such a double reversal of sexual and 
corporeal roles implodes any certainty about subjectivity being aligned with sexuality 
and demonstrates how Carter‟s speculation on trans-gendering induces a re-alignment in 
reading practices.  
 
Reading the processes of event and becoming in The passion of the new Eve through the 
lens of the differential mode of phantasm thus accesses experimental simulacra. Carter 
shifts our awareness to the processes of event and the potentialities of extreme 
becoming as the central content of her text which leads to a reading in terms of narrative 
ad absurdum. Carter‟s playful reversals deny sexual categories or any fixed sexual 
dichotomy and plead for a fluidity of gendering beyond any sexual/genital status of the 
flesh. Such speculations polemically run counter to feminist strategies as caught in 
either claims of sexual equality and parity or demands for sexual differentiation to 
preserve assumed corporeally specific qualities. Carter‟s speculative transgressive 
moves free the libidinal body, now viewed in its multiply dispersed desire(s) which are 
not ruled by any specific sexual status. While for Duras the processes of becoming 
focus on disintegration, loss and madness, as marking the indecisiveness of the status of 
schizodicity and embrace the whole field of sensibility, for Carter the processes of 
becoming are driven to the extremes and their potential reversal; Carter‟s stylistic 
signature is parodic excess and a speculative and cerebral inventiveness.        
                                                                                                                                               
rebellious revolutionary Lilith (Eve compares, and even equates, Sophia and Leilah-Lilith: „This lucid 
stranger, Lilith, also known as Leilah, also, I suspect, sometimes masquerading as Sophia or the Divine 
Virgin, seems to offer me disinterested friendship though in the past I might have caused her pain; I have 
no option but to accept it‟ (Carter 1992b, p. 175)); (6) multi-breasted giant fertility goddess presented in 
the black mama of the amazon underground community of Beulah; (7) infertile amputated man presented 
in Zero who has an ambiguous sexual status: genitally he is a man, yet childless and „one-legged‟; (8) 
male/female transvestite presented in Tristessa as a composite of (denied) genital but fertile male (since 
Eve apparently conceives) and an avowed emotional and performative female, which makes the 
transvestite the most-open amalgam in Carter‟s (utopian) scheme.  
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In order to explore how the parodic processes of event and the excessive processes of 
becoming are engendered by the differential modes of phantasm. I focus on the 
simulacral aspects, which may be provisionally described as fantastic, surrealistic or 
mythic/mythological. A more attentive exploration of the functionality of Carter‟s 
phantasm within the frame of an assumed enquiry into human sexuality is possible since 
differential desiring practice concentrates on the inter-related aspects of the libidinal, 
differential and simulacral. A focus on generic aspects (if more than provisionally 
employed) under-estimates the polemic force of schizoanalytic intent. I turn now to the 
differential modes of phantasm in The passion of the new Eve to explicate how this 
polemic force unleashes Carter‟s parodic process. 
 
Brief, yet inter-related meditations
17
 in The passion of the new Eve function as 
transversal backbone of a memory structure which is discursively presented as 
Evelyn‟s/Eve‟s. This series of meditations establishes the simulacral level of phantasm 
since these brief „statements‟ (or evocations) return to the distancing memory structure 
from which they arise – as simulacra arise from the anoedipal, molecular unconscious. 
 
The road. […] and the unknowable impulsion of the destination ahead of me […] Descend 
lower; while the world, in time, goes forward and so presents us with the illusion of motion, 
though all our lives we move through the curvilinear galleries of the brain towards the core of 
the labyrinth within us. […] I reached the desert, the abode of enforced sterility, the dehydrated 
sea of infertility, the post-menopausal part of the earth. […] I have found a landscape that 
matches the landscape of my heart (Carter 1992b, pp. 39-41). 
 
The meditations are inter-related and enunciated by a gender-shifting – and thus a-
subjective – voice which can be attributed to male/female Eve (who speaks from the 
level of memory since the voyage has been completed from the start). There is a shift 
between pronominal I and Eve/he/she in these meditations which sets them into free 
indirect style which is the stylistic signature of differential desiring practice. The 
libidinal body devoid of fixed genitality displays signs of annihilation and 
transformation in a simulacral manner and symptomatologically. 
 
                                                 
17
 As pointed out, in the formal scheme of the via dolorosa meditations function as prayers in an emulated 
(spiritual) pilgrimage. These libidinal halts or stops are brief and of a distinct discursive (and parodic) 
style. Station 3: On the road to the desert (Carter 1992b, pp. 39-40); Station 4: Eve‟s inner desert (Carter 
1992b, p. 41); Station 7: Eve‟s confusion about his/her bodily status (Carter 1992b, p. 83); Station 12: 
Eve‟s apotheosis (Carter 1992b, p. 191).  
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I know nothing. I am a tabula erasa [sic], a blank sheet of paper, an unhatched egg. I have not yet 
become a woman, although I possess a woman‟s shape. Not a woman, no; both more or less than 
a real woman. Now I am a being as mythic and monstrous as Mother herself; but I cannot bring 
myself to think of that. Eve remains wilfully in the state of innocence that precedes the fall 
(Carter 1992b, p. 83). 
 
Read in the schizoanalytic frame, this is a libidinal Body without Organs: „a tabula 
[e]rasa‟, „a blank sheet of paper‟, „an unhatched egg‟; where the full spectrum of desires 
can be explored. Eve‟s/his/her meditations are stylistically and discursively marked by 
atemporality as they are anchored in his/her receding and returning memory structure. 
The meditative kernels („seeds‟)18 are set off by fabulating scenarios which explore the 
sexual potentialities of the human body and its utopian reversals. These longer text 
passages focus on exemplary, if parodically imploded, sexual/genital states.19 Carter 
takes these explorations to extreme positions which results in the parodic excess 
characteristic of her style of writing and supports calling these scenarios phantasms. 
                                                 
18
 The notion of „seeds‟ in the scheme of threefold return is, for instance, introduced in chapter II 
„Repetition for itself‟ (Deleuze 2004b, pp. 90-163, esp. pp. 104-6 (with specific reference to the 
Bergsonian cone): „Consider what we call repetition within a life – more precisely, within a spiritual life. 
Presents succeed, encroaching upon one another. Nevertheless, however strong the incoherence or 
possible opposition between the successive presents, we have the impression that each of them plays out 
“the same life” at different levels. This is what we call destiny. Destiny never consists in step-by-step 
deterministic relations between presents which succeed one another according to the order of a 
represented time. Rather, it implies between successive presents non-localisable connections, actions at a 
distance, systems of replay, resonance and echoes, objective chances, signs, signals and roles which 
transcend spatial locations and temporal successions. We say of successive presents which express a 
destiny that they always play out the same thing, the same story, but at different levels: here more or less 
relaxed, there more or less contracted‟ (p. 105). Cf. also „Twenty-first series of the event‟ (Deleuze 
2004c, pp. 169-75) where the double-structure of every event as actualization and counter-actualization is 
approached: „Why is every event a kind of plague, war, wound, or death? […] the question is here about 
the double structure of every event. With every event, there is indeed the present moment of its 
actualization, the moment in which the event is embodied in a state of affairs, an individual, or a person, 
the moment we designate by saying “here, the moment has come.” The future and the past of the event 
are evaluated only with respect to this definitive present, and from the point of view of that which 
embodies it. But on the other hand, there is the future and the past of the event considered in itself, 
sidestepping each present, being free of the limitations of a state of affairs, impersonal and pre-individual, 
neutral, neither general nor particular, eventum tantum. …‟ (p. 172; original emphases). Deleuze also 
refers to the process of crystallization (in the framework of his cinema studies) and the fused crystal-
image which is folded actual and virtual. Cf. „Doubts about the imaginary‟ [1986] (Deleuze 1995, pp. 62-
67, esp. pp. 66-7). 
19
 The longer text passages focusing on exemplary sexual/genital states alternate with the affective 
libidinal halts of the meditations. (1) Exploitative white masculinity and female black prostitution in 
Station 2: Evelyn in New York with Leilah (Carter 1992b, pp. 10-38); (2) an amazon community‟s cult of 
maternity under a black mama in Station 6: Evelyn‟s surgery in the underground (Carter 1992b, pp. 49-
82); (3) infertile oppressive white masculinity and polygamy in Station 8: Zero, the patriarchal despot 
(Carter 1992b, pp. 84-109); (4) the un-gendered masochistic Hollywood dream world of the ageing star in 
Station 9: Tristessa, the male/female transvestite and enforced changeling (Carter 1992b, pp. 110-56); (5) 
a mythic phantasm of a Faustian return to the mother(s) and to primordial nature in Station 11: Leilah-
Lilith and Mother; Eve‟s rebirth and death (Carter 1992b, pp. 164-90). Carter plays on the motif of 
Faustian return to the mother(s) at several instances. Cf. „I had reached journey‟s end as a man. I knew, 
then, that I was among the Mothers; I experienced the pure terror of Faust‟ (Carter 1992b, p. 60). This 
refers to Goethe‟s Faust II.   
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While Eve‟s/his/her meditations function as discursive seeds of an enquiry into the 
utopian sexual status quo, these cross-referential scenarios provide a series of 
phantasms which in the schizoanalytic mode of latent politicization polemically 
implode an attempt to capture dispersed desire in sexual categories. In the following I 
look symptomatologically at a series of phantasms (1-5) in The passion of new Eve to 
exemplify Carter‟s schizoanalytic mode which expresses her acerbic polemic against 
rigid gender roles and assumptions of sexual politics (of the 1970s). 
 
The first phantasm (Carter 1992b, pp. 10-38) evokes a post-apocalyptic New York 
without law and order, rat-infested and drowned in acid and sulphur rain. Violence and 
inhumanity reign on several fronts. In an apparently racial civil war, rival white and 
black rival gangs battle for ephemeral positions while blacks erect a wall around 
Harlem. Simultaneously, a gendered war unfolds in which aggressive female sharp 
shooters and snipers take aim at roaming males. Carter takes aim at the race-gender 
components of sexual politics.20 Evelyn takes up with a black dancer-prostitute Leilah, 
foreshadowing their later encounter.21 The phantasmatic scenario of New York in 
collapse serves as a lurid match to Evelyn‟s raw, destructive and exploitative masculine 
instincts. „As dawn came up over the New Jersey turnpike, I saw the desolation of the 
entire megapolis and it was a mirror of my own‟ (Carter 1992b, pp. 37-8). 
 
In one sense, the function of this scenario lies in Carter‟s enquiry into Evelyn‟s sexual 
stance. However, since the text simultaneously moves forward and backward (return, or 
repeat, of the encounter between gender-changed personae) and because of the memory 
structure (inherent knowledge of the process of completed becoming), the phantasm 
serves the over-riding process of trans-gendering and becoming and their inter-relations. 
Carter‟s enquiry into Evelyn‟s sexual stance, while being absorbed in the deployment of 
phantasm, is discursively ironic and polemic though its specific manner of dismantling. 
 
                                                 
20
 The class aspect of sexual politics (the triple oppression of gender-race-class viewed in terms of the 
1970s) does not feature in The passion of new Eve, perhaps for the leveling effect of post-apocalyptic 
anarchy. 
21
 In the later encounter both are women. Leilah emerges transformed into Lilith ‒ Adam‟s first wife 
(according to legend created with him) before Eve (created from his rib) ‒ and mud Lily, a whore-to-
amazon guerilla (in a California in civil breakdown, engulfed in a war of secession from the union) while 
Evelyn is transformed into man-to-woman Eve. 
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The second phantasm (Carter 1992b, pp. 49-82) presents a utopian vision and a 
simulacrum of the underground city of Beulah which not only reverses the disorder, 
lawlessness and decay of the city of New York, replacing it with strict authoritarian 
rules and a white-pink hygienic ambiance, but also does away with male interference. 
Carter‟s phantasm of Beulah parodically veers into the other extreme of sexual politics, 
separatist matriarchy, and takes aim at the radical feminist stance of her 
contemporaries.22 Beulah functions as a mother-ruled amazon community of one-
breasted women (by sacrificial surgery) in need of a male sperm-donor.23 After being 
surgically transformed into a woman, Evelyn will be impregnated with his own semen 
and give birth to the founder of a new race, with the prospect of complete parthogenesis, 
so as to repopulate the devastated planet. „I realized the warm, red place in which I lay 
was a simulacrum of the womb‟ (Carter 1992b, p. 52) where Evelyn is readied for 
rebirth as female Eve. In a phantasmatic mode, the underground quarters of Mother are 
reached by descending „[D]own, down, down an inscrutable series of circular, 
intertwining, always descending corridors that exerted the compulsive fascination of the 
mandala‟ (Carter 1992b, p. 57).24 Carter engages here in a comical parody of mother and 
fertility cults and condenses the history of mother venerations through the ages (Carter 
1992b, pp. 61-2). The ritual service yowl of her amazon daughters: Ma-ma-ma-ma-ma-
ma-ma (Carter 1992b, p. 61) starts the incantations of fertility goddesses such as 
Demeter (Carter 1992b, p. 61) and ends with a triple evocation of Jocasta (Oedipus‟ 
mother and wife; Carter 1992b, p. 62). Carter takes aim at, and reverses, an (assumedly) 
necessitated Oedipal trajectory25 in that Evelyn is raped by the over-sized mama in order 
to reap his semen for reproductive purposes. After being castrated by Mother with her 
                                                 
22
 Cf. for instance, Mary Daly Gyn/Ecology: The metaethics of radical feminism (1990/1978) and 
Monique Wittig The straight mind
 
 (1992/1981-1990) from which Carter „borrows‟ (or parodies) the 
incantations and mother rites performed in the underground amazon community of Beulah.  
23
 Evelyn is apparently the first man captivated by the amazons for the purposes of underground research 
and experimentation on re-activating parthogenesis. 
24
 „And when I saw her [the black multi-breasted mama], I knew I had come home […] The great, black, 
self-anointed, self-appointed prophetess, the self-created god-head that had assumed the flesh of its own 
prophecy […] She was a sacred monster. She was personified and self-fulfilling fertility‟ (Carter 1992b, 
pp. 58-9). 
25
 Carter depicts the amazon mother cult in underground Beulah as revering Jocasta without explicitly 
identifying her with the multi-breasted black mama who later returns abandoned and dying on a 
Californian beach. The role of mothering (and birthing) has an ambiguous status in The passion of the 
new Eve which cannot here be fully explored. Evelyn‟s guard while she is undergoing gender-assignment 
in Beulah, the amazon Sophia, encourages her:  
„“Kill your father! Sleep with your mother! Burst through all the interdictions!”‟ (Carter 1992b, p. 64). 
Whether this points to oedipalization or rather to desired de-oedipalization is hard to decide in Carter‟s 
parodic style though I am inclined to the latter. 
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black obsidian knife, fitted with an artificial womb and female genitalia, and having 
endured several months of hormonal gender-assignment and psycho-surgery, the new 
Eve emerges, corporeally „intact‟ yet emotionally confused and vacillating.26 
 
But when I looked into the mirror, I saw Eve I did not see myself. I saw a young woman who, 
though she was I, I could in no way acknowledge as myself, for this one was only a lyrical 
abstraction of femininity to me, a tinted arrangement of curved lines. […] They had turned me 
into the Playboy center fold. […] I had become my own masturbatory fantasy. And – how can I 
put it – the cock in my head, still, twitched at the sight of myself (Carter 1992b, pp. 74-5). 
 
Eve is now in a precarious double-gendered state, having a male-female mind and 
imagination in a female body and will undergo „true‟ feminization in praxis and in a 
different regime. 
 
Carter‟s third phantasm (Carter 1992b, pp. 84-109) takes the trans-gendered Eve 
through the trials and tribulations of the enforced female sexual slavery of polygamy 
under the bullwhip of one-eyed, one-legged Zero. Society has collapsed, reverting to 
primitive survival. Both Zero (his one-eyed lurcher dog Cain at his side) and his 
conjugal harem of seven women (aged 12-20), into which Eve is pressed, embody an 
extreme form of despotic patriarchy kept alive through the women‟s deluded consent 
and blind and wilful collusion. Carter keeps here an ambiguous regime of ridicule.27 
This monstrous phantasm plays through Eve‟s subjugation and corporeal training into a 
woman through conjugal rape and hard labour which allows for Carter‟s parodic 
reminder of former Evelyn‟s attitude. Yet it is the demonic presence of Tristessa, as is 
                                                 
26
 Carter provides a parodic take on the scene of gender change in Woolf‟s Orlando. „Orlando had 
become a woman – there is no denying it. But in every other respect, Orlando remained precisely as he 
had been. The change of sex, though it altered their future, did nothing whatever to alter their identity. 
[…] His memory – but in future we must, for convention‟s sake, say „her‟ for „his‟ and „she‟ for „he‟ – 
her memory then, went back through all the events of her past life without encountering any obstacle. 
Some slight haziness there might have been, as if a few dark drops had fallen into a clear pool of memory; 
certain things had become a little dimmed; but that was all‟ (Woolf 1975, pp. 97-8). 
27
 „We lived as women of the Mormons must have done, in the appearance of a state of terminal bondage 
[…] So I lived in the dormitory at the ranch-house, tended the pigs and made the garbage run; while every 
Sunday night, I suffered the rage of his marital rape. My life as the wife of Zero! Boredom, pain, a state 
of siege. […] “I am Zero,” he said in a rare burst of speech, after he‟d been eyeing the bust of Nietzsche 
one night for some hours. “The lowest point; vanishing point; nullity. I am the freezing point in 
Centigrade and my wives experience the flame of my frigidity as passion”‟ (Carter 1992b, pp. 100-2). 
The image of the obsessive yet eternally frustrated (frigid and empty) impersonation of (male) sex returns 
as de Sade/Doctor Hoffman in Carter‟s The infernal desire machines of Doctor Hoffman (and in Carter‟s 
fairy tales, for instance as Bluebeard in The bloody chamber). 
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the case in the other phantasms,28 which demonstrates Carter‟s schizoanalytic intent and 
ultimate libidinal trajectory. 
 
The figure or idol of Tristessa as the embodiment of gender-unspecific desire, the 
unreachable object of desire in the state of perfect simulacrum, is the libidinal (and 
simulacral) core of the series of phantasms. Zero believes that he has been robbed of his 
fertility by Tristessa if only through her simulacral presence.29 Carter undermines Zero‟s 
male swagger and despotism by ridiculing his belief that Tristessa has performed a 
„spiritual vasectomy‟ (Carter 1992b, p. 92) on him which he must cure by her violation 
and death (Carter 1992b, p. 98; p. 101; pp. 103-4) once he has detected her „witches 
lair‟ (sic, Carter 1992b, p. 109). Since Carter opts for setting her enquiry into the 
vicissitudes of human sexuality in a post-apocalyptic world, the haunting spectre of 
sterility underscores, in each of the phantasms, a speculative and provocative negation 
of sexual reproduction.30 
 
The first male, the second female and third male/female phantasm of Evelyn‟s sexual 
transformation and process of becoming play through the gendered and trans-gendered 
potentialities of the human body and its sexuality; they ridicule existing or politically 
floated models of sexual politics (of the 1970s). These phantasms are exceeded by the 
fourth male-female and the fifth (female-animal-mineral-cellular) phantasms in their 
simulacral status in that the processes of event and becoming outgrow the 
schizoanalytic principles of programmatic and polemic intent. Carter focuses on the 
libidinal body‟s extreme potential, however now with a bent toward the experimental 
and the speculative. Post-apocalyptic decaying New York, experimental utopian 
underground Beulah and the regressive pioneer shacks in the Californian desert 
polemically prepare the ground for the utopian fabulation around Tristessa‟s machinic 
                                                 
28
 In the second phantasm, during Evelyn‟s psycho-surgery at Beulah, Tristessa‟s films are shown 
(impersonating Greta Garbo): Marguerite (with John Gilbert as Faust), Little women (Carter 1992b, pp. 
71-2). Cf. also the other references to Emma Bovary (Carter 1992b, p. 104); Wuthering heights (Carter 
1992b, p. 125); Mary, Queen of Scots, The Camelia lady (Carter 1992b, p. 131). 
29
 Pointing to the poster of Tristessa used as darting panel and addressing Eve: „“This is the lousiest lady 
in the world. D‟you hear me?” he announced. “She eats souls. She‟s magicked the genius out of my 
jissom, that evil bitch! And it won‟t come back until I stick my merciless finger into this ultimate dyke, 
like the little Dutch boy. Dyke; she‟s a dyke, a sluice of nothingness. You a dyke?” he queried 
menacingly, fingering his knife‟ (Carter 1992b, p. 91). 
30
 Leilah ends up infertile; the amazons are left out of the cycle of reproduction; Zero (so he assumes) has 
been robbed of his fertility by his obsession with Tristessa; Tristessa‟s self-absorption has denied 
him/herself active engendering; Eve/Evelyn (expecting to be pregnant by Tristessa), returning to her/his 
origin (and death?), circumvents a forward cycle and re-creates her/himself. 
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hide-away and the second version of an underground Beulah in Eve‟s hallucinatory 
descent into the sea-side caves. Carter pushes the phantasm in the frame of her enquiry 
into human sexuality further into a dream world of pretence and imagination and finally 
into the elemental world of primordial nature. 
 
The fourth phantasm (Carter 1992b, pp. 110-56) simulates Tristessa‟s hidden abode as a 
movie palace of glass and steel with „ascending sequences or circular elevations‟ (Carter 
1992b, p. 112), core spiral staircases and reflecting glass galleries. She lives in her own 
glass mausoleum among replicas of the dead.
31
 While a series of simulacral enactments 
within the scenario dramatically and farcically unfold,
32
 the libidinal thread between 
Tristessa and Eve within the unleashed sexual pandaemonium unravels. I concentrate on 
Carter‟s speculative staging of the libidinal agenda within the phantasm. In reaching 
Tristessa‟s abode, Eve/Evelyn touches the centre of her/his desire, expressed in the 
repeated mantra: „Solitude and melancholy, said Tristessa, that is a woman‟s life‟ 
(Carter 1982b, p. 110).
33
 While the spectre of Tristessa haunts the text as a whole, Eve 
reaches the originary phantasy in a sexually reversed body, yet with an unchanged mind 
or consciousness: „the abyss on which you opened was that of my self, Tristessa‟ 
(Carter 1982b, p. 110). Eve (as well as Evelyn), assumedly transformed into a perfect 
woman in body, is in deep thrall to Tristessa, assumed to be the perfect woman (in 
appearance and in the imagination of the audience of the Hollywood cinema machine).  
 
New Eve looked down, in an ecstasy of regret, at this sign of love made flesh she could not, 
now, possess, even if death had not possessed Tristessa first. […] It was as if all Tristessa‟s 
movies were being projected all at once on that pale, reclining figure so I saw her walking, 
                                                 
31
 The lived-in tomb comprises as its centre piece an elaborate wax cabinet (Carter 1992b, pp. 116-7), The 
hall of the immortals, with replicas of passed unfortunate Hollywood movie stars laid out in glass coffins: 
Jean Harlow, James Dean, Marilyn Monroe, Sharon Tate, Ramon Navarro, Lupe Velez, Valentino, Maria 
Montez (Carter 1992b, p. 117). 
32
 Tristessa‟s stations of the cross, or passion, are once more replayed (in the form of an inner 
serialization): her discovery among the wax replicas (Carter 1992b, p. 119), her flight to the eyrie (Carter 
1992b, p. 120) and prevented suicide (Carter 1992b, p. 121); her capture, bondage and court martial by 
Zero and his harem (Carter 1992b, pp. 125-6); her derobing and genital exposure (Carter 1992b, pp. 127-
8), her crucifixion (Carter 1992b, p. 129) and wedding to Eve (Carter 1992b, pp. 132-6); her 
imprisonment (Carter 1992b, p. 138) and Tristessa‟s and Eve‟s eventual escape (Carter 1992b, p. 140) 
before Zero and his harem are consumed by the self-destruction of the towering and earthward spiraling 
building. 
33
 During Evelyn‟s psycho-surgery in Beulah the mantra appears as: „“Solitude and reverie,” said 
Tristessa, “that is a woman‟s life”‟ (Carter 1992b, p. 78). And again, after the flight into the desert, 
Tristessa repeats: „“Solitude and melancholy, that is a woman‟s life”‟ (Carter 1992b, p. 144). Carter 
establishes an auditory field of references punctuating the textual surface in the sense of symptoms 
(which cuts through the textual and is thus of discursive intent). 
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speaking, dying, over and over again […] Even in death, she was enigmatic and let her corpse lie 
among ingenious simulacra of corpses (Carter 1982b, pp. 118-9). 
 
Springing back into life after her simulated laying-in, taking flight and being trapped in 
the eyrie, Tristessa engenders in Eve/Evelyn a vacillating gender-free desire. 
 
Tall, pale, attenuated enigma, your face an invitation to necrophilia […] Our Lady of the 
Sorrows […] cadaverous, sepulchral Tristessa, how thin your lips were but how beautifully they 
curved! […] You were the memory of grief and I fell in love with you the minute I saw you, 
though I was a woman and you were a woman and, at a conservative estimate, old enough to be 
my mother (Carter 1982b, pp. 121-3). 
 
Carter‟s simulacral phantasm has Eve/Evelyn fall in love with Tristessa and achieve a 
mocking identification of their inner being before Zero‟s genital exposure of Tristessa.  
 
I must not fall into the chasm of her eyes where I see myself reflected twice […] For the most 
fleeting instant, this ghostly and magnetic woman challenges me in the most overt and explicit 
manner. The abyss on which her eyes open, ah! it is the abyss of myself, of emptiness, of inward 
void. I, she, we are outside history. We are beings without a history, we are mysteriously 
twinned by our synthetic life (Carter 1982b, p. 125). 
 
Tristessa‟s de-frocking unleashes an extravagant Sadean scenario where the enraged 
whip-cracking Zero and his frenzied harem now descend into further excesses, 
„crowd[ing] the poor, bound, female man‟ (Carter 1982b, p. 128), beyond the wild 
rampage and destruction they have already performed. As if the hallucinated 
identification with Tristessa were not enough, Eve/Evelyn as the a-temporal reminiscing 
centre of this spectacle is drawn into the anarchic orgy in that the frustrated Zero (not 
having found the dyke he wished for to cure his infertility) enforces a „double drag‟ 
(Carter 1982b, p. 132) onto Eve/Evelyn and female/male Tristessa as Chopin and 
George Sand.  
 
So he [Zero] made us man and wife although it was a double wedding – both were the bride, 
both the groom in this ceremony. […] I entered the realm of negation when I married you with 
my own wedding ring. You and I, which inhabited false shapes, who appeared to one another 
doubly masked like an ultimate mystification, were unknown even to ourselves. […] My bride 
will become my child‟s father. (Mother laughed until her fat, black sides shook.) (Carter 1982b, 
pp. 135-6). 
 
The mock-wedding ceremony, the savagery of undressing the couple and forcing them 
to engage in sexual intercourse under the eyes of Zero and his harem are distanced 
through discursively slipping into the status of remembrance. In its Sadean excesses, 
Carter‟s phantasm thus strikes a balance between simulacral evocation and utter parody. 
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Eve/Evelyn and Tristessa are both stripped of sexual identity, any genital certainty, and 
forced into living through multiple transitions. Thus the libidinal destinies of 
male/female Eve/Evelyn and male/female Tristessa are at first parallel, then intertwined, 
which elevates them to the mythic level of Tiresias
34
 or the Platonic hermaphrodite.   
 
Here we were at the beginning or end of the world and I, in my sumptuous flesh, was in myself 
the fruit of the tree of knowledge; knowledge had made me, I was a man-made masterpiece of 
skin and bone, the technological Eve in person.[…] He [Tristessa] came towards me. I know 
who we are; we are Tiresias. […] the concentrated essence of being, as if, out of these 
fathomless kisses and our interpenetrating, undifferentiated sex, we had made the great Platonic 
hermaphrodite together, the whole and perfect being (Carter 1982b, pp. 146-8). 
 
Through the play of multiple metamorphoses Carter achieves for once in a utopian 
manner a de-mooring of the relations between sexuality, genitality and libidinal 
orientations which the critical apparatus of differential desiring practice can palpate.  
 
The fifth (female/animal/mineral/cellular) phantasm completes the simulacral series 
enacting the processes of event and becoming and the setting free of libidinal energies. 
It returns to the elemental chthonic powers in Eve‟s hallucinatory regression and rebirth. 
Within the larger framing device of Eve‟s memory, this concluding corporeal 
dissolution has been prepared through the interspersed brief meditations on the process 
of becoming but also through Eve‟s repeated insistent call for (her/his) needed further 
„descent‟ and return to the Mother(s) which eventuates in the third phantasm while 
descending into Beulah and now again after having experienced the hermaphroditic 
corporeal state with Tristessa. This descent, anticipated from the very start of the text, 
first takes the form of (corporeally) entering a rock-face in the sea-side cliffs. „I must 
slide into the living rock all alone to rendezvous with my maker‟ (Carter 1982b, p. 179). 
Yet the downward move into „earth‟s entrails‟ (Carter 1982b, p. 180) through 
underground streams, rock crevices and warm pools unobtrusively shifts the simulacral 
mode and turns into a hallucinatory re-visiting of the underground labyrinth at Beulah. 
Eve‟s return to Mother takes the form of a reversed act of birthing, naked again, moving 
and crawling through caves, wider and lower corridors, simulating warmth „at blood 
heat‟ (Carter 1982b, p. 181) and the womb‟s „familiar, dim, red light‟ (Carter 1982b, p. 
                                                 
34
 The blind phrophet Tiresias features breast and male genitalia and is considered to have known and 
experienced both, woman‟s and man‟s libidinal contentment. Carter refers to this in the love scenes 
between Eve and Tristessa after they are stranded in the desert (Carter 1992b, pp. 46-50). Eve already 
considers herself after the gender-assignment at Beulah as „this artificial changeling, the Tiresias of 
Southern California‟ (Carter 1992b, p. 71). 
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182). Time runs backwards. Duration and progression become meaningless expressions 
(Carter 1982b, pp. 182-3). „Time is running back on itself‟ (Carter 1982b, p. 183) until 
„[T]ime no longer passed‟ (Carter 1982b, p. 184). „I am inching my way towards the 
beginning and the end of time‟ (Carter 1982b, p. 185). Carter‟s phantasm runs 
simultaneously on several levels: the abolition of time parallels a reversed evolutionary 
process which encompasses flora and fauna. 
 
Yet the evolutionary descent is not unraveling separately from Eve‟s inner 
metamorphosis. The process of becoming through the existential stages of woman, 
animal, mineral and cellular forms happens to Eve herself.
35
 The processes of 
transformation taking place here, schizoanalytically understood in Deleuze‟s and 
Deleuze-Guattari‟s vein, are those of the further stages of becoming programmatically 
proposed by Deleuze-Guattari.
36
 Accordingly, Eve‟s final apotheosis parodically reverts 
to her (assumed) pregnancy by Tristessa (looking forward to her potential future) 
contrasted by the offer of her former set of male genitals on dry ice by Leilah-Lilith 
(looking back to her past) which are sent off into the sea.
37
 Eve herself takes out into the 
sea the boat-coffin of the now blind black (Beulah) Mother awaiting her death on the 
beach. „Ocean, ocean, mother of mysteries, bear me to the place of birth‟ (Carter 1982b, 
p. 191). It is left open whether she desires her own rebirth or the birth of Tristessa‟s 
child.        
 
Carter‟s The passion of the new Eve shifts repeatedly the simulacral levels in the pursuit 
of exploring some potentialities of trans-gendering and satirizing the sexual-political 
positions of feminism (as they presented themselves in the 1970s). Yet the last two 
phantasms in particular, the un-gendered Hollywood masochistic dream world of the 
ageing star and the mythic phantasm of a return to the mothers and to primordial nature, 
venture into Sadean parodic excess and experimental speculation. In this manner, the 
                                                 
35
 „The rock had softened or changed its substance; the textures under my enquiring fingers were soft and 
yielding. Time no longer passed. Now the dew felt like slime; this slime coated me. The walls of this 
passage shuddered and sighed at first almost imperceptibly, so that I mistook it for my own breathing. But 
their pulsations exert greater and greater pressure on me, draw me inward. […] Walls of meat and slimy 
velvet. […] Inward. […] A visceral yet perfectly rhythmic agitations ripples the walls, which ingest me‟ 
(Carter 1992b, p. 184). 
36
 „Plateau 10: „1730: Becoming-Intense, Becoming-Animal, Becoming-Imperceptible…‟ (Deleuze and 
Guattari 2004b, pp. 256-341). 
37
 Carter plays here with the mytheme of Ouranos‟s genitalia severed by his son Chronos on the 
instigation of Gaia, thrown into the sea; out of the foam arises Aphrodite, the goddess of love. Out of the 
union of Aphrodite and Hermes emerges the male-female Hermaphroditos.  
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scale of Carter‟s phantasms can be used to demonstrate the divergences between the 
different strands of the schizoid processes of discursive dissociation. 
 
Desiring machines and assemblages of desire: Terror and sexuality  
 
For Carter‟s The infernal desire machines of Doctor Hoffman [1972], I explore the 
formation and function of desiring-machines and of assemblages of desire, and focus on 
how Carter develops the interrelations between the diverse modes of phantasm as 
speculative, experimental and utopian versions of the libidinal. In contrast to my 
reading of The passion of the new Eve where I concentrated on the processes of event 
and becoming as such, I here examine the techniques deployed within these processes. 
In their creative excess, Carter‟s texts veer into the parodic and carry an amused tone of 
exaggeration rather than a purely polemic and aggressive critique. Deploying the 
processes of event and becoming as phantasm turns them into schizoanalytic and a-
representational discourses as the second prong of what I term the schizoid processes of 
discursive dissociation.
38
 
 
As part of Carter‟s signature, in parallel to the distancing memory structure in The 
passion of the new Eve, The infernal desire machines of Doctor Hoffman starts with a 
Proustian textual completion: old Desiderio writing his memoirs so as to revive and 
gratify his desire for Albertina. 
 
I remember everything. […] Yes. […] I remember everything perfectly. […] And my desire is, 
to see Albertina before I die. […] ‒ Old Desiderio lays down his pen. […] What a fat book to 
coffin young Desiderio, who was so thin and supple. […] Unbidden, she comes (Carter 1982a, 
pp. 11-4; p. 221).   
 
Such a distancing framing device opens space for multiple refractions and responses 
between the actualized events and processes: as happening in an evoked present across 
space and time; as remembered in a recalled past and thus tinged with illusion; and as 
                                                 
38
 In this reading of Carter‟s The infernal desire machines of Doctor Hoffman I draw on some ideas of my 
paper „Actualising the post-human potential of Deleuzian desiring machines (Carter The Infernal 
Desiring machines of Doctor Hoffman)‟ presented to the Annual Conference of the Australian Society for 
Continental Philosophy (ASCP) at the University of Auckland, NZ, December 3-5, 2008, The 
Post/Human Condition, convened by M Russell (Auckland) and S Drichel (Otago). My thanks go to the 
panel chaired by J Reynolds (La Trobe) and to the participants in the discussion afterwards, in particular, 
L Lawlor (Penn State) and C Barnett (Auckland); to the (former) chair of the Australian Society for 
Continental Philosophy (ASCP) R Sinnerbrink (Macquarie) and to the delegates, N Kompridis 
(UWesternSydney) and M Wenning (Macau). 
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projected into several layers of a future which has already been superseded, yet can be 
further refracted. I define such a fractal and dissociative technique as schizoid. The 
sophisticated discursive effect of such a simulacral differential phantasm is speculative 
atemporality and with the potential to engage experimentally with utopian versions of 
the libidinal, including provocative and transgressive excess. 
 
Since my focus is on exploring the formation of both desiring-machines and 
assemblages of desire – which complement and extend them – and their respective 
function in the process of actualization, I draw on some of Carter‟s speculative 
imaginings only as far as they impact on my discussion of her libidinal techniques. I 
follow the principal libidinal thread, the evolving desiring-machine(s) and 
assemblage(s) of desire of Desiderio and Albertina, in its permutations through the 
scenarios. Although this foregrounded assemblage of desire, in the end revealed as of a 
hermaphroditic nature, is ultimately Desiderio‟s creation or imaginary construct, it 
survives the challenges and interferences of other libidinal encounters.
39
 I read the two 
principal figures, Desiderio, embodied desire and memory and his feminine alter ego, 
Albertina – an analogue to Proust‟s Albertine – as actualizing, manifesting and 
exemplifying the working of desiring-machines and changing assemblages (and dis-
assemblages) of desire. 
 
The first embryonic stage of the formation of their mutual desiring-machine manifests 
in a process of becoming, situated between the inanimate and the animate: a phantasm 
of Albertina‟s transparent flesh of glass revealing an exquisite filigree of a skeleton 
perceived by Desiderio in a persistent hallucination.
40
 The next stage of actualization 
takes the form of becoming-animal: a dream of Albertina as a black swan-woman 
engaged in a fatal song, then confirmed as Desiderio meets the ambassador-daughter of 
                                                 
39
 For example: Desiderio‟s ill-fated affair with Mary Anne (Carter 1982a, chapter two); Albertina‟s 
service as valet to Count de Sade, an alter ego of Doctor Hoffman which he attempts to keep in check 
(Carter 1982a, chapters five and six); Albertina as brothel Madame in the House of Anonymity (Carter 
1982a, chapter five); Desiderio‟s ravishing by the acrobats of desire (Carter 1982a, chapter four); 
Albertina‟s rape ordeal by the centaurs (Carter 1982a, chapter seven).  
40
 „But I had one curious, persistent hallucination […] BE AMOUROUS! she exhorted one night and, 
another night, BE MYSTERIOUS! Some nights later, she scribbled: DON‟T THINK, LOOK; and, 
shortly after that, she warned me: WHEN YOU BEGIN TO THINK, YOU LOSE THE POINT. These 
messages irritated yet haunted me‟ (Carter 1982a, pp. 25-6; original capitals). 
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Doctor Hoffman.
41
 A peepshow called SEVEN WONDERS OF THE WORLD IN 
THREE LIFELIKE DIMENSIONS (original capitals) confronts Desiderio with seven 
parodic wax replicas of dissembled female and male body parts, apertures and 
appendages and their sexual and libidinal purpose. It exemplifies Carter‟s program for 
Desiderio‟s libidinal trajectory (which is executed in seven stages).42 The peepshow‟s 
simulacral exhibits play through one line of events (among other possible ones); they 
visually enact sexual/genital and libidinal processes but at the same time condense them 
to displays of human corporeality. Since the displays originate in the peepshow 
proprietor‟s „bag of samples‟ which is a microcosm of the world, the exhibits exemplify 
Doctor Hoffman‟s vision of the new world in its crystalline form. Carter ironically 
draws a parallel to the Minister of Determination‟s attempt to re-establish a full, 
„natural‟ computerized inventory to defeat Hoffman‟s imaginary creation. 
 
The ensuing actualization of Desiderio‟s (remembered or imagined) desire for re-
embodying, and incorporating, Albertina eventuates as the becoming-child of 
somnambulist Mary Anne (Carter 1982a, pp. 51-8), another embodiment of Albertina. 
His false (or pretended) recall misfires and leads to a parodic reversal into the libidinal 
structures of a fairytale love which Carter emblematically transforms into a second set 
of machines, now depicting Mary Anne‟s fate in tarot cards. The desiring production 
has done its work and drawn the two protagonists into an assemblage of desire. The 
multiple metamorphoses include processes of degendering.
43
 Carter evokes an 
increasingly experimental crossing of gender boundaries, not a polarized gendered 
                                                 
41
 „When it was time to sleep, she came to me. […] The dream broke like a storm and I woke. […] the 
name I had only seen before in my dream, the name: ALBERTINA. The hieratic chant of the black swan 
rang again in my ears; I swayed as if I was about to faint‟ (Carter 1982a, pp. 29-31; p. 39; original 
capitals). 
42
 „Exhibit One: I HAVE BEEN HERE BEFORE [depiction of a gigantic vagina] […] Exhibit Two: THE 
ETERNAL VISTAS OF LOVE [a pair of gigantic eyes reflecting eternal regression] […] Exhibit three: 
THE MEETING PLACE OF LOVE AND HUNGER [a pair of female breasts] […] Exhibit Four: 
EVERYONE KNOWS WHAT THE NIGHT IS FOR [the headless body of a mutilated woman] […] 
Exhibit Five: TROPHY OF A HUNTER IN THE FORESTS OF THE NIGHT [the bleeding head of the 
decapitated woman of the preceding tableau] […] Exhibit Six: THE KEY TO THE CITY [gigantic male 
genitalia in tumescence] […] Exhibit Seven: PERPETUAL MOTION [depiction of sexual intercourse; 
Desiderio recognizing Doctor Hoffman‟s daughter/ambassador]‟ (Carter 1982a, pp. 44-7; original 
capitals). 
43
 Albertina appears in a hermaphroditic role (Carter 1982a, pp. 33-9) as shape-shifting ambassador to her 
father, Doctor Hoffman, or in the guise of a male valet to the Count (de Sade) while Desiderio succumbs 
to the assemblage of the Maroccan acrobats of desire and other members of the travelling circus in 
becoming-woman (Carter 1982a, pp. 112-9). Count de Sade impersonates as alter ego of Doctor Hoffman 
and as himself: chapter five „The Erotic Traveler‟ (Carter 1982a, pp. 120-42); chapter six „The Coast of 
Africa‟ (Carter 1982a, pp. 142-65). 
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arrangement. These effortless if at times enforced gender-reversals are not limited to the 
protagonists.
44
 As an extended assemblage of desire, the members of the travelling 
circus form a community or collective of freaks who have mastered the powers of 
illusion. Transposed to Hoffman‟s abode, the much-gender-changed Desiderio realises 
his function in the assemblage of desire with Albertina (Carter 1982a, p. 199), only, in 
desperate self-denial, to destroy Hoffman‟s desire generators and with them the world 
of already created phantasms, returning to comfortable reason and re-assuring certitude. 
However, in gleeful ambivalence Carter concludes her experiment in desiring-machines 
with the assertion that the desiring-machines and the realm of imagination can never be 
severed: „Unbidden, she comes‟ (Carter 1982a, p. 221).   
 
In looking beyond the formation of desiring-machines and assemblages of desire, 
specifically at their function, the stations, scenarios or tableaus
45
 of transformations – 
which are experimental in nature – play through the earthly and cosmic potential of the 
animate and inanimate and follow Doctor Hoffman‟s Frankensteinian, or Faustian, 
project of re-creating the world according to the principles of liberated desire and 
imagination. Carter sets Doctor Hoffman‟s experimentation with total becoming up as 
directed at crossing the thresholds between the natural realms, and finally dissolving 
them, in „uncovering the infinite potentiality of phenomena‟ (Carter 1982a, p. 34) and 
thus establishing a „regime of total liberation‟ of desire (Carter 1982a, p. 38). The 
actualized desiring-machines and temporary assemblages of desire are revealed as 
experimental trial constructs within Doctor Hoffman‟s scheme of changing the world of 
reason and order into one of imagination, disorder and chaos – an idea which Carter in 
the end defeats but which nevertheless seductively lingers in the mind. Ironically she 
has Desiderio opting for annihilating the potential world of desire and imagination and 
returning to the reliable world of authority and hierarchy. The Breughel-like antics 
Carter invents are held together by Doctor Hoffman‟s paradoxical axiom: „My notion of 
                                                 
44
 The travelling circus features transgendered Madame la Barbe, the bearded lady (Carter 1982a, pp. 
105-6) and Mamie Buckskin, a „fully phallic female‟ (Carter 1982a, pp. 108-10) as well as cross-species 
freaks such as the scaly Alligator-Man, homo reptilis (Carter 1982a, p. 100; pp. 110-1) living in a tank. 
45
 Carter‟s text presents (old, dying) Desiderio‟s often paradoxical recollections (of his youth) in eight 
stylistically diverse scenarios: „Introduction‟ (Carter 1982a, pp. 11-14); chapter one „The city under siege‟ 
(Carter 1982a, pp. 15-39); chapter two „The mansion of midnight‟ (Carter 1982a, pp. 39-66); chapter 
three „The river people‟ (Carter 1982a, pp. 67-93); chapter four „The acrobats of desire‟ (Carter 1982a, 
pp. 93-120); chapter five „The erotic traveler‟ (Carter 1982a, pp. 120-42); chapter six „The coast of 
Africa‟ (Carter 1982a, pp. 142-65); chapter seven „Lost in nebulous time‟ (Carter 1982a, pp. 166-92); 
chapter eight „The castle‟ (Carter 1982a, pp. 192-221).   
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harmony is perpetual, convulsive stasis‟ (Carter 1982a, p. 161).46 I read the warring 
opposition of Doctor Hoffman and the „Minister of Determination‟ „governing‟ the 
exemplary „city‟ as a speculative experiment in exposing human reason to the seductive 
forces of desire.
47
 
 
Carter‟s speculation draws all of nature, flora and fauna, all human (and inhuman) races 
into the processes of assemblage, disassemblage and re-assemblage and has them enter 
into playful and utopian cross-connections. This elaborate idea of assemblages, reaching 
into and encompassing cross-species experimentation, can be read, in the Deleuzian 
sense, as experimenting with what a body is capable of. Desiring-machines and their 
extension as assemblages of desire where functionality is heightened outgrow individual 
assemblages and become a creative vortex-like scheme of simulacral phantasm in 
Carter‟s work. The title puts an ironic emphasis on the infernality of the desiring-
machines which is how Desiderio ‒ according to his sense of reasoning and order ‒ 
evaluates Doctor Hoffman‟s scheme. Carter pushes her speculative construct to parodic 
extremes in evoking carnivorous flowers amongst living animalistic furniture of 
monkeys, lions, bears, hyenas and jaguars (Carter 1982a, p. 130), appropriately situated 
in a brothel. The proposition of „nebulous time‟ allows for a cannibal forest with girl-
faced birds, „oviparous trees‟ (Carter 1982a, p. 169; pp. 170-1), scaled trees, invisible 
singing flowers, marsupials as „ambulant vegetables‟ (Carter 1982a, p. 171) and 
inventing a mythic centaur community of an innocent ruthlessness, complete with a 
spiritual equine tree, a horse-tree assemblage with quivering entrails (Carter 1982a, pp. 
171-92). Carter masterfully overwrites this speculative pandemonium ‒ anchored in and 
motivated by the event that Doctor Hoffman‟s experimentation has temporarily lost 
desirous force ‒ with an intricate process of enfolding in the Deleuzian mode.48  
                                                 
46
 Carter‟s choice of Doctor Hoffman alludes to the German romantic fantasist E.T.A. Hoffman (1776-
1822) whose stories and novels split into two inter-relating strands of the real/rational and the ideal and 
imagined/irrational, for instance in Phantasiestücke in Callots Manier [1813] and Nachtstücke [1817], 
freely speculative stories which manipulate the real events and grow out of phantasms whereby the causal 
chains are abolished.  
47
 Other (psychoanalytic) readings propose the opposing parties and warring factions as a play of the 
(Freudian) pleasure principle against the reality principle. ref. – The American edition changed the title to 
The war of dreams, a less than appropriate renaming since dreamscapes are only one aspect of Carter‟s 
experimentation. 
48
 There are several encapsulated (enfolded) shells which interact and respond transversally: Doctor 
Hoffman‟s machines driving the changing counter-reality; the past realities Desiderio experiences (or 
rather remembers having experienced or imagines having experienced) and the interferences of opposing 
(resisting) realities such as de Sade‟s brothel and its inhabitants: chapter five „The erotic traveler‟ (Carter 
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The processes of assemblage, dis-assemblage and re-assemblage happen, or rather are 
actualized, on several and inter-acting planes in this text: on a naturalistic level (travels 
across the earth and the seas); on an imaginary level (dreamscapes and multiple 
simultaneous worlds); on an emblematic level (peepshows and visionary vistas); and on 
a mythic level (transposition into „nebulous times‟). The simulacral planes are 
perpetually inter-acting in the sense of the deeply-seated productivity of a freed 
anoedipal unconscious, expressed in Doctor Hoffman‟s scheme of world-recreation: 
 
[Desiderio] So that was the doctor‟s version of cogito! I DESIRE THEREFORE I EXIST. […] 
[Doctor Hoffman] „I had thought there were no defences against the unleashed unconscious‟ 
(Carter 1982a, p. 211; original capitals). 
 
The phantasmagoric stations or experimental tableaus seemingly progress on the textual 
surface-level, inviting a misleading reading as „picaresque narrative‟;49 however, on the 
level(s) of simulacral phantasm, as becomes obvious in the last tableau, the scenarios 
are encapsulated in each other, they produce each other in a fractal manner, and most 
importantly, either eventuate simultaneously or, paradoxically both regressively and 
progressively. 
 
Such a technique of inter-related phantasms parallels a process of enfolding and 
unfolding in the Deleuzian mode which is exemplified by Carter as a creative seed bag 
of „sets of samples‟ which follow Doctor Hoffman‟s rules of divination based on the 
Chinese I-ching. The formation and function of desiring-machines and assemblages of 
desire and the interrelations between Carter‟s diverse modes of phantasm, the 
speculative, experimental and utopian versions of the libidinal, are governed by the 
permutations of this imaginary core which operates in the sense of a Deleuzian abstract 
machine or diagram transversally across the diverse scenarios or phantasms (Carter 
1982a, p. 48; p. 59; pp. 92-3; pp. 93-7; pp. 107-8; p. 118). The convulsive outburst of 
desire in the encounter between Desiderio and the „acrobats of desire‟ (peremptorily yet 
provisionally) annihilates the sample bag of creation in an earthquake and landslide; yet 
                                                                                                                                               
1982a, pp. 120-42) or de Sade‟s murderous alter ego, the black idol and his society: chapter six „The coast 
of Africa‟ (Carter 1982a, pp. 142-65). 
49
 Examples of stations (not in the topological sense)  or experimental tableaus (not in the representative 
or metaphoric sense) are: in the walled city (chapter one); at the seaside resort (chapter two); on the river 
(chapter three); in the mountain city with the travelling fair (chapter four); in the House of 
Anonymity/brothel (chapter five); on the ocean and the coast of Africa (chapter six); in the garden of 
Eden (chapter seven); in Doctor Hoffman‟s castle and underground laboratories (chapter eight). 
  
 
 
294 
Count de Sade through his libidinal appetite re-creates (for a while)
50
 the sampling of 
the world („The Bestial Room‟ in „The House of Anonymity‟/brothel; Carter 1982a, pp. 
130-5). 
 
[de Sade] „I am the willed annihilation of the orgiastic moment in person, ladies.‟ […] „I burn in 
my white-hot, ever-lasting, asbestos flesh!‟ [ …] „I am my own antithesis. […] My loins rave. I 
unleash negation. […] The burning arrows of negation. […] Come! […] Incinerate yourself with 
me!‟ (Carter 1982a, pp. 134-5). 
 
Since Doctor Hoffman‟s records of research still exist in his castle study (Carter 1982a, 
pp. 204-6; pp. 211-2), there is potential for a recovery of the set of samples and, 
although momentarily stalled, the reshaping of the world according to the liberated 
anoedipal unconscious and its freed desire and imagination could go ahead – if 
(dithering) Desiderio were to comply.   
 
The process of expressive encapsulating results in a collapse of temporal and causal 
structures: present, past and future are fused into moments of pure duration; effect and 
cause give way to a spectrum of pure effectuation which complements the moments of 
pure duration. Read in Deleuzian terms, the processes of event and becoming withdraw 
from a representational matrix. The maddening effect of having abandoned time or 
being unaffected by temporality, being suspended in a timeless expanse, finds its 
expression in the exchange between Doctor Hoffman and his daughter Albertina. 
 
His [Doctor Hoffman‟s] first words were: „I go to the city tomorrow and arrive there yesterday.‟ 
‟Yes, of course,‟ she [Albertina] replied. „Because the shadow of the flying bird never moves.‟ 
They smiled. They appeared to understand one another perfectly (Carter 1982a, p. 199). 
 
                                                 
50
 The Count appropriately sets fire to the (imaginary) location of the brothel, thus complying with his 
own rules of destruction and negation. The multiple impersonations of De Sade, for instance as Count and 
his valet (that is Doctor Hoffman and his daughter in disguise) introduce elements of the Sadeian regime. 
At the core of Carter‟s polemic in her treatise The Sadeian woman: An exercise in cultural history (Carter 
1992/1979) lies her provocative agreement with Sade‟s demand for sexual freedom independent of the 
sexual status, male or female, of the bodily flesh. In this polemic treatise, drawing on Foucault, Lacan and 
Freud, Barthes and Bataille among others, Carter argues a case for Sade‟s insane, mad principle of 
limitless and unbound desire as a turning point in the Western imagination. Whether such a „liberated‟ 
discourse turns into exploitative and demeaning pornography does not seem to be of concern to Carter, 
rather her focus is on breaking the literary taboo of erotic violence and to expose the coldness and final 
solitude of the human flesh in extreme circumstances and in the closure of death. Deleuze devotes a major 
part of his treatise on Masochism: Coldness and cruelty (Deleuze 2006d/1967) to the presentation of De 
Sade‟s libidinal regime. Cf. also Lacan‟s provocative parallels between Kant‟s and de Sade‟s fundamental 
moralism, „Kant with Sade‟ [1962/3] (Lacan Ecrits, trans. Fink, 2006, pp. 645-68).   
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This is confirmed when Desiderio and Albertina arrive at their intended marriage bed in 
the love pens (which are set up in the underground laboratories of Doctor Hoffman‟s 
castle) and the full picture of Doctor Hoffman‟s project comes into view. The couple‟s 
potential eroto-energy, heightened through their withheld desire, will be released and 
through their final coupling Doctor Hoffman hopes to realize his intended temporal, 
spatial and causal implosion.   
 
„I shall go to the city tomorrow,‟ said the Doctor, „and, since time will be altogether negated –‟ 
„– you will arrive yesterday,‟ concluded Albertina. They both laughed gently. And now I 
understood this gnomic exchange perfectly (Carter 1982a, p. 215). 
 
Doctor Hoffman‟s world-changing project consists, in Albertina‟s words, of physically 
and mechanically tapping into desire as „the strongest force in the world‟ (Carter 1982a, 
p. 203), „the greatest source of radiant energy in the entire universe‟ Carter 1982a, p. 
203). Doctor Hoffman „will take the world apart and make a new world‟ (Carter 1982a, 
p. 203) according to „Hoffman‟s Principle of Unwrought Simplicity‟ (Carter 1982a, p. 
203). Steeped in oriental and medieval pseudo-sciences, in necromancy and alchemy, 
the Faustian Doctor Hoffman attempts to decipher all affects (pain, love, fear, ecstasy, 
despair) and their infinite combinations and transfer their ideational content into 
palpable perceptual signs, a condensed but complete imaginary. He not only follows the 
principle of a necessary „persistence of vision‟ (Carter 1982a, pp. 204-5) but advances a 
new non-dichotomous philosophy. Carter‟s text [1972] reads here as a 
(contemporaneous) parody of Deleuze-Guattari‟s Anti-Oedipus [1972]. 
 
[Doctor Hoffman] „All things co-exist in pairs but mine is not an either/or world. Mine is an and 
+ and world. I alone have discovered the key to the inexhaustible plus. […] [Desiderio] „What is 
the nature of that key, doctor?‟ „Eroto-energy,‟ he said tonelessly (Carter 1982a, p. 206).  
 
Carter has Doctor Hoffman opting for the infinite Deleuzian enumeration of 
possibilities in the service of a process of unlimited becoming and the liberation of the 
unconscious making way for a new (schizoanalytically imagined) world.
51
 Her utopian 
                                                 
51
 [Doctor Hoffman] „“ For the last five years those transmitters, powered by simple, radiant energy, e.g. 
eroto-energy, have been beaming upon the city the crude infrastructure of (a) synthetically authentic 
phenomena; (b) mutable combinations of synthetically authentic phenomena; and have also been 
transmitting (c) sufficient radiation to intensify a symbol until it becomes an object according to the law 
of effective evolving, or, if you prefer a rather more explicit term, complex becoming. By the liberation of 
the unconscious we shall, of course, liberate man. And the naked man will walk in and out of everybody‟s 
senses‟” (Carter 1982a, p. 208). Carter‟s wording (implicitly) parodies contemporaneous notions of 
„becoming‟.  
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vision of liberated desire in the service of becoming is ambiguously couched in pseudo-
scientific and thus ridiculed phrasing which is underwritten by the cold, exhausted and 
monotonous persona of Doctor Hoffman. The „infernality‟ of the scheme, in Desiderio‟s 
limited perspective, is finally revealed; the magic de-mystified by the „technological 
whiteness and silence‟ of the underground laboratories where „the secretions of fulfilled 
desire are processed‟ into a „biochemical metasoup‟ (Carter 1982a, p. 209). „Reality 
modifying machines‟ take the „pure uncreated essence of being‟ (Carter 1982a, p. 209) 
through a „precipitation process‟ which is assumed to deliver „the germinal molecule of 
objectified desire‟ (Carter 1982a, p. 210), artificially, man-made „life‟, exploiting 
„certain loopholes in metaphysics‟ (Carter 1982a, p. 212). The tour through Doctor 
Hoffman‟s underground laboratories of world re-creation ends in a gigantic assembly of 
love pens where hundreds of forgetful voluntary couples engage in the production of 
eroto-energy scooped off by overhead funnels, fed into the germinal machinery, then 
propelling the transmitters directed at the utopian exemplary „city‟ and randomly at 
other places. Desiderio‟s sudden realization that the stations of his assumed journey, at 
times in search, at other in pursuit of Albertina, partly in her disguised company, have 
led him to „the grotesque dénouement of [his] great passion‟ (Carter 1982a, p. 216) and 
that he is destined as an experimental tool and guinea pig, triggers off Carter‟s 
characteristic sweeping and excessive destruction: mayhem, murder, fire and final 
oblivion.   
 
The concluding castle scenario refracts, and ironically elucidates (since Carter allows 
Desiderio limited insights and comprehension) the initial visions presented to him as 
(material) peep-show exhibits, the bizarre simultaneous worlds of time and space travel 
(for instance in the „river‟ and „ocean‟ events) as well as a purely speculative, „unreal 
but existing‟, utopian realm (for instance the centaur community). Discursively – 
strategically and schizoanalytically employed ‒ this refraction achieves an inter-acting 
and ironic layering of the naturalistic, imaginary, emblematic and mythic levels.
52
 The 
formation of the assemblage of desire of Desiderio and Albertina takes place 
                                                 
52
 „We [Albertina and Desiderio] went out on to the bridge. The chasm was some sixty feet wide and, 
from both its lips, sheer precipices fell to a depth of a thousand feet or more, so deep you could not see 
what lay at the bottom. Beyond the bridge was a little green grove […] I remembered I had seen a picture 
of Hoffman‟s park […] I had seen it in the peep-show. It was the park framed by the female orifice in the 
first machine of all and when I looked beyond the trees I saw the very same castle I had seen then‟ (Carter 
1982a, p. 196). 
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transversally and effortlessly glides through the various modes of phantasm Carter 
deploys: the speculative, experimental and libidinal in its utopian instantiations. 
 
Couched in Desiderio‟s memory structure, Carter‟s text simultaneously  plays across the 
various inter-acting planes: Desiderio‟s „actual‟ or rather „actualized‟ experience of 
arriving with Albertina at Doctor Hoffman‟s castle, on a naturalistic level; his „virtual‟ 
or rather „counter-actualized‟ visionary experience in the peepshow display, on an 
emblematic level; his „splintered‟, schizoid recall of several „forests‟, „groves‟, „parks‟ 
in dreamscapes on the imaginary
53
 and mythic
54
 levels; and in a parodic condensation of 
these various levels, in the bag of Doctor Hoffman‟s „samples‟ modelling all probable 
events in a timeless duration. Carter‟s textual ambiguity even allows skipping from one 
level to the other in evoking (in Desiderio‟s imagination) the „natural‟ chasm‟s vaginal 
lips and an engulfing depth below.   
 
Although it can be argued that the interaction and gliding scale of the planes results, if 
partially, from Carter‟s choice of memory structure which allows for intricate layering, 
splintering and fracturing reach deeper into the textual fabric and effect a nearly 
limitless de-materialization of figures in perpetual transformation and of landscapes 
being eclipsing in earthquakes and landslides
55
 provoked by spurts of desire and fired in 
the process of assemblage and copulation. The system of encapsulated phantasms 
engenders not characters or subjects but rising and melting phantoms, momentary 
apparitions, partly incorporated revenants, „materialized‟ replicas and ghostly shades of 
the dead which people the scenarios. While taken on its own (in the representative 
mode), it is possible to describe this expressive layer generically as gothic, its function 
within the frame of differential desiring practice is more adequately located on the 
levels of Deleuzian actualization and counter-actualization. The speculative and utopian 
aspects of the processes of phantasm, since they are parodically expressed, are best 
defined as a schizoanalytic critique of an assumed incompatibility of reason and desire, 
                                                 
53
 Examples of dreamscapes on the imaginary level are: the fairytale mansion of sleeping beauty in the 
rose biar in chapter two „The mansion of midnight‟ (Carter 1982a, pp. 50-7); the internal living flora in 
the House of Anonymity/brothel in chapter five „The erotic traveler‟ (Carter 1982a, pp. 128-40), esp. „The 
bestial room‟ (Carter 1982a, pp. 130-5). 
54
 An example of a dreamscape on the mythic level is the Garden of Eden in chapter seven „Lost in 
nebulous time‟ (Carter 1982a, pp. 165-71). 
55
 An ironic „earthquake‟ is provoked in the „encounter‟ between Desiderio and the acrobats, for instance 
in chapter four „The acrobats of desire‟ (Carter 1982a, pp. 93-120).  
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and in terms of experimenting, corporeally and textually, with the creative powers of an 
anoedipal unconscious.  
 
Carter‟s text is excessive and at times transgressive, for parodic and satiric purposes, in 
that she does not refrain from evoking physical, emotional and sexual abuse and even 
cannibalism.
56
 A process of assembling, dissembling and re-assembling of Deleuzian 
desiring-machines, and assemblages of desire, takes place. Their intensities flow, break 
and start up again according to the principles of affectivity and connectivity aimed at the 
expression of their becoming. In other words, Carter‟s text can be read through the 
stages of becoming as theorized by Deleuze-Guattari.
57
 In this sense, the singularly 
determined, individual human being fades and gives way to the formation and 
actualization of desiring-machines and assemblages of desire undergoing a continuous 
process of becoming. 
 
Desire and death: differential serialization 
 
Having examined the processes of event and becoming and the techniques within these 
processes in the two previous texts by Carter, I now turn in my third textual reading of 
Nights at the circus [1985] to the question how these processes figure and eventuate in 
the compositional frame. More specifically, I focus on three literary strategies of 
differential desiring practice deployed on the compositional level which I addressed 
theoretically in the context of the Kafka treatise (chapter five) and in regard to the 
simulacral mode of phantasm (chapter six): assemblages of desire and their differential 
serialization; transversality as principle of connection between the series; and specific 
differential devices of connectivity such as the dark precursor, or rather a regime of 
inter-related precursors as sign system (chapters five and six). I attend to the resulting 
refraction of points of view since the above strategies effect a discursive dissociation of 
the textual fabric. The simulacral techniques of phantasm impact on composition, and 
ultimately on expression and style, in that the simulacra insist despite their vanishing 
                                                 
56
 Parallel to Doctor Hoffman‟s experiments in his underground laboratories where „the secretions of 
fulfilled desire are processed‟ into a „biochemical metasoup‟ (Carter 1982a, p. 209), De Sade is broiled 
into a soup by his (black) demonic alter ego. Chapter six „The coast of Africa‟ (Carter 1982a, pp. 142-65). 
57
 „Plateau 10: 1730: „Becoming-Intense, becoming-animal, becoming-imperceptible …‟ (Deleuze and 
Guattari 2004b, pp.  256-341). The full spectrum encompasses the stages of becoming-intense, becoming-
animal, becoming-woman, becoming-child, becoming-molecular, and becoming-imperceptible. However, 
Deleuze-Guattari also conceive of other „eventual‟ [„eventiel‟] becomings such as becoming-book, 
becoming-writer and becoming-text. 
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and their repeated escape; their differential re-appearance thus haunts the text. The 
compositional effects of the simulacrum manifesting as serialization take a range of 
forms such as parallel or divergent series, as circular or decentred series – discussed as 
aesthetic criteria of differential desiring practice in chapter six – which invites a 
characterization of the text as governed by dispersion, disparity and more generally as 
set under the regime of schizodicity. 
 
The textual surface level of Nights at the circus sets up a dialogical discursive frame 
between the initial members of the central assemblage of desire: Fevvers, a bird-woman, 
working as aerialiste, a woman-acrobat on the trapeze; Lizzie, her foster-mother and 
companion; and Jack Walser, the American journalist reporting on the winged freak for 
his series of interviews: „Great Humbugs of the World‟ (Carter 1985, p. 11). This 
assemblage is held together by an intricate regime of auditory and signatory precursors 
in the form of referential and inter-related sounds such as musical tunes, shouts and 
speech mannerisms,
58
 and signature items
59
 which function as differential devices of 
                                                 
58
 The inter-related soundscape establishes an auditory affective level of the total circus assemblage 
which I cannot here explore in detail except by giving some anchoring points. In their Kafka treatise 
Deleuze-Guattari advance the notion of „intrusion of sound‟, of music as „a sonorous block‟ (bells, 
animal‟s shrieks, e.g. Josephine‟s „whistle‟) (Deleuze and Guattari 2006, pp. 4-7) and argue for its 
function in the system of (de-, re-) territorialisation, i.e. as part of the desertification of language. „We 
noted Gregor‟s warbling and the ways it blurred words, the whistling of the mouse, the cough of the ape, 
the pianist who doesn‟t play, the singer who doesn‟t sing and gives birth to her song out of her 
nonsinging, the musical dogs who are musicians in the very depth of their bodies since they don‟t emit 
any music‟ (Deleuze and Guattari 2006, p. 21). Corresponding observations are made by Deleuze-
Guattari with regard to the schizodicity of Artaud‟s howls and Schreber‟s spontaneous (irrepressible, 
schizoid) bellowing (Deleuze and Guattari 2004a, p. 10; pp. 20-1; pp. 23-4) and by Deleuze with regard 
to sounds („auditions‟) in Beckett (Deleuze 1997). Cf. also Lacan‟s observations on the (psychotic) 
auditory effects of the unconscious in the Schreber case (Lacan, trans. Fink, 2006, p. 467). In Carter‟s 
Nights at the circus the following network of referential and inter-related sounds can be detected: (1) 
Fevvers‟ emblematic tune „Only a bird in a gilded cage ‒‟ (a) (Carter 1985, p. 14, p. 107, p. 180, p. 190), 
(b) as song of the Grand Duke‟s toy bird (Carter 1985, p. 266, p. 289); (2) Fevvers‟ performance theme 
(Wagner‟s) „The Ride of the Valkyries‟ (Carter 1985, p. 16, p. 282); (3) (Naked clown) Walser‟s 
exclamation (a) „What a piece of work is man! How noble in reason! How infinite in faculty!‟ (Carter 
1985, p. 111), (b) (Naked demented) Walser‟s declamation to the oncoming Siberian dawn: „Oh!‟ – 
„What a piece of work is man!‟ (Carter 1985, p. 238);  (4) Walser‟s cock‟s crows „Cock-a-doodle-do‟, 
„Cock-a-doodle-dooski‟ (the adapted Russian version) (Carter 1985, p. 152, p. 177, pp. 223-4, p. 236, p. 
256); (5) Mignon‟s songs (a) (Carter 1985, p. 132, p. 142; p. 134, p. 255 (b) as remembered by Walser 
(Carter 1985, p. 255), (c) as lied „Do you know where the lemon trees grow?‟ (Carter 1985, p. 155, pp. 
249-50); (6) an impersonal, multiply aligned above-text voice „H‟m!‟ (Carter 1985, p. 53, p. 77, p. 79, p. 
133); (7) Colonel Kearney‟s speech mannerism (a) „Bamboozlem‟, „Yessir!‟, „Yessirree!‟ (Carter 1985, p. 
147, pp. 274-5), (b) „Old Glory across the tundra‟ (Carter 1985, pp. 102-3) „Tuskers through Siberia!‟ 
(Carter 1985, p. 199) „The Old Glory will wave once again across the tundra!‟ (Carter 1985, pp. 273-4). 
59
 Signature items which function as precursors and differential devices of connectivity: (1) Lizzie‟s 
Father Time clock inherited from one-eyed brothel madam Ma Nelson (Carter 1985, p. 29, p. 48, p. 226, 
p. 234, p. 272); (2) Fevvers‟ gilt toy sword given her by Ma Nelson (Carter 1985, pp. 37-8, p. 48, p. 83, 
pp. 181-2, p. 198, p. 234, p. 280); (3) Fevvers‟ signature flowers, Parma violets (at times matching her 
eye colour) (Carter 1985, p. 29, p. 203, p. 284).   
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connectivity. The inter-species assemblage(s) of desire which the circus forms (and 
unforms) result in a-subjectivity and the evocation of processual becoming on multiple 
levels. Assemblages of desire or desiring-machines (which Deleuze-Guattari and 
Deleuze discern in Kafka and Beckett) replace „subjects‟ or „protagonists‟ in Carter‟s 
work and appear in human and animal formations, that is serialised. The totality of the 
circus assemblage undergoes multiple ruptures, yet, after the eventful voyage of Colonel 
Kearney‟s Imperial Circus Old Glory from London to Petersburg and into wintry 
Siberia, it is re-confirmed if in a changed positioning while the originally intended 
world tour of the circus to Japan, across the Pacific to the United States does not come 
about. 
 
Textually Nights at the circus locates a multitude of human, animal and inter-species
60
 
assemblages of desire in three stations, scenarios or tableaus of transformation, London 
(Carter 1985, pp. 7-91), Petersburg (Carter 1985, pp. 95-193) and Siberia (Carter 1985, 
pp. 197-295); yet the dialogical discursive frame of the central assemblage repeatedly 
breaks
61
 under the affective pressure of the processes of becoming which the members 
                                                 
60
 The human, animal and inter-species assemblages of desire are in a continuous process of 
metamorphosis, to single out three „dynamic cogs‟, Fevvers, Colonel Kearney and Walser (and a couple 
of curious „chimera‟: (1) (Miss) Fevvers is a bird-woman, (a) „Cockney Venus‟ (Carter 1985, pp. 7-8, p. 
90, p. 132, p. 180, p. 203, p. 273), (b) „the only fully feathered intacta in the entire history of the world‟ 
(Carter 1985, p. 71, p. 82, p. 294), (c) „English Angel‟, „Britannic angel‟ (Carter 1985, p. 8, p. 231), (d) 
„(Miss) Sophie/Sophia‟, Mrs Sophie Walser (Carter 1985, pp. 293-4 13, p. 81, p. 84, p. 88, p. 172, p. 279, 
pp. 282-3, p. 285, p. 293), (e) „a hump-backed horse‟ (Carter 1985, p. 19), (f) „a cripple‟ (Carter 1985, p. 
19), (g) tableau vivant „Cupid‟ (Carter 1985, p. 23), tableau vivant  „Winged Victory‟ (Carter 1985, p. 25, 
p. 32, p. 38, p. 54), tableau vivant „Angel of Death‟ (Carter 1985, p. 70), (h) „a „unchback‟ (Carter 1985, 
p. 32), (i) „the marvellous giantess‟ (Carter 1985, p. 42, p. 51, p. 205), (j) „Virgin Whore‟ (Carter 1985, p. 
55), (k) „Flora‟, „Azrael‟, „Venus Pandemos‟ (Carter 1985, pp. 77-9), (l) „rara avis‟ (Carter 1985, p. 185), 
(m) „Feathered Frump‟ (Carter 1985, p. 276), (n) „(Madonna of) Misericordia‟ (Carter 1985, p. 125, p. 
127). Colonel Kearney lives in symbiosis with a divinating pig permanently nesting inside his jacket 
(Carter 1985, pp. 98-9, pp. 100-2; p. 203; p. 275). In Lamarck‟s Educated Apes (Carter 1985, pp. 107-8) 
the (chimp) Professor lives in symbiosis with the (human) Ape-Man (Carter 1985, p. 140) but turns into 
the (simian) entrepreneur of his group (Carter 1985, pp. 168-70, pp. 182-3). The Princess and Mignon (as 
well as Walser) enter into a pact-assemblage with dancing tigers (Carter 1985, pp. 148-9; pp. 154-5; pp. 
162-6; pp. 179-80). Walser turns himself (as clown) into a Human Chicken (Carter 1985, pp. 152-3, pp. 
175-7, pp. 223-4, p. 236, p. 256), then into the tigress‟ gigolo (Carter 1985, pp. 164-5), finally into a 
Shaman apprentice (Carter 1985, pp. 250-1, pp. 255-6, pp. 260-4, pp. 266-7) while both the Shaman and 
Walser live in symbiosis with a bear-cub (Carter 1985, pp. 257-9).    
61
 Discursive breaks under the affective pressure of the processes of becoming rupture the dialogical 
frame of the central assemblage effecting stops and starts of the desiring-machine(s): (1) Walser‟s recall 
of his hiring by the Colonel (Petersburg S1: Carter 1985, pp. 95-104); (2) introduction of the members of 
the circus: the Princess of Abyssinia and her tigers, Lamarck‟s Educated Apes, Mignon the Ape-Man‟s 
woman, Samson the Strong Man, Sybil the Colonel‟s divinating pig (S2: Carter 1985, pp. 105-12); (3) 
introduction of Clown Alley: Buffo the Great, Grik and Grok (S4: Carter 1985, pp. 116-25); (4) Walser‟s 
clown apprenticeship as Human Chicken (S7: Carter 1985, pp. 152-3); (5) Countess P.‟s women 
penitentiary as panopticon and the women‟s rebellion (Siberia S3: Carter 1985, pp. 210-8), the women 
outlaws (S4: Carter 1985, pp. 219-24); (6) Walser and the Shaman (S6: Carter 1985, pp. 236-8), Walser‟s 
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of the other assemblages undergo. In this sense the fluid and shifting assemblages are – 
in the sense I explored in Kafka‟s texts – multi-perspectival and polyvocal. 
 
Simulacral parallel or divergent series which shift the processes of event and becoming 
to complementary simulacral layers, and back to the central assemblage, override the 
textual scaffolding in three locations of transformation (London, Petersburg and 
Siberia); in this way an elaborate network of differential serialization arises which is 
governed by the regime of affectivity. I read the ruptures and discursive breaks in the 
libidinal sense as initiating and actualizing affective moves within the assemblages of 
desire that according to the regime and working of desiring-machines free an anoedipal 
unconscious (as examined in chapters two and three). 
 
While the processes of event and becoming within the assemblages of desire continually 
unfold and evolve, Colonel Kearney‟s Imperial Circus Old Glory, the over-arching 
assemblage as a performative machine, simultaneously undergoes a progressive 
disintegration (in the sense of pro-and regression explored earlier). At the second station 
(Petersburg) vital members, branches of the overarching assemblage of desire as circus, 
are lost.
62
 The inter-species relations are reversed and madness and death take their toll 
on „the circus as triumph of man‟s will over gravity and over rationality‟ (Carter 1985, 
p. 105). At the third station (Siberia) the dynamiting of the circus train brings about 
near-total destruction (Carter 1985, pp. 204-5)
63
 and a dispersal of a few survivors. 
Fevvers‟s party64 is kidnapped by outlaws65 and a witless Walser absconds into 
                                                                                                                                               
shamanic apprenticeship (S8: Carter 1985, pp. 252-70). The shamanization of Walser is a form of 
(progressively) becoming-imperceptible. 
62
 The processes of simultaneous assembling-disassembling, of montage-demontage demonstrate the 
fluidity of the libidinal relation(s) within the totality of the inter-species circus-assemblage. (1) The 
Charivaris, a rope-walking extended family group, are forcedly dismissed for plotting against Fevvers 
(Carter 1985, p. 150, p. 156; the incident of the severed rope, Carter 1985, pp. 158-61). (2) Lamarck‟s 
(simian) Educated Apes opt out since their (human) leader, the Ape-Man (self-styled as Monsieur 
Lamarck), succumbs to alcoholic delirium (Carter 1985, pp. 107-10; pp. 140-2; pp. 168-70, pp. 182-3). 
(3) After the final performance in Petersburg, Buffo the Great, having overstretched his imagination and 
his alcohol consumption, is taken away to the insane asylum (Carter 1985, pp. 173-8). (4) The Princess‟ 
„jealous‟ tigress attacks Mignon for dancing with her (lion) mate and is shot (Carter 1985, pp. 178-80). 
63
 The death of the ailing elephants (Carter 1985, p. 201; p. 207; p. 209; pp. 219-20) and the sly 
(simulacral) disappearance of the tigers into mirror shards (Carter 1985, pp. 201-2; pp. 205-6) divests the 
circus of its animal branches. 
64  
The assemblage is scrambled and in disarray: Lizzie, the Princess and Mignon, the Colonel and Sybil 
the pig, the clowns and their dogs, are either harmed (the Princess is concussed and barely conscious), 
drunk (the Colonel) or dispirited (the clowns).  
65
 The outlaws arranged the blow-up of the train to blackmail Fevvers into intervening with the British 
crown (assuming she has a connection) (Carter 1985, p. 207; p. 220; pp. 225-33). 
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shamanic bear territory (Carter 1985, p. 209; pp. 222-4; pp. 236-8). The process of 
dispersal of the circus as over-arching and anchoring assemblage unfolds further in that 
the clowns‟ „bewitching‟ dance for the drunken outlaws, in unison with a blizzard ex 
machina, rids the circus assemblage of the clowns and their dogs.
66
 The orgiastic dis-
assemblage of the circus ends with the Colonel, intent on starting all over again, taking 
his leave (Carter 1985, pp. 274-8). However, the remaining fragments of the 
assemblage, Fevvers with a broken wing, thus unable to fly, Lizzi, hovering at the 
margins of usefulness, and Walser, possessed and demented, turned sorcerer and 
shaman, re-assemble. Their transformative decline in body and mind creates the 
conditions for their renewed libidinal becoming, just in time for celebrating New Year‟s 
Eve and the start of a new century (Carter 1985, pp. 292-5). 
 
I frame the moments of literary serialization in focusing on the question of how desire 
and death set the libidinal agenda in the multiple scheme of transformation. This is done 
with the aim to exemplify the libidinal complexities of the assemblages and dis-
assemblages of desire in Nights at the circus as literary serialization on the 
compositional plane. I have – theoretically and methodologically – explored such 
triangular libidinal relations as the nexus between impulse, Eros and Thanatos in the 
Deleuzian sense (in chapter six) and – practically – in the triadic reversal in Duras‟ The 
ravishing of Lol V. Stein (in chapter seven). My focus is on the libidinal trajectory of the 
central assemblage of desire, Fevvers-Lizzie-Walser; however I shall take into account 
complementary assemblages which establish simulacral parallel and divergent series.
67
 
The parallel or divergent status
68
 of the simulacra results from affective engagement 
                                                 
66
 The clowns‟ dance and the blizzard are irresistible libidinal (as well as annihilating) forces. The 
mongrel spared for a later roast (Carter 1985, pp. 242-5; p. 249) turns into a sign of a vortexlike digestive 
cycle (as they are devouring a member of their own assemblage). 
67
 Three complementary assemblages which establish simulacral parallel and divergent series, Madame 
Schreck‟s freaks, the Grand Duke‟s collection of objet d‟art eggs and Mr Rosencreutz‟s phantasm take a 
special place as they are connected to Fevvers‟ libidinal trajectory. 
68
 While the central (circus) assemblage of desire sets the libidinal trajectory, the parallel and divergent 
series enact individual libidinal moves which affect the other series. Examples of parallel series are: (1) 
Madame Schreck‟s House of Horrors (London S4: Carter 1985, pp. 57-73), including the stories of 
Sleeping Beauty (Carter 1985, pp. 63-4), the Wiltshire Wonder (Carter 1985, pp. 64-8), Fanny Four-Eyes 
(Carter 1985, p. 69) and Cobwebs (Carter 1985, pp. 69-70); (2) Mignon‟s story (Petersburg S5: Carter 
1985, pp. 126-44); (3) The Grand Duke‟s art collection of toys (Petersburg S11: Carter 1985, pp. 184-93, 
esp. pp. 187-92); (4) The Shaman‟s story (Siberia S8: Carter 1985, pp. 252-70; esp. p. 255, p. 257, pp. 
263-4). Examples of divergent series are: (1) Mr Rosencreutz‟s rebirth ritual (London S5: Carter 1985, 
pp. 74-91); (2) The story of the mute black Princess of Abyssinia; the Princess and Mignon teaming up 
(Petersburg S7: Carter 1985, pp. 146-57; esp. pp. 148-9 and p. 153); (3) Samson the Strong Man‟s story 
(Petersburg S8: Carter 1985, pp. 166-7); (4) The Maestro‟s story (Siberia S9: Carter 1985, pp. 271-8; esp. 
pp. 271-2). Inter-relations of stories take a special status in serialization, for instance, Clown Alley‟s 
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with the central assemblage of desire, how far the simulacra impact on Fevvers-Lizzie-
Walser. 
 
The libidinal moves in the two seduction scenarios Fevvers is drawn into, in Mr. 
Rosencreutz‟s mansion (London S5; Carter 1985, pp. 74-90, esp. pp. 76-83) and in the 
Grand Duke‟s palace (Petersburg S11; Carter 1985, pp. 184-93, esp. pp. 189-92) test her 
bodily hybridity as bird-woman, display her first and second idolization, parodically 
debunk her assumed mythic status („being hatched from an egg‟; Carter 1985, p. 7, p. 
20, p. 21) and reveal her progressive magical flying prowess. Desire (overwhelming and 
engulfing others), death (and birth, „being without navel‟; Carter 1985, pp. 17-8) and 
sexuality (corporeally displaced to her hump and her wings) are entangled with each 
other in Fevvers‟ becoming. On a parallel libidinal level, several clowns‟ rituals serially 
prepare Walser‟s schizoid separation of body and soul,69 while the clowns‟ dance of 
death (Siberia S7; Carter 1985, pp. 242-3), in Walser‟s absence, completes their 
progressive annihilation. For the clowns, as for Walser in his initiation (and indirectly 
for libidinal clown-apprentice Little Ivan; Carter 1985, pp. 121-5),
70
 the triangular 
libidinal nexus is performative, ritualized and orgiastic. A further supporting libidinal 
and simulacral strand
71
 sets up a triple simulacrum (Princess and Mignon – Fevvers and 
party – Walser and party), transversally re-connecting the split assemblage between 
Fevers and Walser, a simulacrum which is executed multi-perspectivally.
72
 
 
                                                                                                                                               
hostess baboushka has a daughter, the axe-murderess, mother to Little Ivan (Carter 1985, p. 121, p. 122) 
who turns out to be rebellious Olga of the Siberian Countess P.‟s women‟s penitentiary as panopticon 
(Siberia S3: Carter 1985, pp. 210-8; S4: pp. 219-24). As with Deleuze-Guattari‟s reading of Kafka‟s work 
best read as totality (rather than in its singular achievements) Carter‟s „serialized stories‟ are internally 
linked, responding to each other, in the sense of schizoanalytic conjunctions of flux or intensities. 
„Sleeping Beauty‟ and „The Fall River Axe Murders‟ which resurface in Nights at the Circus also exist as 
separate „stories‟. 
69
 The clowns‟ rituals are demonstrations of corporeal transformation and dissolution: the „Clowns‟ 
Christmas Dinner‟ (Petersburg S4: Carter 1985, p. 117 and S10: Carter 1985, pp. 175-7), „The Clowns‟ 
Funeral‟ (Carter 1985, p. 117, p. 174), the dance of the buffoons (Carter 1985, pp. 123-4), and the 
clowns‟ dismemberment routine (Petersburg S7: Carter 1985, pp. 151-2). 
70
 Little Ivan turns out to be the son of Olga, daughter of baboushka and axe-murderer, the (later) escapee 
from the Siberian women‟s penitentiary. „Little Ivan had watched from the top of the stove as his mother 
chopped up his father‟ (Carter 1985, p. 122). He is drawn as Walser into the clowns‟ assembly, acting as a 
member in Petersburg but is left behind (Carter 1985, pp. 173-5; pp. 192-3).            
71
 Mignon impersonates revenants from the dead (Petersburg S5: Carter 1985, pp. 134-9), she dances 
trancelike with the tigers (Petersburg S7: Carter 1985, p. 149) and she executes a sonic (vocal), shamanic 
re-evocation of the tigers (Siberia S7: Carter 1985, pp. 249-51; S8: pp. 267-70). 
72
 The re-evoked tigers on the roof of the (former) Conservatorium in the middle of Siberia appear in 
multiple perspectives, from Fevvers‟ and from Walser‟s point of view, thus confirming their shared 
simulacral focus. 
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In contrast to Fevvers‟ libidinal trajectory, Walser undergoes progressively complex 
metamorphoses,
73
 finally transforming from delirious Shaman‟s apprentice to lucidly 
„mad‟ (schizoid) Shaman (Carter 1985, pp. 50-1, pp. 255-6, pp. 260-4, pp. 266-7). 
Walser‟s multiply connected and related transformations prepare the ground for him to 
rejoin the initial assemblage of desire with Fevvers and Lizzie. His stages of 
metamorphosis encompass amnesia, delirium, madness, spiritual possession and 
renewed (shamanic) lucidity. The inter-related libidinal trajectories, each focusing on 
desire and death, exemplify the literary strategies of differential serialization, its 
transversality and connective devices. These trajectories demonstrate the simulacral 
layering within differential serialization and the perpetual fluidity within the processes 
of event and becoming. I propose that only by considering their mutual function on the 
compositional plane can justice be done to the affective network within Carter‟s 
libidinal phantasm.  
 
In the following I pursue some libidinal and simulacral strands in their inter-relations 
and multiple refractions. Each scenario I discuss reflects on the central assemblage of 
desire, though to different degrees, which establishes the libidinal network of 
differential serialization as a gigantic Body without Organs (not in the Proustian 
narrator‟s sense but as an interspecies-circus). The libidinal moves in the first seduction 
scenario around Mr Rosencreutz are couched in the discursive frame of Fevvers‟ 
autobiographical flashbacks to her time before joining the circus.
74
 Being hired for 
Madame Schreck‟s museum of women monsters (Carter 1985, p. 55), Fevvers acts as 
„Angel of Death‟ (Carter 1985, p. 70), as „tombstone angel at the bier of Sleeping 
Beauty stark naked on a marble slab‟ attracting the obsessive masturbatory attention of 
Mr Rosencreutz. As libidinal institutions, closed houses, Ma Nelson‟s Academy and 
Mme Schreck‟s Museum offer transgressive or perverted pleasures, be it those of the 
                                                 
73
 Walser stages a becoming-clown and a becoming-Human Chicken and is thus drawn into the clowns‟ 
assemblage (Carter 1985, pp. 152-3, pp. 175-7, pp. 223-4, p. 236, p. 256); then he performs a becoming-
tigress‟s gigolo (that is a becoming-human lion) and is thus captured by the Mignon-Princess-tigers 
assemblage (Carter 1985, pp. 164-5). Finally, as shaman-apprentice Walser undergoes several stages of 
becoming-animal (bird, bear, stag and idol). 
74
 Fabulating her own life story, turning to her advantage her singularity of having an unusual deformity, 
the freak and „fabulous bird-woman‟ (Carter 1985, p. 15) mesmerises Walser and, despite her coarse 
manners and brash cockney speech, she overwhelms him by her sheer presence. Growing up in a London 
brothel, „[i]n a brothel bred, sir‟ (Carter 1985, p. 22), under the guardianship of her foster-mother Lizzie, 
Fevvers stages „her own tableau vivant from age seven on‟ (Carter 1985, p. 23) as Cupid, the „guardian 
cherub of the house‟ (Carter 1985, p. 23), then at puberty mimicking „Winged Victory‟ (with Ma 
Nelson‟s gilt toy sword) (Carter 1985, p. 25). 
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body or the soul,
75
 pleasures which are guaranteed by simulated timelessness: Ma 
Nelson‟s clock doesn‟t run, it always says midnight or noon; Madame Schreck‟s rituals 
and scenarios take place in the dead of night behind triple-locked gates in subterranean 
spaces. The libidinal destiny of „the only fully-feathered intacta in the entire history of 
the world‟ (Carter 1985, p. 71), while being couched in a dialogical frame and thus 
distanced and parodied, progresses in simulated scenarios which make of Fevvers a 
„Virgin Whore‟ (Carter 1985, p. 55). Either hired out or sold and kidnapped, arriving at 
the appropriately styled gothic mansion of Mr Rosencreutz, Fevvers turns into her own 
simulacrum.
76
 Desire and death are intricably entangled in the scenario: Fevvers 
speculates on the pay (and savours being the provocateur of excitement) while 
Rosencreutz, besotted with her freakishness and corporeal ambiguity, leers after her 
blood. He invokes an incantatory, parodic blend of mythological incarnations, such as 
Flora, Azrael, Venus and Pandemos, Fevvers is to be sacrificed at „the green hinge of 
the year‟, April 30, May Eve (Carter 1985, p. 77), the threshold of spring, so that he 
may gain eternal youth and immortality. Clothed only in her plaits, Fevvers draws her 
magical gilt sword in time to confound him, thus preventing herself from being 
slaughtered by his blade; stark naked, she literally takes flight and escapes to London 
(and into the next station of transformation) where the libidinal agenda intensifies. 
 
In parallel to the first scenario which concludes the libidinal station London – meant to 
entertain and entice Walser‟s imagination – the second seduction scenario set in the 
Russian Grand Duke‟s palace closes the more advanced libidinal station Petersburg – 
now meant to stir Walser‟s jealousy and desirous attraction. Thus the scenario also 
foreshadows with an uncanny sleight of hand the changed milieu of the next station, 
Siberia: the icy milieu of frigidity. It reveals Fevvers‟ still lingering greed (this time for 
                                                 
75
 [Fevvers] „Mr Walser‟ […] You must understand this: Nelson‟s Academy accommodated those who 
were perturbed in their bodies and wished to verify that, however equivocal, however much the cost, the 
pleasures of the flesh were, at bottom, splendid. But, as for Madame Schreck, she catered for those who 
were troubled in their […] souls‟ (Carter 1985, p. 57). 
76
 „“Queen of ambiguities, goddess of in-between states, being on the borderline of species, manifestation 
of Arioriph, Venus, Achamatoph, Sophia.” […] “Lady of the hub of the celestial wheel, creature half of 
earth and half of air, virgin and whore, reconciler of fundament and firmament, reconciler of opposing 
states through the mediation of your ambivalent body, reconciler of the grand opposites of death and life 
[…] when you shall give yourself to me but I shall not possess you”‟ (Carter 1985, p. 81). 
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sets of diamonds), her incurable curiosity, her unlimited, if at times blind libidinal 
daring for which she pays with the loss of her magical gilt sword.
77
 
 
While in the first seduction scenario her inter-species corporeality functions as a 
libidinal lure, in the second seduction scenario her mythic status is tested.
78
 The second 
scenario eventuates in multiply encapsulated and refracted simulacra
79
 and all sensory 
levels are libidinally drawn into the experience.
80
 Although the shared libidinal moves 
are simultaneously actualized on all sensory levels, I shall only follow the spatial shifts 
as they move from the observed and experienced „realistic‟ display of art objects in the 
glass cases to the simulacral phantasm, from the visible descending in scale and 
dimensions to the imperceptible. The scenario glides transversally, and libidinally, from 
the visible display to the imagined simulacral „flicker‟, and vice versa.  Fevvers is 
caught in the cunning evocation of her (assumed) mystery (yolk-hen-egg) but the 
artistic flattery lies in reducing the aerialiste to a miniature: being caught as the 
vanishing point.
81
 To Fevvers‟ alarmed surprise another egg of jade further intrudes into 
her bodily mystery, now exposing her intimate tune: „Only a bird in a gilded cage‟. The 
capture and closing trap further seal her diminution. It is the silver egg which brings 
                                                 
77
 The gilt sword functions as her protective amulet, „her pet talisman‟ (Carter 1985, p. 56), her „mascot‟ 
(Carter 1985, p. 198); yet also as sign of accomplishing flying prowess. 
78
 In a parallel to Helen of Troy, offspring of „Leda and the Swan‟. Zeus approaches Leda in the shape of 
a swan and engenders with her Helen (later of Troy), the most beautiful woman of antiquity which 
launches the war around Troy ending in its destruction and fall. The direct references in Nights in the 
circus to Fevvers‟ status as hatched (Carter 1985, p. 7, p. 8, p. 20, p. 21, p. 28). 
79
 The simulacra are evoked on several spatial planes (marble halls, study, a mezzanine shadowy gallery 
(Carter 1985, pp. 184-6), shifting from the visible to the imperceptible (art objects in glass cases 
descending in scale and dimensions (Carter 1985, pp.187-92).  
80
 The affective-sensory levels (visual, acoustic-auditory, olfactory, gustatory and corporeal-sexual-erotic) 
are foregrounded and make the „persona‟ of Fevvers a body without organs in the sense of acting less as a 
persona than as an affective force field. The affective levels are progressively built up until the simulacral 
ice-sculpture collapses preceding Fevvers‟ „vanishing act‟. The culinary plane: supper of caviar, vodka 
and champagne (Carter 1985, pp. 186-7); the auditory plane: a melting ice-sculpture (Carter 1985, p. 186, 
pp. 188-92), in the form of an effigy of Fevvers with the promised diamond necklace to match the already 
obtained bracelet and the earrings; an automated orchestra in the shape of a music box (Carter 1985, pp. 
197 seq.), and the palpable plane: touching and manipulating each other‟s body parts (Carter 1985, p. 
186, p. 189, p. 190, pp. 191-2) are inter-related and inter-acting and thus turn into an engulfing seduction 
scenario. 
81
 „“My eggs,” said the Grand Duke, “are full of surprises.” […] What inwards things his eggs were! […] 
Inside the yolk, a golden hen. Inside the hen, a golden egg. Now, we have diminished to the scale of 
Lilliput but we have not done yet; inside the egg there is the tiniest of picture-frames, set with minute 
brilliants. And what should the frame contain but a miniature of the aerialiste herself, in full spread as on 
a trapeze and yellow of hair, blue of eye as in life‟ (Carter 1985, p. 189). Parallel proliferations such as 
here the (demonic) collection of eggs (which multiply inwards like Russian dolls) enact and, in a reverse 
act of dismantling, recreate and abolish Fevvers‟s origin, i.e. being hatched not born. In terms of desiring 
practice, this principle of the proliferation of series as playing through a heightened state of intensity, and 
its evaporation, demonstrates the working(s) of a literary machine. 
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about the turnaround in Fevvers from simulacral display – not being a subject but bird-
woman of hatched origin – to awareness of her precarious situation: she must wake up 
to her flying powers – ascend from the anoedipal, molecular unconscious – to catch the 
Trans-Siberian Express.  
 
The egg-shell fell apart into two hollow halves […] out flew the smallest of all possible birds, 
made of red gold. It moved its head from side to side, flapped its wings and opened its beak and 
a shrill sweet warbling came out: „Only a bird in a gilded cage‟. Fevvers gave a start. It finished 
the chorus, folded its wings and the hollow jade closed over again. […] And, here, inside a silver 
egg […] nothing less than a model train – […] with, engraved on the side of each in Cyrillic, the 
legend The Trans-Siberian Express. […] „I‟ll have that one!‟ she cried, reaching in greedily 
(Carter 1985, p. 190-2). 
 
Both seduction scenarios, the Rosencreutz affair of the first station and the Russian 
Grand Duke scenario of the second station embody stages of Fevvers‟ idolization82 and 
demonstrate her libidinal incorruptibility, or – ambiguously and parodically evoked – 
her sexual frigidity.  
 
I turn now to the libidinal trajectory which focuses on the corresponding part of the 
central assemblage of desire, Walser‟s initiation into Clowns Alley, the community of 
clowns, where his process of transformation and becoming takes its first tentative 
steps.
83
 Although Walser is drawn into the clown assembly,
84
 he falls simultaneously 
under the spell of neighbouring (animal-dominated) assemblages, such as Lamarck‟s 
(simian) Educated Apes and the Princess-Mignon-tigers assemblage, both of which 
provide preparatory stages for his later (human-animal shape-shifting) shamanic 
delirium. In parallel to Fevvers‟ nakedness (in the first seduction scenario) as sign of 
exposure, surrender and humiliation, clown Walser is stripped naked by the chimp girl 
                                                 
82
 First she embodies a hybrid-androgynous angel of death, then an ice-sculpture and the progressively 
miniaturized innards of eggs. Fevvers as bird-woman, or woman-bird, is of elusive and undecidable 
gender while correspondingly, Walser as the shadowy „male‟ interest-partner undergoes a process of 
shamanisation (i.e. a process of de-gendering). Both undergo multiple metamorphoses (down to their 
„nakedness‟) which extract them from any form of subjectification. 
83
 „When Walser first put on his make-up, he looked into the mirror and did not recognize himself. As he 
contemplated the stranger peering interrogatively back at him out of the glass, he felt the  beginning of a 
vertiginous sense of freedom that, during all the time he spent with the Colonel, never quite evaporated; 
until that last moment when they parted company and Walser‟s very self, as he had known it, departed 
from him, he experienced the freedom that lies behind the mask, within dissimulation, the freedom to 
juggle with being, and, indeed, with the language which is so vital to our being, that lies at the heart of 
burlesque‟ (Carter 1985, p. 103). 
84
 „The Professor‟s face (who is the leading chimp), grinning like a Cheshire cat, was not six inches from 
Walser‟s own as he popped it (a dunce‟s cap) on. Their eyes met. […] Walser never forgot this first 
intimate exchange with one of these beings whose life ran parallel to his, this inhabitant of the magic 
circle of difference, unreachable […] but not unknowable; this exchange with the speaking eyes of the 
dumb. It was like the clearing of a haze‟ (Carter 1985, p. 108). 
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(with the green hair-ribbon), capped by the Professor with a dunce‟s cap, while the apes 
examine the remains of his tail (Carter 1985, p. 110). He thus becomes an exhibit, an 
object to the animal gaze; the roles of human and animal are reversed.
85
 
 
Walser‟s apprenticeship in Clowns Alley in matters of desire and death is accomplished 
in several steps.
86
 Putting on the clown‟s mask sets him free and creates a separation 
from his encasing self; capped with the (simian) dunce‟s cap and stripped naked further 
bares his restricting old self. His clown‟s apprenticeship under Buffo completes the 
process of draining his former „personality‟. „Buffo the Great, the Master Clown‟ 
(Carter 1985, p. 116) becomes Walser‟s imaginary focus for invoking, and then 
overthrowing, his own human limitation. 
 
This giant is the victim of material objects. Things are against him. They wage war on him. 
When he tries to open a door, the knob comes off in his hand. […] At the climax of his turn, 
everything having collapsed about him as if a grenade exploded it, he starts to deconstruct 
himself. His face becomes contorted by the most hideous grimaces, as if he were trying to shake 
off the very wet white with which it is coated: shake! shake! shake out his teeth, shake off his 
nose, shake away his eyeballs, let all go flying off in a convulsive self-dismemberment. […] 
Silence. […] The lights dim (Carter 1985, p. 116, p. 117). 
 
Buffo‟s convulsive self-dismemberment, the ensuing (mock) funeral,87 being cut down 
to the size of the coffin, and his mysterious Christ-like resurrection, aim at the display 
of dying and death, yet in a schizoid manner simultaneously perform its mockery. 
Buffo‟s life philosophy spells out the ultimate defiance and transgression of human 
existence
88
 which is Walser‟s apprenticeship, foreshadowing his later Shaman 
                                                 
85
 In parallel to Fevvers‟ libidinal trajectory, Walser participates (since the chimp rehearsal is taking place 
simultaneously) but does not experience the ejaculation of the Strong Man copulating with the Ape-
Man‟s woman (Mignon); he becomes his own human parody in paradoxically exclaiming: „What a piece 
of work is man! How noble in reason! How infinite in faculty!‟ (Carter 1985, p. 111). As pointed out, the 
libidinal trajectories of the shifting assemblages of desire are transversally overlaid with a network of 
vocal precursors as connecting axes of sound. Correspondingly, in the libidinal station Siberia, 
responding to the Shaman‟s drumming and his hallucinogenic urine, naked Walser‟s demented voice later 
echoes his earlier insight (declaiming to the oncoming Siberian dawn): „Oh!‟ – „What a piece of work is 
man!‟ (Carter 1985, p. 238). 
86
 „Clown Alley, the generic name of all lodgings of all clowns […] was a place where reigned the 
lugubrious atmosphere of a prison or a madhouse; amongst themselves, the clowns distilled the same kind 
of mutilated patience one finds amongst inmates of closed institutions, a willed and terrible suspension of 
being. At dinner time, the white faces gathered round the table […] possessed the formal lifelessness of 
death masks, as if, in some essential sense, they themselves were absent from the repast and left 
untenanted replicas behind‟ (Carter 1985, p. 116). 
87
 For instance, „The clowns‟ Funeral‟ (Carter 1985, p. 117, p. 174). 
88
 „“We kill ourselves,” said Buffo the Great. […] Despair is the constant companion of the Clown.” […] 
“You must know what you have become, young man, how the word defines you, you have now opted to 
lose your wits in the profession of the clown”‟ (Carter 1985, p. 119-20). There is a paragraph (as speaking 
silence) between Buffo‟s two utterances. 
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existence. Suspension of being, halting of life, convulsive bodily dismemberment, 
multiple self-annihilation and – as final reward – madness, shaking off reason and wit 
but gaining access to an anoedipal unconscious, are the initial lessons for Walser‟s 
libidinal destiny. 
 
The next lesson simulates death‟s other face, Eros, procreation in dance, obscenity and 
parodied sexuality. Since the clowns are self-creating, self-generating, they are perfect 
simulacra of themselves; a lesson Walser learns in time when watching the dance of the 
clowns by Grik and Grok, the musical twins, another pair of clown-philosophers.
89
 
Copulation and castration are inter-mixed in that the dance ends in a multiplication of 
phalluses, thus exposing corporeality but at the same time ridiculing and disarming the 
obscenity through childlike pranks. It is a dance of potential disintegration; yet at the 
same time a celebratory, performed madness provides the licence to transgress and 
defeat all limitations. Clowns Alley lets Walser experience mimed obscenity while he 
has no active libidinal part in it. Once Walser has been inwardly prepared for accepting 
public humiliation in front of a merciless audience, his outer transformation into 
embodying the Human Chicken (Carter 1985, p. 152) takes place.
90
 As becomes 
obvious in the third libidinal station (Siberia) during Walser‟s shamanic delirium, he 
internalizes these „features‟ which become part of his new in-human („crowing‟), 
delirious, schizoid embodiment.     
 
The libidinal trajectories in Nights at the circus overlap and form a multi-faceted 
complex machine of multiple assemblages of desire.
91
 Walser provokes disequilibrium: 
he is being served as Human Chicken for the Clowns‟ Christmas Dinner (Petersburg S4; 
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 „It was a bergomask, or dance of the buffoons […] What beastly, obscene violence they mimed! […] It 
seemed as if they were dancing the room apart. […] Dance of disintregration; and of regresssion; 
celebration of the primal slime‟ (Carter 1985, pp. 122-5). 
90
 Walser is battered with foul eggs, the egg liquor running down his face blinding him; he wears a 
cockscomb and learns to crow: cock-a-doodle-do, cock-a-doodle-dooski. Carter draws here on Heinrich 
Mann‟s novel Professor Unrath, the source of The Blue Angel (with Marlene Dietrich as Lola and Emil 
Jannings as former professor and rooster): the Professor learns to crow for her show. 
91
 Walser is enticed into the Princess-Mignon-tigers assemblage and waltzes with the tigress whose mate 
is taken by Mignon with the Princess performing at the grand stand. „[…] Walser […] thought: there goes 
Beauty and the Beast. Then, looking into the tigress‟s depthless, jewelled eyes, he saw reflected there the 
entire alien essence of a world of fur, sinew and grace in which he was the clumsy interloper and, the 
tigress steered his bedazzlement once more round the Princess‟s white piano, he allowed himself to think 
as the tigers would have done: […] Here comes the Beast, and the Beauty! […] while the dance lasted, 
they lived in perfect harmony‟ (Carter 1985, pp. 164-5). He (unintentionally) provokes through his later 
absence (out of dread?) the disintegration of the assemblage (resulting in the aggression of the tigress who 
is being shot to save Mignon). 
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Carter 1985, p. 117 and S10; Carter 1985, pp. 175-7) and thus drawn into the mayhem 
leading to Buffo‟s descent into madness.92 The simulacral strand of madness does not 
end in the second libidinal station (Petersburg); the dance of death, performed by the 
remnant of the clowns‟ group and their dogs, turns into a dance of chaos and 
annihilation in the third libidinal station (Siberia). 
 
This dance was the dance of death […] They danced it for the wretched of the earth, that they 
might witness their own wretchedness. They danced the dance of the outcasts for the outcasts 
who watched them, amid the louring [sic] trees, with a blizzard coming on. […] When we saw 
those cheerless arabesques as of the damned, and heard the laughter of those trapped in the 
circles of hell, Liz and I held hands, for comfort (Carter 1985, pp. 242-3).  
 
A corresponding transversal connectivity is established between the libidinal trajectories 
in that the Princess-Mignon assembly re-calls the tigers (now natives sitting in for 
tamed ones) who spread out on the roof in simulacral terms (for Fevvers‟ party 
returning from the river), in shamanic terms (for Walser‟s party appearing on reindeers), 
and in experiential terms (for the Princess and Mignon).
93
 The events in the third 
libidinal station (Siberia) are marked by the timelessness and endlessness of the white 
and frozen expanse, ice and snow evoking appearances and dis-appearances of a 
different kind which are framed as shamanic, illusory, and simulacral. Accordingly, the 
assemblages of desire are under the symptomatological spell of the milieu and the 
rhythm of nature. 
In focusing on the function of the libidinal across the stations or scenarios of 
transformation, the bi-directional process of re- and pro-gression in its acausality and 
atemporality comes to the fore. I read the libidinal as (anoedipal, freed) desiring and 
                                                 
92
 „And now Buffo, in his delirium, began to shake, to shake and shiver most horribly, to most horribly 
grimace and to convulse himself in such a way that his immense form seemed to be everywhere at once, 
dissolving into a dozen Buffos, armed with a dozen murderous knives all streaming rags of blood, and 
leap and tumble as he might, Walser could find no place in the ring where Buffo was not and gave up 
hope for himself‟ (Carter 1985, pp. 177-8). 
93
 „We saw the house was roofed with tigers. Authentic, fearfully symmetric tigers burning as brightly as 
those who had been lost. These were the native tigers of the place, who had never known either 
confinement or coercion; they had not come to the Princess for any taming, as far as I could see, although 
they stretched out across the tiles liked abandoned greatcoat, laid low by pleasure, and you could see how 
the tails that dropped down over the eaves like icicles of fur were throbbing with marvellous sympathy. 
Their eyes, gold as the background to a holy picture, had summoned up the sun that glazed their pelts 
until they looked unutterably precious. […] Under that unseasonably sun, or under the influence of the 
voice and the piano, all the wilderness was stirring as if with new life‟ (Carter 1985, pp. 249-50). Carter‟s 
texts contain many classical (literary) references (here to Blake‟s „Tigers burning bright‟) which I cannot 
enter into in the frame of this exploration. 
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propelling force, as (schizoanalytic) changing and becoming intent and as (serialized) 
connecting force in assemblages of desire. The sheer complexity of transformations, the 
multiplicity of assemblages of desire and their over-arching serialization exemplify 
Carter‟s experimental, schizoanalytically programmatic composition and style. I draw 
away from considerations of textual progression in Nights at the circus in the sense of 
the episodic and the picaresque since there is no progression beside the processes of 
assembling, dis-sembling and re-assembling. 
 
In contrast, focusing on the extended range of transformations and metamorphoses 
within the multiple assemblages of desire, thus adhering to the principles of differential 
desiring practice as set out, a way is opened into the affective network between the 
assemblages of desire and their parallel (as well as divergent) responses. My focus is on 
the function of the libidinal and I thus attend to the bi-directional process of re- and pro-
gression which is positioned in the a-representational mode of differential desiring 
practice (thereby not emphasizing time, plot and narrative, and characters within the 
textual confinement of the representational mode). There are no characters in the sense 
of subjects outside the assemblages of desire within which they acquire their status and 
degree of becoming. Enacting differential desiring practice performs an aesthetic shift 
from an interpretative to a processual level which allows the exploration of the libidinal 
complexities of assemblages and dis-assemblages of desire on the compositional plane 
as literary serialization. 
 
Overall, then, in terms of my schizoanalytic and a-representational positioning, I 
observe that the processes of event and becoming in Nights at the circus eventuate 
symptomatologically and experientially, with regard to changing milieus and bodies, 
throughout the composition. Focusing strategically on the symptomatological and the 
experiential overcomes the limitations of a fictional reading concerned with 
representational intrigues which in terms of differential desiring practice only deals with 
the textual effects of libidinal phantasm and neglects the affective network within multi-
perspectival and polyvocal assemblages of desire (chapter five). In deploying the 
parameters of a-representational aesthetics I re-align narrative scaffolding and episodic 
referentiality as (minor) part of differential serialization and picaresque subjectification 
as (minor) part of ephemeral larval selves in the process of becoming within the 
assemblages of desire. While I propose a memory structure as distancing framing device 
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for the previous texts, The passion of the new Eve and The infernal desire machines of 
Doctor Hoffman, which allows for multiple refractions and responses between the 
actualized events and processes (evoked present, recalled past, projected future), for 
Nights at the circus I propose differential serialization since the circus-thematic of 
(human) rationality versus (human and animal) madness, of (human) gravity versus 
(human and animal) „flight‟ runs through the full array of assemblages of desire. 
However, I consider the compositional modes, both a-temporal memory structure and 
differential serialization, as fractal and dissociative techniques of schizodicity within 
differential desiring practice. In The infernal desire machines of Doctor Hoffman the 
simulacral planes perpetually interact and the scenarios encapsulate and produce each 
other in a fractal manner resulting in moments of pure duration and a collapse of 
temporal and causal structures. In contrast to such a system of encapsulated phantasms, 
the libidinal processes of assembling, dis-sembling and re-assembling of multiple 
assemblages of desire in Nights at the circus embrace inter-species processes of 
becoming and demonstrate – in the sense Deleuze-Guattari observe the bi-directional 
status of animals-humans in Kafka‟s works – perpetual fluidity. 
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Conclusion 
 
This thesis theorizes and develops a critical practice, and demonstrates its creativity and 
usefulness, while concomitantly pursuing a re-appraisal of Deleuze-Guattari‟s 
schizoanalytic and Deleuze‟s differential projects. Through developing what I term a 
differential desiring practice this re-appraisal becomes possible which then opens a path 
into a Deleuze inspired literary discourse. The re-appraisal allows the practice to be 
further unfolded beyond the minor/minoritarian, semiotic and critical-clinical 
approaches that currently exist as singular, and unrelated, types of literary analysis in 
the Deleuzian field. Differential desiring practice as presented in this thesis establishes 
an integrated approach in that it sets up the critical frame for a Deleuze inspired literary 
discourse which has not yet been approached and provides practical critical tools for its 
enactment while demonstrating its usefulness and creativity. 
 
The problematic of a Deleuzian literary critique that the thesis unfolds leads in the first 
instance into Deleuze-Guattari‟s schizoanalytic project as presented in Anti-Oedipus and 
A thousand plateaus. However, my parallel and investigative pursuit of a differential 
perspective anchored in Deleuze‟s work, namely Difference and repetition and The 
logic of sense, leads to repositioning the hermeneutic frame and opens the way to a 
more complex and integrative theorization of my critical practice than the 
schizoanalytic frame alone allows. My initial schizoanalytic examination of the 
possibility of a critical practice dealing with resisting texts accesses the programmatic 
notion of an anoedipal, molecular unconscious which I theorize in terms of a libidinal 
theory. My differential perspective examines the relations between subject and time in 
Deleuze‟s Difference and repetition and the process of the actualization of the event as 
presented in Deleuze‟s The logic of sense, thus enlarging and consolidating the 
theoretical and practical scope of the literary critique. 
 
My enquiry into a Deleuze inspired literary discourse and my parallel development of a 
critical practice leads to my double-pronged achievement: to establish an apparatus of a 
literary critique built on – and grounded in – a libidinal and differential construct which 
can creatively and productively handle texts which resist representational interpretative 
practices and, secondly, through practising the critical apparatus in challenging literary 
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texts to demonstrate that the original premises and principles – thematic and stylistic 
schizodicity and discursive dissociation – hold. 
 
The concomitant pursuit of discursive principles of dissociation and practical exegesis 
thus elaborates the conditions under which literary texts – in contrast to interpretative 
practises – can be read schizoanalytically, that is libidinally and affectively, as well as 
differentially and in this manner gauges the a-presentational features of resisting literary 
texts. These conditions take the form of triangular schizoanalytic machines of 
unconscious, desire and becoming which are textually and stylistically enacted as 
literary machines. The fusion of schizoanalytic and differential approaches allows the 
conceiving of more complex schizoid principles – excess, paradox and errancy – than 
each approach on its own could provide, and thus the theorizing and practising of a 
literary critical apparatus, such as thematic dissolution, compositional disparity and 
parodic and simulacral style which can handle liminal and perplexing texts. 
 
By mapping the aspects and modes of differential desiring practice, the thesis practises 
simulacral techniques and a serialization of phantasms deployed in literary texts as a-
representational critical tools. This exploration of the conditions of my reading practice 
is anchored in Deleuze‟s critique of representation which sustains the shift of the 
hermeneutic frame to the differential, that is to the reflections on the relations between 
time and subject and the process of actualization of the event. My exploration redraws 
the initial focus of Deleuze-Guattari‟s schizoanalytic project in that the three syntheses 
of the unconscious are equated with the three syntheses of time. 
 
The differential mode demonstrates (as explicated in my concluding practice in Duras 
and Carter) that the literary can be wielded as a critical tool for breaking linguistic and 
imaginative boundaries, in particular, in developing simulacral techniques. The 
schizoanalytic mode demonstrates that its programmatic demand – the curettage of the 
unconscious – can be used on an affective and libidinal level for experimenting with 
visionary (and utopian) notions of becoming. As I show, the symptomatological model 
of the critical-clinical opens toward the strands of schizoid processes of discursive 
dissociation while differential desiring practice achieves their integration. 
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What presents itself at the beginning as a schizoanalytically inflected practice of literary 
critique evolves under the differential rethinking into a literary discourse, stretching 
literary analysis to its limits and leaving it behind. Schizoanalytic curettage of the 
unconscious and ensuing de-oedipalization outgrow the literary deployment of 
symptomatological embodiment in the sense of making the body, and the text, speak. 
The affective and libidinal modes support the critical-clinical approach but in 
differential desiring practice, as I practice it in this thesis, affectivity becomes a 
discursive regime.  
 
Differential desiring practice, as presented in this thesis in the form of a literary critique 
and a literary practice, unfolds the notion of schizodicity as the critical key to 
understanding the a-representational nature of resisting literary texts. The a-
representational mode of schizodicity – dispersion and absence of the subject in an 
infinite unfolding of the core event – deployed in the Deleuzian enactment and 
actualization of the event functions as a critical tool of differential desiring practice in 
that it is set against representational practices. The different degrees of schizoid 
processes of discursive dissociation which I propose in the thesis – dismantling, 
serialization, libidinal machines – reflect this mode of schizodicity on the textual and 
stylistic levels. Body/text surfaces and their intensities on the affective level, 
transversality and serialization on the compositional level and simulacral becomings – 
Deleuzian incorporeal transformations – on the stylistic level make up the critical 
apparatus of differential desiring practice. 
 
The thesis takes resisting literary texts through the stages of serialized phantasm and 
observes the instantiations of always different literary machines – Kafka-, Proust-, 
Masoch-, Beckett-, Duras-, Carter-machine(s) – which eschew representational 
practices such as subjectification of characters and narrative constructs, and establishes, 
since it works a-representationally, a literary metacritique. Differential desiring practice 
thus opens a path into a Deleuze inspired literary discourse which moves beyond 
literary practice in fulfilling both the schizoanalytic demand for programmatic change 
and the differential charge for the creation of the always new. 
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Overall, what is most promising about this thesis is that it decisively moves away from 
any existing literary critique in that it severs a conceptually guided Deleuzian 
framework ‒ which constrains the analysis and critique representationally ‒ while my 
Deleuze inspired literary discourse takes the Deleuzian frame as a starting point but then 
engages in a dialogical manner, discursively, with its conditions and its critical 
apparatus. As I have shown and demonstrated in the practice this enables a new and 
productive engagement with recalcitrant texts. In particular, two openings ‒ in the 
Deleuzian vein ‒ made in this thesis, the literary deployment in the Deleuzian vein of 
libidinal symptomatology and of simulacrum and phantasm as differential serialization 
warrant further exploration.   
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